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AFRICA GOVERNANCE FORUM (AGF II)
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
IN AFRICA A CONCEPT PAPER
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION
II. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY: A THEMATIC OVERVIEW
2.1 What do "accountability" and "transparency" mean?
2.2 What are the dimensions of public accountability?
2.3 What is the relationship among accountability, transparency and good governance?
2.4 What is the relationship between political and financial accountability on the one hand and socio-economic development on the other?
2.5 What happens when accountability and transparency break down throughout a system?
III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN ACTION: PRACTICES AND ISSUES IN AFRICA
3.1 What structures, processes and practices of accountability exist in Africa?.
3.2 What are the fundamental elements of a national accountability and transparency institutional framework and programme?
3.3 What role can external partners play in promoting and sustaining accountability and transparency in Africa?
IV. CONCLUSION: NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND COMMITMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the United Nations System-wide Special Initiative on Africa (UNSIA), launched in 1996, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are mandated to lead consultations on governance, to organize co-ordinated and collaborative programmes for implementation, and to mobilize resources and political support for good governance.
At the First Annual Africa Governance Forum (AGF I), which took place in Addis Ababa from 11-12 July 1997, participants agreed to pursue collaborative and coordinated programmes in support of good governance and to organize such a Forum annually. These Forums would, inter alia, discuss best practices in various areas of good governance through consultations among African governments, international partners and civil society oganizations; and report and discuss the status of ongoing governance programmes.
AGF I generated debate on a wide range of programmes that reflect key areas of governance in Africa. These include leadership building; transparency and accountability; civil society empowerment, institutions of political transition; and peace and stability. Discussion during AGF I, as well as in post-Forum consultations, emphasized the need to focus AGF II on a single priority area of governance so as to have significant impact on the tenor of debate and the scope of national programmes presented for support. Further, it was agreed that "Accountability and Transparency" would be the sole agenda item for the Second Annual Africa Governance Forum. AGF II has been made possible from the support of the governments of Norway and Switzerland and the European Commission.
The Concept Paper that follows poses a number of key questions that inhere in this pivotal theme, examining relevant practices, processes and methodologies applied by African governments in their striving for accountability and transparency. It offers an operational definition of the concept in accordance with United Nations decisions and resolutions. It also provides an exposition of critical issues, institutions and processes that underpin the performance of governments in their management of public affairs and in their relationship to other segments of national society, as well as external actors, both public and private. More specifically, the paper analyses the functional relationship between political and financial accountability in governance on the one hand and, on the other, economic and social development. Additionally, the document sets out elements of a framework and programme for national accountability and transparency that may be adapted, as appropriate, to specific national situations. Finally, it shows how these elements may relate to changing the attitudes and practices of external players, such as multilateral and bilateral donors, international development agencies, non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations.
II ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY: A THEMATIC REVIEW
2.1. What do "accountability" and "transparency" mean?
Simply put, accountability is the obligation to render an account for a responsibility that has been conferred. It means that those individuals and organizations charged with the performance of particular actions or activities are held responsible. This responsibility is judged or measured in terms of clearly articulated codes of conduct.
Transparency or openness means:
the ready, unobstructed access to, and availability of data and information from public as well as private sources that is accurate, timely, relevant and comprehensive.
tolerance for public debate, public scrutiny and public questioning of political, economic and social policy choices.
2.2. What are the dimensions of public accountability?
Public accountability has a number of dimensions including the following key elements:
Political accountability: This means making authorities answer to the people for actions they take or fail to take in discharging their official duties. Observance of the Constitution is an important test of political accountability under a system of democratic governance. Checks and balances are a potent mechanism for guarding against abuse of power. The Constitution is in essence a solemn pact between the people and the State, which provides the basic foundations for the legitimacy of government and the people’s rights to demand a clear, straightforward report of what the government has done in carrying out the responsibilities conferred on it by the citizens at large. Fair, competitive and free elections that provide the possibility of changing governments offer one means of enforcing political accountability. Elections also foster broad-based and mass participation in this rendering of a comprehensive account.
Administrative accountability: This refers to the vertical reporting relationships that inhere in classical administrative structures of governance, usually known as the bureaucracy or the civil service. Clear definitions of norms, rules, roles and responsibilities -- the division of labour -- provide yardsticks against which to gauge administrative performance. The armed forces constitute a significant and special component of the governance structure. They, too, must be held accountable to civilian authority that is constitutionally established and politically legitimate.
These accountability systems at the macro level may be complemented by mechanisms and institutions at the micro level through decentralizing government, enhancing competition and fostering participatory arrangements that promote horizontal accountability to interest groups, users’ associations and other forms of civil society and community-based organizations.
Developing action models for monitoring and evaluation helps to institutionalize input for accountability, the process by which it is carried out and the transparency of the outcome over and above the usual heavy bureaucratic reliance on written rules, standard operating procedures and accepted routines.
