Capturing the 21st Century:
African Peer Review (APRM)
Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Economic Commission for Africa

2011
African Dolls across the continent are created for young girls to play with and as a charm to insure fertility in women. Their shape and costume vary according to region and custom. Frequently dolls are handed down from mother to daughter. Western dolls are popular in Africa and are often dressed with traditional garb.

Dolls symbolize the future and continuity of Africa; who we are as a people, what we have learned about ourselves and the world around us, and where we go from here in the 21st Century.

## Contents

Preface 4  
Abbreviations and Acronyms 6  

**Part I**  Executive Summary 8  

**Part II**  Concept Paper 16  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. History Revisited</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Historical phases</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Review of NEPAD</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Concluding comments</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Responses to concept paper</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART III**  APRM Structures, Processes and Methodologies 74  

**PART IV**  Challenges and Emerging Themes – Towards Consensus 84  

**PART V**  Closing Session and the Way Forward 98  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Biographies</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Agenda</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>List of Participants</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

What is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)? Why was it created? What are its historical antecedents? What are its implementation achievements, challenges and opportunities? Where will it take Africa, if faithfully implemented? These were the overarching questions that prompted the holding of the workshop on “APRM Best Practices and Lessons Learned” by the APRM Support Section, Governance and Public Administration Division (GPAD), of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). As a strategic partner in the implementation of this innovative and bold continental governance initiative, ECA has been at the forefront of both the conceptualization and implementation of the APRM. Almost ten-years into its implementation, it was timely to hold such a strategic event.

The Ad Hoc Expert Group Meeting (AEGM) brought together eminent African scholars and academics involved in governance, development and democratization issues in Africa; practitioners and consultants in the various aspects of the operation of NEPAD and the APRM, as well as those who had been closely involved in the initial stages of the crafting, structuring and implementation of the APRM. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the background Concept Paper commissioned by the APRM Support Section of ECA, while the specific objectives included: to promote a better understanding of the significance of the APRM process in the trajectory of African political and development thinking; and to examine the implications and impact of the review processes on the various stakeholders, and the experiences gained so far of Africa’s governance systems and development in general.

The background paper explored the genesis and rationale of the APRM in order to broaden, deepen and promote a better understanding of the meaning and significance of the APRM process; examined the impact of the review processes on the various stakeholders, the experiences and insights gained so far in the promotion of good governance and development in general; and demonstrated that peer review is a comprehensive national dialogue that involves all the people, and not primarily a dialogue among African Heads of State or Government, or a selection of informed Africans, political leaders and senior government officials. The Concept Paper attempted to further expand, deepen and enrich intellectual understanding of the evolution of the need for a peer review process in Africa, thereby placing it in the mainstream of African development thought over the last five decades; and thus promoting a better, popular understanding of the APRM as ‘Africa’s innovative thinking on governance’.
The discussions, comments and suggestions were conducted with passion and commitment to the promotion of a better future for Africa and Africans, a continent and people who had been the victims of external forces and agents for far too long. Although there were some criticisms of the way in which the moves toward the creation of NEPAD and the APRM had been conducted, on the whole, the meeting was positive and supportive of the APRM objectives.

The general consensus of the meeting was that the APRM had raised the issue of “getting politics right” in its focus on good governance, solving the economic, political and social question, and its redefinition of an African social contract, based on shared accountability, which emphasizes the rights as much as the duties of citizenship, and on reciprocity and mutual recognition between stakeholders at the national, regional, continental and global levels; and that the peer process was comprehensive and inclusive, rather than elitist or restrictive.

The meeting underscored the sustained role of ECA as the trailblazer of development ideas and the premier Pan-African think tank on Africa’s multiple development and governance challenges. In that sense, the APRM could be celebrated as the culmination of a long quest for an authentic African development paradigm starting with the Monrovia Strategy to the Lagos Plan of Action; from Beyond Recovery: ECA Revised Perspective of Africa’s Development, 1988-98, to the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme, 1989 (AAF-SAP); and finally the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990) to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), of which the APRM is an integral part. The APRM cannot be isolated from its historical pedigree.

This publication, the outcome of the two-day workshop, is therefore the effort of ECA to ensure the promotion, protection and consolidation of the APRM, and its potential contributions, achievements, challenges and opportunities to changing the fortunes of Africa in the 21st century and beyond.

As strategic partner, ECA will continue to take the leadership role and do what needs to be done to ensure that the APRM is continuously consolidated on the continent.

Abdoulie Janneh
Executive Secretary
ECA
### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF-SAP</td>
<td>The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGF</td>
<td>Africa Governance Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPER</td>
<td>Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESRIA</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Global Coalition for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEP</td>
<td>Institute for Economic Development and Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPEO</td>
<td>International Political Economic Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPA</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPoA</td>
<td>National Programme of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSSREA</td>
<td>Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Policy Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMD</td>
<td>United Nations Millennium Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSIA</td>
<td>United Nations System-wide Special Initiative on Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WACAA</td>
<td>West African Centre for the Advancement of the APRM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part I
Executive Summary

“...The APRM has raised expectations and hope and we should not fall short of those expectations and we should not betray that hope. The APRM belongs to us and, I believe, and to future generations. Those future generations have a right to a more developed Africa than we have now. Our grandchildren are the real owners of the APRM. Our duty is therefore to guide the APRM and hand it over in the best possible form. Future generations in Africa will not forgive us if we let the APRM go ... those future generations have in their ranks the Heads of State of tomorrow, the businessmen and women of tomorrow... In short, the hope of Africa that we are dreaming of today”.

A Participant at the Meeting

Opening session

On 28 and 29 April 2010, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) organized an Ad Hoc Expert Group Meeting on the theme, *Deepening the APRM Best Practices and Lessons Learned*, at the United Nations Conference Centre, Addis Ababa. The meeting was attended by distinguished African experts on governance and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process, some of whom had participated as consultants for APRM Country Review Teams, and staff of ECA.

The aims, objectives and purpose of the meeting were: (a) to expand and deepen the intellectual understanding of the genesis of and rationale for the APRM in order to improve development and governance policy processes in Africa, in line with the APRM vision and objectives; (b) to provide alternative home-grown Pan-African perspectives to correct biases and misrepresentations, particularly in western and other non-African literature on the APRM and other African governance initiatives; (c) to put Africa’s own original stamp and imprimatur on the global development debate; and (d) to synthesize the debates during the meeting into a coherent form for dissemination to a larger audience of policymakers, scholars and civil society organizations.
Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, Director of the Governance and Public Administration Division (GPAD) of ECA, expressed the regret of Mr. Abdoulie Janneh, Executive Secretary of ECA, for his unavoidable absence from the meeting, which he had looked forward to attending. With a deep sense of sorrow and sadness, the Director announced the death of Dr. Francis Appiah, Executive Secretary of the APRM Governing Council, Accra, Ghana, who had died while preparing to attend the Ad Hoc Expert Group Meeting. As a mark of the recognition and appreciation of Dr. Appiah's pioneering work on the APRM generally and his exemplary leadership role in directing and managing the APRM process in Ghana, the meeting observed a minute's silence in his memory.

Dr. Hamdok went on to discuss the objectives and expectations of the meeting:

a) To expand, in order to deepen and enrich the intellectual understanding of the genesis of and rationale for the APRM, a way of putting Africa’s own original imprimatur on and thereby Africanizing the global APRM and related development debate;

b) To provide corrective, autonomous and home-grown Pan-African perspectives on the existing literature on the APRM and other African governance initiatives, which had generally come from non-African sources;

c) To synthesize and organize the debates at the meeting into a coherent form, to be made available to a wider audience of policymakers, governments and academics. The ultimate intention of ECA was to put the contributions to the debate together in an accessible format, a publication of some kind.

In order to achieve the objectives and expectations of the meeting, Dr. Hamdok presented the experts with the following challenge:

We expect this meeting to come up with ideas based on the fundamental questions about the APRM and I would like to flag some of them: What is the APRM all about? What has been its performance so far, measured against expectations at its onset? What challenges have been encountered in the course of its implementation? What does the APRM mean to the various stakeholders? What challenges lie ahead, given the current global crisis and realities? Where will this mechanism take Africa if properly implemented and sustained? What role would the mechanism play in reshaping and transforming the governance structures and systems on our continent in the context of development partnership with the rest of the world, East and West?

Dr. Kojo Busia, APRM Chief of Section at ECA provided further insights into the objectives of the meeting. He pointed out that the thematic focus, including the purpose of the meeting, was dictated by the time-tested in-house practice within ECA, which required the periodic holding of ad hoc ex-
pert meetings to identify experiences and best practices in certain policy areas and share them with our main stakeholders on the continent. However he, like Dr. Hamdok, observed that the objectives went beyond best practices and lessons learned, as it was expected that a publication exploring in detail the importance and implications of the multi-faceted dimensions of the APRM for Africa and the wider world from a home-grown African perspective would emerge from the meeting, thereby filling a gaping hole in the fledgling literature on the APRM and governance issues in contemporary Africa, while also providing background documentation on the APRM for the forthcoming meeting of the GPAD Committee for Popular Public Participation and Governance later in the year.

The meeting conducted a critical theoretical, methodological and empirical analysis of the APRM, locating its still unfolding trajectories, challenges, opportunities and problems within the broader context, not only of Africa’s engagement with globalization in its various historical and contemporary manifestations, but also of the dynamics of the competing cultural, economic, political and social forces in Africa, during and in the aftermath of the second and third waves of independence on the continent. In this respect, the meeting noted that the creation of NEPAD and the APRM should be located within the context of, and seen as a reflection of, Africans’ struggle for democracy and development against external and internal forces. For this reason, the APRM should not be personalized as being primarily the result of the efforts of a group of political leaders and elites.

The meeting also emphasized the opportunity the APRM had offered to reinvigorate the interface between an applied African-grounded policy science and the African policy process, thereby facilitating African ownership of the theory and practice of the development process through the medium the APRM provided for the interface by. It located this aspect of the APRM in its facilitating resolution, from a primarily and autonomously African-informed perspective, of the issue of identity and related to it the issue of vision and the roadmap towards democracy and development that it offered. As one participant emphatically and tellingly put it, the meeting had to pose the hard question about the vision by asking, “What is the objective? What type of Africa do we want to build tomorrow?” It was only by asking those questions that the real contribution of the APRM could be determined.

The meeting agreed that a major and significant contribution of the APRM to institutionalizing a culture of accountability had been bringing about a domestic accountability mechanism, reinforced by a continental accountability mechanism to replace externally, i.e., extra-African, imposed ones in the form of conditionality by the international donor community and the Bretton Woods institutions. The participants generally agreed that the challenge for the APRM remained how to mobilize and sustain citizen participation in its country and continental structures and processes in order to prevent ‘APRM-fatigue’ and the negative manifestations of “institutional gamble”, particularly its bureaucratization and being used to legitimize anti-people policies and anti-democratic processes.
In mapping the way forward and the challenges ahead for the APRM, the meeting called on ECA to take the initiative, in collaboration with other strategic APRM partners and the APRM continental secretariat, of publishing a book on the APRM and organizing follow-up meetings, including in the form of colloquia and seminars, and to encourage African scholars to spend their sabbaticals at ECA. That should viewed not only as part of the continuing process of deepening the APRM process, but also as a strategy for focusing on lessons learned and disseminating emergent best practices within and outside Africa in order to enhance the process and thereby consolidate democracy and development in Africa.

Main observations and issues raised

Consensus on proposed areas of action that emerged in the course of the discussions in the Meeting included the following:

Summary of main discussions

Original Strivings, Initiatives and Successes in Political and Development Thinking

a) The post-independence history of Africa showed that African countries had been engaged in several externally influenced and driven initiatives from the first decade of post-colonial development up to the 1990s. Moreover, African countries had initially been preoccupied with nation-building and the promotion of continental African unity. The OAU had been concerned with liberation movements, particularly in Southern Africa and against Apartheid, suggesting that liberation and decolonization of the continent were the priorities, rather than the promotion of democracy and good governance within the independent African countries.

b) Africa’s own initiatives prior to the 1990s in the wider global context of the Cold War had typically been sidelined by external forces which controlled African economies and the political make-up. Nonetheless, African leadership also bore a share of the responsibility for the failure of participatory development and promotion of democracy on the continent, as exemplified in military coups, one-party States, Marxist socialist regimes, authoritarian top-down socialism, human rights abuses of the African people, economic deterioration and huge deficits in physical and social infrastructure.

c) The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of Eastern Europe, the evaporation of international communism, globalization and the emergence of market forces had reinvigorated the on-going momentum and determination of African political and development thinking, initiated during the anti-colonial struggles, as manifested in the writ-
ings of Nkrumah, Mboya and Nyerere, and further acknowledged and reinforced during the post-colonial period, as demonstrated during the Monrovia Symposium and later the Arusha Declaration, for Africans to rethink the past, review the present, craft visions and reinvent a future of their own.

d) Thus, while Europeans were engaged in rethinking their past and reinventing their future – a new European concept within the context of a rapidly globalizing world and reviewing their development partnership with the developing countries – African leaders and intellectuals had already started to retool, as it were, acquiring the appropriate capacity to be proactive in response to domestic needs and demands, global changes, challenges and opportunities.

e) The struggle for democracy and human rights in post-colonial Africa was essentially and significantly home-grown and internally driven, propelled and won by African peoples, with progressive intellectuals playing a very important part in it. Therefore, the historical processes of the origins of NEPAD and the APRM should be seen in the home-grown and autonomous struggles of African peoples for democracy and development. This was the history of the present in which to locate the African Peer Review Mechanism.

f) While there may be disagreement as to whether NEPAD and the APRM were externally-driven or entirely African initiatives, what was clear was that they were administered, managed and implemented by Africans. It was also significant that African countries were opening their borders and their books to enable other Africans to review their governance practices in the four APRM thematic areas.

**APRM – Impact, Prospects and Potentials**

The APRM had raised the issue of “getting politics right” in its focus on good governance, and solving the economic, political and social question, and its redefinition of an African social contract based on shared accountability, which emphasized the rights as much as the obligations or duties of citizenship, and on mutuality, reciprocity and mutual recognition by stakeholders at the national, regional, continental and global levels. This was the link between democracy and development, not only as a national and continental imperative, but also as a global one to bring about a new international political and economic order.

a) The APRM had the potential to redeem and restructure the anti-people bias of much of post-independence African development in view of its potential to bridge the divide between the African political elite and African peoples by providing and institutionalizing a domestic accountability mechanism in its governance systems, thereby replacing external accountability to the donor community by domestic accountability. In that respect, the APRM process was an indispensable vehicle for conducting a grand, national policy debate about the past, pre-
sent and future of APRM member States in an open, frank and non-intimidating manner and environment. It had therefore created new spaces for citizen participation in public affairs. In that respect, as one participant observed, the APRM provided a niche that progressive Africans could use to create a better understanding of democracy, as well as greater awareness of the political issues at stake, and in the process facilitated the promotion of continental African citizenship.

b) A major potential contribution of the APRM to national, regional and continental politics was its serving as an early-warning mechanism to avert national crisis and its ripple effect in neighbouring countries and, in some cases, across Africa. This was clearly stated in the idea of the APRM as enunciated in the APRM base document. The value of the APRM and of heeding the prognostications of impending national crisis in country review reports was illustrated by the 2007 general elections crisis in Kenya and the outbursts of xenophobic attacks on non-national Africans in South Africa.

c) The APRM facilitated the promotion of an African developmental State.

d) There was a significant role for civil society organizations in APRM country, regional and continental processes in continuing to ensure the expansion of political spaces in order to prevent democratic reversals and the narrowing of political spaces. But they needed to be provided with the appropriate human, material and managerial capacities.

Promotion…and…Consolidation...

a) One major challenge was how to ensure that the APRM reports and recommendations were appropriately acknowledged by reviewed countries, sufficiently distributed and made available to the public, and adopted accordingly. Kenya was noted as one country that appeared to have ignored such recommendations, with grim consequences for ordinary people, as manifested during and after the 2007 general elections.

b) While the leading role in the initiative for the APRM came from a number of leaders, there were also many actors who played crucial roles, as well as many undercurrents that went into the struggle to bring it about. In that respect, the fears about its sustainability once the APRM founding initiators had left the stage – that it would fall into desuetude – were not well-founded. However, the issue of the sustainability and consolidation of the APRM continental and country processes at all levels – National, Eminent Person to Peer Forum – had to be seriously considered and measures taken to ensure that the momentum that had galvanized the process in recent times was not lost. Both the Forum and the Panel had originally been dynamic and committed, but that was no longer the case. Hence the need to revisit the Forum and the methodologies for peer review.
c) There was a pressing need to address problems associated with the APRM Country Self-Assessment Methodology, which, in the view of many, is cumbersome and repetitive, while the questionnaire, which is the backbone and foundation of the APRM process, omits or pays inadequate attention to some key governance issues, such as media freedom, the informal sector, youth, and climate change, and there are no clear guidelines for its administration.

d) No less problematic was the division of the APRM country process into five-stages, particularly the time frame within which it had to be completed. It was symptomatic of the problem that the time frame had varied from one member State to another. There seemed to be some consensus on the need to streamline it.

e) The peer process stages also needed to be revisited in order to identify the most critical phases of the entire process.

**Protection…**

A deepening of the African regional and continental integration processes was needed. In order to ensure the success of NEPAD/APRM, safeguards had to be provided against three kinds of “institutional gamble”: against NEPAD/APRM being ‘hijacked’ and appropriated by foreign forces, notably the forces of “liberal imperialism” and “liberal internationalism”; against NEPAD/APRM national and continental processes becoming routine, to avoid their becoming formalities, i.e. institutions for the legitimization of non-democratic processes providing cover for corruption; and lastly, against their becoming an extension of State-driven policy, devoid of popular voices and popular participation.

**Leadership**

Leaders and leadership, sincerity and commitment were critical to the performance and sustainability of the APRM. At the country process level, commitment and political will by the political leadership was vital in order to move the process ahead.

**African Perspectives**

The reiteration of an endogenous African development vision and strategy firmly based on defining and animating Pan-African principles of self-reliance, respect for human dignity and racial pride, as critical drivers of African development had to be a prime objective of NEPAD and the APRM.

a) Africa needed a developmental State. In the crafting and promotion of an appropriate African developmental State, African intellectuals and policymakers should engage the Chinese and learn from their experiences.
b) Africans needed to determine what kind of democracy was needed or suitable; what kind of future society and economy was desirable; and the culture and work ethics appropriate to emerging 21st century challenges and opportunities.

**Role of ECA**

In relation to NEPAD/APRM, ECA had played and should continue to play a critical role analogous to that of a continental African applied/policy research think tank on democracy and development, an incubator, and producer of indigenous African ideas-based knowledge to solve practical problems, inform policy, and a distiller of policy to rethink and reshape such ideas in order to produce new knowledge, even in the face of difficulties and great odds. It was noted that the ECA focus and programmes on the APRM were very much in line with the historic role it continued to play in Africa. ECA should therefore take the lead and drive the initiative to write a book on the APRM from an African perspective, with a chapter devoted to narrating the history of the APRM, how it came into being in Africa and the initiatives taken by Africans in order to fill a gap in the literature, which had generally been dominated by scholars from the West.
Part II
Concept Paper

I. Introduction

Created by NEPAD and inaugurated only a few years ago, the APRM is a bold and unique African initiative; and although in its present configuration the APRM is a ‘work-in-progress’, its achievements so far are very encouraging. As it continues to operate, expand its membership and thus gain more expertise and experience, explore hitherto inaccessible governance domains, expose new governance deficiencies, and identify emerging ‘best practices’, the APRM is also likely to encounter new challenges and opportunities.

Moreover, if the objectives of the APRM are inadequately understood by the people or the review process is inappropriately utilized by those joining or steering it – Member States, African political leaders, the Panel and Forum – inefficiently or incompetently managed by those entrusted with its administration or cynically manipulated by African governments, it is likely to be discredited. Thus, while the APRM is obviously a major and revolutionary African innovation and arguably critical to the promotion of the ‘African Renaissance’, there is also the possibility that its efficiency, credibility, legitimacy and popular support will be undermined if its mission, rationale, meaning, objectives and place in African development thinking is not sufficiently understood by all the stakeholders, as well as those steering and managing it.

So far studies and research on the APRM have mainly been on the identification and clarification of its objectives; instrumentalities and processes; standards and procedures; how the mechanism performs its functions; its achievements so far; and the challenges and prospects for the future. Other studies have focused on the role and expected performance of the various stakeholders, in particular civil society and other non-State actors. On the whole, they have mainly concerned the clarity of the objectives and the efficiency with which the Mechanism, including its administrative support, can perform its functions effectively.

The main objective of the study is to explore the genesis and rationale of the APRM, in order to broaden, deepen and promote understanding of the meaning and significance of the APRM process; explore the implications and impact of the review processes on the various stakeholders and experiences so far achieved for Africa’s governance systems and development in general; demonstrate that peer review is
not primarily a dialogue amongst African Heads of State or Government, but rather a comprehensive national dialogue that engages the entire body politic that has participated in the process.

This study also seeks to further expand, deepen and enrich intellectual understanding of the genesis and rationale of the APRM, its objectives and processes within the context of modern African historical experience, the struggles for independence and nation-building, development and democratization efforts, thus placing it in the mainstream of African development thought over the last five decades.

The study seeks to answer the following basic questions. What is the APRM? What is it all about? How has it performed so far? What achievements has it made, expected and unexpected? What challenges have arisen or are likely to arise? What does the APRM mean to the various stakeholders: governments, civil society organizations, the people, the private sector, development partners, indeed, to the continent and the African peoples?

Why the need for an APRM now, after more than five decades of independence? Is it an external imposition, gentle, friendly persuasion or Africans’ own judgment and decisions, resolution and commitment? What was the genesis of the APRM in the African development discourse? Is it the product of evolutionary intellectual and political process, ideas insights and reflections on governance and development issues or is it a creative adaptation of a foreign ‘best practice’? Where might the process take Africa? What are its ultimate objectives? How can Africa achieve them? By what means or processes and involving whom and what?
These are critical questions. Answering them will promote a better understanding of the rationale for the APRM, evaluate its effectiveness in the performance of its functions; how it is expected to sustain and consolidate its achievements; and its capacity to respond effectively to the emerging challenges and opportunities as the peer processes gain momentum, with increasing numbers of new members, expanding the volume of responsibilities, adding more complexities as it explores and exposes governance issues, enriching the corpus of ‘best practices’ and experiences to be discussed, debated and exchanged.

