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I. Introduction

Background: Climate as a development risk

1. Climate change is a major systemic risk to sustainable development, and its impact is especially pronounced in Africa. Rising temperatures, shifting precipitation patterns and frequent extreme events are undermining growth, fiscal space and social inclusion. The exposure of people, livelihoods and physical assets to climate hazards has intensified, with far reaching consequences for food security, water availability, health outcomes, infrastructure and trade performance.

2. The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (2021) projects that Southern Africa will experience more intense droughts, heatwaves and storms, exacerbating socio-economic vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities pose significant risks to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agenda, as climate disruptions impede the realization of the full benefits of regional integration. For a region whose economies depend on climate-sensitive sectors, including agriculture, mining, energy and transport, climate change is not only an environmental concern but a structural headwind to inclusive growth and transformation.

Climate–trade linkages

3. Trade remains central to Southern Africa's development, and the AfCFTA seeks to deepen integration, reduce barriers and expand markets. However, climate shocks are disrupting trade infrastructure, supply chains and undermining productive capacities. Prolonged droughts in Zambia and Zimbabwe have triggered energy shortages that reduced industrial output and constrained cross-border trade, while recent tropical cyclones in Mozambique have repeatedly damaged ports and transport corridors, raising costs and reducing the competitiveness of exports. Likewise, in Malawi Cyclone Freddy destroyed over 200,000 hectares of farmland in 2023, resulting in economic losses of more than US$500 million, undermining agricultural exports and food security. Similarly, record breaking rains in 2022 flooded South Africa's Port of Durban and surrounding transport networks,

bringing operations to a standstill and disrupting trade flows, a stark reminder of the rising vulnerability of critical infrastructure to climate shocks.

4. The SADC Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy and Action Plan (2022–2030) highlights that recurrent hazards, including droughts, floods, pests and disease outbreaks, not only threaten lives but also undermine trade facilitation and progress toward the attainment of SDGs. Climate change therefore amplifies the structural challenges facing the region, such as infrastructure deficits, informality and poverty, posing risks to the realization of the full benefits of AfCFTA.

Purpose and structure of the report

5. This Progress Report assesses how climate change is affecting trade and economic prospects in Southern Africa and reviews country-level progress on climate commitments across the 11 member States covered by the ECA Subregional Office for Southern Africa (SRO-SA): Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Part II of the report synthesizes the trade-related impacts of climate shocks in the region. Part III tracks the status of submissions under the UNFCCC (Nationally determined contributions and National Adaptation Plans). Part IV presents key messages and policy recommendations to strengthen resilience, sustainability, integration and trade.

II. Impact of climate change on trade and the economy in 11 member States

6. Extreme weather conditions such as floods, droughts and intense rainfall, damage transport, energy and irrigation infrastructure disrupting supply chains, energy supply and agricultural output. The increased vulnerability to extreme weather is more pronounced on transport infrastructure, including ports, airports, railways and roads, contributing to rising costs, operational delays, and lower trade volumes. Across the SRO-SA countries, climate shocks affect logistics, production and market access in interconnected ways. The subsections below summarize (i) key

climate risks and recent shocks and (ii) their implications for trade and infrastructure.

Angola

7. Angola's trade is supported by the Benguela Railway and the Lobito Corridor, which link the Port of Lobito to the Copperbelt in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These arteries facilitate exports of copper, cobalt and manganese, as well as food products and industrial goods. However, sections of the corridor traverse flood-prone areas, exposing critical infrastructure to the dangers of flooding. The World Bank's Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR) warns that, without adaptation, climate change could reduce Angola's GDP by up to 6 per cent by 2050. Southern Angola has endured the worst drought in 40 years, with agricultural productivity projected to be up to 7 per cent lower by 2050 than under a no-damage faced by member States. Capital stock losses from floods and heat-related productivity declines pose persistent headwinds to competitiveness. Recent assessments indicate rising acute food insecurity in the region due to weak 2023/24 harvests and high prices in drought-affected areas, [1] potentially affecting up to 1.5 million people by early 2025[2]. Higher grain import needs are already exerting pressure on trade balances and fiscal space.