Financial and budgetary accountability: This dimension of accountability refers to the ability to account for the allocation, use and control of public monies and public assets and properties from beginning to end in accordance with legally mandated and/or professionally accepted rules, principles and practices for each phase of the monitoring process through the final audit.
2.3 What is the relationship among accountability, transparency and good governance?
Accountability and transparency strengthen the legitimacy of government, public officials and their policies and decisions in the eyes of the people. They contribute to giving individuals and groups the sense that they as citizens are truly in charge of their government.
Dispute between individuals, organizations, classes, and regional or ethnic groups often break out over issues of the distribution of power and wealth. In many African countries, the public sector and the government still pervade economic and social matters, quite often including the production and delivery of economic and social goods and services. In such a context, political power is an important channel for accessing and controlling economic and social resources. Political competition between individuals or groups is more likely to become or to remain orderly and peaceful when the allocation of budgetary resources is made in an open and accountable manner. The same holds true for the process of choosing among economic and social options.
Full, pro-active and honest disclosure of temporary economic setbacks and financial difficulties strengthens public understanding and patience, thereby protecting the democratic process against demagoguery and other forces likely to undermine democratic governance.
A transparent electoral process increases the likelihood that election results will be readily accepted by all competing parties. It thus leads to more stable government. Efficient or effective government will depend on the institutions, quality and substance of governance. And this in turn will depend on the competence, integrity, honesty, legitimacy, and accountability of those who govern.
2.4 What is the relationship between political and financial accountability, on the one hand, and socio-economic development, on the other?
The interests of the people are more likely to influence a government’s agenda and decisions where political and financial accountability exist than where they are absent - simply because economic, financial and social resources of the country are more likely to be allocated in the most economically efficient, socially beneficial and environmentally friendly manner. The poor, including such underprivileged groups as rural women, can exercise greater leverage on public policy and budgetary choices as political accountability expands beyond urban-based elite circles.
At the micro-accountability level, development programmes and projects, as well as government agencies, are more likely to respond to the public interest and more likely to monitor the quality and timeliness of their performance where their beneficiaries and stakeholders have mechanisms through which to make their voices heard.
Financial accountability reinforces the trust and confidence of both the national taxpayer and the external aid donor, thereby creating a climate for better revenue collection and therefore higher overall resources for the development process, as well greater external moral and material support.
Economic reforms are more likely to be regarded as legitimate and therefore easier and faster to implement, politically and socially, if there is full confidence that the adjustment process is transparent and that both public and private office holders meet the highest standards of accountability for inputs, the process itself, and its results.
A well-paid, efficient and highly motivated civil service is indispensable for sound public policy-making and implementation. Lack of administrative accountability renders technical expertise ineffective and unrewarding; at the same time, it corrodes the moral backbone of public administration. A corrupt bureaucracy undermines the effectiveness of democratic institutions and overburdens the private sector. Petty corruption, for instance by the police or customs officials, can be as damaging to the legitimacy of democracy as grand corruption.
2.5 What happens when accountability and transparency break down throughout a system?
A world-wide phenomenon, corruption generally refers to the abuse of public office for private gain. It is worth noting, however, that the private sector is far from immune to corruption. Moreover, much corrupt activity, both within and between countries (frontier corruption), occurs at the interface between the public and the private sector. Corruption does not necessarily involve money or in-kind payments; nepotism -- favouritism shown to friends or relatives in conferring privilege -- is one of the most common forms of corruption.
Several theories have been advanced to explain or, at times, justify corruption. Economists emphasize outright measurable profiteering behaviour through a variety of mechanisms, one being the principal-agent-client model, another, the "arms-length principle". Some theories point to contextual factors, including culture and social values, conflicting signals and loyalties arising from societies undergoing significant transitions, whether economic, political or socio-psychological -- often all at the same time. Other theories use individual and psychological variables as predictors of corruption and corrupt behaviour.
Corruption entails a number of categories of costs to society, among them: losses in economic efficiency, distortions of incentives and distribution, loss of political legitimacy by government institutions, dilution of the work ethic and damage to the moral fabric of society.
Fighting corruption is not a simple proposition. First, the optimum level of corruption may not be zero. Patronage, for example, exists to some degree in all democracies, notably after a general election, and is not necessarily an evil. Often, it helps consolidate hard-won gains, especially after a fundamental transition from one system of governance to another, giving recognition and responsibility to significant actors in the change process who might not otherwise participate in the new political order. While a multitude of solutions and measures may be combined in anti-corruption policy and programme packages, the exact mix and effectiveness of each will vary with individual country or sector circumstances. From a general public policy point of view, it is worth recalling that corruption tends to increase with monopoly and discretionary power, but correlates negatively with accountability.
Any policy package to fight corruption must include a two-pronged strategy:
a) economic and social reforms;
b) building and strengthening institutions and institutional capacity.