The contention...

Since emancipation from slavery and the final phases of the anti-colonial struggles, African peoples – indigenous and those in the Diaspora – have been concerned with the long-standing impact of these phenomena on their dignity, and the perceived image that they were hapless and helpless, unable to manage their own affairs or design their future without external help or direction. They have thus been engaged in redeeming and rehabilitating their externally imposed status, expressing visions of the future – and the means by which they could, or should, be implemented – in which Africans could live in peace and harmony, nurture and consolidate their societies according to their own values, cultures and traditions, create and manage their economies in support of their needs and demands, wishes and aspirations, not influenced, guided or directed by any other peoples; and be able to create the necessary conditions in which people can freely engage in various economic, creative and cultural activities and, in the process, contribute to the promotion of development and the welfare of all the people, ensuring that they project African perspectives and ownership, and are not made captives of external forces or the manipulations of other people.

Visions are often inspired by reminiscences of past events and experiences, analysis and evaluation of present conditions, and created by a conjunction of ideas, resolution, commitment and purposeful actions to project the desired future. Equipped with the appropriate knowledge, skills, competence,

The African is anxious that his attitude of mind, his approach to problems, should be identified as an African approach. After independence is won, he wants to see that Africa is recognized on her own merits. This desire has led to a determination to establish ‘the African personality’…a reaction from colonialism, intended to wipe away the constant references by people in other parts of the world to Africa in terms of British Africa, French Africa, Belgian Africa or Portuguese Africa.

aspirations, motivations and the will power, people can create their own vision of the future. By constructing alternative scenarios, people can envision various possibilities in the future that they could strive to achieve. That future could be a life of abundance, prosperity, peace, security and stability.

Historically it has always been people with an appropriately informed and clearly articulated vision, coupled with the requisite capabilities and will power, who have been successful in creating a future of their own making. As circumstances changed, they have attempted to re-evaluate and review the means and processes by which the visions were implemented and to reformulate or fine-tune the visions, thus enabling them to be flexible and adapt to changing circumstances. Articulation of visions and review of the means by which they are implemented are thus continuous processes. Those without such capabilities have been left behind and often become victims of the changes or overwhelmed by the expansive ambitions of the successful.

NEPAD is the product of the experience and insights gained by African leaders in their collective attempts to better understand the exigencies of the African socio-economic development and democratization processes in a world that is rapidly changing, inexorably and increasingly interdependent. It also symbolizes African resolution and determination to redeem the past and rehabilitate the African image; to inject the African perspective on governance and development issues, articulating the principles and standards, rules and procedures, practices and processes; as well as asserting African ownership of the prescription and implementation of appropriate policies.
NEPAD represents a vision, the most recent in a series of many visions crafted by Africans in the course of the long African historical struggles for freedom and independence from slavery, through colonialism and the anti-colonial struggles, the exploitation and marginalization of the international capitalist economic system, and the disorientations of the Cold War. It expresses the objectives – the critical components of the vision – and prescribes the principles and procedures, codes and standards, institutions and processes that support the objectives and how they should be adopted and sustained. Its underlying political and philosophical principles and the organizational prescriptions have therefore been part of the African development thinking since Africans achieved independence five decades ago.

The APRM provides the mechanism and participatory processes for identifying governance deficiencies, verifying the adoption and consolidation of the declared pre-conditions for the achievement of the socio-economic and political objectives of NEPAD – the major components of the vision – and promotion of the African Renaissance.

...Outline of the Concept Paper

Both NEPAD and the APRM are products of historical experiences, and African political and development thinking. This paper is divided into four sections. The first briefly reviews the impact of external forces on Africa and the African peoples which informed, influenced and inspired African struggles for freedom and rehabilitation, independence and self-reliance, to be masters of their own affairs, responsible for ensuring their own future of peace and prosperity for all the people.

In order to better understand the historical context within which the events and experiences took place, the prevailing ideas and ideologies, and domestic African responses, the socio-economic and
political changes, and the successes and failures of African initiatives, leaders and peoples grappling with the tasks of decolonization, nation building, development, governing and the democratization processes that led to the crafting of NEPAD and its supportive mechanism, the APRM, the review is divided into distinct historical phases which are examined in the second section.

Although the APRM is an independent operational mechanism, it is a device crafted by NEPAD to verify and ensure the adoption of the preconditions essential to the promotion and achievement of the overall objective of NEPAD. Therefore, in order to enrich the intellectual exploration of the rationale for the APRM and thus promote a better understanding of what the APRM is all about, its achievements so far and the likely future challenges, the genesis of NEPAD, its objectives and the prescribed means by which they are expected to be promoted, sustained and consolidated are reviewed in section III. It demonstrates that the creators of NEPAD were informed and influenced by historical events and the experiences of the African peoples; that they were aware of past initiatives, their failures and successes; and that they were determined to rectify the past, creatively and purposefully confront the present and resolutely prepared to respond to the challenges of the 21st century. The last section identifies some of the major achievements of the APRM, emerging issues, challenges and opportunities.

II. History Revisited

Modern African history is characterized by three powerful external forces whose impact on and damage to African societies and economies continue to inspire the determination, resolution and commitment of African leaders to collective and purposeful action in order to: redeem past humiliations, rehabilitate the African personality, assert its dignity and the contribution Africa and Africans have made to the development of ancient civilizations; and to ensure that Africans are independent, capable of protecting and promoting their interests, and crafting and managing their own destiny.

Slavery and colonialism undermined and distorted African economies, depopulated and fractured African societies, depersonalized and degraded African peoples. Africans became ‘possessed’ means of production for the development and enrichment of other peoples’ economies and societies. Their human efforts – labour – and natural resources were appropriated and exploited for the benefit of slave masters and colonial rulers. Slavery destroyed the growth potential of the economies of many African societies. It disoriented and humiliated Africans in the Diaspora as well as in their original homes. Colonialism appropriated and occupied African territories; ruled, determined and controlled their destinies; exploited human and material resources for the benefit of the colonial powers; discriminated against and marginalized Africans in the management of their affairs in their own countries. The global economic system further exploited the African continent, relegating and marginalizing Africans.
The abolition of slavery was largely brought about by external forces, influenced and supported by religious and humanitarian considerations, as well as ‘rationalism’ since slavery was becoming ‘antiquated’ and comparatively expensive compared to the new means of production introduced by the Industrial Revolution. Freedom from colonial rule, on the other hand, was largely brought about by the anti-colonial struggles conducted and managed by Africans themselves. Modern African States are thus largely the creation of the colonial rulers, structured, exploited and governed for the benefit of the imperial powers. But modern African nations – and societies – are exclusively the product of the first and subsequent generations of African leaders and their supporters.

Whilst engaged in the anti-colonial struggles for self-rule, African leaders were also mindful of the history of slavery. On achieving independence, some African leaders continued to be haunted by the phenomenon of slavery and its generic impact on the African peoples, their societies and economies, and appeared to be preoccupied by the urge to redeem African dignity, honour and self-respect; to ensure that Africans acquire the capabilities to be in charge of their own affairs, craft, manage and control their own destinies, and are never again enslaved or colonized, exploited or disregarded, discriminated against or humiliated.

The more reflective and ‘revolutionary’ African leaders, conscious of their historical role in the expected ‘African Renaissance’, regarded independence not merely as a timely replacement of alien rule by the indigenous peoples, but more importantly as a precious opportunity to reclaim African’s lost dignity and honour, self-respect and self-reliance; and to create new African societies and nations, with their people living in harmony, peace and security, active and productive, promoting
Years of Arab slave raiding, and later years of European domination, had caused our people to have grave doubts about their own abilities. This was no accident; any dominating group seeks to destroy the confidence of those they dominate because this helps them to maintain their position, and the oppressors in Tanganyika were no exception. Indeed, it can be argued that the biggest crime of oppression and foreign domination, in Tanganyika and elsewhere, is the psychological effect it has on the people who experienced it. A vital task for any liberation movement must therefore be to restore the people’s self-confidence...


...development and the welfare of all the people, guided by a system of governance most appropriate and meaningful to the peoples themselves.

As the inevitability of independence was gradually dawning, there were some doubts as to the exact timing of independence and whether Africans had the quality of leadership and competence to rule themselves. In 1957 the Gold Coast was the first African country to become independent, as Ghana, and Kwame Nkrumah was the first black African to successfully organize an anti-colonial campaign against British rule. Expectations in the rest of Africa were then very high, and so were

And while yet we are making our claim for self-government, I want to emphasize... that self-government is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end, to the building of the good life to the benefit of all, regardless of tribe, creed, colour or station in life. Our aim is to make this country a worthy place for all its citizens, a country that will be a shining light throughout the whole continent of Africa, giving inspiration far beyond its frontiers. And this we can do by dedicating ourselves to unselfish service to humanity. We must learn from the mistakes of others so that we may, in so far as we can, avoid a repetition of those tragedies which have overtaken other human societies.

Kwame Nkrumah, The Motion of Destiny, 1953
What we do assert is something quite different; what we have set our hands to here is the establishment of a civilized State in which the values and standards are to be the values and standards of Britain, in which everyone, whatever his origins, has an interest and a part...

...For the truth is that the only way in which the multitude of East African tribes can hope to enjoy the benefits of civilized government, both central and local, now and for generations to come, before they have become themselves civilized, and thereby to have the opportunity to become civilized, is under the forms of colonial government...administered by a strong and enlightened colonial power and directed, as British colonial policy has been for centuries...


the stakes. British colonialism was based on the assumption that Africans were not capable of governing themselves and managing their economic affairs. It was a trusteeship, imposed upon the British by virtue of the fact that they, the British, were more civilized than the Africans.

Obviously, this unilaterally imposed assumption of superiority was not accepted by Africans. Still, there were questions in the air. Were the people of the Gold Coast ready for independence? Had the British properly civilized, sufficiently educated, these Africans to manage their own affairs? Would Ghana – the new, independent erstwhile African colonial territory – prove to be a good or bad example for the rest of colonial Africa, which was then struggling for independence? Ghana’s independence was thus a test in two senses: one, British recognition – or judgment – of the African capacity for self-rule; and two, Ghanaians’ capabilities to sustain self-rule with prosperity, fairness and justice. Barbara Jackson, the British academic, succinctly articulated the prevailing liberal stance on the issue:

“Since, however, the crucial question throughout Africa is now and will be for decades to come whether or to what degree the African can take responsibility for his own destiny, the Gold Coast experiment has more than the simple interest of novelty. It will inevitably be watched by Africans and non-Africans as the proving ground of African maturity” (Jackson, p. 55).
If we can make a success of our endeavours it will be a demonstration to the world that a former tropical African colonial territory is as able and capable of conducting its own affairs as any country in the world. This will be an event of tremendous significance.

If on the other hand we fail, we show ourselves disunited, inefficient, or corruptible, then we shall have gravely harmed all these millions in Africa who put their trust in us and looked to Ghana to prove that African people can build a State of their own based on democracy, tolerance and racial equality.

Kwame Nkrumah, “Speech on a Motion by the Prime Minister, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, for an Address to Her Majesty the Queen in the Ghana Parliament on 6 March, 1957” (mimeo)

Acknowledging the importance of Ghana being the first black African country to be independent, Kwame Nkrumah, its first Prime Minister and later President, said: “Our most important contribution to the movement for the independence of colonial peoples will be the force of our example”.

Africa was also about to join the international community of independent sovereign nations; and to have the opportunity, hitherto denied by colonialism, to shape her own future and to contribute to international peace and security and, possibly, world civilization. Would Ghana be able to make such contributions? Did Nkrumah, the African, have the personal qualities and capabilities to provide an exemplary African leadership for the rest of the world to see and respect? Was he, or could he be, the African equivalent of India’s Jawaharlal Nehru or Malaysia’s Tunku Abdulrehman?

III. Historical Phases

1960-1970: The Post-colonial Period

Within three years of Ghana’s independence, a record number of African countries achieved their independence. Africans seemed to have arrived on the world stage, and were ready and eager to make their mark on world history. That independence would enable Africans – as Africans and not as appendages or shadows of other peoples – to make a contribution to humanity and world civilization. The period began with tremendous euphoria of rising expectations and beliefs by Africans
...the 1960s can be – and must be – the crucial ‘decade of development’ – the period when many less developed nations make the transition into self-sustained economic growth – the period in which an enlarged community of free, suitable and self-reliant nations can reduce world tensions and insecurity.

President J.F Kennedy, The President’s Message to Congress, 1961

– and some external well-wishers –that independence and unity provided the basis for the solution of all their problems.

Political independence was perceived as the essential condition that would facilitate the promotion of economic growth, development and welfare for all the African peoples. Political organization and mobilization were thus regarded as the most critical components of the nation building and development processes. It was Kwame Nkrumah, leader of the first black African country to become independent, who established the primacy of politics in African political economy when he said: “Seek ye first the political kingdom and the rest will be added unto you”.

The first decade of independence was in many ways exhilarating; partly because independence itself was a novelty and partly because there were many things Africans could now do which in the...
...Africa now has an opportunity to build an ethic appropriate to the development of a good and stable society or allow one to develop which contains the seeds of future strife and confusion...It is my belief that we in Africa must seize the opportunity we now have, so that a new attempt can be made to synthesize the conflicting needs of man as an individual and as a member of society

...the opportunity [created by independence] is before us provided we have the courage to seize it. For the choice is not between change and no change; the choice for Africa is between changing or being changed – changing our lives under our own direction or being changed by the impact of forces outside our control. In Africa there is no stability in this twentieth century; stability can only be achieved through balance during rapid change.


colonial period they could not. Indeed, to some African leaders independence represented a unique window of opportunity that would and could allow Africans to create societies based on their own visions, different from those imposed on them by the colonial powers.

The first generation of African leaders was faced with three major challenges. One was the management of the inherited colonial State machinery, the economy, and the maintenance of law, order and stability. In many African countries there were not enough Africans with the required technical skills and professional knowledge and experience to run a modern nation-State. In some countries, the so-called multi-racial societies where European or Asian minorities were dominant in the economic and commercial sectors of the country, the problems were quite serious, and urgent. Popular perceptions of independence implied that Africans must be seen to be in control, occupying key positions in the economy and society. Yet non-Africans – citizens or non-citizens – occupied most of the important and sensitive positions in the private and public sectors.

Another challenge was the promotion of African unity. The quest for unity precipitated controversial debates, based on divergent ideological convictions and influenced by international political and economic support. The third challenge was the formulation of an ideology that could galvanize the enthusiasm, talents, skills and energies of the ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse peoples to work and live together in peace, security and stability, promote economic development – pro-
ducing the goods and services needed by the people – build the new nation, promote its interests and defend its sovereignty. Nostalgia for the pre-colonial communal African past, coupled with the apparent success of the Soviet Union and Communist China in rebuilding their societies and feeding their peoples, convinced a number of African leaders of the relevance of socialism to their own post-colonial situations. But what kind of socialism and how to implement it were debatable issues. Some leaders espoused Fabian socialism and others modified Keynesianism, and a scattered few were intrigued, though not yet seduced, by Marxism-Leninism. But all of them believed in a strong central political authority and the State as the engine of economic growth and nation building.

At these early stages of decolonization, as Africans were evolving – or groping towards – their own political ideology in response to the challenge of creating new societies, nation building and development from the accumulated impacts of colonialism and the international capitalist economic system, the notion of socialism appeared very attractive. Socialism conveyed the imperative of the community, equality and a better future echoing, precisely, the galvanizing impetus of the anti-colonial struggles and the expectations of new societies of freedom, dignity and self-respect, sufficiency and welfare for all the people. In most parts of Africa the term ‘capitalism’ was associated with colonialism and, as most of the domestic capital was foreign-owned, even the incipient African businessmen linked its origins with the colonizing powers. Although the communists insisted that there was only one route to socialism, various advocates of African socialism argued that there was a non-communist, African road to socialism. African socialism was presented as a rejection of foreign ideologies, as well as a declaration and manifestation of Africans’ determination to formulate an ideology based on their own cultures and traditions, realities and expectations.

The colloquium on ‘The African Road to Socialism’, convened by President Senghor and held in Dakar from 3 to 8 December 1962, provided the first major platform for the advocates and protagonists of African socialism to articulate, debate and defend their interpretations of African socialism.

Our road to socialism must be a road designed and charted in accordance with the conditions and circumstances of Africa as a whole. We do not therefore seek to copy the methods by which other countries have achieved socialism within their own States. Indeed, the path to socialism followed by many countries has not been one worked out in accordance with a pre-conceived plan.

Virtually all the presentations of African socialism rejected the inevitability of the class struggle, and instead insisted that the bases of African socialism were the ethical and cultural norms of African traditional societies, the underlying principles of reciprocity and solidarity of the African community.

African socialism was thus projected as the most popular and ‘legitimizing’ ideology for nation building and development; and a country putatively based on the ethical principles and ideals of the traditional society became ‘socialist’ – the vision – of the individual African States that adopted it. This applied even to those African countries that opted for the modified versions of Keynesianism. Because of the unacceptability of the label ‘capitalism’ in those early years of decolonization, these countries presented their ideologies as African socialism, although they might contain some elements associated with capitalism.

1963 marked the first major post-colonial African attempts to institutionalize the processes of promoting African unity and determining its ultimate objectives in a binding or respected Charter. Pan-Africanism was the vision of the African peoples – those on the continent and in the Diaspora – and once African countries became independent the fulfilment of the vision on the continent – African unity – became the passion and commitment of all African leaders. However, now that the erstwhile dependent countries were independent, with their own elected leaders exercising and enjoying political power within the sovereignty of their respective countries, and had adopted different ideologies as their respective national visions, both the objectives of African unity and the methods by which they could be promoted and achieved became hotly contested issues during the deliberations on the drafting of the Charter.

*The practice of African Socialism involves trying to see what is relevant and good in these African customs to create new values in the changing world of the money economy, to build an economy which reflects the thinking of the great majority of the people. Few Africans are so Westernized and de-tribalized that these attitudes no longer have their hold on them...The challenge of African Socialism is to use these traditions to find a way to build a society in which there is a place for everybody, where everybody shares both in poverty and in prosperity, and where emphasis is placed upon production by everyone, with security for all.*

Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After*, p. 167
The disagreement eventually crystallized into two groups or schools of thought: Monrovia and Casablanca; and two major contestants: Presidents Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. The issues were: should continental political unity be brought about immediately with one major decisive action or should it be a long-term objective, brought about gradually through the consolidation of the newly independent nation-states, and the purposeful creation of sub-regional groups as the building blocks? Led by President Nkrumah, the Monrovia group argued for the immediate establishment of continental unity. President Nyerere won the day, and the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter became at once the accomplishment of a vision and the major mechanism for creating the ultimate vision, that of the African Union. Since then, nation-building and development at the national level have had priority.

The Charter was obviously a product of compromises and reluctant concessions on the issues of boundaries and sovereignty, particularly on the part of the Monrovia group, which, subsequently, created serious problems in terms of coordinated strategies and actions. Confirmation of the colonial boundaries reinforced the artificiality of African States created by the colonial rulers with complete disregard for the contiguousness of the ethnic diversities that later engulfed African leaders in boundary disputes and various political and armed conflicts that consumed their energies, time, talents and resources. It is, however, noteworthy that many African States committed themselves to the eradication of poverty, illiteracy and preventable diseases and were, to that extent, promoting the OAU vision.

Although the period was characterized by the euphoria of independence and optimism for the future, it was, sadly, also a decade that witnessed a series of military coups and assassinations of political leaders, which later became the expected features of independent Africa. The attempted secession of the Shaba Province of the Congo, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1960 and the use of foreign mercenaries in the region; the army mutinies in East Africa and the revolution in Zanzibar in 1964; the overthrow of the Nigerian Government and the assassination of the Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, in January 1966 and, in the following month, the military coup against President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, all demonstrated how fragile African States were and how vulnerable they could be to the Cold War and ideological intrigues.

By the end of the decade Africa had produced two major visions. One was African Socialism, articulated by individual African leaders; the other was African unity, manifested in the OAU Charter, a collective product created through contentious processes whose consequences reverberated for many years. Still, the vision of unity was powerful enough to arouse enthusiasm for and commitment to the total decolonization and independence of Africa, and to energize support for African liberation movements, as was the determination of some African leaders to ensure that Africa and Africans would never again be humiliated, exploited and disregarded.
It was in the course of this period that African States were exposed to the realities of the emerging global village, an inter-dependent and rapidly changing world, but one still dominated by the international capitalist system and, for Africans, influenced by the exigencies of the Cold War. The actions or inaction of certain other countries impacted on them and African leaders found themselves unable or indecisive as to how to respond. By then, a large part of Africa was under military rule and many African leaders were sensitized to the possibilities of being overthrown by their own armies. It was feared that many African States were on the verge of collapse. Economic difficulties were mounting, social tensions were evident and potential or real violent ethnic conflicts were reported in many African countries. Social and economic inequalities were deepening. The economic and social burden on the majority of the people was becoming unbearable.

It was then clear that the previous development strategies had failed and African leaders appeared unsure or undecided as to what needed to be done, unable or unwilling to undertake the necessary reforms and improve the situation. The debates begun in the previous decade regarding the appropriate development ideologies – socialism or capitalism – continued with increased passion and conviction in the 1970s. It was a period of intense intellectual reflection, rethinking and strategizing for the future of the continent and its peoples, and the beginning of earnest concerns about the status and fate of Africa in the international community and, in light of existential problems and global changes, about what kind of Africa and Africans were emerging, and what Africans could themselves do to preserve and protect the essential societal, cultural and environmental character of the continent and promote the interests of the people. A new vision for the future was thus needed. But should a vision be crafted by Africans themselves, by other peoples, or should it be left to evolve through the workings of the international economic and political forces impacting on the continent and its peoples? These were fundamental issues of African perspectives and ownership.

We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution – a revolution which brings to an end our weakness, so that we are never again exploited, oppressed, or humiliated.

Julius Nyerere, The Arusha Declaration, 1967

1970-1980: The Realities of Independence

It was in the course of this period that African States were exposed to the realities of the emerging global village, an inter-dependent and rapidly changing world, but one still dominated by the international capitalist system and, for Africans, influenced by the exigencies of the Cold War. The actions or inaction of certain other countries impacted on them and African leaders found themselves unable or indecisive as to how to respond. By then, a large part of Africa was under military rule and many African leaders were sensitized to the possibilities of being overthrown by their own armies. It was feared that many African States were on the verge of collapse. Economic difficulties were mounting, social tensions were evident and potential or real violent ethnic conflicts were reported in many African countries. Social and economic inequalities were deepening. The economic and social burden on the majority of the people was becoming unbearable.