Botswana

8. Livestock, especially beef, remains central to Botswana's agricultural economy and export profile, even though diamonds dominate overall export earnings. Over 95 per cent of commercial beef output is exported mainly to the United Kingdom and Europe, climate risks can decimate such a lucrative market.[3] A semi-arid climate, low and erratic rainfall and recurrent droughts are reducing cattle numbers and productivity in the sector. Statistics Botswana reports that the national cattle population fell from 2.5 million to 1.7 million between 2011 and 2015, with

[1] Reliefweb (2024). Angola - Key Message Update: Below-average harvests lead to early lean season.
[2] FAO (2025). projections from the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET)
[3] African Union (2024). Botswana country food and agriculture delivery compact

households reporting cattle reduction of over 45 per cent.[4] Over the past 35 years, Botswana's beef exports have been in steady decline, raising concerns about the country's long-term ability to sustain this vital sector. From a grazing perspective, climate change compounds systemic challenges. Degraded rangelands, bush encroachment and declining rainfall compound systemic constraints in the sector. Sustained climate variability has eroded pasture quality and carrying capacity, underscoring the fragility of the beef export industry.

9. At the production level, drought and water scarcity are major constraints. Recent estimates indicate that approximately 40 percent of Botswana's livestock units, about 809,000 head, are affected by water scarcity and frequent droughts.[5] These conditions have led to widespread cattle deaths, stagnant productivity, and a decline in the competitiveness of the beef export industry. Extensive cattle production in arid and semi-arid regions depends on water-efficient irrigation and improved rangeland management; however, climate variability continues to erode pasture quality and livestock carrying capacity continues to diminish.

Eswatini

10. The sugar industry remains a cornerstone for the Eswatini economy, contributing around 5 per cent to GDP and employing approximately 20,000 people, with about 92 per cent of output exported. However, production is vulnerable to droughts, erratic rainfall and water scarcity. Climate change is affecting Eswatini in several ways. More broadly, agriculture is highly vulnerable to drought as 80 percent of farming in Eswatini is rain-fed. Prolonged dry spells have over the years reduced dam capacity needed for irrigation-intensive sugarcane. The production of sugarcane, one of Eswatini's main commodity crops that requires irrigation, decreased by 6 percent in 2023 due to adverse weather conditions. During the El Niño–induced drought in 2015/16 and 2016/17, cane output fell by 14.8 per cent

[4] UNDRR (2019). Where's the beef? Drought-parched Botswana struggles to keep cattle culture alive
[5] World Bank (2022). Roadmap for Sustainable Livestock Value Chains in Southern Africa

between 2015/16 and 2016/17, with yields dropping from 101.2 tonnes to 89.5 tonnes per hectare. [6] More broadly, 80 per cent of farming remains rain-fed, leaving staple food crops like maize exposed leading to food insecurity and hunger. In addition, agriculture's contribution to GDP declined by 3.5 percent between 2000 and 2019, partly due to drought. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) data show that the agricultural land in all provinces has been under constant stress since 2020. Maize production was expected to decline by 12 percent in 2024 due to low rainfall.[7]

11. With over 70 percent of the population dependent on agriculture, the increased frequency of extreme weather conditions necessitates adaptation to create a climate-smart agricultural sector with a long-run objective of ensuring food security and generating exportable surpluses. Focusing on sustainable energy is also pertinent to reducing reliance on carbon-intensive energy production that exacerbates climate stress. Severe natural disasters can worsen vulnerabilities in the agriculture sector. Due to prolonged droughts, 29 percent of the population face acute food insecurity, and Eswatini ranks highest in food vulnerability among SACU member states.

Lesotho

12. Lesotho's economy relies on textiles, diamonds and water exports, while imports include food, fuel, machinery and construction materials, highlighting the need for diversification and the existence of climate resilience gaps. The agricultural sector employs over 30 per cent of workers yet contributes a modest share to GDP, and remittances from South Africa remain a significant share of income flows. The country faces recurrent droughts and floods. Major events since 2010, including severe drought (2015–2016) and record floods (2010–2011) have affected many citizens over the years. With the water sector contributing 8-10% of the GDP, Lesotho's water sector is facing mounting pressure as reduced precipitation and

[6] World Bank (2022). Country Private Sector Diagnostic Creating Markets in Eswatini Strengthening the Private Sector to Grow Export Markets and Create Jobs
[7] IMF (2024). Kingdom of Eswatini: Selected Issues; IMF Country Report No. 24/305.

shifting rainfall patterns erode water availability, deepening the country's reliance on imports and hindering efforts to diversify exports.

