New Fringe Pastoralism:
Conflict and Insecurity and Development in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel
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Publications Section  
Economic Commission for Africa  
P.O. Box 3001  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
Tel: +251 11 544-9900  
Fax: +251 11 551-4416  
E-mail: ecainfo@uneca.org  
Web: www.uneca.org

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Executive summary

a. Preamble

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has received several requests to conduct research on the causes of conflict and its consequences on development in three African regions (Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes). Preliminary findings indicate that violent conflicts involving pastoral communities have become widespread in many African countries, particularly in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Though pastoral communities have a long history of conflict, the intensity of such conflicts is increasing as a result of competition over scarce resources stemming from the discovery of minerals, oil and gas and the land rush to secure food and commodities. The issue has also been aggravated by climate change and environmental degradation. As such, the Capacity Development Division has made it a priority to examine the underlying causes and challenges of insecurity and illicit activities in pastoral communities and their negative consequences to economic growth and sustainable development.

Abdalla Hamdok, the Acting Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, challenged the Capacity Development Division to investigate the socioeconomic and political factors that contribute to pastoralists’ role in insecurity, violence and illicit activities in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. It is envisaged that the knowledge generated through this research programme will feed into high-level policy processes as a major contribution to the current debate on the grave insecurity in pastoral regions.

b. Conclusions

i. Pastoralists roam close to 40 per cent of the total land mass of Africa and their contribution to countries’ GDP varies considerably (from 10 to 44 per cent) (table 2.3). The majority of pastoralists inhabiting arid and semi-arid land on the continent make their living in environments characterized by climatic variability and precipitation unpredictability. These conditions of recurrent droughts result in crop failure, mass herd decimation, food insecurity, hunger and famines.

ii. Despite these harsh environmental and living conditions pastoralists contribute significantly to a country’s wealth. On average, pastoralists contribute between 30 to 38 per cent of the gross value of the agricultural commodities for the entire African continent.

iii. The majority of pastoralists are poor, and large numbers of them live in shanty towns and squatter settlements throughout the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Pastoral areas are among the most underdeveloped and fare worse than other areas in terms of social development, public amenities, health services, education and the provision of clean drinking water.
iv. The majority of the ongoing African conflicts, including those in the Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, north-eastern Kenya, Somalia and the Sudan, involve pastoralists. The strained relationship between pastoralists and the State poses serious economic and political security issues for the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Due to their regular mobility and remoteness from the authority of government, pastoralists are increasingly implicated in international crime networks (human trafficking, drugs, illegal migration and transnational jihadist and religious extremist groups), with serious negative implications not only for their safety but also for the economies of their countries.

v. Land alienation and encroachment on rangeland for urban expansion, agriculture, oil, gas and mineral prospecting are among the greatest challenges to pastoralists’ way of life. They are also among the main factors driving conflicts among pastoralists, between pastoralists and farmers, and between pastoralists and entities awarded large-scale land concessions. The State is often a party to conflicts in pastoral areas, where pastoralists are forcibly evicted or denied access to grazing land. In this regard, as is explained in the section on pastoralism and violence, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel are the most affected regions.

vi. While some pastoral communities continue to resist State-imposed resettlement, there is a strong indication that some pastoralists in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa have settled voluntarily (in rural areas and in the outskirts of urban settlements) to ensure security of tenure and to gain permanent access to public amenities, health care and education for their children.

vii. An emerging trend in regional and multilateral pastoral development policies is a shift from conventional livestock development to pastoral development. The pastoral resilience programmes in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel – which involve, among others, national Governments, the World Bank, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – are testimonies to this new trend.

viii. The shift from livestock to pastoral development has also heralded a shift from national to regional pastoral resilience programmes, with the latter being more sensitive to the regional nature of pastoralists’ transboundary migratory patterns.

ix. Although conflicts in pastoral areas are triggered by national issues ranging from inequitable development, marginalization and exclusion to self-determination, they have also assumed regional and international dimensions. The "new wars" in pastoral regions are multifaceted.

x. Climate change is a major contributing factor to displacement and food insecurity. The role of El Niño in the 2014–2016 drought, for example, has already been acknowledged by African policymakers. It is estimated that...
60 to 70 per cent of displaced persons, whether internally displaced or refugees, are pastoralists originating from the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, where climate variability poses a major obstacle to the achievement of food security and poverty reduction in pastoral areas.

xi. New fringe pastoralism (or new licit and illicit career patterns pursued by small numbers of pastoralists) affects a large number of hard-working, law-abiding pastoralists, who have been unfairly collectively labelled as a source of insecurity in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.

c. Recommendations

i. Design and implement long-term pastoral development programmes with the aim to enable structural economic transformation, market access and diversification of sources of livelihood.

ii. Develop country-specific, regional transboundary legal and administrative frameworks to ease restrictions on pastoral cross-border mobility for trade and exchange of pastoral products. Equally important is improving the pastoralists’ resilience and coping mechanisms in order to respond to climate change and seasonal rainfall variability.

iii. Take into account agriculture-livestock integration and plans for the future of pastoralists when formulating land policies. In general, policies tend to expand agriculture and other forms of production without doing this. In some cases, pastoralists have been denied access to traditional grazing land and pastures without being given access to alternative land or compensated for the land they lost.

iv. Pastoralists should collaborate with local government authorities and community leaders to facilitate land ownership for pastoralists under customary land arrangements, and national land policies and legislation.

v. Land policies that are equitable and inclusive provide the necessary instruments for conflict prevention and political stability in pastoral areas and should be integrated into the policies designed for improving the pastoral economy, with the strategic aim of fostering peace and security.

vi. Policymakers have recognized El Niño as a major environmental hazard leading to drought and floods that impair food and livelihood security in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Therefore, policies aimed at sustainable livelihood production should cover the predictable effects of El Niño on the population as a whole and pastoralists, in particular, in order to improve their coping strategies.

vii. Governments, the private sector and international partners should increase and encourage investment in livestock production to facilitate the use of modern production techniques and marketing outlets.
viii. Due to underrepresentation of pastoralists in national politics, Governments and political institutions (political parties and parliaments) should undertake deliberate efforts to increase the participation of pastoral communities in public life and their representation in Government and political institutions.