It was then clear that the previous development strategies had failed and African leaders appeared unsure or undecided as to what needed to be done, unable or unwilling to undertake the necessary reforms and improve the situation. The debates begun in the previous decade regarding the appropriate development ideologies – socialism or capitalism – continued with increased passion and conviction in the 1970s. It was a period of intense intellectual reflection, rethinking and strategizing for the future of the continent and its peoples, and the beginning of earnest concerns about the status and fate of Africa in the international community and, in light of existential problems and global changes, about what kind of Africa and Africans were emerging, and what Africans could themselves do to preserve and protect the essential societal, cultural and environmental character of the continent and promote the interests of the people. A new vision for the future was thus needed. But should a vision be crafted by Africans themselves, by other peoples, or should it be left to evolve through the workings of the international economic and political forces impacting on the continent and its peoples? These were fundamental issues of African perspectives and ownership.
In 1977 the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) held a major conference in Dakar, Senegal on “Africa and the Problematique of the Future”. The conference was headed by the Director of IDEP, Samir Amin, one of the most distinguished African scholars and researchers, and was attended by leading left-leaning African academics, policymakers and representatives of the incipient civil society organizations. IDEP was the major UNeca-supported research and training institute based in Africa with an exclusively African mandate, while CODESRIA was, and still is, the leading and most independent non-governmental African research and training organization. The conference concluded that “with the removal of the comprador class in Africa” the ongoing crisis would be resolved, and presented an optimistic socialist vision of Africa.

In 1979 the Governors of the African Development Bank (AfDB) requested the World Bank to undertake a study and report on the development problems of Sub-Saharan Africa. In the same year, the OAU, with the support of ECA, organized a symposium in Monrovia, Liberia to “take stock of the present, explore the future, determine our course of action in the years ahead and organize our solidarity”. Participating in the symposium were prominent Africans from various organizations, civil society and UN agencies participating in their personal, unofficial capacities.

Our ancient continent, our life-giving mother who bears within her the hopes of the world, is now on the brink of disaster, hurtling towards the abyss of confrontation, caught in the grip of violence, sinking into the dark night of bloodshed and death. Gone are the smiles, the joy, the life from its sombre face. Can there be nothing, nothing left but a hardening of attitudes, a heightening of antagonisms, the violent upsurge of fratricidal conflict?...no sooner has peace been made than it is broken, mediations come to naught, and the Organization of African Unity is rocked by disputes of an amazing diversity....Africa is no longer at peace.

Is it possible to believe that it is at least strengthening its economic potential that it is resolutely facing up to the challenge of development?

Edem Kodjo, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, What Kind of Africa by the Year 2000, 1979, p. 6
The symposium raised three important questions:

» What kind of Africa by the year 2000?
» What kind of development does Africa need?
» What kind of Africans do we wish to mould?

The symposium blamed the problems facing Africa largely on external forces, particularly the impact of colonialism, the working of the international economic system, and the “development plans and strategies implemented hitherto”. It criticized development strategies from “outside” based on theories of economic development intended to maintain the colonial pattern of economic production and life-styles. It rejected the notion of “catching-up” with the developed countries. It questioned the practice of African countries producing what they “do not eat”, and “eating what they do not produce”. It recommended self-sufficiency in food and urged the control of African natural resources by Africans and advocated education for “life” and not for “elites”. It abhorred the great “inequalities” and “conspicuous consumption” within African countries.

Many delegates denounced human rights violations and the lack of democracy in African countries. They complained about the neglect of women and their contribution to development. The delegates wanted development “which places mankind at the centre” instead of being “things-centred”. They encouraged school systems and the public to “… ‘reappropriate’ the traditional African cultural values of solidarity, mutual respect and attachment to the environment”. They wanted “democratization of the development process” and the “creation of the right political and social environment, the recovery of self confidence... and the willingness to achieve effective and meaningful cooperation among African States”. They stated that “We are profoundly convinced that, unless the basic freedoms are respected, the response will be subversion and repression and the start of a downward path to destruction. We are convinced that progress comes from criticism, self-criticism, tolerance – preconditions for this dignity to which we aspire”.

They proposed a “self-sustaining” and “self-reliant” economy and an “African common market”; they suggested the establishment of an “African Monetary Fund”, and the setting up of multinational African enterprises.

The symposium acknowledged that Africa was part of the world, but said Africans refused to be treated as “vassals”. It stated that by the end of the millennium it would develop a new, responsible and responsive cooperation, in which partnership would not be that of “a horse and rider” and freedom that of “a free fox in a free henhouse”. It would be that of interdependence based on mutual respect, equality and dignity.
Mindful of the coming millennium and the younger generation of Africans that was likely to lead the continent and its people and forming ‘future Africans’, the symposium stressed the importance of helping them “to become more responsible citizens and respecting their responsibilities, encouraging their participation in decision-making that concerns them. This is how we can best work towards a change for progress in Africa” (para. 61). However, that would require an end to the violence and socio-economic and political problems across the continent. “It is with this younger generation in mind that we have dreamed of a strategy of public safety”. It would be that generation “which will judge tomorrow whether or not we have betrayed it”. The symposium was thus very mindful of the kind of future African citizens that should be formed.

*We wish to be the agents of our own progress and no longer merely the beneficiaries of the progress made by others on our territories using our natural resources…* 

*We want to take over the management of all our own affairs and not merely participate in it to an extent dictated by other…* 

*The era of international division of labour is over. The time has come for the development of the creative autonomy of peoples within a readjusted exchange system…* 

The Symposium, paragraph 57
Meeting later in July of the same year in Monrovia, Liberia, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government endorsed the Monrovia Declaration, committing themselves “individually and collectively on behalf of our Governments and peoples to promote the social and economic development and integration of our economies with a view to achieving an increasing measure of self-reliance and self-sustainment… the economic integration of the African region in order to facilitate and reinforce social and economic intercourse”. They also committed themselves to the development of indigenous entrepreneurial and technical skills in order to enable Africans to assume greater responsibilities in the promotion of development; and to ensure that development policies “reflect adequately our socio-cultural values in order to reinforce our cultural identity”. They firmly believed that those commitments would facilitate the establishment of an “African Common Market leading to an African Economic Community”.

The Heads of State and Government further resolved that during their annual sessions they should pay special attention to the discussion of economic issues; and they exhorted the Administrative Secretary-General to work with ECA Executive Secretary to draw up annually economic co-operation measures and programmes at regional sub-regional and continental levels.

**1980-1990: From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to Structural Adjustment and Restructuring.**

From the inspired deliberations of the Monrovia Symposium – reasoned and passionate discussions and debates, self-criticism and rethinking, aspirations and resolutions for a better, equitable, prosperous and dignified Africa, informed and directed by the Monrovia Declaration – emerged the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, adopted by the Extraordinary Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government in Lagos in April 1980.

The LPA provided the framework, strategies and principles of the development programmes whose implementation would take Africa out of crisis into a new development paradigm: the LPA vision of future Africa. The programme included the following key principles:

- Self-reliance at the national, sub-regional and regional levels.
- Equitable distribution of wealth at all levels of the governance system, the most fundamental objective of the development programme, and thus the vision.
- The public sector was the critical agent in the promotion of development and should be appropriately strengthened and expanded.
- Inter-African economic cooperation and integration was equally critical and should accordingly be strengthened.
- Agriculture was prioritized, firstly to ensure food self-sufficiency, then exports. Member States were urged to stipulate specific yearly goals for food and agriculture at national and regional levels, and to establish a mechanism for regular monitoring. Secondly, industrialization to sat-
isfy basic needs; mining industries, to recover sovereignty over national resources; and human resources, science and technology to ensure availability of the skills required.

The Monrovia Symposium was the first ever entirely African gathering to discuss African conditions, review and reflect on the history of the African peoples, what had happened since Independence – lessons learned, experience, and insights gained – to discuss an alternative course for the future of Africa and Africans. In light of the historical background of the humiliation of slavery, exploitation and colonial oppression, portraying Africans as hapless and unfortunate people, unable to think, plan or manage their own affairs, the symposium was a great landmark. It proved that, if left alone, with freedom of expression and sufficiently empowered by knowledge and information, resolution and commitment, as they had been in Monrovia, Africans could study, reflect and analyze their conditions, discuss alternative courses of action and craft their future. More importantly, Monrovia demonstrated Africans’ determination to decolonize the future of Africa and Africans.

“Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings which justify their national and international protection and on the other hand that the reality and respect of peoples’ rights should necessarily guarantee human rights;

Considering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone;

Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay particular attention to the right to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights;

...Firmly convinced of their duty to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights and freedoms and taking into account the importance traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa;...”

Part II – Concept Paper

Apparently inspired by the spirit and earnestness of the proceedings and resolutions of the Monrovia Symposium, in June 1981 the Heads of State and Government of the OAU committed themselves to the endorsement and promotion of the *African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights*, the world’s first comprehensive charter on the rights of humankind. The definitions of human rights had in the past invariably been derived from external sources, reflecting the experience and values of the drafters of the charters or conventions. African perspectives or cultural values were rarely included in the crafting of the rights. Whereas western societies tend to value individualism, African societies are basically communitarian, characterized by ethnic, cultural and religious diversities; solidarity, empathy and reciprocity. Certain categories of people have rights that are specific to their very being, those that collectively constitute the kind of people they are and the societies in which they live.

Still, by the beginnings of the 1980s the economic, social and political problems in most African countries had reached crisis proportions. The “nightmare scenarios” predicted in the previous decade had developed into daily realities. African countries had failed to generate and sustain economic growth to meet the needs of their expanding populations. Many were facing a crisis of survival. Balance of payments problems were endemic and increasingly unbearable. Long-term economic planning (five-year plans) was no longer possible. The basic strategies that emerged were survival, “crisis-management” and “maintaining the saveable”. Harsh realities had to be faced, new issues acknowledged and alternative strategies adopted.

There were fears that even the gains made in the previous decades of independence might be lost. Ethnic tensions, food riots and measures to maintain law and order characterized many African countries. A number of African countries were gradually slipping back into dependency, this time on the World Bank, (WB) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the international development community.

In 1981 the World Bank published its long awaited report “*Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*”, commonly known as the *Berg Report* after its leading consultant. Unlike the LPA, the report contended that “domestic policy issues” were the main causes of Africa’s problems. It discounted the historical causes and the external shocks impacting on African economies and societies. The report recommended emphasis on agriculture, in particular for export, trimming the public sector and encouraging private enterprise, drastically reducing real wages and removing subsidies. In short, the report insisted on “retooling” African economies, with emphasis on growth based on free enterprise, production for export and a ‘minimal State’. Some of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) – or conditionalities – subsequently imposed by the WB and IMF compelled African countries to devalue their currencies, raise interest rates, withdraw food subsidies and social services, and reduce levels of government involvement in business and productive activities. As part
of the strategy of restricting the role of the State, the report strongly encouraged the development of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

ECA had consistently warned African governments and the world at large of the persistent negative trends and their impact on the continent. The Commission undertook two long-term studies on the future prospects of Africa:

» ECA and Africa’s Development 1983-2008: A Preliminary Perspective Study
» Beyond Recovery: ECA Revised Perspective of Africa’s Development 1988-2008

In December 1984 the United Nations General Assembly, “Alarmed by the critical situation in Africa…”, and “Convinced of the need for concerted action…” adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa, registering the concern of the international community at the “worsening plight of African countries” and pledging its support, help and cooperation. It noted that the “maintenance of peace and security” was critical in meeting the challenges of development, and affirmed that “national policies and measures, such as those outlined in the Lagos Plan of Action … provide a framework for national and sub-regional action and international support”. The Declaration concluded:

“We are convinced that unless urgent action is taken the rapidly deteriorating situation in Africa may well lead to disaster. We are therefore fully committed to supporting the efforts of African countries to meet the dual challenge of survival and development by taking concerted and urgent measures commensurate with the needs outlined in the present Declaration”.

In the following year, 1985, meeting in Addis Ababa, the Heads of State and Government of the OAU issued Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990 (APPF). It reiterated “our full commitment to the principles and objectives” of the LPA “…which are more valid today than ever”, but in light of the existing circumstances resolved to focus on a five-year programme, which included the following measures:

» Accelerated implementation of the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos
» Prioritizing improvement of the food situation and rehabilitation of agriculture to alleviate drought conditions
» Alleviation of Africa’s external debt
» Measures to ensure a common platform for action at sub-regional, regional, continental and international levels
» Measures to alleviate the impact of government of Apartheid South Africa policies to destabilize neighbouring countries.
Although APPER acknowledged that Africa’s own shortcomings in development policies had contributed to the debt problems, on balance, external factors were more to blame. It also admitted that, although five years had elapsed since the adoption of the LPA, “little progress has been achieved in the implementation of the Plan and the Act”.


As the World Bank and the international development community insisted that ‘rethinking’ and a ‘fresh-look’ at African development problems were needed, an insistence that was encouraged by the end of the Cold War and the apparent failure of socialist development models, African governments were incrementally pressurized into reverting to Western conventional wisdom on development strategies, stressing growth within the framework of free enterprise. But the critical issue was how to create the essential preconditions – the enabling environment – in the African context in order to ensure that growth could be initiated and sustained, and development promoted.

In 1986 the World Bank, the Aga Khan Foundation and other international development agencies held a conference in Nairobi, Kenya on the Enabling Environment. In general, the conference recommended that all legitimate efforts had to be made and means used to mobilize resources for development in Africa. Hence the all-embracing catch-phrase: ‘Enabling Environment’. In effect, the Conference endorsed the World Bank ‘rethinking’ and supportive strategies. It was thus urged that, in order to survive and develop, Africa had to create the ‘environment’ in the African governance systems that would ‘enable’ people – nationals and foreigners – to apply their talents, skills, energies, entrepreneurial expertise, enterprise, etc. for personal profit and, in so doing, generate growth and development for the benefit of all the people. A timely reminder, in fact, that there was no substitute for the ‘invisible hand’ of personal gain and the residual societal benefits. It was also in this context that the SAPs – ‘conditionalities’ – were regarded as critical components of the new strategies, creating the preconditions for investment and productive activities.

Thus, in the course of the 1980s and beyond, the dominant development strategy was the promotion of the private sector. This entailed economic liberalization and allowing market forces to play a key role in the allocation of resources; promotion of ‘good governance’, accountability and transparency in public affairs; policy and institutional reforms; support for NGOs and gender validation. This trend was further expanded and consolidated in 1989 by the publication of the World Bank report, “Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth”, a long-term perspective study (LTPS).
The LTPS was the largest study of African conditions the Bank had ever undertaken. It involved many leading African and non-African scholars, researchers, and policymakers, was extensive and participatory in its consultation, deliberation and preparation, comprehensive in scope and in-depth in its analysis. However, its basic assumptions on the causes of Africa’s problems were essentially similar to those of the Berg Report, and thus fundamentally different from those of the Monrovia Symposium and the LPA. So too were its prescriptions, although they were somewhat nuanced and broadly based on the selective inputs of the contributors, sensitive and responsive to issues raised, considerate and accommodating to the pressing needs of the people. They were supportive of the growth strategy, enhanced role of the private sector, the enabling environment, fundamental policy reforms, minimalist role of government, and the promotion of ‘good governance’.

As the imposition of SAPs continued to create very serious socio-economic and political problems in many African countries, causing riots in some countries as people lost their jobs, social services were cut, and poverty increased, creating real threats to societal peace and destabilization, ECA responded with an alternative structural reform strategy, The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Transformation (AAF-SAP), and recommended it to the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government for adoption as taking into account African perspectives on structural adjustment. By adopting the AAF-SAP, OAU member States were expected to abandon World Bank SAPs, which had been responsible for so much socio-economic and political pain. As it challenged the conventional wisdom, the AAF-SAP was not well received by the WB, IMF or the donor community and, as no support was forthcoming and no African coun-

For two-thirds of mankind living in Asia, Latin America and Africa – collectively called the Third World countries – life is still short and brutish. But even among the Third World countries, the situation is so grave in Africa that there is a growing belief that Africa is such a poor relation to Latin America and Asia that it should be categorized as constituting the Fourth World...In fact, unlike the other continents, the situation in Africa, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, is daily becoming aggravated. The distance in the political, economic and technological domains between the rest of the world and Sub-Saharan Africa is widening daily into a virtually unbridgeable gulf or, many may suggest, into an abyss.

Adebayo Adedeji, “Africa and Africans and Their Historic Challenge”, Convocation Lecture of the Eighth Convocation Ceremony of the University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria, 3 December, 1987, UNECA
try made provision for its implementation, it eventually became a dead letter. ECA Executive Secretary, Professor Adebayo Adeleji, described Africa towards the end of the 1980s as: “…the wretched of the earth, where the vast majority of the people are wallowing in poverty, misery and disease…”.

Thus, towards the end of the decade, and as the SAPs were creating more hardship, undermining the popularity and legitimacy of governments were unable – or constrained not – to provide essential public services, African leaders found themselves virtually no longer in control of their policy options. The gravity of the situation prompted Julius Nyerere, the former President of Tanzania, to lament bitterly: “And I see that even among the underdeveloped and poor, Africa is the most backward economically, the most vulnerable, and the most threatened by what is happening in the world, and within our continent”.

Ironically, however, the deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the impact of the SAPs produced two very important phenomena. One was the activation of civil societies, the creation of NGOs and various types of community-based organizations (CBOs) engaged in self-help, provision of services and promotion of community interests. The other was the involvement of some of these organizations in the defence of human rights and basic freedoms, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. The proliferation of NGOs and other civil society organizations, as well as political parties, each promoting and defending its interests, created new conflicts based on political, economic, cultural, religious, and philosophical differences and the means by which the interests could be promoted and sustained. But they also created opportunities for cooperation, networking and partnership amongst NGOs and the CBOs. The dynamics of interactions between the governments and the various organizations in the civil and private sectors, and the latter amongst

...The worst thing of all in Africa now, however, is that Africa is now reeling like an out-weighted boxer after fifteen rounds of punishment. There is a loss of morale, and of self-confidence among a large number of Governments and peoples of Africa. There is a feeling of hopelessness, a loss of the will to fight, and a desire to surrender. There is an intolerable feeling of dependence. We can’t even scream! We are afraid that the aid we now get might stop if we do scream, or if we argue against the powerful in the United Nations or GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Julius K. Nyerere, speaking to a Pan-African Committee of Artists and Intellectuals for Children in Bamako, Mali, March 7th 1989 (mimeo)
themselves immensely contributed to the emergence of active and vibrant civil societies across the continent.

**1990—2000: Paradigm Shifts...Rethinking and Reinventing**

With the end of the Cold War, the West no longer felt the need to protect its former allies, the African dictators, while those abandoned by the communists had their weaknesses suddenly exposed and were challenged by the people they had oppressed and repressed in the previous decades. Directly exposed to the people, many of whom were organized in political parties or NGOs and other civil society groups, some African leaders frustrated the political parties, others repressed the emergence of strong civil societies, while yet others resorted to the manipulation of ethnic sensitivities and fears.

Throughout Africa, people – particularly the immediate post-independence generation – had begun to be aware of their citizenship rights and obligations. They were better educated and well informed. They were worried about the existing socio-economic and political conditions in Africa.

The people wanted to participate in public affairs, but were constrained by existing structures of governance. Under one-party governments or military regimes people were not really involved in the decision-making processes that affected their lives and livelihood. These governments, characterized by the leadership of the ‘Big Man’, constrained and regulated civil societies, ostracized, ignored or marginalized some diversities and their traditional authorities, and abused their rights as well as those of other citizens.

Moreover, following the collapse of the communist development model and the disillusionment with authoritarian, top-down socialism, there emerged a wave of rethinking on the issue and essence of development: what it means, what it entails and how it can be promoted, sustained and consolidated, as well as the issues of freedom and democracy, what they mean, their role in the promotion of the development process; and, more importantly, the relationship between freedom, democracy and development. Is development possible without freedom? Is democracy possible without freedom and vice versa? Is freedom feasible in the absence of development? What is the role of the people – and in the case of Africa an amazing diversity of peoples – in the promotion of development?

These concerns and the determination of the people, particularly the young, post-independence generation who had lived all their lives under African governments, led to the **International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa**, held in Arusha, February, 1990. The conference was requested by African NGOs and sponsored by ECA. It was the first of its kind in Africa, a collaborative effort between African civil society organizations, NGOs and governments, and United Nations agencies, collectively exploring and promoting
a better understanding of the role of popular participation in the development and transformation of the continent. Like the Monrovia Symposium, the Arusha Conference candidly and passionately discussed African conditions and their underlying causes – domestic and external –, the dominant and restrictive roles of African governments, and the lack of popular participation in the development and democratization processes. Its conclusions and recommendations were condensed in The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation.

The core objective of the Charter was to inject a different approach into development thinking, that the people were the object of development and the means by which development was promoted. People were the beneficiaries of well-crafted and implemented development strategies, as well as the victims of inappropriate or inefficiently implemented development strategies. It was thus critical to ensure popular participation at all levels of the development processes. The Charter asserted “that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the people, nor can the economic crisis be resolved and the human and economic conditions improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people. After all, it is to the people that the very benefits of development should and must accrue” (para 7).

However, none of that could be brought about and sustained unless people were sufficiently empowered and the governance systems were appropriately structured, creating the enabling environment for the people to participate fully and effectively in the decision-making processes that affected their lives and livelihood. Under the prevailing conditions of the SAPs, African governments were compelled to take undemocratic actions, restricting the role of trade unions and professional...
associations, thus systematically disempowering people from participation in the development and democratization processes.

One of the most important measures adopted by the OAU in 1990 in response to what was taking place in the world and its impact on Africa was its declaration on the “Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World”. This was in response to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emerging concept of a common European home. The end of the Cold War precipitated fundamental changes in the political relations between African political leaders and their Western allies, while the emerging concept of a common European home made African leaders nervous about their role in the international community. It was feared that Europeans were more likely to be pre-occupied with their European affairs and the promotion of a common European destiny — vision — and less concerned with Africa and its problems; and more stringent in the deliberation and disbursement of assistance. Heads of State and Government were clearly perturbed by the changes taking place in the world and their impact on Africa. They were also very concerned about the WB-IMF “increasing tendency to impose conditionalities of a political nature for assistance to Africa”. They nonetheless stated their determination to promote “self-reliant human-centred development on the basis of social justice and collective self-reliance so as to achieve accelerated structural transformation of our economies”.