Institutional capacity-building to tackle corruption requires:
a) strengthening civil society and the mass media, through multiplying the mechanisms available to voice public opinion;
b) strengthening government watchdog agencies, such as the Offices of the Inspector General, Comptroller/Auditor General, and Mediator/Ombudsman. Measures need to be taken to ensure that these offices have adequate human, financial and logistical resources (both quantitative and qualitative), appropriate work procedures and investigative powers, and adequate independence.
c) strengthening the agencies and departments in charge of the electoral processes, so as to safeguarding the integrity and credibility of elections and of democracy itself.
Political will is critical to the effectiveness of any anti-corruption measures. However, in itself, political will does not suffice. It must be supported by appropriate institutions. The national and local leadership must also be seen to be honest and determined to weed out corruption. One issue is whether to focus "on revamping the system" or " catching individual culprits". The ultimate objective is to dismantle any system of incentives that entices individuals, groups or organizations into corruption.
III ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN ACTION:
Practices and issues in africa
There is nothing intrinsic about African cultures that predisposes the continent to corruption or creates a vacuum of transparency and accountability. However, corruption and lack of accountability can create enormous damage in Africa --economic, social and psychological -- as the continent adopts economic and political reform measures to democratize and to benefit from globalization.
Since the early years of independence, notably over the last decade or so, African countries have made significant efforts to put in place, maintain, and nurture systems, structures, processes and practices to uphold accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs. They have also sought to guard themselves against both petty and grand corruption. Given Africa’s diversity - including differences in such factors as political systems, emergence from situations of civil war, urban/rural balance, functional and legal literacy and development of communication networks - the record is a mixed one. But, reform efforts at the national level, coupled with the strength of civil society organizations (many of them traditional) at the local level, provide ample ground for optimism. Each country, at its own pace and within its particular circumstances, taking advantage of experiences throughout the region at various levels, will seek home-grown answers to some of the issues discussed below:
3.1 What structures, processes and practices of accountability exist in Africa?
Constitutions
Constitutions in virtually all African countries provide for the establishment and maintenance of accountability and transparency systems. It is the manner in which these systems have performed that has posed problems. This has to do with the absence of supportive mechanisms, civil society organizations that are not active or are hindered from being active politically, the lack of political will, the tenacity of the one-party state culture, and the inertia in consolidating political leadership geared to the exigencies of a new kind of state-building.
In most African countries, the constitution contains eloquent proclamations of aspirations and intentions, often articulated in foreign forms that have yet to mobilize the political will for action and adjudication. To become operational and meaningful as foundations for governance, accountability and transparency, constitutions in Africa have to be "indigenized" -- owned by Africans -- to reflect their own historical experiences, needs and aspirations. The majority of citizens in African countries, especially in rural areas and in city slums, tend to perceive the constitution as an esoteric document whose content and purpose can be understood only by the rich, powerful and literate urban-based elites. Accountability and transparency remain mysterious concepts beyond the local level.
Yet it is at the local, often traditional level that the greatest promise may lie wherever formal "modern" governance can create a functional interface with grassroots structures, many of them centuries old. In Botswana, the Kgotla, the country’s traditional local assembly, has become a mechanism for public consultation through which citizens can debate and reject government initiatives. Mali has instituted a Forum for Democratic Questioning in which voters can directly call cabinet ministers to account in public before an honorary mock jury ; this type of public hearing draws heavily on a form used by the Emperor for the regular airing of his subjects’ grievances.
Elections
Of the 45 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, 37 conducted presidential and/or parliamentary elections between 1989 and 1997. Of these, 14 have used proportional representation and an additional 5 a system of semi-proportional representation. In 17 states, results have been determined on the basis of plurality and in 8 by majority vote. Constitutionally mandated limitations on the number of terms any one person may serve are designed to put an end to the entrenchment of "presidents-for-life" and other instances of unwarranted clinging to office.
However, while elections are clearly a better mechanism than coup d’etats to access power, the electoral experience of many African countries over the last few years has been characterized by post-election disputes. Although ad hoc commissions -- with more or less independence and autonomy - have been created in many countries, there is a clear and distinct risk that, far from fostering transparency and accountability, elections may complicate their emergence.
On all sides of the political arena -- and in the absence of other avenues for social mobility, economic self-advancement and prestige in the modern sector -- the main drive may be to capture or cling to the state apparatus itself, particularly where elections are perceived to be a "winner-takes-all" contest. Under such circumstances, democratic multi-party elections may degenerate into corruption-prone processes in which the vast majority of the electorate -- illiterate, poor, and above all, traditionally unaccustomed to challenging the powers that be -- is politically disenfranchised and reduced to no more than "voting materials", ballots to be bought and ignored until the next electoral campaign. In this context, political parties may need to be reviewed in terms of their role as vehicles for achieving political power, as well as their functions in civic education and policy debate. There is also the issue of funding for political parties and, indeed, the entire electoral process, their sources and how they are accessed and monitored.