ix. Regionally, pan-African and regional organizations, development partners and Governments should support and encourage pastoral development organizations in the creation of country and transboundary networks capable of influencing national and regional pastoral development policies.

x. Governments, the private sector and international partners should support the development of sustainable water sources and grazing and pasture land to reduce the risks associated with future occurrences of drought and El Niño. It is only through sustainable sources of affordable animal feeds - both plant-based and manufactured - that pastoralists can secure sustainable livelihoods.

xi. With the spread of education, pastoral associations and national and regional networks, building partnerships with relevant actors (particularly in research and extension services) are critical for the improvement of pastoral production technology and methods. Technologies and innovations emanating from agricultural research endeavours cannot be considered useful unless and until they are made available in usable forms to producers.

xii. Support should be extended by Governments, the private sector and the international community for investment in meat and milk processing to meet the increasing demand of urban consumers for milk and milk products. For example, vast quantities of milk are currently wasted because of the limited processing capacity of producers, the poor cold chain systems and the very short shelf life of milk and dairy products. Behavioural change takes a long time, but it should not be neglected, when, for example, dairy production interventions are contemplated.

xiii. As the pastoral production techniques and methods used have, by and large, remained the traditional ones, many of which are out of step with current innovations suitable for small-scale production, it is vital that capacity development and training institutions be established with the aim of upgrading livestock production. A more pressing need is to train pastoralists and staff working in livestock extension services in modern pastoral production techniques and innovations.

xiv. Current African urban development policies need to be more cognizant of the presence of a large number of pastoralists around small and large urban settlements, providing cities with meat and dairy products. In many cases, pastoralists have found themselves displaced and dispossessed against their will.
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

This report focuses on the emergence of new fringe activities that have transformed the relationship involving pastoralism, the State and the traditional national and transnational mobility of pastoralists. The phenomenon is multifaceted in nature and has been embraced by only a minority of pastoralists, but it has had far-reaching impacts that transcend location. New fringe pastoralism, therefore, has national, regional and global aspects related to pastoralists' relations with transnational, networked communities of interest. As this report shows, the communities of interest traverse the African continent in networks involved in international migration, trade and other licit and illicit activities. Therefore, this report is not a conventional study of pastoral socioeconomic production and reproduction systems as a whole, but instead is limited to exploring some new fringe activities with consequences for the present and future of pastoralism as a resilient and ever adaptive way of life despite the pressures and myriad of challenges it faces.

The general perception that pastoralists live in isolated communities wholly or partially dependent on livestock and livestock products is gradually being eroded. Pastoralists are increasingly integrated into modern activities and new livelihood and occupational patterns, with large segments of the pastoral communities practicing what is now referred to as urban pastoralism. While the traditional pastoral way of life and career patterns have been influenced by modernization, penetration of the market economy and commercialization, one aspect of pastoral life has persisted: mobility in search of water and grazing land. In the new context of globalization and economic interdependence, pastoralists' mobility has been enhanced through the increase in demand for their products (for example, meat, milk, milk products and hides).

Pastoralists roam close to 40 per cent of the total landmass of Africa and contribute between 10 and 44 per cent of the GDP to African countries (table 2.3). According to the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), an estimated 1.3 billion people benefit from the livestock value chain (ILRI, 2013). Pastoralists constitute about 5 per cent of the total population of some African countries, while in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, they comprise between 10 and 20 per cent of the total population. It is estimated that pastoralists contribute about 90 per cent of the meat consumed in East Africa and close to 60 per cent of the meat and milk products consumed in West Africa.

As a result, there is conflict between the promising economic opportunities that await African pastoralists and the prominence of insecurity and conflicts among pastoralists, between pastoralists and agriculturalists and between pastoralists and the State. Together, these characteristics point to the emergence of new pastoralists, who have, on the one hand, retained certain elements of old pastoralism while at the same time taken up new activities and have different livelihood patterns. These emerging pastoral characteristics oscillate between integration into a globalized
market economy and involvement in violence both internally and transnationally. In both cases, pastoralists have reinvented old and centuries-tested knowledge and capabilities shaped by mobility and resistance to the authority of the modern state.

1.2 Rationale

As part of the reorganization of ECA, the new Capacity Development Division has been tasked with providing focused and coherent capacity development support to enable member States and pan-African institutions to achieve sustainable development. In line with this new mandate, ECA is proposing, based on the demands of its main stakeholders, to study the socioeconomic impact of violence and illicit economic activities in pastoral communities, which is undermining ongoing efforts towards development in the continent.

Moreover, as the continent finds itself uniquely positioned to take advantage of the new global economic openness, seizing this opportunity for generating and maintaining growth to improve the socioeconomic situation of its people is critical. As such, it is proposed that high-level researchers and experts on pastoralism be brought on board to facilitate informed studies, research and policies aimed at moving the region towards the enduring peace and stability that is needed for an effective socioeconomic and politically transformative agenda.

1.3 Research sites and country selection criteria

The following countries have been selected for in-depth research: Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan. There are six main selection criteria indicative each of these States:

- A long history of peace, cooperation and conflict between the State and the pastoral societies;
- Experienced an emergence of insurgency groups that are largely dominated by pastoralists;
- Pastoral areas that have been subjected to large-scale land concessions and areas of mineral, gas and oil exploration and production;
- Religious fundamentalist groups, together with violence and illicit activities carried out by pastoralists and others;
- Discernable governance challenges, particularly in pastoral areas where the State’s authority is constantly challenged by non-State actors;
- Considerable presence of international and African regional or subregional organizations, such as the United Nations, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
1.4 Objectives

The objectives of this study are as follows:

a. Document the socioeconomic impact of conflicts involving pastoral societies in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel;

b. Investigate the root causes of the strained relationship between the State and pastoral societies in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel;

c. Describe and explain the relationship between pastoral groups and the transnational jihadist organizations and its impacts on pastoral livelihood patterns and sustainability;

d. Document and explain the relationship between conflict and illicit activities and its socioeconomic impact;

e. Raise awareness among policymakers about the current state of relations between pastoral communities and the State and its link to conflicts, illicit activities and violence;

f. Prepare a major report to be discussed at an international high-level policy dialogue conference to be held at the end of the research programme period. The conference will address the situation of prevailing insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, as well as the linkages between peacebuilding and development at all levels involving, among others, Government pastoral associations and networks and other stakeholders.