Apparently in support of the LTPS prescriptions and recommendations, donors organized themselves into the Global Coalition for Africa, (GCA). The GCA monitored African governments’ initiatives on governance reforms, organized several meetings, conducted seminars involving prominent African leaders, and sponsored research and publications on development issues and the promotion of good governance. GCA pioneered the preparation and publication of the national governance reports and the self-assessment initiatives amongst its African members.

In 1993, having eventually recognized the lasting damage inflicted by violent conflict, insecurity and instability, and their negative impact on foreign investment and development assistance, the Heads of State and Government met in Cairo, Egypt, and adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

In 1995 a major rethinking and reinventing took place within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with regard to development assistance to the developing countries, including Africa. At that time the OECD was responsible for over $60 billion of various types of aid to the developing countries. Every year following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the demise of communism, the disintegration of Eastern Europe and the impact those events had on the emerging democratic and popular participatory revolution across the world; coupled with globalization, the rise of market forces and the prospects for global competitiveness as the 21st century approached, European members of the OECD were forced to undertake certain governance reforms in their own countries, as well as a major review of their development assistance policies and practice.

Responsibility for rethinking and restructuring development assistance in the run-up to the new millennium was left to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the collective directorate of development policies of the OECD and an informal and formal think-tank. It coordinates the development policies of its member countries, exchanging views, information and experiences. The primary concern of the DAC was the role of development assistance and the principles and conditions under which Africans could be made to institute the necessary governance, institutional and policy reforms conducive to aid effectiveness. While the OECD countries undertook the necessary governance and other reforms in order to respond effectively to their own domestic issues and emerging global realities, African political leaders were unwilling to do the same in their countries. It thus seemed to the DAC that as long as aid to African countries was perceived by Africans as somewhat ‘forthcoming’ or ‘guaranteed’, African leaders would continue to be reluctant to undertake the necessary reforms.

From the DAC perspective, globalization was a phenomenon that could not be resisted. It was, however, threatening to some people – those unable to cope with it; but it also provided opportunities and possibilities to those who had the capabilities to respond to them speedily and effectively.
The end of the Cold War had liberated both developed and developing countries from cynical mutual ideological manipulations. They were now free to concentrate on the real development issues in “a new era of shared human progress in the 21st century”. With the elimination of the confusions of the Cold War, the transition to the 21st century would be, in the words of the DAC chairperson, “...based upon an increasingly clear vision of partnership – of mutual interests and mutual responsibilities”. (The DAC Annual Report, 1996)

As conceived by the DAC, the real development issues confronting African countries were responding to globalization, and the mobilization of their human and material resources to solve their domestic socio-economic and political problems. Globalization would necessitate the integration of the developing countries into the international market-oriented economic system; and mobilization of human and material resources would require the release of the energies, talents, entrepreneurial spirit and enthusiasm of the peoples –creating the enabling environment. But African countries could not be integrated into the international economic system because they lacked the capabilities to compete in the global marketplace. They were also unable to mobilize their human and material resources because their economic and political systems were inflexible, inefficient, bureaucratic, dictatorial, corrupt, and lacking in democracy, good governance, transparency and accountability. Africans also lacked the technological and organizational capabilities that would enable them to benefit from information and communications technologies.

The partnership proposed by the DAC was thus basically one of enabling Africans to respond to the challenges of globalization and meet the economic, social and political needs, demands and aspirations of the peoples. The DAC synoptic statement on partnership in development, including
its principles and objectives, was published in May 1995, entitled: “Development Partnerships in the New Global Context”, approved by OECD development ministers and heads of aid agencies the same month and later approved by the OECD Council at ministerial level. The principles and objectives that constituted the fundamental basis of the partnership that had to be accepted by all the partners included the following:

» Development cooperation is an investment in the future.
» Combating poverty at its roots must be seen as a central challenge.
» Strategies for success are now available. These were listed as: a sound policy framework – encouraging stable, growing economies with full scope for a vigorous private sector and an adequate fiscal base; investment in social development, especially education, primary health care, and population activities; enhanced participation of all people, and notably women, in economic and political life, and the reduction of social inequalities; good governance and public management, democratic accountability, the protection of human rights and the rule of law; sustainable environment practices; addressing the root causes of potential conflict, limiting military expenditure, and targeting reconstruction and peace-building efforts towards longer-term reconciliation and development.

The new development partnership was in effect an agreement among donors on shared orientation for development cooperation with recipient countries and, within that orientation or framework, a commitment to assist developing countries to face the challenges of economic and social development in the 21st century. The most distinctive features of the partnership were: (1) commitment to the development strategies that had proved successful – hence no new visions or experimentation that would require different strategies; (2) acknowledgment of the highly competitive, interdependent world into which developing countries had to be integrated; and (3) commitment to assisting the developing countries within the framework of the statement.

Implied in the partnership were responsibilities and obligations for all partners, as well as conditionalities flowing from them. The partnership was in effect a contractual relationship between the developed and developing countries based on ‘a meeting of minds’, shared objectives, obligations and responsibilities. Developing countries were expected to be responsible for their own development policies, to undertake major institutional and policy reforms and create the conditions conducive to development and effectiveness of aid. The conditions included peoples’ participation in the development process; good governance, transparency and accountability; respect for human rights and the rule of law. The implications of these obligations are obvious. African governments had to strive for open societies, good governance, accountability and transparency; allow the broadest possible freedoms for individuals, NGOs and other voluntary or professional organizations, to participate in civil society, and put in place the appropriate macroeconomic policies to encourage the private sector and development generally. In other words, they had to promote a liberal democratic governance system.
For their part, the developed countries were committed to supporting the efforts of the developing countries, but on the basis of discussions and ‘a meeting of minds’. The discussions were not on the framework and its underlying principles but on what African countries were prepared to do in order to participate in the partnership. The framework was not subject to the ‘meeting of minds’; it was the foundation on which minds had to meet.

Re-launching Africa’s Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action. In the same year, 1995, Heads of State and Government met again in Cairo in extraordinary session to review, reassess and identify the root causes of the socio-economic and political problems that had been confronting African countries for many years, and to agree on collective long-term solutions to be undertaken by African governments with the support of the international community.

The meeting noted that over the years many initiatives, plans and strategies had been adopted: “Unfortunately these plans were not adequately implemented by the majority of the countries”. The meeting thus appealed to African countries to rectify the situation, stressing three fundamental principles:

- People should be the centre and object of development
- Governments should ensure the involvement of the people in the conception, implementation and monitoring of development plans, programmes and projects
- Special attention should be paid to the full involvement of women in all social and economic activities.

The meeting stated that “Africa is a resilient continent. Indeed Africa is a continent in transition. It has immense human resources. With a strong will, more determination, planning and vision, we can make Africa an economic power that it ought to be”. Although the meeting reaffirmed the OAU commitment to the LPA, it nonetheless adopted the Cairo Agenda, stating the fundamental principles: “We recognize and resolve that democracy, good governance; peace, security, stability and justice are among the most essential factors in African socio-economic development. Without democracy and peace, development is not possible; and, without development, peace is not durable”.

The recommended actions included:

a) Promotion of sustainable development, through national unity

b) Promotion of good governance, through decentralization; clarifying the role of government and the private sector in development

c) Food Security
d) Capacity-building and human resources development

e) Structural transformation of African economies, but based on different strategies from those identified with the SAPs

f) Regional economic cooperation and integration.

The Agenda registered its displeasure with the international community and development partners.

“Development aid that had been provided had not always been used for the priority programmes of countries assisted. What is more, we are witnessing an increasingly marked trend of rivalry between African governments and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Sometimes the governments were even robbed of their responsibilities. The NGOs should play a supportive role by complementing government efforts but, given their fragility and lack of requisite resources, these organizations cannot assume the responsibility for the development of the continent”.

In 1996 the United Nations System-wide Special Initiative on Africa (UNSIA) was created to provide inter-agency cooperation and coordination in support of African countries that had been undergoing very severe socio-economic and political problems and had accepted and adopted the stipulated governance reforms. UNSIA was accordingly supported by the OAU. But the prescriptions of the governance reforms were largely external initiatives, including funding and technical professional expertise. Africans were not involved in crafting concepts or strategy formulation. There were thus neither African perspectives in the prescriptions nor ownership in the strategy formulation.

In 1997, acknowledging the critical role of governance in the development and democratization processes, and in response to the emerging consensus among African leaders that good governance was an essential ingredient in the promotion of human development, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) created the Africa Governance Forum (AGF). The AGF convened annually. One governance issue was identified and related papers prepared. Before the AGF convened, participating countries organized their own national conferences attended by government and a wide range of stakeholders from the private and civil society sectors, as well as development partners, to discuss the topical governance issues within the context of their countries.

The main objective of the AGF has been to provide a continental forum to African governments, policymakers, civil society organizations and the private sector for the exchange of ideas, sharing information and experiences on best practices and issues related to the promotion of good governance on the continent. The movement has created an environment conducive to mutual learning,
self-appraisal and constructive criticism, and a sense of partnership and ownership regarding Africans’ approach to the promotion of good governance, democracy and human development. It has also facilitated the prioritization of governance issues and debate of sensitive issues related to the democratization process in the continent.

The pursuit of African unity was one of the earliest cherished objectives of the first generation of African leaders. Despite the difficulties encountered in the pursuit of the objective, successive African leaders reiterated the objective and committed themselves to its realization. At an extraordinary meeting of the OAU in Sirte, Libya in September 1999, Heads of State and Government resolved to accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community.

At the close of the 20th century major economic paradigm shifts had taken place in Africa, from public sector-led and State-controlled economic growth and development to market- and government-regulated strategies. Momentous transformations of governance systems were earnestly undertaken by popular demand and democratic electoral pressures in many African countries. The one-party State and coercive political mobilization had been replaced by multi-party politics and democratic systems of governance:

As we prepare to enter the twenty-first century, and cognizant of the challenges that will confront our continent and peoples, we emphasize the imperative need and a high sense of urgency to rekindle the aspirations of our peoples for stronger unity, solidarity and cohesion in a larger community of peoples transcending cultural, ideological, ethnic and national differences.

In order to cope with these challenges and effectively address the new social, political and economic realities in Africa and the world, we are determined to fulfil our peoples’ aspirations for greater unity in conformity with the objectives of the OAU Charter and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. It is also our conviction that our continental Organization needs to be revitalized in order to be able to play a more active role and continue to be relevant to the needs of our peoples and responsive to the demands of the prevailing circumstances. We are also determined to eliminate the scourge of conflicts, which constitutes a major impediment to the implementation of our development and integration agenda.

Sirte Declaration
2000… African Perspectives and Ownership: Towards Capturing the 21st Century

Unlike the post-colonial period, when the issues of the economic and political systems were controversial, there is now a general consensus among African leaders that the private sector is the engine of growth and that good governance is the means by which social and economic development should be promoted. African unity has been greatly enhanced and the prospects for the consolidation of the African Union are encouraging.

With the end of the Cold War, a new International Political Economic Order (IPEO) had emerged, creating new centres of economic power and political influence impacting on Africa and the African peoples, making additional demands on the mineral and other resources of the continent, and draining Africa of its valuable human resources, as professional and skilled Africans migrated to other countries in search of better employment or security. Globalization, coupled with liberalization, has enabled Africans with marketable skills and talents to migrate to countries where they are in demand and well-paid. The world is now based on information and knowledge, communication and transportation, increasingly open societies, with governance systems that are incrementally becoming more accountable to the people and responsive to their needs and aspirations.

Africa is now a continent inhabited by a new generation of citizens who are better educated and very much aware of their citizenship rights and obligations, and prepared to participate effectively and meaningfully in the development and democratization processes of their countries. Moreover, the leaders from the previous generation who are aware of what has transpired in Africa in the fifty years of independence – the successes and failures –, recognize the gravity of conditions in Africa, and emerging global realities, acknowledge past mistakes and are prepared – or compelled by increasingly assertive civil societies – to address them.

As the 21st century approached, Africa and Africans were thus confronted, not only with the challenges of domestic needs and demands – promotion of human development, including the Millennium Development Goals –, but also new global realities, challenges and opportunities. The United Nations Millennium Declaration (UNMD) of September 2000 was an affirmation of the international community’s support for the consolidation of democracy and assisting Africans in their struggles for lasting peace, poverty eradication, sustainable human development and integration in the global economy. Moreover, African countries have to be competitive in global markets, and Africans have to acquire the capabilities and confidence to participate in the new international political economic order (IPEO).

Following the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2001, when African conditions and the UNMD were discussed, some African leaders decided to respond to the emerging global challenges and opportunities confronting Africa. Previously known as the New African Initiative (NAI), NEPAD is a consolidation of two separate responses: the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery
Capturing the 21st Century: African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Best Practices and lessons learned

(MAP), which had been advocated by Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Bouteflika of Algeria and Obasanjo of Nigeria; and the OMEGA Plan of President Wade of Senegal, presented to the Francophone Summit in January 2001 as “an African strategy for globalization” focusing mainly on the need for education and infrastructure development.

MAP originated in 1999, inspired by the realization that, in light of the emerging global realities, Africa had to be pro-active, craft its own vision of the future, design programmes and strategies of action in order to avoid ongoing and growing marginalization in an increasingly globalizing world. MAP was intended to be both a vision and a detailed plan of action. As it provided the basic principles and foundations, articulated the major components of the vision – the African Renaissance – and the means by which they ought and must be implemented, MAP represented the latest manifestation of African development thinking.

However, while OMEGA and MAP were in the process of being converted into NAI, the Executive Secretary of ECA was engaged in formulating a ‘COMPACT’ that would rationalize and reinforce the partnership between African countries and their development partners, thus ensuring the flow of investment and aid to the continent. Commitment by African countries to undertaking major institutional and governance reforms was presented as the foundation of the ‘COMPACT’. Moreover, as the promotion of NAI objectives was itself a collective commitment by African leaders, there had also to be a ‘compact’ committing them to ensuring compliance and reinforcement. Thus, while NAI and MAP provided the inspiration, objectives and means, ‘COMPACT’ inserted the basic foundations and processes by which the objectives could be achieved and the external partnership reinforced.

IV. Review of NEPAD

The salient aspects of NEPAD are reviewed below in order to indicate that the people who crafted it were informed and influenced by past events and their impact on African peoples, their societies and economies. They were inspired by the determination to ensure that Africans would never again be the victims of external agents or the humiliation, exploitation and discrimination of the colonial period, and impact of the capitalist global economy that designated Africa as the major source of raw materials and Africans as supportive labour in the extraction and exploitation of their own resources.

The creators of NEPAD were aware of previous false starts and well-intentioned African initiatives and the reasons they had failed and were determined to redeem and rectify past mistakes and bad governance, and assume African ownership and leadership, responsibility and accountability in ensuring that the basic needs, demands and aspirations of the people were catered for. In order to create the enabling environment – the pre-conditions – to ensure that Africans were in control of their own destiny, designers and promoters of their vision of the future, Africans are determined to
respond effectively and meaningfully to domestic needs, wants and wishes, changes and emerging realities, as well as to global challenges and opportunities.

**Redemption and Rehabilitation from Past Subjugation, Exploitation and Humiliation...**

NEPAD reminds its readers and prospective members that Africa is the original home of humanity. The continent contains a rich complex of mineral resources that have contributed immensely to the industrialization and development of rich western countries. Africa is the cradle of civilization whose contribution to world civilizations cannot be ignored; and as Africans are grappling with their existential problems of development and poverty alleviation they must be made aware of the role their continent and ancient ancestors played in the advancement of civilization and the development of other peoples’ countries.

Africans have, however, been subjugated, humiliated, exploited and discriminated against. The impoverishment of slavery was accentuated by the legacy of colonialism, the exigencies of the Cold War and the dynamics of the international economic system. “For centuries, Africa has been integrated into the world economy mainly as a supplier of cheap labour and raw materials. Of necessity this has meant the draining of Africa’s resources, rather than their use for the continent’s development... Africa remains the poorest continent despite being one of the most richly endowed regions of the world” (para. 19).

Colonialism undermined traditional African governance institutions, weakening their values and legitimacy by using them as agents of the imperial powers. In the process, it also constrained the development of an indigenous middle class with the skills to manage the emerging States. Modern African States were colonial creations, serving the interests of the imperial powers. At independence, virtually all African States were weak, with “…dysfunctional economies...characterized by a

---

*Paragraph 14*

... As part of the process of reconstructing the identity and self-confidence of the peoples of Africa, it is necessary that this contribution to human existence be understood and valued by Africans themselves. Africa’s status as the birthplace of humanity should be cherished by the whole world as the origins of all its peoples. Accordingly, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development must preserve this common heritage and use it to build a universal understanding of the historic need to end the underdevelopment and the marginalization of the continent.
shortage of skilled professionals and a weak capitalist class, resulting in a weakening of the accumulation process” (para. 22).

African conditions were further compounded by the inappropriate policies pursued by the first and subsequent generations of African leaders, lack of implementation, corruption, mismanagement and bad governance; and the SAPs of the 1980s that provided only “partial solutions” and paid “inadequate attention to the provision of social services” (para. 24), consequently entrenching “a vicious cycle” in which economic decline, reduced capacity and bad governance reinforce each other, “…thereby confirming Africa’s peripheral and diminishing role in the world economy. Thus, over the centuries, Africa has become the marginalized continent” (para. 26).

…and rectification of the situation
The NEPAD initiatives are intended to rectify the past mistakes and experimental failures, to “…build on and celebrate the achievements of the past…reflect on the lessons learned through painful experience, so as to establish a partnership that is both credible and capable of implementation”. As development is “…essentially a process of empowerment and self-reliance” the partnership to be established is that of “peoples and governments” (para. 27). The preparation of development plans must thus be “through participatory processes involving the people”, and as “…African leaders derive their mandates from their people; it is their role to articulate these plans and lead the processes of implementation on behalf of their people”. It is stressed that the NEPAD initiatives are centred on “African ownership and management” (para. 47), and accordingly appeals are made “…to all the peoples of Africa, in all their diversities…to mobilize themselves in order to put an end to further marginalization of the continent and to ensure its development by bridging the gap between Africa and the developed countries” (para. 55).

Rethinking governing…
On achieving independence, African leaders took control of the governments of their countries. Government was assumed to be the principal agency that could bring about the required social changes, economic growth and development in general. It was then considered that only the government had the legitimacy, capability, moral and political responsibility to bring social change and development to the people. The political leaders and their supportive senior civil servants in charge of those governments were convinced that they were the most competent people to determine what was good for all the people and the country; that they had the requisite capabilities to formulate the relevant policies, design the most appropriate development projects, and implement them efficiently.

The people had no meaningful role to play in the processes involved in these extremely technical activities and ‘highly confidential’ matters, which were solely the concern of governments. The people were recipients of public services and not participants in the governing process, policy formulation or designing public services. Governance – let alone good governance – was not in the
political or bureaucratic vocabulary of those who were in power and authority in Africa. Politicians rarely acknowledged their electoral promises to those who elected them. Constitutions were not always respected, laws were often disregarded; accountability was scarcely acknowledged, and transparency and access to information were restricted.

The whole issue of development has now been rethought. It is the people who are the real object of development; they are the means by which development is brought about, as well as the victims of inadequate or inappropriate development policies and the beneficiaries of better ones. Many African States are constrained in their development efforts because “…African governments did not empower their people to embark on development initiatives to realize their creative potential”. (para. 23). The promotion of development is a collective effort. It must be initiated and promoted by the people themselves. But in order for all these activities and processes to take place, an environment of peace, security and good governance is needed.

NEPAD paragraph 71 confirms that African leaders’ own experiences have convinced them that “…peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development”. Paragraph 79 acknowledges that “development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance”. It further confirms that NEPAD undertakes to respect and promote “the global standards of democracy, the core components of which include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers’ unions, and fair, open and democratic elections periodically organized to enable people to choose leaders freely”, thus enabling people to participate freely and effectively in the decision-making processes that affect their lives and livelihood.
...Towards Good Governance...

Whereas in the past African leaders directed their attention to governing and ruling the people, purportedly administering things on behalf of the people, now, because of the consequences of the mistakes made in policy formulation and implementation, and the pressure from the public for more effective and meaningful participation in the affairs that affect their lives and livelihood, critical thinking on governing in Africa has shifted from government to governance. Government is an institutional concentration of power at the disposal of those managing and controlling it. Government is action-oriented, directing, ordering, controlling, authoritative and commanding. But in the last analysis government is merely a collection of individuals elected or appointed to run and manage the affairs of the people, and those individuals are likely to make mistakes or abuse their power and authority if not constrained or made accountable.

Governance is essentially a process that facilitates the utilization of collective power for the management of society in its various aspects – social, economic, political – at various levels, from the village to the nation, and the management of a whole array of organizations and associations in which people are involved, pursuing common objectives or interests. Governance is thus about power, how it is utilized, on behalf of whose interests or for what purpose; and about decision-makers, how they make decisions and implement them; how they can be made accountable for the decisions they have made and implemented; and how the institutions of governance interact with one another and with the people and organizations in civil society and the private sector determines the efficiency and effectiveness of the governance system.

As already stated, one of the most dramatic consequences of the SAPs was the activation of civil society, and this in turn triggered the proliferation of the various types of NGOs and CBOs, as well as entrepreneurs of all sorts, who in turn put pressure on the State for public participation, accountability and transparency. Critical thinking on governing in Africa has shifted from government to governance. “Democracy and State legitimacy have been redefined to include accountable government, a culture of human rights and popular participation as central elements”. (para. 43).

News about the spread of democracy, expansion of the political space and demands for human rights; and the demands of the emerging new generation of young African citizenry and potential – competing – leaders demanding their rights, were issues and events that could no longer be contained, regulated or ignored. “Across the continent, democracy is spreading, backed by the African Union...which has shown a new resolve to deal with conflicts and censure deviation from the norm. These efforts are reinforced by voices in civil society, including associations of women, youth and the independent media” (para. 45). All these issues and demands have to be acknowledged and appropriately addressed. Hence the supportive prescriptions:
The purpose of the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative is to contribute to strengthening the political and administrative framework of participating countries, in line with the principles of democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and promotion of the rule of law. It is strengthened by and supports the Economic Governance Initiative, with which it shares key features. Taken together these initiatives will contribute to harnessing the energies of the continent towards development and the eradication of poverty.