Parliaments
Parliaments are designed to serve as institutions through which elected representatives of the people act as watchdogs on government behaviour and performance between elections, so as to make sure that the needs and interests of the people are best served. In particular, through their Finance and Budget Committees (in some countries, Ways and Means Committees), Parliaments ensure that budgetary choices and economic and social policies lead to a pattern of allocation of scarce resources -- economic, financial and otherwise -- that is clearly in the public interest. Public hearings on the budget and other instruments of economic and social policy-making and programming should provide sufficient transparency to pressure the government to make accountability a visible reality. Voting -- or refusing to vote -- the budget on an annual basis, taking into account the government’s budgetary performance during the previous fiscal year, can thus be a legitimate and concrete mechanism for ensuring government accountability. This process is facilitated if the Court or Chamber of Accounts presents the Parliament with a detailed report on budgetary execution.
In many countries, the Constitution empowers the Parliament to bring down the entire Cabinet by a vote of no-confidence - either on the general programme of the government, on a specific policy or piece of legislation, or on some action or activity of the government that members deem contrary to the general welfare of the people. In Ghana, where Parliament again became an active governance organ only in 1992, a recent national governance workshop focused in particular on the role of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive and the needs of new MPs unfamiliar with the workings of a pro-active parliamentary system.
A few African countries have constitutional provisions whereby a sitting President may be impeached if members of Parliament determine that he/she has violated the Constitution. Some countries have established a special High Court of Justice to try the Head of State on charges of high treason, and Cabinet Ministers for criminal offences committed while in office. However valuable as ultimate safeguards, such provisions are rarely invoked in countries whose constitutions allow members of Parliament to summon the President and/or the Prime Minister or any Cabinet Minister before the National Assembly to provide written or oral responses to questions and queries of public concern. In Madagascar, the Prime Minister and all Cabinet Ministers appear before the full National Assembly on live radio and television to report on their annual activities, their performance and the results. Their individual presentations are followed by a tough question-and-answer session.
Many Parliaments in Africa lack the political motivation and incentives to challenge the incumbent government or its policies, programmes and budget submissions. Voting rules ("winner- takes- all") often result in a lopsided ruling majority that carefully guards information concerning its internal workings and other matters from minority scrutiny. Parliaments also need the technical and institutional capacity to question the wisdom, soundness or effectiveness of a government’s actions, policies, budgets and legislative programme. In addition, as in many long-established democracies, general mistrust between "outsiders" and "politicians" slows the creation of an environment for holding public hearings in which experts in various walks of life can give advice stemming from their "hands-on" experience or professional expertise on a particular piece of legislation or a given public policy issue.
Parliamentarians need adequate and reliable information to debate and to make decisions, as well as supportive material infrastructure, including a library and other research facilities, along with modern information systems. There is also a strong need for a two-way communication between citizens and their representatives. In Mozambique, the imperatives of consolidating peace have given rise to a trust-building process of informal grassroots consultations, known as concertacao, in which citizens are encouraged to present their views and ideas that can be developed into laws through the formal channels established by the Constitution.
The Judiciary
An independent Judiciary is designed not only to uphold the rule of law and due process of law, but also to make sure that all public officials stand trial if their actions or activities violate the law of the land. Special Constitutional Courts have been created in some countries, with the objectives of ascertaining that bills submitted to Parliament and enacted as laws fully conform to the Constitution. More generally, there are Supreme Courts entrusted with the task of making sure that government decrees and actions do not violate the law.
Administrative tribunals serve as a recourse for citizens against damages inflicted by government decisions and activities. Courts of Accounts (or, more frequently Chambers or Sections of Accounts within Supreme Courts) pass judgement on government budgetary execution and the activities of public accountants, so as to assess whether the national budget has been implemented in accordance with parliamentary authorization and in full compliance with legally mandated public accounting rules and procedures. Unfortunately, these verdicts by the Court of Account are seldom issued on time and do not receive the ample public exposure that they merit. These Courts of Accounts are sometimes complemented by Courts of Budgetary Discipline. In a few countries, Offices of Mediator or Ombudsman have been established with non-binding authority to address violations of human rights and other grievances that citizens may have against public agencies.
The independence of the Judiciary in many African countries is constitutionally guaranteed under the principle of the separation of powers. Nonetheless, magistrates in nearly all African countries are civil servants whose appointments and other career prospects depend on the Executive. Moreover, few magistrates have been trained in financial management. Other factors also contribute to loss of confidence in the judicial system, among them: lack of predictability, physical distance between tribunals and the vast majority of citizens, and the huge financial costs of litigation.
African countries have written laws and regulations with penalties of varying severity for embezzlement of public moneys and other property, as well as bribery and other types of corruption, especially profiteering. In many cases, the Constitution provides for disclosure of assets by the Head of State and Cabinet Ministers and updates of their personal financial records. Moreover, these high-level officials may not be involved in public procurement activities. Both penalties and disclosure procedures should be expanded for application to all civil servants in both central and local governments. In Mauritius, an administrative action may be the subject of judicial review and the Ombudsman has wide constitutional powers to enquire into administrtative malpractices.
The Mass Media
Government monopoly of newspapers, magazines and other print media has tended to be widespread on the African continent. With the advent of multi-party democracy, privately owned and privately managed news outlets, including radio and, in a few countries, television, have substantially revolutionized mass communications.