1.5 Structure of the report

This report consists of an executive summary and five chapters. The executive summary outlines the policy imperative, rationale and objectives of the development of a research programme on new fringe pastoralism and its socioeconomic impacts and implications for the spread of illicit activities and conflict in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. It also presents the conclusions and recommendations emanating from the report.

Chapter two gives a brief introduction to the population, economy and geography of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. It also presents the most recent data on the size of the pastoral population as a proportion of the total population of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa and their contribution to GDP as a whole and to agricultural GDP. Chapter three explores the opportunities and challenges confronting pastoralists. In particular, it elucidates the major pressures that affect pastoral societies, including conflict and displacement, poverty, climate change and food insecurity.

Chapter four provides a synopsis of the contemporary causes of conflicts between the State and pastoral communities (heavy-handed infringement in local sovereignty,
inappropriate livestock development policies, the impact of national development policies on pastoralists’ capacity to survive and the failed policy interventions to control porous borders in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel). The appropriation of pastoral land is analysed as a case of skewed state policies, which further alienated pastoralists and resulted in land becoming a main point of contention. Current regional and multinational conflict-sensitive pastoral development efforts are also introduced as a welcome policy response to the linkages between conflict, underdevelopment and insecurity in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.

Chapter five is wholly devoted to the definition of new fringe pastoralism and its positive and negative manifestations, in terms of involvement in licit and illicit trade in goods and services, human smuggling, drug trafficking and small arms and light weapons proliferation. It elucidates three reinventions of “old” pastoral livelihoods into adaptation strategies linking local and globally networked pastoral communities. Some important factors that have spurred the emergence of new fringe pastoralism, include the following: diversification of pastoral production systems due to economic pressure; urbanization; adaptation to climate change; increased cross-border trade; more targeted movements in search for water and pasture; and the ability to tap into improved market information. Finally, chapter six briefly assesses the nexus between conflict and development, together with the socioeconomic and security implications of new fringe pastoralism and its role in the current conflicts in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.
2. Opportunities and challenges

2.1 Opportunities

All major African pastoralists belong to cross-border communities that are found in two or more countries. The map above shows the spread of pastoralists across the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. The Sahel stretches from the Atlantic Ocean, below the Sahara Desert and above the Guinea Savannah, to the Horn of Africa. This zone covers nearly 6,000 km from West to East (Oba, 2014; Elmqvist and Olsson, 2006; and Mortimore and Adams, 2001) and includes several climatic zones, from the arid and semi-arid regions of the southern edges of the Sahara to the Nile Basin and the East African highland to the humid tropics of Lake Chad Basin into Cameroon and the Central African Republic (Boone and others, 2011).

Climatically, the rainy season ranges from one to two months in the north to four to five months in the south. Mean annual rainfall in the Sahel is 100 to 200 mm in the north, where the Sahel gives way to desert, and 500 to 600 mm at its southern limit. Occasional winter extratropical rains can occur, but these generally bring less than 25 mm of rainfall. In other words, the rains increase from north to south.

Together, the Horn of Africa and Sahel regions make up the Greater Sahel. The two regions experience similar seasonal migratory patterns in search of water and pasture, together with similarities in livestock composition, the length of annual south-north seasonal migratory routes, and pastoral management practices, despite cultural and social organizational differences. It is also worth noting that agropastoralism (pastoralists practicing both livestock and crop production) is common in the moderate climate of the southern Sahel.

Pastoralists move between the home range, wet season rangeland, dry season rangeland and drought reserve areas. These migratory patterns are critical adaptive strategic responses to drought and ecological variability (Oba and Lusigi, 1987). It has also been noted that across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, the mean annual rainfall is 200 to 400 mm, rising to 400 to 600 mm in the southern wetter zone. However, both temporal and aerial rainfall variability is found in both regions. One implication of this variability is that the climatic impacts could be location-specific, with some areas showing distinctive rainy season characteristics.

The pastoral ecology is vulnerable to high precipitation variability and recurrent drought, which requires complex adaptive strategies ranging from opportunistic mobility to livestock and crop diversification. In recent years, pastoralists have become increasingly dependent on humanitarian emergency aid and relief programmes after losing their livestock, the main source of livelihood and survival in the harsh arid, semi-arid and desert conditions.

Economically, agriculture is the largest productive sector in Africa, employing 70 to 90 per cent of the total labour force and supplying up to 50 per cent of household food requirements and incomes. The total land area of Africa is about 30 million km$^2$, with
livestock production taking place on about 45 per cent of that land, or 16 million km$^2$, where nearly 80 per cent of the population lives. Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and the Sudan together possess about 25 per cent of the continent’s livestock-producing land (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), 2010). In these countries, 70 per cent of the rural poor own livestock, and over 200 million people rely on livestock for income. In small-scale mixed crop-livestock farming, livestock provide draught animal power, transportation and manure for fertilizing cropland (IUCN, 2010).

Globally, pastoral production accounts for 10 per cent of total meat production (or one billion head of camels, cattle and ruminants) and supports some 200 million pastoral households across the world. In the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, pastoralists own one third of all livestock and half of all small ruminants, and supply 60 per cent of the beef, 40 per cent of the meat from small ruminants, and 70 per cent of the milk in these regions. Table 2.1 shows the total number of pastoralists in 16 African countries, where the proportion of pastoralists (including nomadic and agropastoralists) to the total population is more than 11 per cent (more than 58 million pastoralists out of the 508.8 million total inhabitants of these countries). At the country level, Somalia, South Sudan and Djibouti have the highest number of pastoralists as a proportion of the total population, followed by Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Senegal, Uganda, the Sudan, the Niger, Benin, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Nigeria.