13. Lesotho experiences significant climate hazards including droughts, floods, and storms, which accounted for over 90% of the average annual hazard occurrence for the period 1980-2020. The 2011 floods were the most extensive ever documented since the 1930s, while the drought experienced from 2015 to 2016 is considered the most severe on record. Between 1980 and 2000, the country experienced two separate years of drought, with the number increasing to 6 between 2001 and 2020. With over two-thirds of the population relying on rain-fed subsistence agriculture, droughts exacerbate the country's existing challenges of poverty and food insecurity. During December 2010 and January 2011, Lesotho experienced record-breaking rainfall, floods, and rockslides, resulting in estimated losses equivalent to 3.2% of the country's GDP. In 2019 alone, 433,000 Basothos were adversely affected by drought, while in 2020, the number stood at 766,000.

Malawi

14. Agriculture accounts for roughly 30 per cent of GDP and is largely rain-fed, with constraints from declining soil fertility, size of farm landholdings, poor technology, and the limited uptake of sustainable practices. Exports remain concentrated in unprocessed crops such as tobacco, tea and coffee. Even where water is physically plentiful, water systems are under pressure from pollution and deforestation, and the country is vulnerable to flooding.

15. Cyclone Freddy (2023) devastated over 200,000 hectares of farmland, with estimated economic losses exceeding US$507 million.[8] More than 2.3 million people were affected, hundreds of thousands of households lost crops and livestock and many became food-insecure.[9] The shock tightened grain markets, elevated

[8] Government of Malawi (2023). Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) – Cyclone Freddy
[9] IFAD (2024). Building smallholder farmers' climate resilience Lessons learned from IFAD's response to Cyclone Freddy in Malawi

staple prices and weakened export potential, worsening the trade balance. Malawi's updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) estimates that climate change causes annual economic losses equivalent to at least 5 percent of GDP.

Mauritius

16. As a small island developing State with an extensive exclusive economic zone, Mauritius faces rising sea levels, ocean warming and more frequent extreme weather. Critical coastal infrastructure, including Port Louis Harbor, major roads and commercial areas are exposed to cyclones and flooding. Tourism (about 20 per cent of GDP and up to 22 per cent of employment) and fisheries (15–19 per cent of exports) are sensitive to ecosystem degradation and shifting marine conditions. Severe rainfall events, such as the March 2013 flood, underscore recurrent risks. Estimated average annual direct flood losses are around US$22 million, with cyclones and floods together causing substantial damage each year.[10]

17. According to the country's disaster risk profile (DRP Mauritius, 2016), flooding is the second-largest risk after cyclones, causing 20 per cent of direct economic losses associated with disasters, and the country will experience, on average, around 22 million USD yearly direct losses from flooding. It is also estimated that nearly 60% of the direct losses from flooding are attributed to the residential sector, and 20% to the commercial sector. Additionally, droughts accounted for 96.8% of the combined economic losses reported nationally between 1990 and 2014.

Mozambique

18. Mozambique ranks among the countries most exposed to climate hazards. Growth and export performance depend heavily on carbon-intensive sectors (natural gas, coal, aluminium), while ports and corridors (Maputo, Beira, Nacala, Quelimane and

[10] Republic of Mauritius (2021). First Updated NDC for the Republic of Mauritius

Pemba) are vital to regional trade. Cyclones Idai and Kenneth (2019) devastated Beira port and inland transport links, forcing closures and disruption of regional trade. Road infrastructure damage from Idai alone was estimated at US$489 million.[11] The World Bank estimates annual climate risk to the road network at roughly US$160 million (about 1.1 per cent of GDP). GDP growth fell from 3.4 per cent in 2018 to 2.3 per cent in 2019, reflecting the impact of these shocks. [12]

Namibia

19. Namibia is among the driest countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Recurrent droughts have severely affected livestock systems, with widespread rangeland degradation and bush encroachment reducing forage availability. The sustainable stocking rate has roughly halved over the past century. In 2018–2019, drought killed an estimated 60,000 head of livestock and caused two-thirds of crops to fail, leaving about one-third of Namibians without adequate food. Livestock dominates agriculture's value, and these recent droughts have led to herd destocking, subsequent supply constraints and price pressures. Downstream effects on processing, transport and services have weighed on growth and external balances.