Paragraph 80

...and the commitment

Participating governments and their leaders are expected to:

» “Create or consolidate basic governance processes and practice”… and take the lead in supporting initiatives “that foster good governance…and ensure that the core values of the initiative are abided by” (para. 81).

» Commit themselves “…towards meeting basic standards of good governance and democratic behaviour…and giving support to each other” (para. 82).

» Serve in a body (Forum) that “will periodically monitor and assess the progress made by African countries in meeting their commitment towards achieving good governance and social reforms…and provide a platform to countries to share experiences with a view to fostering good governance and democratic practices” (para. 85).

Mindful of what happened to the previous African initiatives which, despite declared commitments, were for various reasons not implemented, NEPAD urged: “We must not relent in implementing this programme of building sound and resilient economies and democratic societies” (para. 58); and appealed to “the African peoples to take up the challenge of mobilizing in support of the implementation of this initiative by setting up, at all levels, structures for organization, mobilization and action” (para. 56).

Resolution to Respond to Changes, Challenges and Opportunities

Finally, there is the resolution and commitment of the participating members of NEPAD to be proactive and prepare themselves to respond effectively and speedily to changes and challenges so that Africans will be able to avail themselves of the available opportunities and never again be the victims of external events or agents, as was the case in the past. In the past, Africans tended to
be re-active or even passive in the face of global challenges and opportunities and consequently became victims of changes and challenges. Africans now need to be proactive, getting involved in the global markets of goods and services, ideas and politics, acquiring the requisite knowledge and information, identifying possibilities and opportunities and responding to them appropriately and effectively, thus strengthening and positioning themselves as credible, competent and competitive global actors as the 21st century unfolds.

“Across the continent, Africans declare that we will no longer allow ourselves to be conditioned by circumstances” (para. 7). In fact, NEPAD is convinced that “an historic opportunity” exists that will enable Africans to end the scourge of underdevelopment. The appropriate human and material resources, as well as technology and skills that are needed to promote development and alleviate poverty, are within the reach of the African peoples. What is needed is the commitment to mobilize these resources, with bold and imaginative leadership, good governance and the forging of “a new global partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual interest” (para. 6). The possibilities for such partnerships to be created are contained in the September 2001 United Nations Millennium Declaration that confirmed the “global community’s readiness to support Africa’s efforts to address the continent’s underdevelopment and marginalization” (para. 46).

NEPAD is therefore a comprehensive African response designed to address contemporary African problems of development and democratization, as well as asserting African perspectives and ownership, preparing Africans to respond effectively and speedily to future changes, challenges and opportunities. Like the LPA, NEPAD is also informed, influenced and inspired by what happened to Africa and Africans in the past, the determination to ensure that the resources of the continent will be utilized for the benefit of its people, and that African peoples will never again have to suffer such humiliation, disorientation, exploitation, discrimination and marginalization in the new IPEO.

NEPAD, moreover, represents the latest vision of Africa’s future in the new IPEO. It has crafted a corpus of objectives, constituting the components as well as building blocks of the vision that must be promoted, sustained and consolidated in the prescribed way. The crafting of the vision and the precondition for its implementation are informed and enriched by the knowledge and experiences of previous African visions and strategies and how they were implemented or the reasons why they were not implemented. Accordingly, NEPAD has created the APRM to verify and ensure that in the promotion of the major components of the vision – African Renaissance – the preconditions are appropriately adopted, sustained and consolidated.

Given the objectives of NEPAD and the way they are expected to be promoted and consolidated, there is an intrinsic interdependent functional relationship between NEPAD and the APRM. As the APRM ensures that the objectives of NEPAD are promoted and consolidated according to the principles, standards, code and procedures prescribed by NEPAD, and as NEPAD is a product of African
development thinking, so too is the APRM. NEPAD needs APRM to verify and ensure that member countries do, in fact, promote and consolidate the stipulated development and democratization objectives and do so in the prescribed way. Moreover the need to ensure and verify that African countries do in fact implement their declared programmes and the stipulated strategies is based on historical experience, which has informed and influenced African development thinking.

V. Concluding Comments

Colonialism inaugurated the ‘scramble for Africa’, appropriating and allocating African territories among the European colonial powers, and declared that African material resources were for the benefit of all mankind and that, since Africans were unable to exploit them, it was the responsibility of the colonial governments to manage the resources on their behalf. It made Africans means of

For the civilized nations have at last recognized that while on the one hand the abounding wealth of the tropical regions of the earth must be developed and used for the benefit of mankind, on the other hand an obligation rests on the controlling Power not only to safeguard the material rights of the natives, but to promote their moral and educational progress.

Sir F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa, William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., Edinburgh, 1926, p. 18

In tropical Africa or the Pacific we have for the most part primitive races that seem at present to have but little to contribute and that must undergo long years of patient work before they can effectively assimilate the best we can offer.

Arthur Mayhew, Education in the Colonial Empire, Longmans, London, 1938, p. 3

Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native’s brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people and distorts, disfigures and destroys it. This work of devaluing pre-colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today.

Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, New York, 1963, p. 170
production in the creation of wealth for the benefit of the colonial rulers. Colonialism denied Africans self-respect and dignity, and disregarded and discriminated against them in their own lands. Africans were presumed to be backward, ignorant and unable to identify their own valuable natural resources without the help and skills of other people. They were, moreover, presumed to have no culture worthy of recognition or respect, and to be incapable of ruling themselves with justice and fairness. It was therefore the moral responsibility of the ‘civilized’ nations to ensure that Africans ‘became civilized.’

Africans in all manner of ways rejected colonialism and the assumptions underlying colonial rule. They engaged in various anti-colonial struggles and movements for self-determination and independence. Once independence was achieved, they were further engaged in other struggles, and in various phases, creating and consolidating nations, promoting development and welfare within the colonial-imposed State boundaries and containing a multitude of diversities, some of which were erstwhile hostile neighbours and others separated from their clans and extended families. In their efforts to create unity in the midst of diversities, new nations and the promotion of development, they crafted their own visions of the future, and adopted strategies for implementing them.

As they grappled with the emerging post-colonial realities, implementing their plans and promoting their objectives, Africans encountered successes and failures, which in turn created serious socio-economic and political problems, but in the process gained experience and insight, and accumulated competence and confidence, resolution and commitment to determine, collectively as Africans, the future of Africa and Africans and the most appropriate means of promoting and implementing such a vision of the future. The Monrovia Symposium and the LPA, the Arusha Conference and the Charter were such earlier collective commitments. More importantly, in the course of the last five decades of struggle for development, peace, security and stability and the systems of governance most appropriate to African conditions, African leaders, intellectuals and policy-makers were also engaged in development and political reflections, re-evaluating past objectives and re-assessing the strategies adopted, rethinking and reinventing in pursuit of the most desirable future for Africa and Africans, and the strategies for promoting and bringing it about.

By the time the 21st century approached, Africans had achieved a great deal: they had demonstrated that they could manage their own affairs, despite setbacks and failures. Africa itself had undergone tremendous transformations in terms of popular participation, multiparty politics and democratic governance, and how it organized its economic and productive activities. Africans were thus convinced that they were capable of crafting their own visions of the future and designing the means by which it could be promoted; and, although some of the strategies adopted to implement the visions were inappropriate or inadequate, and political will and commitment were lacking, in the process Africans had nonetheless gained experience and confidence that they could manage their own affairs. NEPAD was the latest African vision of the future and the APRM the instrument
specifically designed to review it and ensure that the objectives of the vision were implemented in the way and conditions it prescribed by.

The APRM is essentially about governance and the related economic, social and political issues in Africa and the ways in which Africans managed their public affairs in the past; and, in light of what has transpired in the past five decades of political independence and economic management in Africa, what needs to be done to ensure that Africa and Africans have the appropriate capabilities to effectively respond to domestic needs and demands, and emerging global realities, challenges and opportunities. It is thus a product of experience and insights and a long process of intellectual reflection, development thinking, and a series of collective political consensuses amongst African leaders on a wide range of governance and related issues.

Those participating in the APRM have at their disposal a huge corpus of knowledge and experience to draw upon in order to gain insight into the genesis of the present problems confronting Africa and, hopefully, collectively explore the best approaches to solving them. Nonetheless, the peer review process is also a very sensitive exercise, as it identifies and exposes governance deficiencies, touches on the quality and commitment of political leaders, their leadership commitment and political will. While joining the APRM is voluntary, once membership has been confirmed, performance according to the principles and practice of the African Peer Review (APR) process is obligatory. Citizens and their various organizations in participating countries are entitled to participate in the process.

All the major actors in the governance system must be consulted. The whole process is African owned. The inputs and the final products in the APR process are the efforts of Africans, collectively working together in pursuit of common objectives. Beyond the inevitable exigencies of funding, no external, non-African, participation is involved. This means that the responsibility for success or failure of the APRM rests solely on the shoulders of Africans, and not on their development partners or international development agencies.

*ENSURE the participation of all stakeholders in the development of the national Programme of Action including trade unions, women, youth, civil society, private sector, rural communities and professional associations;...*

*Memorandum of Understanding, Article 22.*
One of the major functional roles of the APRM is to facilitate and reinforce the collective exploration and identification of African perspectives on governance and related issues; and, through the peer review process, ensure that the identified ‘best practices’ are widely disseminated and shared among participating members, thus promoting and enhancing African ownership on strategies and their implementation, and in the process redeeming the presumed perceptions of Africans as people who are incapable of managing their own affairs or crafting visions of the future and the means by which they can be implemented. It also asserts Africa’s as a major player in global markets of goods and services, ideas and views on global issues, thus contributing to world civilization.

**Achievements**

So far the achievements of the APRM have been very encouraging. It has empowered citizens and demystified governments, making them more user-friendly, accessible and responsive. It has released and empowered the ‘Shackled-Citizen-Jinn’ from the constraints and dictates of the ‘Authoritarian-State-Bottle’, scrutinized the powers of the executive and exposed the weaknesses of the ‘Big Man’. In the course of the National Process, the Governments of participating countries are obliged to ensure that there is effective and meaningful inclusive participation by all the stakeholders in the country. Citizens are informed and encouraged to participate in the National Process.

More importantly, as a process designed to facilitate the empowerment of people, enhancing their confidence and self-respect as citizens with entitlements and obligations in matters related to governance and democratization issues, it has strengthened public policy processes (PPP), thereby expanding the public policy community (PPC). In the past, PPP were discouraged in Africa because of the prevalence of one-party governance systems and the dominance of the ‘Big Man’ and consequently the PPC was very weak. By facilitating the release of energies, talents, enterprise and entrepreneurship, the APRM unlocked human and material resources so that people could participate in the economic and development processes of their countries, thus ensuring that the continent and its peoples – Africa and Africans – are in control of their own affairs, and Africans have the capabilities to respond to global realities and contribute to the promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in the world.

The peer process provides challenges and opportunities to both governments and the people in Africa, as well as Africa’s development partners. For Governments and political leaders it is the challenge of admitting to and owning failures and accepting legitimate criticism, the opportunity to respond to popular demands for effective, accountable and transparent governance systems, and the willingness to discuss, debate and resolve issues in a participatory open manner.

It is moreover an opportunity for African Governments to demonstrate to the citizens, and in particular those who elected them, that they were sincere in their electoral promises and committed to promoting the welfare of the people, protecting their lives and property, human and peoples’ rights,
and ensuring peace, security and stability; building mutual trust and strengthening citizens’ confidence in the effectiveness and fairness of their governance systems and the integrity and honesty of their political leaders. For the people, it is the challenge of taking their citizenship responsibilities much more seriously, acquiring the appropriate information, knowledge and skills, and empowering themselves through organization and partnership. It is also the opportunity to participate effectively and meaningfully in the decision-making processes that affect their lives and livelihood; the peace and security to enjoy the fruit of their labours and the companionship of their families and friends.

For both governments and citizens the peer process presents challenges and opportunities to strengthen the institutions of governance, the democratization processes and the understanding and practice of democracy and good governance. Peer review is thus a comprehensive process and not merely confined to the Peer Forum or the higher levels of government and civil service. All adult citizens of the country are entitled to participate in the process; participating Governments are obliged to ensure that the process takes place, and the Country Review Team is obliged to verify that the National Process has taken place as mandated.

For the development partners, the APRM – and NEPAD – offers the challenges of fashioning new, mutually beneficial partnerships in order to help to create and support an environment of peace, stability and security conducive to the promotion of human development and prosperity in Africa. It also provides them with the opportunity to share their accumulated development experience and proven appropriate best practices with African countries.

For all the African stakeholders the APRM is clearly a unique and innovative mechanism. It provides the challenges and opportunities to foster, adopt and systematically monitor and review policies and practices likely to promote democracy and good political governance, sustainable human development, poverty eradication, and continental economic and political integration. More importantly, the APRM is bound to strengthen democratic governance institutions and expand the democratization processes in other sectors of society. Due to the still pervasive political culture of the one-party State and dominant executives, democratic governance is fragile and democratic processes, though constitutionally mandated, continue to be threatened in many African countries. However, it is now becoming increasingly difficult for African governments to abuse their power and authority with confidence and impunity as they could in the recent past. The people are now sufficiently empowered, aware of their constitutional and political rights and better organized in the protection and promotion of those rights. The people are thus continuously empowered to promote and consolidate the ‘virtuous circle of good governance’.

In light of what has transpired in the five decades since independence, the experience gained in economic management, development and democratization in Africa, the successes and failures,
inappropriate strategies and lack of implementation for various reasons, the arrival of the APRM is timely and its functions essential. APRM ensures that participating members do, in fact, commit themselves to the implementation of the NEPAD objectives in the manner prescribed. In the past, many objectives were not reached because nothing was done to try to achieve them and, political leaders lacked the political will to initiate the necessary measures and mobilize the appropriate resources.

In verifying and ensuring that in the implementation of the NEPAD objectives the participating countries adopt, sustain and consolidate the prescribed preconditions, the APRM is, in effect, reinforcing the building blocks for the capable State which will incrementally promote the NEPAD objectives and eventually create, promote and consolidate the NEPAD vision – African Renaissance.

It is, nonetheless, important to note and reflect upon the fact that NEPAD and the APRM are interdependent and, although the one cannot exist without the other at present, it is possible that in the long run the APRM may have an existence of its own. This is an area that needs to be recognized, understood and addressed. The APRM ensures that NEPAD will be implemented in the manner prescribed. In other words, NEPAD articulates a vision of the future development of Africa coupled with the appropriate models of the economic, political and democratic systems of governance. The APRM also ensures that the models are implemented. It is, however, possible that in the process of operating the APRM, as the people gain more confidence in themselves, acquiring experience in the operation of governance systems, as well as being exposed to the ‘best practices’ of other countries in the East of the South, deepening their understanding of the objectives and dynamics of governance systems, new ideas and developmental thinking may evolve, questioning the existing governance models and proposing alternative ones. In other words, if the APRM continues to function as it does now, it is possible that it may enable Africans to identify other kinds of models. NEPAD may be overtaken by events because the kind of model or society that it is trying to create may not be accepted by future generations of Africans. But since the main objective of the APRM is to ensure that certain principles are observed, promoted and consolidated, it may be there forever. Africans could thus make a major contribution, not only to Africa, but to the whole world.

VI. Responses to Concept Paper

Lead Discussant 1 – Professor Abdalla Bujra
While commending the historical sweep and insightful analysis of the paper, Professor Bujra argued that what it offered was grounded in an elitist or “establishment” interpretation of post-independence development in Africa, as typically recounted and accepted by African governments, the OAU, the international community and the great majority of “mainstream” African intellectuals. To correct this elitist bias, Professor Bujra offered “the other side of the coin” by highlighting the
contradictions of African politics and development, as well as the social forces and issues, noting in particular the catalytic role of indigenous social movements and progressive intellectuals in mounting pressures and mobilizing to resist anti-people socio-economic policies and authoritarian rule.

To illustrate his argument, Professor Bujra outlined the following as central to an understanding of historical trajectories charted by African countries since independence: (a) *The transition from the colonial to the neocolonial State*, during which the euphoria of political independence was tempered between 1960 and 1970 by the reality of Africa’s continuing dependence on the former metropolitan/colonial powers and the United States of America; (b) *State-capture of the Organization of African Unity*, by means of which the movement for the unity of Africa was taken over by the State and uncoupled from the people of Africa; and (c) *Emergence and consolidation of the power of an African political-bureaucratic elite* by a national political-bureaucratic elite.

He argued, however, that by the mid-1960s an alternative, non-mainstream model of development, and with it an alternative development strategy for Africa, had emerged, the Arusha Declaration marking a critical watershed in opening up the debate about *another development*, as was the role of progressive intellectuals, within the University of Dar es Salaam, the Dakar-based IDEP, and CODESRIA. According to Professor Bujra, this counter-hegemonic alternative development model created a rupture between progressive intellectuals and the political-bureaucratic elite, such that “the relationship between the political ideas evolving from the intellectuals and [those of] governments and the externals became a major problem”.

By the mid-1970s, African economies had begun to decline, with deepening debt and escalating social problems, exacerbated by the world oil crisis. ECA, IDEP and CODESRIA all warned that changes were needed. As Professor Bujra described it, economic and social decline in due course led to the onset of military coups and other kinds of authoritarian rule in Africa. By 1978-1980, the World Bank had begun to prepare its own economic reform package in order to contain the crisis. In 1981 it published the Berg Report, “a political statement” about how “to remove the crisis, and change, and rebuild the African State”. But the African response to the crisis, in the form of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), was diametrically different from the approach of the Berg Report. The essential and anchoring principles of the LPA were:

a) Self-reliance as the basis of development at the national, regional and continental levels.
b) Equity in the distribution of wealth at the national level as “the fundamental objective of development”.
c) The central role of the public sector in development.
d) Inter-African economic integration.
e) Change in the international economic order to favour Africa and Third World countries.
Regrettably, said Professor Bujra, the LPA was not only ignored by African governments, but also attacked by the institutions, which proceeded to impose Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) on governments. The intolerable and unbearable economic, political and social costs of SAPs for the mass of African peoples and the middle classes gave rise to social groups and movements which opposed SAPs and reprisals from various African governments that wanted to quell them. This had dire consequences, in the form of deadly social upheavals and unrest.

ECA published the African Alternative Framework to SAP, which was bitterly attacked by the World Bank, the IMF and the donor community. The World Bank released its own Long-Term Perspective Study, “essentially a charter for the long-term control of African economies, [which provided] the basis on which all other programmes from the World Bank, the IMF and the donor community stood”.

As recounted by Professor Bujra, the African response to the World Bank and to the continuing and seemingly intractable African Crisis included: (a) the Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1998-1990; (b) the African Charter for Popular Participation; (c) the Abuja Treaty; (d) the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; (d) the Cairo resolutions on non-recognition of undemocratic change of government, and monitoring elections; (e) the Sirte Declaration, leading to the supersession of the OAU by the African Union, and with it a refreshing debate on how much State sovereignty was to be ceded to supranational African institutions; (f) the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the criticisms it elicited within Africa for not only “deriving its intellectual inspiration from the World Bank”, but also for
abandoning “the principles of the Lagos Plan of Action”; and (g) the establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism, “the only part of NEPAD that actually went to country level”.

Professor Bujra thus came full circle back to the relevance of the APRM in the broader context of his own characterization of the typical African State as a “neo-patrimonial, rent-seeking one, [embedded] in systems of patronage”. In this connection, he posed two questions about the insertion of the APRM into the domestic politics of its member States: (a) Had the APRM made any difference to governance in its member States? Had it reversed the patrimonial character of the State? (b) What was the APRM anyway? Was it an instrument of the donor community? Professor Bujra’s unequivocal answer was that the APRM was an instrument for making liberal democracy more efficient for two reasons: (a) liberalization of the economy and the political system would attract investment from outside by reducing the cost of investment, and increasing the amount of profit repatriated by foreign investors; and (b) since liberal democracy is about elections, it would facilitate the circulation and reproduction of the political elite, “in a musical chair system”, which would be impossible, if there were no such elections.

Professor Bujra ended by observing that, in as much as the APRM was a response to and reflection of the new “liberal imperialism”, masquerading as neoliberalism or the new institutionalism, the challenge for Africa was to change the APRM into a much more effective instrument for the people than for foreign investors.

Lead Discussant 2 – Ms. Marie-Angelique Savané

Ms. Marie-Angelique Savané, the second lead discussant, made the pertinent observation that the concept paper, and the presentations by Professors Mohiddin and Bujra, had relied on and drawn very heavily from the history and experience of English-speaking Africa, neglecting developments in other linguistic zones on the continent, particularly French- and Portuguese-speaking Africa. She noted that the whole experience of national conferences and how they have changed the political history of Africa was not covered or reflected in the general thrust of the presentations. She attributed this omission to the fact that too few people from French- and Portuguese-speaking countries were present at the meeting, although those countries had been instrumental in popularizing the idea and practice of national conferences as a constitutional route to democratization in Africa. She therefore suggested that balance should be ensured when calling for papers.

Ms. Savané predicated her presentation on the need for participants to go beyond factual presentations and be more sophisticated in their analysis: not only stating facts, but also indicating the complexities of the situation. She illustrated this approach to understanding the APRM in the broader context of Africa’s postcolonial history with some pertinent observations. First, was the connection between development and international aid? Using the Lagos Plan of Action as a point of departure, Ms. Savané argued that it provided a good example: the Heads of State had accepted it
and immediately the World Bank emerged with the development funding. It was the same international partnership urging good governance now and which had not done so in the 1960s and 1970s when there were coups. Military governments and corrupt States were recognized, as the focus was placed on development.

She pointed out that the approaches to development and governance that African intellectuals had put forward in the 1960s and 1970s, such as those emphasizing democracy, basic needs, self-reliance, autonomy and rural development, that had been rejected by the mainstream international development community, were now being appropriated and propagated by the same international partnership, as if the debate had never existed in Africa. She also drew attention to the fact that the reaction of Africa to the global process was complex in that, to take the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as an example, the decisions had not necessarily been accepted by all Africans; some civil servants were not in favour of SAP, and nor was the generality of African civil society, following the Arusha Declaration on Popular Participation, which also mobilized against SAP.

Ms. Savane argued that, in order to advance and enrich its objectives, the analytical focus of the meeting should be the role of women, which was typically forgotten, if only because African women were at the forefront when decolonization and research on women and development were discussed. She went on to locate the significance of the APRM in its design to address good governance issues, which neoliberalism tended to obscure. Developing this observation, she argued that NEPAD had emerged at a time when development was accepted as being within the neoliberal system. There had been no debate about the need to socialize the system. That issue had been resolved but what had not been resolved was the governance issue. It was in order to address the governance issue that the APRM had emerged from NEPAD without any major intervention.