Table 2.1: Pastoralists as a proportion of the total population in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa (mid-2015, in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population size (million)</th>
<th>Pastoralists (estimates in millions)</th>
<th>Pastoralists to total population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Benin</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.696</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Burkina Faso</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.127</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Chad</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Djibouti</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Eritrea</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ethiopia</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>1.471</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Kenya</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>4.430</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Mali</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>1.670</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Mauritania</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.180</td>
<td>42.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Niger</td>
<td>181.8</td>
<td>8.181</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Senegal</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>3.498</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Somalia</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>6.660</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 South Sudan</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>7.320</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sudan</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>8.180</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Uganda</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>9.223</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>508.8</td>
<td>58.281</td>
<td>11.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Livestock production is estimated to account for about 38 per cent of the gross value of agricultural production in Africa, with 92 per cent of this value in the form of beef cattle, dairy cattle, goats, sheep and chickens (International Fund for Agricultural
The total livestock population in Africa is estimated at about 250 million tropical livestock unit equivalents. Table 2.2 shows the number of camels, cattle, goats and sheep in 16 Sahelian and Horn of Africa countries. These 16 countries contain about 87 million tropical livestock units of camels, cattle, goats and sheep, which represent 34.8 per cent of the continent’s total tropical livestock units, including all other livestock types.

Table 2.2: Camels, cattle, goats and sheep in 16 countries in the Sahel and Horn of Africa (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Camels</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Benin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 222 000</td>
<td>1 755 000</td>
<td>879 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Burkina Faso</td>
<td>18 364</td>
<td>9 090 700</td>
<td>13 891 000</td>
<td>9 277 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Chad</td>
<td>1 550 000</td>
<td>7 850 000</td>
<td>6 850 000</td>
<td>3 250 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Djibouti</td>
<td>71 000</td>
<td>300 000</td>
<td>515 000</td>
<td>470 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Eritrea</td>
<td>370 000</td>
<td>2 090 000</td>
<td>1 825 000</td>
<td>2 290 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 164 100</td>
<td>57 706 389</td>
<td>29 112 963</td>
<td>29 332 382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Kenya</td>
<td>2 937 262</td>
<td>41 218 849</td>
<td>25 430 058</td>
<td>17 420 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Mali</td>
<td>889 500</td>
<td>10 313 300</td>
<td>20 083 130</td>
<td>14 423 280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Mauritania</td>
<td>1 525 000</td>
<td>1 875 000</td>
<td>5 680 000</td>
<td>4 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Niger</td>
<td>1 720 185</td>
<td>11 377 313</td>
<td>14 883 559</td>
<td>11 115 982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Nigeria</td>
<td>285 000</td>
<td>19 450 000</td>
<td>71 000 000</td>
<td>40 550 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Senegal</td>
<td>4 842</td>
<td>3 421 126</td>
<td>5 381 312</td>
<td>5 381 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Somalia</td>
<td>7 150 000</td>
<td>4 900 000</td>
<td>11 600 000</td>
<td>12 325 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 South Sudan</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11 817 000</td>
<td>13 550 000</td>
<td>16 750 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sudan</td>
<td>4 792 000</td>
<td>30 191 000</td>
<td>31 029 000</td>
<td>39 846 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Uganda</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13 623 000</td>
<td>14 011 000</td>
<td>1 921 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22 107 253</td>
<td>204 038 673</td>
<td>264 712 022</td>
<td>109 057 481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total TLU</td>
<td>22 107 253</td>
<td>145 741 909</td>
<td>26 471 202</td>
<td>10 905 748</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: TLU; tropical livestock unit.

Therefore, it is understandable that livestock is a major contributor to the gross domestic product (GDP) of these countries, calculated as part of agricultural GDP. Table 2.3 shows the contribution of livestock to the agricultural GDP in the same 16 Sahelian and Horn of Africa countries.

1 1 tropical livestock unit = 1 camel, 1.4 bovine, 2.5 donkeys, 10 sheep or goats.
Table 2.3: Gross domestic product at current market price, agricultural contribution to gross domestic product (per cent) and livestock contribution to agricultural gross domestic product (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP (USD)</th>
<th>Agriculture contribution to GDP (%)</th>
<th>Livestock contribution to agricultural GDP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>9 575 356 735</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>12 542 221 942</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>13 922 224 561</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1 589 026 158</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>2 607 739 837</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>55 612 228 234</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>60 936 509 778</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>12 037 229 619</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>5 061 180 371</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>8 168 695 870</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>568 508 262 378</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>15 657 551 477</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>5 707 000 000</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>13 282 084 042</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>The Sudan</td>
<td>73 814 947 341</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>26 998 477 289</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>884 434 868 534</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On average, across all 16 countries, the agricultural sector contributes 27 per cent of GDP, with livestock contributing approximately 38.8 per cent of agricultural GDP. The individual countries with the largest contribution in that regard are Djibouti (90 per cent), Burkina Faso (55 per cent), Mauritania (53 per cent), Chad (44 per cent), Kenya (43 per cent), Benin (41 per cent) and Somalia (40 per cent).

Despite their huge livestock wealth, countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria are net importers of livestock to satisfy a growing appetite for meat from a growing population and a rising middle class. Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger are livestock exporters (Thornton and others, 2006; OECD, 2008). Pastoralists and agropastoralists in these countries have created subregional livestock trade and marketing zones linked to historically known transboundary migratory routes and patterns. Ironically, the Sahelian countries export livestock to the coastal countries, which spend more on animal product imports (milk and meat), because of their higher income than the Sahelian and Horn of Africa populations. In terms of exports, the coastal countries derive less income from animal products than those from the Horn of Africa and the Sahel because some coastal areas are infested with animal diseases and the tsetse fly. However, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire appear to be exceptions for meat and milk, respectively. Data on financial flows reflect a chronic deficit in the balance of trade in animal products. This deficit is greater for dairy products than for meat, for which the area is still dependent on imports to satisfy the growing demand.
resulting from rapid population growth, income growth and changes in food habits, especially in towns (OECD, 2008, p. 49).