South Africa

20. South Africa faces intensifying droughts, water scarcity and extreme rainfall. The mining sector, contributed 7.3 per cent of GDP in 2022 and employed over 469,000 workers is vulnerable to flooding, heat and water constraints that increase costs and disrupt output and logistics. As global markets decarbonize, firms that fail to transition to clean energy face competitiveness risks. Agriculture is similarly exposed. The 2015–2016 El Niño drought reduced maize production by more than 40 per cent, shifting South Africa temporarily from net exporter to net importer and altering regional grain trade. Floods in April 2022 damaged access roads to the Port

[11] World Bank (2019). Mozambique Cyclone Idai Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
[12] World Bank (2019). Mozambique Economic Update

of Durban, forcing temporary suspension of operations and disrupting supply chains.

Zambia

21. Zambia's high rainfall variability brings both floods and droughts, with pronounced effects on agriculture, tourism, infrastructure, and mining. The 2024/25 drought sharply reduced maize yields, leading to export restrictions to protect domestic supply and increasing the likelihood of imports. IMF assessments suggest climate shocks have reduced growth by 0.4–0.6 percentage points in recent years. Hydropower provides roughly 87 per cent of electricity generation, making the economy, in particular, copper mining sensitive to drought-driven power shortages. These electricity deficits have lowered copper output and raised costs, underscoring the need to diversify the energy mix and strengthen infrastructure. In addition, persistent power deficits have contributed to declining manufacturing production, given that electricity is a critical input required to operate mechanized plants and equipment.[13] Flood risks to trunk roads, especially around Lusaka and in northern provinces, pose additional threats to domestic and regional supply chains.

Zimbabwe

22. Zimbabwe has experienced repeated droughts, cyclones and floods, with severe consequences for agriculture and trade. As a land-linked economy and a key transit hub, climate damage to transport corridors has adverse regional implications. Cyclone Idai (2019) devastated the eastern districts of Chimanimani and Chipinge, destroying over 50,000 hectares of cropland and damaging more than 90 per cent of local road networks. Total damages were estimated at about US$622 million, with export corridors blocked and significant delays and diversions imposed on trade. [14]

[13] Zambia Association of Manufacturers (2020). Navigating Climate Change Effects in Manufacturing
[14] World Bank (2019). Restoring Zimbabwe's Livelihoods, Infrastructure After Cyclone Idai

III. Progress on key international commitments

23. Southern African countries are Parties to the Paris Agreement and related conventions, including the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and the Convention on Biological Diversity, reflecting efforts to align national policies with global commitments. Under the Paris Agreement, Parties submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) every five years, each representing progression in ambition. Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted around COP21 (2015) became Parties' first NDCs upon ratification. Successive NDCs must reflect progression and highest possible ambition (Paris Agreement, Article 4). National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), established under the Cancún Adaptation Framework (2010), provide a medium- to long-term approach to adaptation planning, complementing short-term programmes and facilitating integration across sectors and levels of government. In parallel, NAP process guides countries in reducing vulnerability and integrating adaptation into development planning. The next NDC cycle ("NDC 3.0") is due in 2025 and informed by the first Global Stocktake. The table below summarizes the status of NDC and NAP submissions for the 11 SRO-SA member States (as of 6 October 2025).

Country	Latest NDC Submission	NAP Submission
Angola	**NDC 3.0 (2025)**	Not submitted (In process)
Botswana	Second updated NDC (2024)	Not submitted (In Progress: Framework for formulation of the NAP is in place)
Eswatini	**NDC 3.0 (2025)**	Not submitted (In Progress: Under stakeholder review)
Lesotho	Second NDC (2025)	Not submitted (In Progress: Draft NAP submitted for review)

Malawi	Updated first NDC (2021)	Not submitted (In Progress: Framework for formulation of the NAP is in place)
Mauritius	**NDC 3.0 (2025)**	Not submitted (In process)
Mozambique	Updated first NDC (2021)	**NAP submitted (2023)**
Namibia	Second updated NDC (2024)	Not submitted (In Progress: Framework for formulation of the NAP is in place)
South Africa	Updated first NDC (2021)	**NAP submitted (2021)**
Zambia	**Provisional NDC 3.0 (2025)**	**NAP submitted (2023)**
Zimbabwe	**NDC 3.0 (2025)**	**NAP Submitted (2024)**

Status of NDC and NAP submission – Southern Africa (as of October 6, 2025)

24. **Angola** submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) in 2015, followed by its first NDC in 2020, a revised first NDC in 2021, and the NDC 3.0 in 2025. According to the NAP Tracker, Angola's NAP is still under formulation and has not yet been officially submitted. The National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change is underway, focusing on the transport and energy sectors.