Clearly, the mass media, including the state-owned news organs at times, act as a watchdog on government and exert a dissuasive influence on illegal, unethical, wasteful and otherwise harmful activities of public officials. Public opinion, both at election time and during the interim periods, has incrementally become a force to be reckoned with, thus contributing to enhanced transparency and a heightened sense of accountability on the part of public officials.
Although severe libel laws constrain the risk-taking behaviour of the mass media, some African countries remain uneasy about making room for private television or private radio stations. Even where private mass communications organs exist, their independence may be an issue; often, as elsewhere throughout the world, they are subject in varying degrees to manipulation by powerful political and financial mentors. Nonetheless, one of the nine "strategic directions" of Malawi’s National Democracy Consolidation Programme concerns the media and includes the establishment of independent rural local-language newspapers and radio stations, along with the formulation of a Freedom of Information Act.
Civil Society
Civil society organizations, such as human rights committees of various kinds, act as watchdogs and whistle-blowers over violations of human rights and abuses of power by elected or appointed officials. Although in many African countries, NGOs and community-based associations seek funding for various programmes and projects that benefit their members, few of them have been created explicitly to act as watchdogs on corruption, illegal or immoral public behaviour, inefficiency in carrying out of public programmes and projects, or openness in public policy formulation and implementation. Labour unions sometimes become active players in enhancing accountability and transparency in economic management. While civil society organizations can play a very useful role in the observation of human rights and ensuring accountability and transparency, many are too localized and too dependent on external support. They are also regarded with suspicion by governments and political parties, which tend to perceive them as inherent enemies rather than potential partners in making democratic governance in Africa effective and efficient.
The role of civil society organizations and creating networks among them to reinforce their existing strengths calls for careful study. In Cape Verde, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, and Zambia, for instance, the National Long-Term Perspectives Studies programmes have been used to solicit ideas from civic organizations and associations for defining national goals and mapping pathways to reach them. In South Africa, where many civil society groups lost financing after the transition or lost skilled personnel to new government structures, the national authorities have created a long-term mechanism, the National Development Agency, to fund and otherwise assist civil society organizations.
The Private Sector
Chambers of commerce and professional business associations are becoming increasingly vocal and assertive in making the voice of the business community heard in policy arenas and on issues that concern the private sector. At times, they have gone beyond a purely -- albeit important -- reactive role to play a more pro-active one, taking the lead in initiating and exerting pressure for policies, programmes and legislation to meet the special needs and circumstances of private sector development.
However, the private sector still remains largely dependent on governments for the creation of a fair and friendly business environment. Where they exist, efficient procedures for obtaining such basic business essentials as import licences or obtaining contracts from the public sector have not yet taken hold. The same is true of efficient, effective and equitable mechanisms for taxes, customs fees and their collection. All these essentially administrative lacunae or weaknesses lead to favour-seeking from public officials and therefore undermines the ability and/or willingness of private business to be vocal vis-a-vis government.
Public Procurement Procedures
Whether domestically financed or externally funded, public procurement is a significant portion of the government budget. Access to it may sometimes be a matter of survival for private business in many industrialized as well as developing countries. Public procurement commissions or directorates have consequently been created in many African countries for the sake of greater transparency in this highly sensitive area.
Some states have set an appropriate floor above which open bidding must be applied. Others have established preferential treatment or quotas for local bidders so as to level the playing field between large and small contractors, as well as between those that have recently emerged and those that have repeatedly executed public contracts over many years. Both types of measures merit study for application elsewhere. A number of African governments have also adopted regulations that militate against unfair advantages for foreign bidders (and their local affiliates), which may sometimes be recommended by donors.
Control and Audit Institutions
Many African countries have created special institutions responsible for auditing public expenditures, disbursements, collection activities, financial accounting of public services, and the monitoring and evaluation of public corporations, as well as public services, programmes and projects. These institutions, whether General Inspectorates of Finance or Offices of State Auditor-General/Comptroller-General or General Inspectorate of Administration, usually report directly to the Chief Executive or the Finance Minister. Generally, they lack the requisite institutional capacity, autonomy and prestige that would enable them to carry out their duties as watchdogs of public resources and public financial accounting. Tanzania has recently created the office of Minister of Governance, which seats an MP in the Office of the President to review and coordinate the work of all bodies, permanent and ad hoc, charged with responsibilities for accountability.
Some sectoral ministers often have their own internal Inspectorates with jurisdiction limited to that ministry itself. Some countries have set up ad hoc anti-corruption commissions or special units, but the precise workings and mutually supportive relationships between these ad hoc entities and the regular Inspectorate is often unclear. In some countries, the auditing of state owned enterprises is entrusted to private, independent professional accountants. It may therefore be important to support and strengthen the institutional capacities of associations of local professional accountants so that they can assist governments in discharging their accounting duties. In Benin, the President engaged a private management consulting firm from a neighbouring country to undertake a financial and operational audit of key economic agencies, including the nation’s main port. Uncovering areas of large-scale waste and neglect, as well as fraud and abuse, the independent private consultants identified a variety of opportunities to make or save substantial sums for the Treasury.