Three major zones, or corridors, can be identified as major livestock trade markets in the Horn of Africa: (a) southern corridor (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and South Sudan); (b) north-eastern corridor (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia/Somaliland); and (c) central north-western corridor (Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudan). Informal regional markets are also common, but they experience less transaction intensity than those in the Sahel. Also in common with the Sahel, livestock marketing in the Horn of Africa is a private sector responsibility, and trade is managed by a vast network of producers, traders, financiers and transporters, who have to find ways through border restrictions, excessive taxation, outdated veterinary controls and insecurity fears of pastoralists, who are described by the authorities as unruly.

Elites outside pastoral areas are also involved, and the evidence suggests that the larger traders and richer livestock owners benefit the most from trade and can access the most profitable export markets, with the poorest herders barely involved (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014, p. 6).

In the Sahel, at least three livestock trade zones that contain country and transboundary markets can be found. The first involves the coastal countries (Cabo Verde, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone), which trade among each other and with other neighbouring countries. The second zone includes Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Togo, where livestock is imported from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. The third zone includes Benin, Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria. Nigeria and Cameroon, which are part of the first and the second zones benefit from geographical proximity to Burkina Faso and Mali. Another trading zone, which is linked to most of the other three livestock trade zones mentioned above, comprises Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, South Sudan, and the region of Western Sudan. It is, therefore, important to recognize the thriving livestock trade between the Central African Republic, Chad, South Sudan and the Sudan, extending to Ethiopia and Eritrea, thus linking the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In the Sudan and Chad, the Boranga (Chad), Geneina (the Sudan) and Seraf Omra (the Sudan) livestock markets, in particular, have been supplied with livestock from Chad and, in turn, export to Chad (Aklilu and Catley, 2010). Livestock trade between South, Eastern and Central Darfur and South Sudan is reported to have continued despite the violent conflicts that have plagued these territories. Livestock markets, such as those in Geneina (the Sudan), Amdafok (the Central African Republic), Um Dukhun (the Sudan) and Bazi (the Central African Republic), are traversed by migratory routes and attended by livestock traders from the three neighbouring countries (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2012; African Development Bank, 2013).

2 Some of the main transboundary livestock markets are in the towns of Moyale (on the border of Ethiopia and Kenya), Mandera (Kenya, near the borders with Ethiopia and Somalia), Garissa (Kenya), Humra (the Sudan), Metemma (Ethiopia, on the border with the Sudan), Hamashkoraib (the Sudan, near the border with Eritrea), Wagar (the Sudan, near the border with Eritrea), Dadda’to (Djibouti, near the border with Eritrea), Kurmuk (the Sudan, near the border with Ethiopia), Alail-Dadda (Djibouti, near the border with Eritrea).

3 The news media are full of stories linking pastoralists to terrorist groups, cattle theft and attacks on farming communities in the Central African Republic, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, and the Sudan, among others.
In short, the majority of pastoralists eke out a living from arid and semi-arid land and employ diverse adaptive strategies in order to cope with precipitation variability, drought and periodic famines. Despite these challenges, pastoralists’ contributions to the national economies of their countries and regional trade in livestock and livestock products are substantial. Unfortunately, these contributions are not matched by social development programmes or improvements in the lives of the majority of pastoral communities. The following section shows that most pastoralists live under considerable livelihood pressures, land alienation, climate change and food insecurity, emanating from institutional and market failures.

2.2 Challenges

Although pastoralists are livestock keepers and move regularly according to seasonal variations in rainfall and pasture, they also pursue diverse occupations besides raising livestock, such as agriculture, trade and wage labour. Pastoralists are also socially and economically stratified. Below, is a quote about this from a World Bank report:

A small share of livestock keepers, from between 5 to 20 per cent, depending on the country, can be considered business-oriented with incentives to expand their livestock production and tap into the growing market for animal protein. These keep relative large herds and derive a significant share of their cash income from accessing and utilizing livestock markets. The remainder of livestock keepers can be defined as livelihood-oriented: they keep animals more for the many livelihoods services they provide — such as insurance, manure and hauling services — than for selling meat, milk and other livestock products to the market. (World Bank, 2014: 25).

The report also suggests that the number of livestock owned by the second category of pastoralists is so small that they cannot derive large benefits from regularly selling their surplus production to the market.

Generally, the pastoralists of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa can be classified into these two categories or classes: the wealthy or well-off and the poor. Pastoralists, who can be described as better off, are, similar to the poor, also affected by drought and climate change, while the poor generally also suffer from at least three interlinked pressures: those associated with poverty or livelihood; land alienation; and food insecurity. These pressures are discussed below.

Poverty among pastoral communities: Pastoralists in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa have been exposed to several spells of prolonged drought, resulting in the loss of livestock and crop production. The aftermath of prolonged drought goes beyond the reduction of income from livestock to the total loss of the herd, transforming often self-sufficient pastoralists into destitute people depending on emergency food in camps for internally displaced persons. This explains why poverty tends to be more prevalent in situations of climatic unpredictability and low precipitation, coupled with environmental degradation and shrinking land and land-based resources. Evidence shows that these factors are catalysts in the reproduction of poverty, often exacerbated by failure of policy responses and a lack of voice in the corridors of power.
Little and others (2008, p. 1) state that the current views of pastoralists fail to recognize the diversity of their livelihoods and, thus, labelling all of them as poor would “empower outside interests to transform rather than strengthen pastoral livelihoods”. Their research in northern Kenya dismissed orthodox methods for counting the poor, and acknowledged that measuring poverty among pastoralists is not easy because of difficulties in conducting surveys in remote areas or inaccessibility to places where roads are impassable. While Little and others (2008), attributed poverty among pastoralists to loss of land, conflict and political marginalization, factors that also affect non-pastoralists, particularly farming communities, others relate poverty among pastoralists in arid areas of Africa to ecological insecurity and political instability (Hjort and Mohamed Salih, 1989; Mohamed Salih, 1995; de Bruijn, 2000; Markakis, 1992; UNDP, 2007).