In addressing the historical background or evolution of the APRM, Ms. Savane referred to her considerable involvement at the highest levels in the discussions leading to its establishment and her subsequent role as chairperson and member of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons. She said that the objective of her presentation was partly to remind the many people who believed the APRM was primarily the initiative of African Heads of State and Government that other African stakeholders had also played an important role, and partly to highlight and acknowledge the role played from the outset by partner institutions, later referred to as “strategic partners”, namely, UNDP, ECA and AfDB.

Ms. Savane sketched an historical outline of APRM that ranged over the following nine points.

a) **The Role of Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo:** She underlined the important foundational roles of President Thabo Mbeki, within the context of his approach to the African
Renaissance, and President Olusegun Obasanjo, who, as President of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, wanted Nigeria to regain its place in African affairs.

b) **The Role of the Strategic Partners:** The important foundational role of the Economic Com-
mission for Africa, which was often not mentioned, although the process for implementation
of the approach had emerged from ECA, in particular the questionnaire design. UNDP had
provided funding for the trust fund set up by NEPAD for the mobilization of human resources
and, in particular, to kick start its activities. The facilitating role of the chief executives of ECA,
UNDP and the African Development Bank also had to be remembered.

c) **Origins of the APRM:** The APRM had been established independently of NEPAD. It had
emerged from a resolution endorsing the NEPAD Declaration on Democratic, Political, Eco-
nomic and Corporate Governance adopted in Durban in 2002 by the General Assembly of the
African Union when it was still the OAU. Durban had been the real starting point where all
the member States of the African Union endorsed implementation of the process called the Af-
rican Peer Review Mechanism. It was important to recall that because many people now had
the impression that the APRM had been brought about by a small group, whereas the entire
African community had endorsed the resolution.

d) **The Participatory Process for Selecting APRM Eminent Persons Panel:** Contrary to popular
belief, the procedure for the selection of the Eminent Persons Panel was not authoritarian. Can-
didates were not proposed countries. The first panel had been selected on the basis of discus-
sions between the various NEPAD institutions which had resulted in the selection of personali-
ties representing the various regions of Africa. It was only later that they proposed the names
of eminent personalities to the committee of six Heads of State, which had endorsed the entire
list with the exception of one country.

e) **Take-off of the APRM Process:** The APRM process started in March 2003, following the Abuja
Summit of Heads of State, which had endorsed ‘Organization and Process’, a yellow docu-
ment containing all the details of the various texts that explain the manner in which the APRM
should be organized and the processes.

f) **Charting a New Terrain:** There was an initial ambiguity surrounding the process, which was
officially launched in Cape Town by President Thabo Mbeki. Mme Savane recalled that the
Heads of State had not understood what was happening and that everyone had left Cape Town
without knowing what they were supposed to be doing.

g) **Resource Capacity Challenges:** There had initially been serious financial and human resource
problems. It was important to know why Heads of State took major decisions without allocat-
ing the resources necessary for their implementation. Expertise or human resource capacity to drive the APRM process had also been lacking. The resource problem pitted the APRM process against the international development partners, who not only wanted the APRM to follow the OECD model but also to rely on expatriate advisers and consultants. As Chair of the APRM Panel, Ms Savane had told the OECD that the APRM was Africa’s business and that the OECD was not the reference. There had been an imaginative attempt to raise funds for the APRM through an endogenous process, whereby a “law” was agreed at Algiers in 2004, that rich African countries, in particular the oil-producing countries, should contribute one million US dollars every year. That had increased the APRM budget and Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt had regularly contributed a great deal.

h) **African Ownership of the APRM**: That had been emphasized from the outset and was the founding principle of the APRM. Ms. Savane underscored two dimensions of African ownership of the APRM. Firstly, it meant that for the first time the citizens of a country were able to assess their own political, economic, social and corporate experience and give their view, a point that was repeatedly emphasized during the meeting. Secondly, the APRM process had drawn exclusively on expertise from Africa and the African Diaspora, thus demonstrating that reviews could be conducted without western expertise.

i) **The Politics of the APRM Country Process**: Beyond the technical, scientific, objective and other observations made about the limitations of the APRM country review methodology, Ms. Savane cautioned against an overly quantitative approach to the assessment or peer review process. She stressed that it was important not to lose sight of the fact that the APRM country process was above all and fundamentally a political process.

**Discussion of the Presentations**

The discussions noted the points of convergence and divergence between Professor Mohiddin and the lead discussants. The central focus was on how to situate the APRM within the challenges, opportunities, problems and development prospects of Africa in the new millennium, without losing track of the burden of the history of its interface with various phases of globalization, the promise of the halcyon days of the immediate post-independence period and the lost opportunities of the past. The overall consensus was that the APRM was more beneficial than otherwise.

The salient points and issues that emerged, providing illuminating and substantive material for the discussion, can be summarized as follows:

a) The post-independence history of Africa showed that it had been engaged in several externally driven initiatives from the first decade of development until the 1990s, when there was a break between past and present initiatives, which NEPAD and the APRM were designed to repair.
b) It was also clear that Africa’s own initiatives prior to the 1990s had been sidelined by external forces that controlled African economies and political make-up in the wider global context of the Cold War.

c) There was a need to examine the African crisis more explicitly and, as one of its causative roots, the responsibility of African leadership for the failure of development and democracy.

d) The struggle for democracy and human rights in post-colonial Africa – the second wave of liberation – was essentially and significantly home-grown and internally driven and had been impelled and won by African peoples, with intellectuals playing a very important part. The struggle of mass democratic movements in places like Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Sudan was part of the process of liberation from internal colonialism in its different sources in several African countries. For that reason, the historical processes that had given rise to NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism were rooted in African peoples’ home-grown and autonomous struggles for democracy. That was the historical context of the African Peer Review Mechanism.

e) The importance of the concept paper lay in the fact that it provided the larger picture, the historical Pan-African tapestry, that showed that the APRM was part of a yet-unfolding historical process.

f) What now remained was for the meeting to produce two “products”: a tentative outline of a magisterial and definitive book on the APRM, and the road map to writing and publishing it.

g) A recurring theme of the interventions was a development vision and strategy based on defining Pan-African principles of self-reliance, respect for human dignity and racial pride as the critical driving forces of African development. That had to be a prime objective of NEPAD and the APRM.

h) The APRM had raised the issue of “getting politics right” in its focus on good governance, solving the economic, political and social issues, and its redefinition of an African social contract based on shared accountability, which emphasized the rights as much as the duties of citizenship, and mutuality, recognition and reciprocity between stakeholders at the national, regional, continental and global levels. That was the link between democracy and development, not only as a national and continental imperative, but also as a global imperative to bring about a new international economic and political order.

i) Africa needed a new “return to the source” to rediscover the radical, progressive stream in African political thought in order to provide an intellectual framework and analytical lenses
for understanding, not only African history, but also global history and Africa’s place within it. African history had to be seen, not only as the story of the past as told by “elitist” scholars and mainstream apologists of the West, but also and more significantly as one told from the radically disabused point of view of the lived experiences and struggles of African peoples for liberation from want, bondage and indignity, and in search of respect, democracy, development, peace, and security. This kind of people’s history would focus on the “historical sociology and pathology” of Africa’s unequal incorporation into globalization processes, its contradictions and the character of the State in its domestic and global manifestations. It would also provide insights into how the peoples’ struggle for democracy and freedom from expatriate domination and its continuation under their domestic proxies came to be dissociated from the conventional nationalist struggle based on accommodation with the powers-that-be.

j) According to one participant, if the APRM had the potential to redeem and restructure the anti-people bias of African development, it was because of its radical, even revolutionary potential to bridge the growing divide between the African political elite and African peoples by providing and institutionalizing a mechanism, which another participant described as increasingly leading to Africa’s quest for domestic accountability in its governance systems. According to this point of view, the overriding impact of the APRM, if implemented faithfully, would be the replacement of external accountability by domestic accountability. In this respect, the consensus was that there was a significant role and place for civil society in the APRM country, regional and continental processes, not only to ensure the expansion of political spaces, but also to act as a perpetually vigilant sentinel in order to prevent democratic reversals and the narrowing of political spaces. There was pride that NEPAD and the APRM were African-owned products.

k) NEPAD/APRM was gradually helping to solve governance problems in several African countries.

l) ECA had played and should continue to play a critical role analogous to that of a continental African applied research think tank on democracy and development. The ECA focus and programmes on the APRM were very much in line with this historic role, which ECA is still playing in Africa.

m) African regional and continental integration processes had to be further developed.

n) In order to ensure the success of NEPAD/APRM, one participant thought safeguards were needed against three kinds of “institutional gamble”: against NEPAD/APRM being “hijacked” and appropriated by “foreign forces”, notably the forces of “liberal imperialism” and “liberal internationalism”; against NEPAD/APRM national and continental processes becoming bu-
reaucratic routines, to ensure that they did not become mere “formalities”; and lastly, against their becoming an extension of State-driven policy or something devoid of popular voices and popular participation.
PART III
APRM Structures, Processes and Methodologies

Presentation by Professor S.K.B. Asante
Professor S.K.B. Asante focused more specifically on the history, unfolding institutional processes and stages, challenges/opportunities, problems and prospects of continental and national APRM structures, and the integration of the continental APRM into African regional and continental organizations, such as the regional economic communities and the African Union. He began by making a number of general observations about the APRM implementation process before going on to focus more specifically on the Ghanaian APRM process and its lessons for other APRM country processes.

Beginning with APRM continental structures and processes, Professor Asante identified the following as requiring close attention in order to resolve emerging problems facing the fledgling APRM:

a) The APR Forum and the APR Panel of Eminent Persons seem to be losing steam. It was imperative to reinvigorate them in order to sustain the initial enthusiasm and dynamism that characterized their work.
b) The human, physical/logistic and financial resource base of the APRM continental Secretariat had to be strengthened in order to cope more efficiently with its increasing workload, which was itself the outcome of growing adherence to the APRM and institutionalization of the APRM in APRM member States.

c) There was a pressing need to address problems associated with the APRM Country Self-Assessment Methodology, especially the APRM questionnaire and its omission of a number of key governance issues, such as media freedom and climate change.

d) In view of the fact that the timeframe given for completion of the APRM country process had rarely been respected and the wide divergence in the time taken to complete the base review process, the whole process had to be streamlined.

e) At the APRM country process level, commitment and political will by the political leadership was important for galvanizing and moving the process forward.

With regard to the Ghana APRM country process, Professor Asante referred to funding problems, capacity constraints, and decentralization and how the problems were approached. It was realized that the commitment and demonstration of political will by the country’s political leadership, as well as emphasis on the APRM as a national, rather than partisan political, process, were essential ingredients in moving the process forward.

From the outset, the idea of an APRM focal point in the Presidency had been avoided when creating an APRM national structure in order to insulate the office of the focal point from partisan politics. Hence in Ghana, the continuity and sustainability of the APRM process, in the face of the inevitable democratic political succession, was the overriding consideration in the creation of an APRM Governing Council in the country. Another problem had been the post-review process, specifically the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the National Programme of Action (NPoA). Ghana had tackled the problem by avoiding having two parallel programmes, one for the NPoA and one for the NPPD, for example, by requiring that the NPoA be integrated into the national executive programmes of the country, and dividing the NPoA into three main areas-short-term, medium-term and long-term.

The problem of decentralization of the APRM process had necessitated the establishment of district oversight committees in all the 170 districts of the country, with each committee made up of nine members, five women, four men, or four women, five men. The functions of the district oversight committees at the district level included: (a) integrating the committee members, and through them the communities in the districts, into the ownership structure of the APRM; (b) representing the Ghana APRM Governing Council; (c) dissemination and advocacy activities on the APRM; (d) moni-
toring and evaluation of the APRM national process; and (e) the presentation of periodic reports on their APRM-related activities to the district assembly. By decentralizing the country APRM process in that way, and making timely information and financial disbursements available to the APRM district oversight committees, the Ghana APRM Governing Council had created APRM awareness throughout the country, generating grassroots-based constituencies and a groundswell of popular support for and investment in the APRM.

Professor Asante highlighted the fact that the Ghana APRM Governing Council had taken the initiative and assumed a leading role at the West African regional level in the establishment of the West African Centre for the Advancement of the APRM (WACAA), comprising APRM councils in Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso and Togo. The primary objective of WACAA was to share experiences with participating Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member States, adopt common and subregional strategies on APRM implementation processes, mainstream APRM activities into academic programmes and key universities in the sub region through research and staff development.

Concluding his presentation, Professor Asante identified the impact of the APRM in Ghana, in terms of the following achievements:

a) Better service delivery to meet the growing demands of Ghanaians for a share of accelerated and more effective development;

b) Vigorous national debate about policies and priorities involving the participation and empowerment of citizens in national development;

c) The promotion of transparency, openness, accountability and democracy;

d) Facilitating Ghanaian ownership of the development process;

e) The Ghanaian Government’s adoption and in some cases implementation of a number of recommendations from the APRM Country Review Report, notably (i) the establishment of a Ministry of Chieftaincy Affairs; (ii) an upper limit on the composition of the country’s Supreme Court to 13 Justices, from the previous constitutionally unlimited number; (iii) the enactment of the Whistleblower Act; (iv) Enactment of a law against Domestic Violence, especially against women; (v) Enactment of a law against human trafficking; (vi) Abolition of the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, which had tended to undermine the separation of powers; and (vii) Reduction in the number of ministries.
With regard to lessons learned and experiences gained from the Ghana APRM country process, Professor Asante pointed to: (a) firm and demonstrated political will and commitment; (b) autonomy of the APRM country structures and institutions; (c) massive public enlightenment; (d) critical involvement of non-State actors at national, regional and district levels; (e) integration of NPoA with existing national development processes; (f) sharing of experiences with other APRM member States and the Pan-African Parliament.

**Discussion on Professor Asante’s presentation**

The discussion that followed Professor Asante’s presentation touched generally on (a) the idea of the APRM and (b) the structure and process of the APRM continental and country processes; and more specifically on: (c) funding problems; and (d) the implications and impact of the APRM.

» The Idea of the APRM:

Returning to the issue of the origins of the APRM, many participants emphasized the fact that the APRM was not and should not be viewed as a continuation of Bretton Woods institutions’ policies and practices; it was a holistic outlook with a people-centred development agenda based on four comprehensive thematic areas. One participant argued that it was part of the dialectics in the struggle for the governance agenda on the African continent, a follow up to the popular struggles of the 1980s. Recalling a conversation with a number of Heads of State on the APRM, another participant argued that the response she got from them underscored the radical implications of the idea of the APRM, which civil society organizations had not yet taken seriously.

The point was made that the idea of the APRM encapsulated a new multidimensional, disaggregated perspective on leadership in Africa. It was one that went beyond focusing on political leadership, defined in terms of those controlling the State, the resources of the State and the personnel of the State. Going beyond that narrow equation of leadership with ‘political leadership’, the APRM located and analysed leadership in terms of the rights and obligations of citizenship and partnership, and therefore as shared by many people, including youth and women many non-governmental and civil society organizations and the private sector.

» APRM Structures and Processes

One significant point that permeated the discussion was that the APRM continental and national processes were envisioned and designed not simply as technical artefacts, but also as pre-eminentely consultative and politically contested ones, which by their nature were also intrinsically embedded in politics and power relations directed at the acquisition and control of State power. For that reason, the APRM should not be viewed as ‘an event’ but a process, a political process, one that emerged from political struggle by various actors and should therefore not be personalized around
its initiators. One participant observed that it had been built on certain institutions and would not disappear because its initiators had gone. According to another participant, it was unfortunate that the radical left in Africa, though in principle in favour of the APRM, had problems with it because it did not fit in with what they were used to. The left in Africa tended to be critical and unmindful of the potentials for change and betterment of life arising from ideas and proposals put in place by those not in their ideological spectrum.

The discussion emphasized that the APRM was not about the executive branch alone. It was a comprehensive process covering parliament, the judiciary, the private sector, civil society, and community-based organizations, among others. According to one participant, it was not clear how the APRM covered the private sector apart from in terms of corporate governance. The role of the private sector was the focus of another participant’s observation about the sector’s apparent indifference to the APRM continental and country processes and the need to link the APRM to their business interest and convince them that it could be useful for their business.

The point was also made that discussion of the APRM tended to focus too much on democracy and political governance, with a corresponding neglect of its other three pillars.

The discussion also drew attention to the APRM questionnaire, particularly the fact that it was cumbersome and repetitive. A consensus emerged, however, that the various methodologies adopted for the country self-assessment process – household survey, expert panel survey, desk research and focus group discussion – had some redeeming features: information was gathered and, in the process, people were learning a lot by being asked questions; even if they were unable to answer them, they would go home thinking and worrying about them, which was positive. But another participant wondered whether the methodology of the country self-assessment, the selection of the technical research institutions, and the country self-assessment report had generally been competently and professionally done and subjected to internal peer review, and whether it was really impossible to manipulate them. Yet another participant wondered about the fit between the substantive content and focus of the questionnaire, such as the democracy and political governance thematic section on liberal democracy, and the political reality on the ground; pointing out that the constitution of a State in Africa provides very little indication of political practices. There were also suggestions on how to improve the APRM questionnaire by making it more relevant and focused on a number of neglected areas, such as the informal sector, youth, rural development and climate change. One participant noted that young people in Africa constituted a time bomb but the questionnaire contained very few questions pertaining to them.

Another recurrent issue was the domination of the APRM country process by the executive branch, and its consequent bureaucratization and appropriation by civil servants, because there was money in it, as one participant observed. It was probably in order to avoid bureaucratization of this kind...
that another participant suggested that a way had to be found of ritualizing the APRM as part of the national process of dialogue and moving it forward in order to strengthen and deepen it. There is therefore a need for the promotion and consolidation of the initial national process into regular national political processes.

The issue of the sustainability of the APRM continental and country processes also featured in the discussion. One participant argued that, while the initiative for the APRM came from a number of leaders, there were also many actors who played crucial roles, as well as many undercurrents that went into the struggle to bring it about. In that connection, a number of participants pointed out that the fears that once the APRM founding initiators had left the stage, the APRM would fall into desuetude were groundless. Nonetheless, there was general agreement that reinvigorating the APRM Forum and the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, as well as the country APRM processes, was a strategic imperative. There was also general concern that the APRM Secretariat needed capacity and an institutional foundation in order to fulfil its mission. Participants also emphasized the need for political will and visionary leadership at the level of the APRM Forum and APRM Panel of Eminent Persons to drive the process forward.

Regarding sustainability at the APRM country level, it was suggested that enabling legislation was needed in order to make the APRM part of domestic law, because that would make it much more difficult to do away with the APRM country process. The issue of sustainability was also raised from the angle of the citizenry, who may suffer what one participant described as “APRM fatigue”, if no perceptible or concrete gains were derived from the process.

Another issue raised during the discussion was standardization of the APRM country structure, procedure and process, in view of sometimes wide divergences and approaches over the composition of governing councils, their powers and location, selection of the technical research institutions, funding of governing councils, as well as that of the process. In a number of cases, the divergences occurred with a view to manipulating the process. For that reason, one participant argued that, while local variation was fine, it was also important to have a standard framework that would allow for a lower level of manipulation. In that respect, the Ghana APRM decentralization model was generally acclaimed as a best practice, showing how the process, and particularly the NPoA, could best be integrated into national development objectives and programmes, and then disseminated all the way to the grassroots, at the divisional or district level.

» Funding the APRM:

A number of observations concerned the funding of APRM continental and country structures and processes. One participant commented that Finance was absolutely critical because the APRM process was very expensive. At the APRM country level, for example, in addition to the recurrent
and capital costs of keeping the governing councils operational and conducting APRM dissemination and advocacy activities, conducting the country self-assessment, validating it and hosting the country review teams, peer-reviewed countries also had to fund their NPoAs, all of which ran into several hundred million US dollars. At the core of the discussion on the issue, therefore, was the realization that funding was bound up with the ownership, credibility, autonomy, viability and sustainability of the APRM continental and country structures and processes. One participant starkly analysed the dilemma over funding, external influence, internal influence, localism, and ownership as follows:

“Even when funding comes through the UNDP, it’s called the UNDP Basket Fund, but these are donor funds. On the other hand, we say this is our own. I think these are issues we need to examine very seriously at an intellectual level. To say, as Africans, yes it is a question of ownership, you are driving the process; you cannot drive what you don’t pay for – I think there is a problem with that”.

Funding – how, and from what sources to generate the funds to run and sustain the APRM – had been a major consideration from the initiation stage of the APRM. One participant who had been there at the beginning recalled that they had learned from experience that it was best to start with the little you had that would enable you to own the process.

Another issue arising from those considerations was how to fund the governing councils in a manner that did not detract from their autonomy, by insulating them and the APRM country process generally from government control or undue interference so that the credibility of the process was not tainted. The general thrust of the discussion on that point was that it was important for APRM governing councils to have their own separate budgets and secretariat with staff hired by them, under their control, and accountable to them.

» Implications and Impact of the APRM

Several participants pointed to the implications of the APRM for the interface between knowledge and policy formulation in the continent. The value of the APRM in that respect was defined in terms of the fresh opportunities and challenges it had provided for the management and direction of the role of intellectuals in the policy process, particularly through the application of scientific methodology to the conduct of the country self-assessment. Indeed, the promise and significance of the NPoA was that it was derived bottom-up, through the application of scientific methodology, from the perceptions and identification of a sample cross-section of a country’s population, including ordinary men and women and the country’s elite, about policy issues, focusing on what should be done to address them, and how to prioritize policy responses accordingly. One participant made the point forcefully in another way:
“But for us as Africans, it [the APRM] is a very good exercise in knowledge /policy interfaces. I hear you, Professor, talking of working with many people in the policy field, but also on the ground with non-governmental and civil society organizations. It is a triangular process with a clear epistemic drive. There is a clear process of knowledge management and knowledge use for policy-making. I am happy that ECA is taking this initiative because it is time we academics reflected; make our contribution to this process, rather than trying to criticize it”.

Another participant pointed to the academic value of the country self-assessment and country review reports as research-based, written in simple language by and for Africans, with a rich wealth of data that he had found useful as teaching material in undergraduate and graduate classes.