The Civil Service
Why do so many civil servants perceive as "nuisances" or "spies" anybody who approaches them seeking information or simple statistical data? It is an age-old tendency, constituted of many elements: administrative secrecy; fear of the potential reprisals of a supervisor; traditional bureaucratic behaviour -- to "keep one’s mouth shut and not make waves’’; attitudes stemming from the early years of independence that categorize both foreigners and private sector people as inherent enemies of government; as well as lingering remnants of past government monopoly on information and on the mass media.
In addition, especially with regard to fiscal and customs legislation, administrative secrecy creates closely guarded, much cherished opportunities for profiteering. The post-colonial state in Africa has by and large retained the top-down traditions inherited from the former colonial power with the end result that the average citizen still fears even walking into a government office to pay bills, let alone to seek information or challenge government decisions and policies.
Deficiencies in democratic governance aggravate the culture of bureaucratic impunity. Holding a membership card of the ruling party or being a well-known financial contributor to the winning side is still considered insurance against administrative sanctions and/or judicial prosecution. Consequently, the failure to enforce existing laws, rules and regulations is a major weakness of governance in Africa that contributes to an environment of general laxity in accountability and transparency. An informed citizenry is a bulwark against such abuses of power and corrupt practices.
Taken together, weak professional ethics, strong allegiance to an individual Head of State, Cabinet Minister, or a powerful political figure or office-holder, rather than a sense of commitment to some abstract notion of "state", or "rule of law", or "the public interest", all converge to perpetuate a sense of inheritance in bureaucracy. A compounding factor is the general divergence between the formal and informal rules and procedures -- often apparently impassable -- as well as the fact that governing elites tend to be so small that all their members know one another, which hinders full application of the "arm’s length principle"
Insufficient political will, especially the lack of example, at the higher levels of the political and bureaucratic leadership impacts on lower-level officials so that accountability, transparency and moral rectitude become slogans to be repeated rather than practiced. In the words of one MP, "The customs officer knows full well that, higher up, some public money is being diverted into personal pockets. Why then shouldn’t he or she help himself/herself in the process?".
Of the 14 countries that took part in the First Africa Governance Forum, 9 had embarked on system-wide programmes of civil service reform. Many African countries have established disciplinary councils within their civil service to administer disciplinary sanctions whenever civil service statutes are violated. A few countries have adopted codes of conduct or integrity pledges, setting ethical standards of behaviour by civil servants and other public officials. Most African bureaucracies, like the vast majority the world over, are organized strictly along hierarchical lines of command in which the higher levels of authority have powers both to discipline and to promote, as well as to create the enabling environment within which civil servants can work efficiently, honestly and with a sense of dedication and purpose. Higher public sector wages and, in some cases, the payment of salary arrears can contribute enormously to improving both morale and efficiency.
Decentralization
At the time of the above-mentioned Forum, 10 countries had adopted policies for decentralization and regional autonomy to revitalize and democratize traditional local governance mechanisms; to foster greater popular participation; and to enhance the responsiveness of government to needs at the local level. Many expressed concerns about capacity-building in local governance. Swaziland, for instance, evaluates its decentralization by, inter alia, the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery and the level and quality of the input of Sub-National Councils to national development plans.
South Africa has developed a system of cooperative governance that obligates the national and provincial "spheres" of government to help the locally elected authorities to exercise their powers to the benefit of their residents, whether in planning, delivery, or financial services. These powers can no longer be arbitrarily taken from local governments that cannot perform their duties. A variety of national government departments are currently involved in capacity-building programmes in the provinces – which, in turn, are assisting local authorities.
In many other cases, however, decentralization has yet to move beyond the realm of official pronouncements. Fiscal arrangements are needed to make it truly functional and effective. Moreover, in many countries the world over, decentralizing government can also decentralize corruption or encourage the emergence of local "strongmen" who develop their own networks of corruption, financial and non-financial, and thereby encumber transparency with another layer of deliberate obscurity.
Structural Reforms and Liberalization
Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, 35 countries have embarked on structural adjustment programmes designed to reduce the size and role of government, especially in the economy; to remove government monopolies; and to enlarge the role and activities of the private sector. These adjustment packages also seek to reduce opportunities for profiteering and other kinds of corruption among public servants and public officials.
Structural adjustment reforms have attempted to revamp public sector structures at the macro level but have so far had little effect on the incentive structures of bureaucratic behaviour. Low public salaries and low civil service morale become even more glaring in an environment in which the leadership ignores or condones the accumulation of personal wealth and conspicuous consumption by some notoriously corrupt officials.