The debate on poverty among pastoralists can be summarized as follows: “In the configuration of arid land and the political situation prevalent in most Sahelian arid countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the pastoral population is in a more vulnerable position than other groups. [...] So in times of crisis the pastoral populations are among the poorest. Within the pastoral groups, it is especially the women, the elderly and the former slave groups who are in the worst position. They are the most affected by insecurities all around them.” (de Bruijn 2000, p. 138). More recently, major droughts occurred in the region in 2005, 2010 and 2012. The food crisis in 2012 resulted in 18.7 million people going hungry, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2012). In Burkina Faso, a season of bad rains was compounded by an influx of refugees fleeing a political crisis in Mali. The majority of those in Burkina Faso are pastoralists who ended up in camps for internally displaced peoples (Heifer, 2012).

In a study on the factors influencing transient poverty among agropastoralists in semi-arid land in Kenya, ElHadi and others (2012, p. 117–118) found that poor households were less educated, had smaller herds (5.73 tropical livestock units) and had more members (7.89 adult equivalents) than their non-poor counterparts, which had an average of 10.82 tropical livestock units and 5.41 adult equivalents, respectively. The authors concluded that poor households had fewer sources of livelihood (average of two) than non-poor households. Poorer households also received more remittances (88.4 per cent) than their non-poor counterparts (86 per cent). These results suggest that the number of livelihood sources, level of education and age of the household head, and family size are some of the key determinants of transient poverty among agropastoralists (ElHadi and others, p. 18).

A study on human capital (sex, education and age of household heads, family size and dependency ratios) focusing on the determinants of poverty among pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia found that, among 100 poor households, 45 were led by women, accounting for about 66.2 per cent of the total households headed by women in the study. This is a significant difference at less than a 1 per cent probability level. This implies that households led by women are disproportionately poor compared to their male-led counterparts. Access to education is also very limited in the pastoral context; the survey indicated that 58.2 and 41.1 per cent of the poor and non-poor, respectively, were illiterate. The groups with the most cases of poverty have no education, while those groups with higher education level have fewer cases of
poverty. This implies that, even though education does not generate remunerable employment in the pastoral context, the ability to read and write has some advantages in poverty reduction (Adugna and Sileshi, 2013).

**Land alienation:** Among the causes driving conflict among pastoralists and between pastoralists and other land users (subsistence farmers and large-scale private farms) are the following: poverty; exclusion and limited economic integration; few economic alternatives to livestock keeping; insufficient infrastructure, such as roads and markets, to enable interaction with other communities; and limited reach of judicial and law enforcement institutions in pastoral areas. Other contributing factors include small arms proliferation because of the availability of automatic weaponry resulting from macrolevel conflicts, which leads to increased banditry and makes commercial raids more viable; small arms enabling smaller groups of raiders to act regardless of community disapproval of raids; weakened community sanctions on cattle theft; and environmental degradation and unpredictability (African Union, 2010).

Land alienation, or what is referred to in the African Union as land division and encroachment in rangeland, is one of the main factors causing conflicts among pastoralists, between pastoralists and farmers and between pastoralists and entities awarded large-scale concessions for minerals, gas, oil or agricultural production. The State is often a party to conflicts in pastoral areas, where pastoralists are forcibly evicted from or denied access to grazing land. As explained in the section on pastoralism and violence, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel are the areas most affected by such conflicts.

Among the high-profile cases of alienation of pastoralists' land are those involving large-scale rangeland concessions in Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, the Niger and the Sudan for public or private (foreign or national) interests. The various policy assumptions used to justify those land concessions include national interests; exploiting minerals, oil and gas for national development; wildlife and biodiversity conservation; and food production for a growing population. These policies, however, date back to the debate during the 1960s and 1970s between the modernists and conservationists, in which the former advocated for the modernization of pastoralists while the latter viewed pastoralism as a viable way of life that should not be tampered with or sacrificed for modernity or national interest. This debate is ongoing.

### 2.3 Conflict and displacement

In short, the above-mentioned pressures are ultimately associated with conflict, displacement and physical insecurity, which partially explain the strained relationship between pastoralists and the state and account for their participation in national and transboundary illicit activities.

Two main observations merit special consideration in the debate on the current conflicts in Africa. First, with the exception of those in the Great Lakes region, all major continuing long-term conflicts are located in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa and are fought by pastoralists or agropastoralists. Generally, the conflicts are symptomatic of historic strained relations between pastoral societies and the State. However, these relations have evolved in recent years, leading to the emergence of
so-called new pastoralism. Among the new fringe pastoralists, young people have joined jihadist organizations with connections to transnational extremist groups, and others have become part of illicit activities, such as drugs and human trafficking, contraband trade and the kidnapping of tourists. In much of the Sahel, pastoralists have taken the route of armed struggle, seeking autonomy, while others have opted for self-rule. Second, the current policy responses to new pastoralism have treated it either as a matter of law and order or as an effort to counter national terrorism as part of the war on terror. Dialogue and a much deeper understanding of the sociocultural and political dynamics that have propelled the new pastoralists into this course of action are needed. Under the circumstances, the policy responses do not seem to be working, and an increasing rift is growing between the State and society in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.

Most ongoing African wars are fought in areas where pastoralism is the dominant form of livelihood. By and large, these wars can be attributed to several factors, which have been widely discussed in the literature on the State-pastoralist relationship. Below is a list of at least six factors that distinguish the present wars from those of the past:

a. Although the wars have been triggered by national questions ranging from inequitable development, marginalization and exclusion to self-determination, they have not only assumed a regional dimension but also have been internationalized;

b. The internationalization and transnationalization of the conflicts between pastoralists and the State have contributed to the creation of global solidarity networks, which have become part of or are supported by transnational jihadist and global justice movement activists;

c. The new wars in pastoral regions are multifaceted; in other words, these wars take place at the local level over scarce or at least unpredictable resources, at the national level between States and pastoralists who are struggling for the right of self-determination or autonomy, at the regional level as proxy wars pitching neighbouring States against each other, and at the transnational level as expressions of transnational jihad movements;

d. The sources of financing for the rebel or liberation movements are equally diverse, including extortion, animal theft, diaspora support and illicit activities, such as kidnapping for ransom and drug and human trafficking;

e. Unlike previous State-pastoralist conflicts, the leadership of the current movements are vying to not only bring about an alternative national political order but are also contributing to transnational jihadist movements that have originated in other parts of the globe, with the objective to change the global order;

f. Pastoral areas in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa (Kalahari Desert and Namib Desert) have become the focus of large-scale land
concessions and important hubs for the production of minerals, gas and oil. From the Sudan to Chad, and from the Central African Republic to Nigeria, the Niger and Mali, pastoralists’ resistance to State control and their quest for self-determination, autonomy and a fairer share of the wealth of their land is unparalleled in recent history.