25. **Botswana** submitted its INDC in 2015, its first NDC in 2016, and its second NDC in 2024. The country has not yet submitted its NDC 3.0. For adaptation planning, Botswana has not yet submitted a NAP but developed a National Adaptation Plan Framework in 2020. This framework serves as an overarching strategic document to guide adaptation planning and mainstream climate resilience into development processes. Furthermore, Botswana submitted its first Adaptation Communication in 2022, which reports progress and financial needs and is expected to serve as the basis for a complete NAP submission.

26. **Eswatini** submitted its INDC in 2015, its first NDC in 2016, its revised first NDC in 2021, and its NDC 3.0 in 2025. Following the Global Stocktake at COP28 in 2023, Eswatini had the opportunity to align its draft NDC 3.0 with international goals while addressing local priorities, such as poverty reduction and resilient infrastructure. The Ministry of Tourism and Environmental Affairs held a national stakeholder consultation and validation workshop to gather final inputs on the draft NDC 3.0, ensuring its alignment with previous consultations in September 2025.[15] For adaptation, Eswatini submitted its first Adaptation Communication in 2021. According to this document, the NAP process is underway and currently under stakeholder review.

27. **Lesotho** submitted its INDC in 2015 and its first NDC in 2018, and its second NDC in 2025, but has not yet submitted a third NDC. For adaptation, the country launched its NAP process in October 2015 with a multi-stakeholder workshop and has developed both a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and a National Climate Change Policy (NCCP). In 2024, Lesotho submitted a draft NAP for review with support from the UNFCCC's Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG). [16]

28. **Malawi** submitted its INDC in 2015, its first NDC in 2017, and a revised first NDC with an Addendum in 2021. On adaptation, Malawi has developed a National Adaptation Plan Framework to guide the NAP process, building on a previously developed NAP Roadmap. This framework validates and updates the country's vision, objectives, and mandates for adaptation planning, ensuring coherence with national policies and strategies. It also provides the foundation for readiness funding from the Green Climate Fund and continued stakeholder engagement. [17]

[15] **Ministry of Tourism and Environmental Affairs** Facebook
[16] UNFCCC (2024). National Adaptation Plans 2024
[17] Government of Malawi (2020). Malawi's National Adaptation Plan Framework

29. **Mauritius** submitted its INDC in 2015, its first NDC in 2016, a revised first NDC with an Addendum in 2021, and its NDC 3.0 in 2025. Although Mauritius has not submitted a full NAP, it included an Adaptation Communication as part of its revised NDC in 2021 for the period 2021–2030. While no standalone NAP framework has been published, Mauritius has received technical support and readiness funding from the Green Climate Fund, notably to formulate and implement NAP. [18]

30. **Mozambique** submitted its INDC in 2015 and a revised first NDC in 2021 but has not yet submitted a third NDC. The country has made significant progress by submitting its NAP in March 2023 and also presenting its NDC Implementation Plan.

31. **Namibia** submitted its INDC in 2015, its first NDC in 2016, a revised first NDC in 2021, and an additional update to the first NDC in 2023. Namibia submitted its first Adaptation Communication in 2021 and is preparing its NAP in line with its Adaptation Framework. To support this, Namibia has initiated the development of a monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) system for the NAP process.