Structural reforms call for a more active, enterprising private sector operating in a more friendly fiscal, legal and institutional environment. Competitive, transparent markets supported by fair, transparent and predictable law enforcement with regard to property, contracts and other business transactions are meant to raise business confidence and attract long-term national and foreign investment. However, current signals conflict. The new "official’’ rules of the game co-exist with the old entrenched ways of doing business in an environment of economic, political, social, administrative and judicial uncertainties. In such an atmosphere, the business community is bound to "play it safe’’ rather than "play fair" in whatever ways its members consider fit, given a particular occasion.
African governments and their external financial and development partners are now doing a better job of communicating with the people. Nonetheless, many activities related to structural adjustment are still shrouded in less than total transparency. The privatization of public enterprises is one example.
A strong and effective centre is needed to ensure the existence of an enabling environment for a viable private sector, a healthy civil society, and a well-functioning process of decentralization.
Independent Research Centres and Think-Tanks
Public policy analysis, research institutions and other forms of scholarly and intellectual think-tanks are not as yet functional and effective mechanisms on the African public policy scene. While primary and vocational education clearly deserve high priority, the development of institutions of higher learning, research centres and independent think-tanks would be a positive contribution to the search for higher levels of accountability and transparency and the promotion of sustainable human development.
Information and knowledge are crucial for the survival and competitiveness of any society. This is particularly critical for Africa in its current multiple transitions. Research institutions and think-tanks play a vital role in the creation of knowledge and ideas. They can therefore contribute significantly to the generation of informed debate on public policy issues.
Continuous Evaluation of Public Policy and Public Programmes
Continuous evaluation of public agencies, development programmes and projects is not yet an established administrative tradition in many developing countries, even though some donors require evaluation of their programmes, sometimes by independent entities. A government’s performance and record are often presented in terms of inputs and effort, with little attention to such critical issues as efficiency and effectiveness, much less outcome and impact. Moreover, budgetary and public accounting rules in many African countries rule out the earmarking of funds. Coupled with business and tax administrative practices of not publishing the prices of goods and services before and after the imposition of taxes, this leads to situations in which citizens as taxpayers may not perceive the linkage between their tax payments and the amounts and/or quality of goods and services provided by public agencies, programmes and projects.
3.2 What are the foundations of a national accountability and transparency framework and programme?
Admittedly, the codes of conduct, as well as the institutions that define and uphold accountability and transparency, depend on the laws, traditions and the prevailing conventions in each country. The general attitude of the citizens towards accountability and transparency in both the public and private sectors will be determined largely by the cultural, moral and philosophical values, as well as the historical experiences of the peoples concerned. Nonetheless, a combination of factors is likely to pressure African countries to strive for high standards of accountability. These factors include enhanced political awareness by the local African populations themselves; the international environment; the impact of globalization; the information and communication revolutions; and the prevailing world-wide trend towards more democracy, better governance and more open societies.
Accountability and transparency need not be equated with western-style democracy. Nonetheless, a sound, functioning and effective national accountability and transparency institutional framework and programme must be built on at least two basic foundations: legal and political. The first is the rule of law. Without respect for human rights and the rule of law, very few will venture into any productive and creative activities. Respect for human rights and the rule of law protect individual and collective life; security for property and the sanctity of contracts; the assurance that individuals and groups will be protected against any arbitrary government action and the assurance that one will enjoy the legitimate fruits of one’s labour.
The second foundation for a viable accountability framework and programme is broad-based, participatory democracy that empowers individuals and groups to take an active, well informed and meaningful part in public affairs at both the local and national levels. Participatory democracy gives individuals and groups a sense of self-esteem and citizenship as they share not only in the making of decisions affecting their lives, but also in the selection of those who will be entrusted with the power to make decisions on their behalf. On the basis of these legal and political foundations, as well as the specific norms, institutions and processes that depend on the particular circumstances, each country should be expected to demonstrate that it has, or intends to have, in place -- as well as in effective operation -- a workable situation-specific version of a national accountability and transparency institutional framework and programme. The latter needs to include specific law enforcement provisions.
3.3 What role can external partners play in promoting and sustaining accountability and transparency systems in Africa?
3.3.1 Changing Attitudes and Practices of External Players
External players such as multilateral and bilateral donors, international development agencies, non-governmental organizations, and multinational corporations are, to varying degrees and in different ways, involved in activities designed to promote and sustain accountability and transparency systems in Africa. Some of these external actors have been bold enough to take up the issue of public sector corruption, including grand corruption involving high level officials.
By its resolution 51/59, adopted on 28 January 1997, the United Nations General Assembly committed the United Nations to helping member countries design strategies to prevent and control corruption. Resolution 51/59 also adopts an International Code of Conduct for Public Officials.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) stresses good governance as a prerequisite for and component of sustainable human development. It seeks to promote accountability and transparency in areas such as the legislative and the judiciary branches of government, civil society organizations in their advocacy and monitoring roles; public and private management; electoral processes; decentralization and other mechanisms of enhanced participation. The Programme for Accountability and Transparency (PACT), as well as national governance programmes supported by UNDP, propose reforms and capacity building measures with direct or indirect impact on reducing corruption opportunities and incentives.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund focus on issues, measures and programmes for accountability, transparency and corruption insofar as these factors affect economic policy and management. They emphasize economic and institutional reforms aimed at improving the management and accounting of public resources, as well as creating and maintaining a transparent, stable and predictable economic, legal and regulatory environment conducive to sound macro-economic management and efficient private sector economic activities. IMF and the World Bank are particularly concerned with financial and budgetary accountability, transparency in public procurement, market-oriented economic reforms, and civil service reforms that focus on governance. The latter is also trying to foster a more participatory approach to the design, implementation and evaluation of its development projects and programmes, with a view to strengthening mechanisms for the input and reactions of communities and associations of local beneficiaries and users.