Whether recent studies on pastoralism grasp the totality of the current and ever-changing dynamics of state-pastoralism relations, diversification of pastoral production beyond conventional farming and non-agropastoral activities (wage labour, trade and tourism) has yet to be substantiated. For example, traditional resource conflicts in Darfur (the Sudan) have been transformed into a civil war of genocidal proportions, involving not only the traditional local resource conflicts, but also the State and its sources of support (the Janjaweed militias and the Arabic-speaking groups). The Darfur conflict engulfed the neighbouring countries of the Sudan (Chad and the Central African Republic), the United Nations and the African Union. Presently, some Darfur liberation movements are part of a Sudan-wide coalition of armed opposition (Sudanese Revolutionary Front). These forces are confronting the Government of the Sudan not only in Darfur, but also in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. Likewise, the Tuareg insurgency, which started as a self-determination movement, has become part of the transnational Islamist jihadist movements.

As documented by the International Crisis Group (ICG) (ICG, 2015), the role of pastoralists in the ongoing conflict in the Central African Republic, described by some analysts as a conflict between Muslims and Christians, is another example of how pastoral resource competition cannot be separated from identity politics and competition over modern resources and minerals, including oil, gold and diamonds.

Pastoralists are caught between the securitization of development and discourse regarding so-called new wars (wars involving non-State actors and identity politics, which are less ideological than the Cold War) (Kaldor, 2007). Generally, securitization is about when and why an issue is considered or framed as a security threat. Securitization is the specific speech act of framing an issue as an existential threat that calls for extraordinary measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics (Williams, 2003). If the State were to decide that a particular issue poses a security threat, that issue would become a security problem if it is defined as such regardless of whether it is actually a security problem. Pastoral societies have been viewed as an appropriate topic for the securitization discourse following the events of 11 September 2001 for at least three reasons: the relocation of African members of Al Qaida to North Africa and the Sahel; the creation of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb; and the transformation of Somali Islamist movements into active Al Qaida supporters (Al-Shabaab and the Somali Islamic Jihad). Similarly, the brutality of Boko Haram, initially as an urban-based movement and later as a radical Islamist movement, has caught Nigerian and foreign analysts by surprise (Mohamed Salih, 2011).

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4 Studies on pastoralists have focused on a number of themes, such as pressure from globalization and commercialization of pastoral production, which have become major contributors to the national wealth through livestock export. A considerable number of studies have also been devoted to answering the question of whether pastoral livelihoods are sustainable. Some other studies have concentrated on more conventional themes, such as age and generation set, animal colours and migratory.
The economics of securitization are rooted in democratic peace theory (namely that democracies do not go to war against each other), and economic interdependence is a guarantee against war between liberal democratic States. In societies where human security is impaired and the population is unable to eke out a living, there is a security threat not only to the pastoralists’ existence (through conflicts over scarce resources) but also to those who are better off. Kidnapping of tourists, drug trafficking, recruitment of fighters, and suicide bombings are some of the desperate measures some will take to ensure human security while jeopardizing the security of others.

An added factor in the framing of pastoralists as a security threat is the general weakness of the State and its inability to assert its sovereignty over all of its territory, particularly remote and inaccessible pastoral areas. Mobility, which is a pastoral way of life, makes it difficult for the State to establish modern institutions capable of bringing pastoralists into the fold. As a result, there has always been tension between the State and pastoralists over what constitutes sovereignty.

The governance challenges faced by and weakness of institutions in most African countries affect their ability to provide equitable service delivery and inclusive development. However, not all institutions in the continent are weak; inevitably, some have more efficient governance and function better than others. In a sense, these institutional strength variations must be studied and compared and contrasted in order to tease out best practices to be used to enhance future policy formulation and implementation.

### 2.4 Resources and identity politics

Conflicts over natural resources are so common that they are hardly distinguishable from other forms of conflicts, such as those related to identity politics. In this section, three cases are used to illustrate the entanglement of resource and identity politics in the uranium-rich Tuarq region of the Niger; the South Sudanese conflicts that pitched Dinka against Nuer in the oil-rich regions; and Muslim-Christian conflict in the Central African Republic, which originated in conflicts over land.

In its 2012 report on uranium, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency (2012) estimated that the Niger produces 7.5 per cent of the world’s uranium. From highest-grade uranium ores found in Africa Uranium, production accounts for 70 to 90 per cent of the country’s exports, depending on the upward or downward fluctuation of uranium prices. For example, for the past forty years, the French mining company, Areva, has been mining uranium around Arlit. Recently, the Government of the Niger issued mining permits to China to explore for uranium and establish mines around Teguida n-Tesumt and In-Gall, south of Arlit. Numerous additional permits have been awarded to Australia, Canada, India, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America for uranium exploration in the area around Agadez, to the west of In-Gall, and in all of the areas north up to the border with Algeria. Nearly all of these areas are right in the middle of the Azawagh Valley, which is key to the survival of most of the Tuareg people in the Niger (Tuareg Culture and News, 2008).
This conflict in the Niger is generally attributed to the demands from the Tuareg people of the Niger for a greater and more equitable share of the country’s uranium revenues. In general, the ongoing conflicts in the country are caused by grievances associated with marginalization, indigenous land rights and Government exploitation of mineral resources without due consideration for local development (Keenan, 2008, p. 449).