In general, participants also saw the APRM process as a vehicle for conducting a grand national policy debate about the past, present and future of APRM member States in an open and non-intimidating manner, thereby creating new spaces for citizenship participation in public affairs. One participant, drawing on her experience as a member of an APRM country review mission to Burkina Faso, expressed and illustrated that aspect of the APRM dramatically:

“The real story of the APRM will be to tell you about the stories, to see a real, patient woman in Burkina Faso without any shoes coming to attend [APRM meetings]. Hardly dressed…. people start telling the military how they hate them. And by the end of the day, you will see a military guy standing and saying, ‘I beg your pardon; please forgive me, we didn’t realize how much we are hated in the countryside’.

Another contribution of the APRM to national, regional and continental politics was its potentially important role as an early-warning mechanism to avert national crisis and its ripple effect in neighbouring countries and, in some cases, across Africa, and thus a critical instrument for identifying potential conflict and violence, contributing to the promotion, sustainability and consolidation of peace, security and stability in the continent. The value of the APRM processes in signalling impending national crises in country review reports was illustrated by the 2007 election crisis in Kenya, and the outbursts of xenophobic attacks on non-national Africans in South Africa.

A number of participants felt that the most unique impact of the APRM was that it was the interposition into the domestic politics and public policy processes of its Member States of an external African supranational accountability mechanism, albeit a voluntary one, with powerful power of moral suasion. For one participant, it was this in-built accountability mechanism in the APRM structure and process that made the whole process exciting, because African minds had always been controlled from without. The APRM was reform from within, whereas structural adjustment had been reform from without. An intermediary panel was needed at the sub-regional level that would have the moral authority to ensure that there was some kind of external accountability.
While there was general consensus about the value-added and positive impact of the APRM on domestic, regional and continental political processes, there was also recognition of its limits and problems. It was noted that it was probably too early to make a final judgement on it. The cautious positive verdict was tempered by the need not to see the APRM as definitely a causal factor, but as intersecting with other recent trends towards democracy and good governance in Africa, all seamlessly reinforcing and complementing one another.

The general feeling was that the APRM and its underlying principles needed to be consolidated as drivers of the emergent political economy of good governance and another bulwark in defence of democratic governance and against democratic reversals.
Dr. Kojo Busia: Session Objectives

Dr. Kojo Busia, Chief of the APRM Support Section, ECA, introduced the session, stating its objectives, which were mainly to provide an opportunity for the meeting to draw together and synthesize observations and the emerging consensus from previous sessions about the analytical and policy gains and potentials of the APRM and to develop scenarios on how they could be directed to inform future policy choices and analytical parameters that would have an impact on critical issues on African governance systems in the next generation or so.

To this end, the presentations during the third session would address, among other issues, the role, challenges and opportunities of the African developmental State; the impact of the current global economic and financial crisis on Africa; and the role of China in the world, with emphasis on exploration of the relationship between the engagement of China with Africa and its consequences for what shape the governance of African countries should take.
Professor Chege looked at the history of the concept of the developmental State and its practice and governance implications in Africa. With particular reference to the APRM thematic areas, and drawing on the APRM country review reports of Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, he highlighted the lessons of the developmental State for corporate governance, ethnic pluralism and competitive electoral politics in Africa.

For Professor Chege, the prototype of the developmental State was probably Japan, which had emerged from the ruins of the 1945 bombing and the destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima to become the world’s second largest economy in less than fifty years. That transformation had been possible because the State played a major role in planning the market. The defining element in the concept of the developmental State, based on the Japanese “miracle”, was the planned market economy, a development model that differed from the socialist, (centralized planning), and the liberal capitalist (indicative planning) models.

Regarding the African experience of which development strategy to adopt, Professor Chege pointed out that the role of the developmental State as exemplified by the Japanese model and experience, contradicted the World Bank’s view in the late 1980s and 1990s that the State, particularly the African State, could only intervene with destructive results in economic development and growth, and that, consequently, getting the prices right would solve Africa’s problems, and the State should get out of business. With hindsight, Professor Chege observed that it was clear from evidence now available that Ghana, once touted as a prime example of neoliberalism in Africa, was in depression
during the SAP years, and that the economies of Mozambique and Tanzania, which had also been held up as exemplary, were also depressed during those years.

According to Professor Chege, the question was whether African countries were capable of planning the market for the benefit of Africans. The historical evidence pointed to the fact that, in countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal, there had been periods of success for the developmental State, working with African people to get to the market, competing internationally, eliminating poverty. It was in that sense – getting the State back on the policy agenda, reinvigorating and capacitating the developmental State as it had historically featured as an episode in the emergent post-independence African political economy – that the APRM could be viewed as providing a strategic opportunity for its member States to create the good governance environment for the re-emergence of the African developmental State.

The major contribution of APRM in the unfolding debate over the African developmental State, according to Professor Chege, would be through its thematic focus on economic management and governance, with facilitating reinforcement by the other thematic areas, democracy and political governance, corporate governance and socio-economic development. In order to illustrate his view that the economic management and governance thematic focus of APRM pointed to how to re-invent the African developmental State, he referred to popular opinions derived from country review reports in various peer-reviewed APRM member States running against neoliberalism, but favouring a major role for the African State in planning the market. One recurrent refrain in the surveys analysed in a sample of country review reports was that microeconomic stability was non-negotiable as there was a disconnect between government action and the actual policies taken, with grassroots communities dissatisfied with the entire process. In their own words, those communities were of the view that “governments make reforms here, they work, but we don’t feel the impact in our households or purchasing power.

Furthermore, according to Professor Chege, the survey of the APRM reports showed that, according to popular opinion, although security was a problem and the police were corrupt, the education system was working, but more teachers, books, and equipment were needed. These were all critical areas for the developmental State. He also noted that the first four APRM Country Review reports contained very profound ideas from the people about policies that ought to be implemented in order to ensure the developmental State.

Professor Chege summed up the popular view that emerged from those APRM country review reports as follows:

“If you are going to form a developmental State, you need reform policies that address how microeconomic policies translate into groups, are inclusive and promote quality of life by
promoting jobs, providing basic necessities like water, and most of all incomes that count. This is the great lesson we ought to learn from countries such as China, India, Malaysia and South Korea. What Malaysia and China did was invest in their human beings before anything else. Literally everybody has an education; everybody’s health is insured, making sure that diseases are eliminated to secure a better quality of life for their citizens”.

He summarized the findings in some APRM country review reports as follows:

a) **On Corporate Governance**: It was clear from the Kenya Country Review Report that corruption and lack of a nationalist agenda were problems in the corporate sector. For example, the Kenya country self-assessment elite survey data noted that, according to the field survey of corporate governance, people inside and outside the corporate sector said that the private sector was as corrupt as government. Doing business in the private sector was not corruption-free. It was the same in Mauritius.

b) **On Democracy and Political Governance**: The Banjul 2006 AU Summit and the APRM Forum held simultaneously had shown that a cross-cutting issue in various APRM country review reports was the problem of ethnic diversity and the proper management of diversity. According to Professor Chege, addressing the issue in order to construct structures of democratic governance in Africa would require finding ways to accommodate ethnic pluralism and inclusiveness; budget allocations to address economically backward or disadvantaged groups; and bringing in proportional representation in order to cure the addiction to majority government in African politics. He also recalled that it emerged from the country review reports that elections had to be got right and reflect the people’s message: Ways had to be found of making legislatures and governments much more accountable through credible electoral governance processes.

---

**Professor Adele Jinadu: Africa and the Global Economic and Financial Crisis**

Professor Jinadu’s presentation reflected on the global economic and financial crisis and the questions arising from it: firstly, the role and capacity of regulatory authorities in Africa; and secondly, political leadership on the continent. He placed his presentation in the context of the political and policy governance framework of the APRM in order to illustrate the possibilities the APRM opens up for African responses to the global crisis.

For Professor Jinadu, the global crisis highlighted the strategic policy imperative for reform in three interrelated policy areas along lines indicated in the APRM: (a) the vulnerability of African political economies to external shocks; (b) the imperative and extent of regulation; and (c) what was required
to bring about a political and policy environment conducive to securing the capable or developmental State in Africa. In order to confront the global crisis and its recurrence, Africa required a developmental State, defined in terms of the emergence of the capable State through the enhancement of State capacity by (a) strengthening the regulatory functions and powers of the State and its regulatory authorities, such as central banks, stock exchanges, parliaments, anti-corruption agencies, electoral management bodies, and ombudsmen; and (b) democratizing the State through the politics of openness, inclusion, credible elections, separation of powers, the rule of law, and social reform through the provision of social facilities, such as education, health, roads, potable water, electricity, etc., in order to address the massive problem of the structural condition of the African State.

Regarding the vulnerability of African political economies to external shocks, Professor Jinadu argued that the current global crisis had demonstrated the need to strengthen the capacity of public, and particularly regulatory, authorities in Africa, in order to enable them to exercise independent regulatory or supervisory powers and functions in their respective areas of public policy, ranging from banking and financial services to consumer and environmental protection. A good illustration of policy response in that respect was the action of the Central Bank of Nigeria in averting the imminent collapse of Nigerian banks in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

On the imperative of regulation, Professor Jinadu argued that the response to the global crisis around the world pointed to the inevitability of regulation to cushion the world’s political economies from the more serious consequences of imperfect markets. The crisis demonstrated the limits of deregulation and its founding myth of the market, and that the dichotomy of regulation ver-
sus deregulation was misleading in failing to see that regulation did not necessarily supplant the market, but rather constrained it in ways that enabled the market to operate in a policy framework structured by regulatory constraints in the public interest.

He went on to argue that the APRM had brought to the policy debate in Africa a strategic shift in the governance and policy focus from the neoliberal economic and political prescriptions of SAPs, with emphasis on rolling back the State, to the imperative of an interventionist State to allocate social surplus, based on democracy and good governance and their sustaining political culture as a condition for the capable or developmental State and its regulatory role.

Professor Jinadu remarked that the APRM was part of the emerging African consensus on the need for coordinated home-grown pan-African supranational responses to the antinomies of globalization, of which the global crisis was only symptomatic and the latest episode. He went on to indicate the sense in which the APRM was designed to provide a policy framework for anticipating and mitigating internal and external shocks to African political economies:

a) The APRM economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic development thematic areas set out the policy framework and environment for engendering stabilization and macroeconomic activities and programmes of regulatory bodies, such as central banks, security exchange commissions, stock exchanges, environmental protection agencies, etc.

b) The APRM democracy and political governance thematic area spelled out the judicial, legislative, and political environment conducive to strengthening the regulatory capacity of the State and particularly its regulatory agencies, in order to insulate them from political control and manipulation by partisan interests and their own internal contradictions, in ways that run counter to the public interest.

c) In peer-reviewed APRM member States, NPoAs have typically outlined policy measures, including budgetary requirements to strengthen and capacitate regulatory authorities, particularly threatened ones, in sectors as varied as banking, insurance and related financial institutions.

Professor Jinadu then moved on to the political leadership question, which he argued was approached from two intersecting perspectives in the APRM democracy and political governance thematic focus:

a) It was clear from the APRM that the political leadership question was fundamentally one of crafting unproblematic and democratic political succession rules and adhering to them. This was why the APRM democracy and political governance thematic areas attached great impor-
to compacting constitutional, electoral and political reform for democratic and constitutional political succession. Therefore, the APRM value addition to Africa’s cultural reorientation is to engender democratic political order, based on respect for tolerance, accountability and transparency.

b) Disaggregation of political leadership into various levels, tied to citizenship rights and obligations under liberal constitutionalism, emphasizing various interrelated spaces in public political, as well as private and related associational institutional life, for expansion and liberalization and for various dimensions of the leadership role to be played out. This was what was meant by the APRM offering a new social contract based on mutual recognition and reciprocity among State and non-State actors in APRM member States, and reconfiguring the relationship between the political leadership and the people, in terms of political responsibility, ethics and accountability in public political life.

Professor Mohammed Salih: on “China and Africa”

Professor Salih’s presentation focused on China’s role in Africa, against the background of the country’s rising economic and political profile in global affairs. He recalled that Africa had been engaged with China since independence. Historically that engagement had been based in part on a combination of demographic, economic and political considerations, which had now assumed even greater dimensions. That was because 65 per cent of the world’s strategic mineral and energy
resources were in Africa. The emergence on the world stage of China with its huge population and its hunger for those raw materials had created a new geopolitical dynamics in the world.

According to Professor Salih, an important dimension of Sino-African engagement was a heated, even brutal intellectual and policy debate, not only within Africa, but also within Europe. At the core of that debate was the question whether China offered an alternative development model based on pragmatic developmentalism, whose characteristics included nationalist leadership, a strong alliance between the State and the industrial sector, and development for harmony.

Professor Salih outlined the characteristics of the Chinese model and path to the developmental State:

a) A strong nationalist leadership, whose primary interest and commitment was to serve the public interest.

b) Full State control of the internal market and of certain aspects of the external market, particularly finance and currency.

c) A strong national currency, the Yuan, which was now used by more than ten countries, with guarantees from China, while the rest of the world uses the US dollar.

d) A strong alliance between the State and the industrial sector, based on the State deliberately creating partnership between the public and private sectors, including State subsidy of both sectors. No Chinese company would invest in Africa without the support of the Chinese government to cushion their investment risk.

e) The State pursued a policy of reducing unequal development between the various regions/provinces, urban/rural areas of China through development for national harmony.

Professor Salih went on to describe the options of China’s pragmatic developmentalism so characterized offered Africa as follows: Africa looked at China’s developmental State from the perspective of two types of developmental States: an authoritarian State, as given by the West; and a developmental State based on the concept of pragmatic development, which delayed social progress in society for a particular period of time until it was ready for engagement at a level that might be called liberal.

According to Professor Salih, three dominant perspectives had tended to inform perceptions of China’s engagement with Africa:
a) The first was South-South cooperation, which the European Union (EU) and the United States had viewed uncomfortably as a threat to their historic role as the conventional dominant development actors in Africa.

b) The second perspective, advanced by western knowledge-framing processes, viewed Africa-China relations from the perspective of Africa as an ex-colonial domain, over which the West still exercised a certain hegemony. He noted that that western discourse and perspective was supported by surrogate epistemic communities, which discussed Sino-African relations in terms of problems that would occur as a result of China’s involvement in Africa, such as environmental problems, indifference to human rights and democracy issues in Africa, and dumping of Chinese products in Africa. That perspective also framed Sino-African relations in terms of the unfair advantage it offered small Chinese firms to compete with African small and medium size enterprises and the employment it created for unskilled Chinese labour.

c) The third perspective was offered by a group of African academics and policymakers who saw China’s international development role and rise to global power as offering an opportunity for Africa. China’s rapid transformation from an underdeveloped country when it became a member of the World Bank in 1980 to its current status as a developmental State and major player in the global political economy offered Africa a number of lessons to consider.

Professor Salih argued that the third perspective was the right one for Africa because it meant engaging China from the perspective of what kind of opportunities would accrue to the continent, rather than one biased by the ideological and self-serving position of the West, which saw nothing but problems for Africa in China’s relations with it, and in so doing privileged the West. He therefore argued that Sino-African relations had deep historical roots which should provide points of departure for a more nuanced and informed analysis of trends and tendencies in those relations, in the broader context of Africa’s engagement with the world economy and politics. To underscore his argument, Professor Salih adduced historical evidence, dating back to the 19th century, when China had just begun to sense Africa, and particularly between 1945 and 1965. He referred to the support several African countries gave China on the Taiwan issue and emphasized China’s contribution to the struggle for democracy and against racism by reminding participants of its solidarity with African liberation movements and the struggle for African independence. He pointed to China’s early support for African development in the form of various Chinese development projects in Burkina Faso, the Sudan and Tanzania, even at a time when China itself was underdeveloped.

From those small foundational beginnings in the 1945-1965 period, China now had a very significant presence in Africa. The major Chinese policy statement on Africa was the Beijing Declaration, about which many Africans had been sceptical because they had heard similar declarations before from others, but, Africa’s scepticism had soon given way to optimism and hope in the face
of the concrete demonstration of China’s commitment to Africa’s development, exemplified by (a) the rise in China-Africa trade from $US10 billion in 1999 to the present target of $US 100 billion, in terms of trade; (b) China’s establishment of 150 trade offices and 200 trade centres in Africa; and (c) China’s inauguration of the $US1 billion China-Africa Research Cooperation and Exchange Programme. Professor Salih argued that the concrete demonstration of solidarity with Africa was evidence that what China promised and signed up to, it delivered, whether it be roads, schools, 4000 scholarships for Africans to study medicine, agriculture, and so on.

Professor Salih then analysed the relevance of China’s developmental pragmatism more specifically in terms of the APRM in order to draw out the implications of China-Africa relations for the APRM thematic focus on (a) democracy and political governance in the sub-thematic area of human rights, and (b) corporate governance.

**Democracy and Political Governance:** He contended that the experience of China had shown that any connection between development and democracy should be rejected out of hand. The facile conflation of democracy with development had to be avoided, as did any use of democracy as a metaphor for development. Otherwise, if democracy failed, people would immediately say that democratic failure was really an aspect of developmental failure. There was a sense in which conflating democracy and development through the imposition of conditionalities by the West was paternalistic. Professor Salih did not like the idea that the West treated Africans like children, the suggestion that, unless someone was denying them money and resources and imposing conditionalities concerning democracy and human rights, they would not respect democracy and the human rights of their people.

He contrasted the paternalism of the West in imposing democracy and human rights as conditionalities for aid to African countries, thereby conflating democracy with development, with China’s position of not doing so. He noted that there was no evidence that China’s involvement had reduced or negatively affected the democratic process in Africa.

**Corporate Governance:** Professor Salih suggested that the APRM corporate governance thematic area should be disaggregated, with separate focus on the practices of national and international corporate organizations operating in APRM member States. Accordingly, foreign – including Chinese –, as well as national corporate firms and how they operate should be examined. This would help to give a very clear view of who was who and who was doing what. No less important, in view of their work in the area of corporate social responsibility, was the engagement of civil society organizations in the APRM country processes in that area, on issues such as environmental degradation and corruption.
Professor Salih concluded that the significant import of the APRM for the emergence of the developmental African State was the opportunity it had offered Africans for self-critical assessment of development aid and the role of the development partners in the overall development process in Africa, beyond the narrow and typical focus on project-based evaluation. This was the more important in view of the ever-deepening poverty of African peoples after several decades of foreign aid and technical assistance, with no drinking water, and with education worse off than ever before. He ended on the following note:

“In the African peer review mechanism, we need to look at development aid. We need to evaluate it. I find it very strange that, ever since development aid has been coming to Africa, all the evaluations are project-based. Whether the project has succeeded or not succeeded. Let us look at all these donor countries and review them through this peer review mechanism… Where does their money go? …. Look at the various donors, including China, and how they fare. Then we will have a clear picture, instead of trying to be ideological”.

Discussion of the Presentations by Professors Chege, Jinadu and Salih

Dr. Kojo Busia introduced the debate by noting that the presentations had advanced the focus of previous sessions on ‘upstream’ issues of the APRM – structures, processes, background and origins, and some of the challenges and the prospects of the process itself, which has its own unique value for African governance. – They had analysed the outcomes of the process, the content of the APRM reports, and their implications for shaping Africa’s development. Such analysis was invaluable because change was sought through the APRM instrument, a self-assessment instrument through which African peoples expressed their preferences and what the State could do about them, thereby shaping the development of African countries. Dr Busia was therefore hopeful that:

“If sustained, over a period of time, the APRM has the potential to re-shape the character and policy direction of the State in Africa. This is precisely what we have tried to address through this panel. How do the economic governance components of the reports address the developmental State? What preferences do the reports say about corporate governance issues?”

The discussion of the three presentations ranged over the following issues.

» The APRM and the Political Environment of Development

There was a general sentiment that the three presentations clearly showed the very fast paced dynamic global environment, characterized by rapid economic, political and technological changes within which the current democracy and development debate in Africa and elsewhere was tak-
ing place. It was also generally agreed that contemporary globalization had continued to pose the challenge of the old globalization for Africa: how to contain, arrest and reverse the incremental intensification of Africa’s marginalization and exploitation. While many participants emphasized the significant enabling and facilitating construction and development of physical and socio-economic infrastructures for development, no less important for them was what one participant described as “soft infrastructures”, something like governance, which had to be there and had to be good. In other words, many participants saw a necessary, though not necessarily causal or sufficient, link between democracy, defined broadly as good governance, and development as a way of confronting and seizing the opportunity of the challenge of globalization. Linking democracy and development to the international political economy would require the creation of strong economic, political and sociocultural institutions, corresponding to the existing neoliberal system, but informed by enlightened African traditional values, in order to attract domestic and external investment on a continuing and sustainable basis.

» Democracy/development

Other participants were more cautious in approaching the democracy/development debate. They maintained that democracy had to be seen to deliver the goods on the street, otherwise it would be “a hollow shell”, mere sloganeering. Yet, saying this was a way of further underscoring the seamless overlap or interconnectedness between the APRM democracy and political governance theme and the other three APRM themes: economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. One common thread linking the four themes and reinforcing the importance of “soft infrastructures” for democracy and development was building strong and capable governance institutions.

This was what one participant meant when he remarked that proper institutions that allow investment had to be created. Much the same point was implied by the observation of another participant that the APRM enabled countries to take advantage of the small window of opportunity to rebuild and strengthen institutions provided by the global financial and economic crisis.

The general view, therefore, was that the linkage between democracy and development was as much instrumental as it was visionary or normative in relation to the kind of democratic developmental State Africans should create, and the requisite legal and political culture required to promote, sustain and consolidate it. In confronting that artisanal or design problem of the institutional and psycho-cultural or attitudinal correlates of democracy and development as seamlessly interrelated policy objectives, some participants wondered what kind of life philosophies it was desirable for the APRM to drive Africa towards? It was clear that you could have development without liberal democracy, you could have development with socialist democracy or you could have development without any form of democracy, but could you have democracy without any development?
From considerations of the link between democracy and development and the role of the APRM in facilitating it, the discussion shifted to related issues concerning the political environment of democracy and development. One such issue was the pertinent one of how political culture was to be understood and how it had manifested itself in various African countries in shaping political leadership and the character of democratic politics and development on the continent. With different political cultures and the different political leadership deriving from and reflecting them, while in turn shaping them in a dialectical or dynamic way, one participant wondered if that did not mean, for example, that if Kenya’s political culture was different from Tanzania’s, the APRM might be working in a different way in Kenya and Tanzania. Furthermore, the same participant believed it was important to link the social question and its resolution to the different character of political culture and political leadership in Africa, in order to grapple with how the APRM could resolve the deepening structural crisis – deepening poverty, deepening inequality, deepening imitative youth culture. Still on the relationship between culture, development and politics, another participant argued that the question of the inclusion of African cultural values was crucial in a discussion of the model of society it was desirable to develop in African countries. What values had emerged from the APRM experience? It was essential to build upon cultural values in order to take the aspirations of the people into account in development strategy.