32. **South Africa** submitted its INDC in 2015, its first NDC in 2016, and a revised first NDC in 2021. The country submitted its NAP in 2021, building on the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2019), which provides a medium-term framework for climate resilience. The NAP, coordinated by the Department of Forestry, Fisheries, and the Environment, emphasizes equity, gender-responsiveness, and iterative adaptation planning. In 2024, the Climate Change Act was passed, strengthening the legal framework for adaptation by mandating national adaptation objectives, progress indicators, and updated scenarios. [19]

[18] UNFCCC (2024). National Adaptation Plans 2024
[19] Government of South Africa (2024). In-Country Programme of Support to South Africa's Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment

33. **Zambia** submitted its INDC in 2015, its first NDC in 2016, and an updated first NDC in 2021. In March 2025, Zambia submitted its provisional NDC 3.0, making it one of the first two countries in the region to do so. For the Adaptation planning, Zambia developed its NAPA in 2007, its National Climate Change Response Strategy in 2010, and the National Policy on Climate Change in 2016. The NAP submitted in 2023 has identified medium- to long-term adaptation actions that will enable the government to systematically implement priority adaptation actions, contributing to the implementation of Vision 2030, the National Development Plans, and the NDC. [20]

34. **Zimbabwe** has demonstrated a strong commitment to the global climate agenda. The country submitted its INDC in 2015, its first NDC in 2017, and a revised first NDC in 2021. Notably, Zimbabwe became the first country in Southern Africa to submit a comprehensive NDC 3.0 in February 2025. In 2019, Zimbabwe developed a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Roadmap, laying the groundwork for mainstreaming climate change into development planning. Building on this roadmap, Zimbabwe formally submitted its National Adaptation Plan in 2024, following an inclusive multi-stakeholder consultation process supported by the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

[20] Government of Zambia (2023). National Adaptation Plan

IV. Key messages and policy recommendations

Key messages

a) Climate change poses a systemic development threat to Southern Africa, with rising temperatures, droughts, floods and storms undermining growth, constraining fiscal space and undermining social inclusion. The IPCC (2021) identifies Southern Africa as a climate hotspot where vulnerabilities will deepen without decisive adaptation.

b) Climate shocks increasingly erode trade competitiveness by disrupting agriculture, mining, transport and energy systems. Drought-induced energy shortages and cyclone-damaged corridors illustrate cross-border spillovers.

c) AfCFTA's potential gains are at risk unless climate resilience is embedded as a core enabler of implementation, particularly through standards, logistics and services mobility.

d) Despite regular NDC updates and regional DRR strategies, adaptation gaps persist in resilient infrastructure, climate-smart trade policies and long-term finance. Limited progress on NAPs highlights the need to accelerate planning and execution.

e) Urban and water resilience are pivotal. Rapid urbanization heightens exposure to floods and heat, while under-investment in water systems threatens agriculture, energy and trade.

f) The region has demonstrated commitment to international agreements; the priority now is to translate commitments into bankable projects and measurable outcomes.

Recommendations

The SADC region through its institutions should,

a) adopt a SADC Climate–Trade Resilience Strategy that integrates adaptation into AfCFTA implementation, prioritizing resilient transport corridors, ports and cross-border energy systems.

b) issue regional guidelines and standards for climate-resilient transport, storage and energy infrastructure to reduce supply-chain disruptions.

c) establish a Southern Africa Climate Adaptation Facility to coordinate capacity-building, knowledge exchange and access to climate finance (e.g., GCF, Adaptation Fund).
d) scale pooled adaptation-finance vehicles to crowd in concessional and private capital for climate-smart trade and infrastructure projects.
e) provide a platform where member States periodically share experiences in building resilience, mitigation and disaster preparedness

National governments through their public institutions should,

a) mainstream climate adaptation in trade, industrial and investment strategies to safeguard competitiveness under AfCFTA, with focus on agriculture, energy and transport.
b) prioritize climate-smart trade infrastructure, resilient ports, dry ports, road networks and power grids, to minimize climate-induced disruptions.
c) fast-track finalization and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), aligning them with updated NDCs and national development and urban strategies.
d) strengthen inter-ministerial governance linking environment, trade and finance to coordinate adaptation and safeguard competitiveness.

The private sector (businesses, investors and financial institutions) should

a) integrate climate-risk assessment in value chains, diversify sourcing and adopt circular-economy models to reduce exposure in agriculture, mining and manufacturing.
b) mobilize private and blended finance for adaptation; water resilience, renewable energy and climate-smart logistics, leveraging regional DFIs and pension funds.
c) support PPPs for climate-resilient cities, including sustainable transport, smart water systems and resilient energy grids to de-risk trade and industry.

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