Both the Bretton Woods Institutions and African governments have, over the years, paid increasing attention to moving the reform policy making process away from a purely technocratic monopoly and towards wider participation and debate by national, sectoral and local stakeholders. However, much remains to be done, particularly to make the process as transparent as possible and to hold both the reforming government and its Bretton Woods partners more accountable for the impact of their structural adjustment programmes, negative as well as positive. In addition, the Bretton Woods Institutions may not indefinitely be able to evade issues of political accountability of their adjustment partners in government, whatever the statutory limits of these programmes.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has committed itself to making bribery of foreign officials a criminal offense and withholding tax-exempt status from citizens who take bribes. Many national departments of development cooperation, as well as international fora, are concerned with the issues of corruption, transparency and accountability, as well as participatory democracy and good governance. These include the European Union, the International Development Association, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Global Coalition for Africa, the Ford Foundation, the Canadian, Dutch, Nordic and United States international development agencies, the Organization of African Unity, the Africa Leadership Forum, and the G-7/8.
Other inter-governmental and bilateral organizations, as well as international NGOs (most notably, Transparency International and the International Chamber of Commerce) are taking a more active and forceful stance towards safeguarding the integrity of external development aid and international business transactions, with particular attention to project-related international procurement activities and bribery in international business. This newly emerging international consensus that corruption must be confronted has been stirred, at least in part, first by the end of the cold war; second, by an implicit recognition on the part of donors that improved governance and enhanced accountability within recipient countries must be matched by increased transparency in their own international business practices and dealings with these nations; and third, by the positive side effects of increased business competition as economic globalization intensifies: to stay competitive, companies may have to squeeze their profit margins as well as their costs .
However, with or without the end of cold war and economic globalization, foreign policy and strategic considerations -- military, as well as economic -- still take centre stage in the agenda of many external players. Consequently, many of them may not regard issues of political accountability, governance and democracy as critical to their long-term benefit. In the short term, many have benefited from fraud-prone ritualistic electoral processes, as well as from one-party or no-party systems. Similarly, some donors may be tempted to use accountability and transparency as an expedient means of shirking their responsibilities and commitments with regard to official development assistance to African countries.
3.3.2. Policy Dialogue versus Conditionality
One of the major policy dilemmas facing the donor community is whether to make external aid conditional on each recipient country’s efforts to combat corruption and uphold standards of accountability and transparency or to engage in a policy dialogue with recipient countries on the issues of accountability, transparency and corruption. The particular circumstances of each country determine the relative proportions of wielding a stick or enticing with a carrot. Although donors may decide against an across-the board conditionality with regard to accountability and transparency in any specific recipient country, one can imagine situations in which it may be advisable to apply conditionality to specific programmes or projects. This can foster the creation, further growth, and multiplication of " islands of accountability and transparency" with demonstrable and "snowball" effects on the rest of the economy and the bureaucracy, as well as on politics and civil society. What may be most practical is a dynamic and flexible country or sector/project-specific approach to issues of conditionality in accountability and transparency matters. There should be no compromise on the inescapable need for every recipient country to demonstrate clear, unambiguous and determined commitment, in a progressive and visible manner, to upholding accountability and transparency standards, as well as controlling both grand and petty corruption. However, donors and African countries may wish to revisit the very notion of conditionality so as to make it a mutually shared commitment.
IV. CONCLUSION: NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND NATIONAL COMMITMENT
The essence of democratic governance is immutable and its basic principles are universally acceptable and applicable. Their precise manifestations, however, are subject to various sociological, cultural, economic, historical and philosophical factors. Africans ought to assert their particular kinds of ownership of these universal principles. Accountability and transparency are characteristics of good governance that work both top-down and bottom-up, and that may be decisive for the long-term legitimacy and survival of the emerging African democracies, as well as the economic, social, cultural, and moral well-being of African nations.
The major thrust towards accountability and transparency, first and foremost, must come from within each African country, mobilizing all sectors of the nation (the government, the civil service, the private sector and civil and political associations) under committed, capable and honest leadership. National and local ownership of transparency and accountability issues, policies and programmes, buttressed by policy dialogue with donors will need to be secured if transparency and accountability demands are not to become just a passing fad. Civil society associations and a strong mass media organs need to join forces with a committed and honest leadership to make accountability and transparency not only instruments for the attainment of higher general standards of living and therefore sustainable human development, but also values in and by themselves.