Other perspectives that emerged from the discussion on political culture included the vexed issue of political culture, political leadership, democracy and development; the causal link between the continent’s crisis of political succession, and the endangered status of political and social pluralism and diversity in many APRM member States. Yet other participants wanted the APRM to contribute to providing a platform or environment for political and other kinds of pluralism, an issue so significant that the APRM Forum had recognized it as a major cross-cutting issue requiring urgent public policy resolution.

» Africa and China

Although discussion of China was situated within the broader context of the political environment of the developmental State summarized above, a number of participants touched specifically on certain aspects of the historical trajectories of China’s development and its present political economy to illustrate the character of its current role in, and the relevance of its model of developmental pragmatism for, Africa. Three areas, around which the Chinese developmental model revolved and which pointed to a desirable policy direction for designing the new African developmental State or reconfiguring it along the lines enunciated in the four APRM governance themes featured prominently in the discussion: (a) the centralization of its financial system; (b) social security as a social safety-net for Chinese workers; and (c) very strong social policy in areas of infrastructural development – roads, water, energy, electricity, railways, education, and health. Participants in general agreed on and emphasized the importance of Africa not engaging with China antagonistically, as
the West would wish, but engaging with it constructively by extending the framework the APRM provided for Africa’s relationship with its “conventional partners”, not only to structure Africa-China relations, but also and more importantly to mediate and mitigate the adverse and objectively unfavourable and unequal exchange relations in which Africa found itself in its relations with China.
PART V

Closing Session and the Way Forward

The closing session provided the opportunity to review substantive issues raised about the APRM and how the APRM processes and structures at the country and continental levels could be improved in order to better serve the idea and practice of the developmental State in Africa. It was in this context that one participant suggested that it was necessary to take stock every four years and reflect on and relaunch the work on new directions based on concrete experience on the ground.

The closing session also provided the opportunity for discussion on how to go about implementing what Dr. Kojo Busia had described in his introductory remarks during the welcome session as, “the vision of a book” that might come out of the meeting. The session concluded with closing remarks by the Director of GPAD.

Review of the Substantive Issues raised during the Meeting

There was general agreement that four broad issues or challenges had emerged that required further exploration, elaboration and discussion at future meetings, colloquia and seminars held by the GPAD in collaboration with other APRM strategic partners and the APRM continental secretariat, regrettably absent on that occasion.

The four challenges were (a) African-centred knowledge production and dissemination on the APRM; (b) deepening the involvement and engagement of civil society in the APRM; (c) policy engagement of State actors other than the executive branch and non-State actors in the APRM; and (d) technical support of the APRM process by the APRM technical partners.

Challenge of Knowledge Production

The challenge of knowledge production and dissemination, underlined by the imperative of African ownership of the APRM and the development process viewed and pursued from critical African perspectives was to (a) correct expatriate, Eurocentric claims about, and interpretations of the APRM; (b) subject the APRM continental and national structures and processes to intellectual but
policy-informed scrutiny in order to improve them; (c) archival documentation, codification and classification of the mass of data-based knowledge and publications coming out of the country self-assessment reviews and the country review reports; and (d) manage in proactive and imaginative ways the complex interface between knowledge and policy in order to bridge the gap between them in Africa. In pursuit of such an objective, participants agreed on confronting the challenge by encouraging and attracting African scholars, policymakers and civil society activists to spend sabbaticals at the GPAD on APRM-related assignments.

Challenge of Deepening Civil Society Capacity

This entailed the challenge of deepening the involvement and capacity, not only of civil society, but also of other non-State actors and non-executive branch State actors in the APRM country structures and processes. They should all, particularly the civil society actors, go beyond sensitization, dissemination and advocacy to include the enhancement of their intellectual capacity in order to subject the process to intense scrutiny and provide concrete proposals about how to advance it, including, in the case of non-State actors, by conducting country self-assessments parallel to the official ones.

Challenge of Freedom and Development

This was an historical challenge, going back to the anti-slavery and anti-colonial struggles and the post-independence period, as demonstrated at the Monrovia Symposium and the Arusha Conference. The issues of economic growth with or without freedom – indeed the whole meaning of development – have been topics of discussion and controversy throughout Africa’s post-independence period.

The Challenge of Policy Engagement

The challenge of policy engagement required the various State actors – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary at African national, regional and continental levels, the APRM technical partners and the international donor community – to deepen their involvement in the APRM thematic areas relevant to their interests in order to strengthen APRM structures and processes as a force for democracy and development.
Challenge of Technical Support

The challenge of technical support entailed UNECA leadership, in collaboration with other APRM strategic partners, building the capacities of the APRM continental and country secretariats, and reviewing and standardizing the APRM questionnaire and methodology.

The Challenge of Documenting the APRM in a Book and Other Formats

As part of the challenge of knowledge production and dissemination, participants agreed on the need for a book on the APRM from an African perspective. The objective was to fill a gaping lacuna in the literature on the APRM and set in motion a dynamic intellectual process and applied policy reflections on the APRM among various stakeholders on a continuing basis designed to improve the APRM cycles beyond the base review into the second, third and fourth review cycles.

To this end, participants made suggestions about the format, scope, and substantive content of the book. The suggestions converged around the following:

a) GPAD should rethink the idea of, and approach to writing and producing the book. That would require deciding whether to publish a single or multiple volume(s), and whether it would be a reflection of lessons learned and best practices;

b) Deciding on the chapters of the book, with an outline of each chapter, including a chapter devoted to narrating the history of the APRM, how it came into being in Africa and the initiatives taken by Africans, in order to fill a gap in the literature, which had generally been dominated by scholars from the West;

c) Documenting the reflections from the Ad Hoc Experts’ Meeting and using them as a basis for a broadened follow-up/second experts’ meeting on the APRM;

d) In pursuing the APRM book project and the broadened follow-up of the APRM experts’ meeting, GPAD should involve and secure the participation of the APRM continental secretariat, NEPAD, the other APRM strategic partners, notably AfDB and UNDP, and African-based research institutions and think-tanks, such as CODESRIA and the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA).
Closing Remarks by Dr. Abdalla Hamdok

Dr. Hamdok highlighted two broad issues that had cut across the various sessions. The first was the importance of situating the APRM within the history of African development since colonial times and the struggle for democracy on the continent. Against such a background, the various session presentations and discussions had provided illuminating and insightful comparative analyses of the APRM and development and governance policy issues that had emerged from the APRM country processes. The meeting was not unmindful of, in fact it had emphasized, the limitations of the APRM in order to improve it and avoid unnecessarily overburdening it by confining it to the things that it can deliver.

The second issue revolved around the complementary debate on democracy and development, which had provided useful insights into the way forward for Africa amidst the challenges of globalization and African continental integration.

On behalf of ECA, Dr. Hamdok thanked the participants for their excellent contributions, which had made the expert meeting a success, and particularly Professor Ahmed Mohiddin for preparing the Concept Paper, which had set the intellectual tone for the meeting.
Annex I – Biographies

Kingsley Botwe Asante is a national of Ghana, who holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London. Executive Director of SKB Asante International Consultancy Services, resident scholar at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, member of National African Peer Review Mechanism Governing Council, part-time Professor at the Legon Centre for International Affairs, Professor Asante is a retired United Nations Principal Regional Adviser to African governments and Coordinator of the Multidisciplinary Regional Advisory Group at the Cabinet Office of ECA. Professor Asante has had over forty years’ post-graduate experience at the national, and international levels, as well as with the United Nations, in academia, management, administration, consultancy, advisory services and African development. He has served as consultant to a number of international organizations, including ECA, the European Union, ECOWAS, AfDB, IDEP, African Leadership Forum and the African Union of Parliaments. He received the Ghana Book Award for Distinguished Writers, and has published five books on regionalism and over 50 short articles.

Abdalla Bujra is a Kenyan national who holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of London. As an academician and scholar, Professor Bujra has taught in various universities around the world. He has also served on several major high-level pan-African panels and committees linked to the African Union and pan-African independent research organizations. He is currently Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Nairobi-based African Center for Economic Growth (ACEG). He has published extensively on issues related to governance and development in Africa and also contributed to numerous publications in the form of journal articles, reports, occasional working papers and chapters in books.

Kojo Busia is a national of Ghana and the United States of America. He is Chief of the APRM Support Section, Governance and Public Administration Division (GPAD) at ECA, Addis Ababa. He has 15 years’ professional experience in international promotion of democracy and governance from both bilateral and multilateral perspectives. Assignments have taken him to countries in and out of the African continent, including Eastern Europe, Asia and the United States. Since 2006, he has led the ECA strategic support to the APRM process continentally, including designing peer review programmes for several African countries. Prior to his work with ECA, Dr. Busia worked with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as a Foreign Service Officer and rose to the level of Team Leader, Democratic Governance programmes at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) missions in Kenya and Mali. Dr. Busia obtained his Ph.D. in International Development Policy and M.A. in Political Science and African Studies, both from Cor-
Michael Chege is a Kenyan, who is currently working as advisor to the Kenyan Government on International Development Policy at the Ministry of Planning and Development, on a UNDP technical assistance programme. He coordinated the technical team that produced Kenya’s first internal self-assessment of the APRM in 2005. Prior to his current position, he was the Director of the Centre for African Studies at the University of Florida, Gainesville, where he also taught African politics and development. He taught at the University of Nairobi from 1977 to 1988, and subsequently worked for the Ford Foundation as programme officer in charge of governance and international affairs in Eastern and Southern Africa from 1988 to 1994. He was also a visiting scholar at the universities of Geneva and Harvard. Professor Chege earned his doctorate degree from the University of California at Berkeley and has widely published on issues of African governance, African politics and African development.

Abdalla Hamdok is a national of Sudan and Canada. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics from the School of Economic Studies, University of Manchester, UK. Dr Hamdok is a Policy Analyst/Economist with over 20 years’ experience in addressing governance challenges in Africa at the national, sub-regional and continental levels. He served as Chief Technical Advisor at the ILO/Southern Africa Multidisciplinary Advisory Team, Zimbabwe, and later on as Principal Policy Economist at the African Development Bank, Côte d’Ivoire, where he played a lead role in the development of the African Development Bank policy on good governance. He also worked at ECA for the Development Policy Management Division before joining the International IDEA based in South Africa, as Director for Africa and Middle East. He has also been a Principal Consultant and Head of the Public Sector Group as well as member of the Management Committee of Deloitte & Touche Management Consultants, Zimbabwe. He returned to ECA and was appointed as Director of the Governance and Public Administration Division before his recent appointment as Deputy Executive Secretary of the Commission in December 2011. Dr. Hamdok has authored several publications on governance and other related issues.

Lisau Adele Jinadu is a Nigerian who holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, USA. Professor Jinadu has over 40 years’ senior professional work experience, serving in various capacities in universities and international organizations in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Senegal and USA. He has served as consultant to a number of national and international organizations including AU, UNDP, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ECA, and USAID. He has written over 30 chapters in various books, and several articles in journals. Professor Jinadu currently lectures at the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Nigeria.
Justin Mbaya Kankwenda is a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from National University of Zaire (UNAZA), former Lovanium University, Kinshasa, Congo. Dr. Mbaya has served in national offices, universities, and various research institutes. He also served at various UNDP offices in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Burundi and the UNDP/Regional Bureau for Africa in New York where he worked until his retirement. Dr Mbaya has been involved in the activities of civil society organizations, NGOs and research institutes and served as Vice President of the Pan-African Strategic and Policy Research Group, an African international think tank. He is founder and CEO of the Congolese Institute for Development Research and Strategic Studies (ICREDES) in Kinshasa. Dr Mbaya has published numerous studies on African and DRC developmental issues in national and international scientific journals. He has also contributed chapters in several books.

Ahmed Mohiddin is a Kenyan. He has a Ph.D. in International Affairs and African Studies from McGill University. Professor Mohiddin has over 40 years’ professional experience in social, political, governance, economic, cultural and development issues. He has rendered consultancy services to a number of national, international and non-governmental organizations. He has been writing and researching consistently over the last 30 years in various fields and published books, chapters and papers and journals. His extensive consultancy and international experience helped him to develop a concept on APRM, which is the basis for the publication of the book entitled “Capturing the 21st Century: APRM best practices and lessons learned”. He is currently an international consultant.

Mohamed A. Salih is a national of Sudan and The Netherlands. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics and Social Studies from the University of Manchester, UK, in 1983. In the academia, Professor Salih has served as teaching assistant, lecturer, senior research fellow and visiting professor. Prior to his work at the Institute of Social Studies, Professor Salih was Director of Research at the Nordic Institute of African Studies in Uppsala, Sweden, where he was responsible for managing the Africa-wide research programme with annual regular activities in all Nordic countries. He has also undertaken policy and advisory research and numerous assignments for national governments, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, bilateral, regional and multilateral organizations. Professor Salih has co-edited and co-authored books, written more than 65 chapters in books and over 30 journal articles. He is currently Professor of Politics of Development at the Institute of Social Studies, University of Leiden, the Netherlands.

Marie-Angélique Savané is a Senegalese sociologist. She is currently an international consultant and Chairperson of the Foundation in Support of Basic Initiatives and a columnist on a weekly magazine, Nouvel Horizon. Ms. Savané was the first chairperson of the Panel of Eminent Persons of NEPAD/APRM. She has worked with various United Nations agencies such as United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Population Fund and international institutions such as IDRC in Africa, Geneva.
and New York, where she served as Head of Research, Team Manager and Director for Africa. Ms. Savané has served as member of various independent commissions and board member of various national and international institutions. She was a member of the advisory board of the International Labour Organization and the World Bank. She worked at the International Negotiation Network with Jimmy Carter, former United States President, and at the Africa Leadership Forum with Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian President. Ms. Savané played an influential role in the emergence of African civil society in the seventies and eighties. She has published numerous articles and edited several books.
Annex II – Agenda

United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa

GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVISION

Ad-Hoc Expert Group Meeting on Deepening
APRM Best Practices and Lessons Learned

28 – 29 April 2010

Large Briefing Room
United Nations Conference Centre (UNCC)
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
## Work Programme

### Day One – 28 April 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:00-09:30</td>
<td>Arrival of Experts and Registration at UNCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:30 – 11:00</td>
<td><strong>Welcome/ Opening session</strong></td>
<td>Plenary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Speakers:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Mr. Abdalla Hamdok, Director, Governance and Public Administration Division (GPAD), ECA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Introduction/Objectives of the Ad Hoc Expert Meeting and Background, Rationale and Purpose to Study (K. Busia and A. Mohiddin)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00-11:30</td>
<td><strong>Coffee Break</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30 – 13:00</td>
<td><strong>Session I - APRM: From Theory to Praxis and Lessons so Far</strong></td>
<td>Plenary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Mbaya J. Kankwenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Lead Discussants:</strong> Abdalla Bujra and Marie-Angelique Savané</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Topics to be discussed/covered (Indicative)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Historical background of APRM – from Monrovia to the Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» The Evolution of African Development Thinking: political thinking, creation of NEPAD – APRM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» The Shifts in African Development Strategies and Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Africa/African Contribution to Humanity/Civilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» The African Renaissance: colonization, Apartheid and South Africa’s liberation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Relevance of Traditional Institutions Governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-14:30</td>
<td><strong>Lunch and DSA Payment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30 – 15:30</td>
<td><strong>Session I – Historical background of APRM</strong></td>
<td>Plenary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30 – 16:00</td>
<td><strong>Introduction of Session II</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Lead Discussant:</strong> S. K. Asante</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Introduction: (K. Busia and A. Mohiddin):</strong> What do we know? How do we know? Where does it take us? Who defines best practices?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Topics to be discussed/covered</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Structures: processes, procedures, resources, capacity and legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» The Five Stages of the processes – Is this adequate?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Who are the “peers” in the African Peer Review?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» OECD-APRM Comparative Peer Review?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00-16:30</td>
<td><strong>Coffee Break</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30 – 18:00</td>
<td><strong>Session II – APRM</strong></td>
<td>Plenary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:00-09:30</td>
<td>Recap. of previous day <em>(A. Jinadu and A. Mohiddin/Moderators)</em></td>
<td>Plenary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:30-11:00</td>
<td><strong>Session II- APRM (Cont.)</strong></td>
<td>Plenary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Session III- Way Forward: Consolidating African Perspectives – Towards Capturing the 21st Century</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Moderator: (A. Jinadu and A. Mohiddin)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Lead Discussants: Mohamed Salih, Adele Jinadu and Michael Chege</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong> – How can the APRM consolidate and facilitate African Perspectives on the following Government Issues?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Impact of current economic and financial crises on Africa: Challenges and Opportunities;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» What is the Nature and Role of the Developmental State?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» The Challenges/Prospects of Democracy and Domestic Accountability?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» The Role of China and its Impact on Shaping African Governance;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» The Role of Leadership in Africa.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00-11:30</td>
<td><strong>Coffee Break</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30-13:00</td>
<td><strong>Session III- Way Forward: Consolidating African Perspectives – Towards Capturing the 21st Century</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-14:30</td>
<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30-16:00</td>
<td><strong>Session III- Way Forward: Consolidating African Perspectives – Towards Capturing the 21st Century</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00-16:30</td>
<td><strong>Coffee Break</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30-17:30</td>
<td><strong>Session III- Way Forward: Consolidating African Perspectives – Towards Capturing the 21st Century</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:30-18:30</td>
<td><strong>Closing Session</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Mr. Abdalla Hamdok, Director of GPAD, ECA</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:00</td>
<td><strong>Dinner</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex III – List of Participants

Ad-hoc Expert Group Meeting on Deepening APRM
Best Practices and Lessons Learned
28-29 April 2010,
UNCC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

1. Prof. Sam Asante
   Member, APRM NGC
   P.O. Box LG 161
   Legon, Ghana
   Tel: +233 21 51 333
   Fax: +233 21 510 174
   E-mail: sasante32@yahoo.com

2. Prof. Wafula Masai
   Programme Coordinator (ACEG)
   Parklands Road
   Opposite Holiday Inn and Next to Sclater’s House
   Nairobi, Kenya
   Tel: (254-20) 374 6909, 375 4540
   Cell: (254) 0721 421 866
   Fax: (254-20) 375 4541
   E-mail: aceg@aceg.org
   wafulam@yahoo.com

3. Prof. Mbaya J. Kankwenda
   Directeur Exécutif
   ICREDES
   14125 Bauer Drive
   Rockvill, Maryland 20854
   USA
   Phone: 1-240-6697250
   Tel: 450-42 8065
   Fax: 703-659-1135
   E-mail: mjkankwenda@icredes.org,
   mbaya.kankwenda@repsg.union.org,
   mbaya.kankwenda@undp.org
4. Prof. Abdalla Bujra  
   Executive Director  
   DPMF  
   P.O. Box 26586-00100  
   Nairobi, Kenya  
   Tel: +254-202713591 (office)  
   Fax: +254-202712801  
   Cell: +254-722 764951  
   Email: dpmf.nairobi@dpmf.org  
   abdallasb@gmail.com  
   abdalla@bujra.com  
   Websites: dpmf.org/Bujra.com

5. Ms. Marie-Angelique Savané  
   1st Chairperson of the APRM Panel  
   Tel: +221 33 8251340  
   Cell: +221 77637 9677  
   Fax: +221 33824 9677  
   Email: masavane@aol.com

6. Prof. L. Adele Jinadu  
   Professor of Political Science  
   Department of Political Science  
   University of Lagos  
   262B Corporation Dr.  
   Dolphin Estate  
   Osborne Rd.  
   Lagos, Nigeria  
   Cell: +234 802 337 5901  
   Email: lajinadu@yahoo.com

7. Prof. Mohamed Salih  
   Professor of International Relations  
   Institute of Social Studies (ISS)  
   University of Leiden  
   The Hague, The Netherlands  
   E-mail: salih@iss.nl
8. Prof. Michael Chege  
Advisor, International Development Policy  
Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030  
P.O. Box 3005  
Treasury Building  
Nairobi, Kenya  
Cell: + 254-721921156  
Email: michael_chege@yahoo.com

9. Prof. Léopold Donfack Sokeng  
Agrégé des Facultés de droit  
Jurisconsulte/Consultant  
P.O. Box 15755  
Douala, Cameroon  
Tel: +237 99 99 87 36  
+237 77 19 09 19  
Cell: +237 999 87 36  
Fax: +237 342 75 61  
E-mail: ldsokeng@yahoo.com, aansedi@yahoo.fr

10. Prof. Ahmed Mohiddin  
406 Bay Street  
Ottawa K1R 6A4  
Canada  
Tel: +613 239 0001  
E-mail: mohiddinahmed@hotmail.com

11. Dr. Abdalla Hamdok  
Director, Governance and Public Administration Division  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)  
P. O. Box 3005  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
Tel: +251 11 544 3040  
Fax: +251 11 5151 1953  
Email: ahamdok@uneca.org
12. **Dr. Kojo Busia**  
Senior Development Management Officer  
Chief, APRM Support Section  
Governance and Public Administration Division  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)  
P. O. Box 3005  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
Tel. +251-11-544-5439  
Fax: +251-11-551-1953/5541  
E-mail: kbusia@uneca.org

13. **Ms. Hodane Youssouf**  
Development Management Officer  
APRM Support Section  
Governance and Public Administration Division (GPAD)  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)  
P.O. Box 3005  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
Tel: +251-11-544-5245  
Fax: +251 -11-551-19-53  
E-mail: hyoussouf@uneca.org

14. **Ms. Bethlehem Teshager**  
Information Assistant  
APRM Support Section  
Governance and Public Administration Division  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)  
P. O. Box 3005  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
Tel: +251-11-5-44-54-17  
Fax: +251-11-5-51-19-53/55-41  
E-mail: bteshager@uneca.org
15. Ms. Yetinayet Mengistu  
   Programme Assistant  
   APRM Support Section  
   Governance and Public Administration Division  
   United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)  
   P. O. Box 3005  
   Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
   Tel: +251-11-5-44-5-44-52-64  
   Fax: +251-11-5-51-19-53/55-41  
   E-mail: ymengistu@uneca.org