In South Sudan, oil is produced in areas largely inhabited by pastoralists (the largest groups are the Dinka and Nuer). Although the map demarcates the oil-producing areas as Dinka or Nuer, numerous other pastoral groups also live in these regions. According to the World Bank (2014), South Sudan is the most oil-dependent country in the world, with oil accounting for almost all of its exports and about 60 per cent of its GDP. According to current reserve estimates, oil production is expected to decline steadily and will become negligible by 2035.

According to the ICG, the civil war in the Sudan started on 15 December 2013, following a weekend meeting of the National Liberation Council of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement when fierce fighting erupted between rival units of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. President Salva Kiir announced on national television that former Vice-President Riek Machar had attempted a coup. Within days, eleven senior political figures were arrested for alleged involvement. The war pitched one ethnic group against the other, particularly Dinka and Nuer, the ethnic groups of the President and ousted Vice-President, respectively. The civil war resulted in the displacement of 2.2 million people, who became internally-displaced people or refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan, Uganda and other parts of the world. The total death toll from the conflict is estimated to have reached about 50,000 by 2016 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016).

It would be erroneous to designate recent and current sporadic conflicts in South Sudan as conflicts between pastoralists and the State without examining elite competition and pastoralists’ (Dinka, Nuer and other marginalized groups) grievances, which emanate from inequitable distribution of the factors of development.

The recent conflict in the Central African Republic has been presented as a conflict between Muslims and Christians, but, in reality, it has three more dimensions: it is conflict between pastoralists and cultivators, between private mineral interests and both pastoralists and cultivators and between pastoralists and the protectors of large wildlife and forest conservation reserves established since the colonial period.

The profile of the pastoralists who have crossed from Chad to gain access to the abundant pastures in the Central African Republic has changed in recent years. Many of them, including Arabic- and Fulfulde-speaking Fulani groups, such as the Uuuda’en, Ontorbe, Anagamba and Biibe Woyla, own their cattle (ICG, 2015).

Herds are increasingly managed by waged drovers employed by wealthy urban cattle owners in N'Djamena and senior Chadian military officers. The owners of large herds are called neopastoralists and have a lot of capital tied up in the activity (ICG, 2015, p. 4). Often armed and equipped with satellite phones, drovers are heavily criticized in southern Chad for disregarding traditional regulations, trampling pastures used by
sedentary cattle farmers, destroying crops and threatening family farmers and even village chiefs when disputes arise. Claiming military or political protection, they often force local communities to give their cattle access to large swathes of land (Weyns and others, 2014). The Chadian army has been known to support cattle drovers in the Central African Republic. According to several witnesses, soldiers have crossed into northern Central African Republic to resolve disputes between drovers and local communities. In early 2008, the Chadian army launched several offensives along the Markounda-Maitikoulou road and in the north of Paoua in north-western Central African Republic (Weyns and others, 2014) (see the map).

In the Somali region of Ethiopia, it is reported (Abdi, 2016) that there is considerable livelihood diversification in pastoral areas. There is, for example, an intensification of cultivation of wheat in pastoral areas, particularly in Jigjiga, Negelle and Madawalabu; fishing and poultry are becoming new sources of food and changing eating habits in different locations. Some pastoralists are engaged in large- and small-scale irrigated farming of sugar cane plantations, vegetables, onions and rice. Others are involved in cattle and camel dairy farms being developed near urban centres and at Gode and Jigjiga. Instead of dependence on rain-fed grazing, pastoralists have become involved in the production of fodder in order to protect their animals against shortage of pasture during drought (Hussien, 2016).

In the case of Uganda, however, Muhereza (2016) reports that the underlying principle of agricultural modernization is the specialization of production to maximize returns. The logic of all pastoralists, including the Karamojong, on the other hand, is usually to diversify production to minimize and manage risk. In this case, many interventions that seek to promote specialization of production have instead undermined the viability of pastoralism. These policies usually tend to emphasize either commercial beef ranching or commercial dairy farming and yet both beef and dairy products are produced on a single enterprise owned by pastoralists. Interventions to modernize livestock production target the transformation of pastoral systems into commercialized forms or settlement. These interventions have not only failed to integrate crop and pastoral production systems but they have also sometimes undermined the interlinkages between the systems. Since time immemorial, the success of both has depended on a symbiotic relationship between the two production systems. It should, therefore not come as a surprise that almost 60 per cent of the households that have resettled in the greenbelt areas have continued to maintain their homesteads in the cattle-keeping zones. This process demonstrates that in a sense they are moving with the times, but at the same time are still attached to pastoral livelihoods. Income from settled crop farming is being reinvested in rebuilding herds – some of the former pastoralists eventually move back to pastoralism, but most remain settled crop farmers because they cannot manage the difficulties facing pastoralism. Pastoralists who voluntarily resettled in the green belt areas have also pursued different objectives – some considered it a means to secure land. Even the educated elite with formal employment and some of those who have proposed the implementation of pastoral settlement policies are investing part of their incomes in acquiring land and raising livestock.

The transhumant Peul (Fulani) and Mbororo are the largest pastoralist groups in the Central African Republic. According to the ICG (2012), their herds are generally shrinking, and, as a result, they have become poorer and have increasingly adopted
a sedentary life. Since the Sahel drought of the 1970s, pastoralists originating from Chad, the Niger and the Sudan have migrated southward in search of water and pastures in the Central African Republic. At that time, they began to move throughout western Central African Republic. The number of pastoralists has increased with subsequent drought spells and as people have fled the civil war in Darfur. As opposed to the Central African migrating cattle herds, the foreigners have larger herds, are better organized and are often heavily armed (Weyns and others, 2014).

According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the recurrence of drought, in combination with social and economic factors, has typically contributed to conflicts between rural populations in the region. Changes in the natural environment have led northern pastoralists to push southwards into regions used by sedentary farmers. At the same time, increasing demand for food has meant that farmers have expanded cultivation into land used primarily by pastoralists. Such changes have led to competition, tensions and violent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers and modern and traditional farmers’ groups (UNEP 2011, p. 54).

### 2.5 Climate change and food insecurity

This section explains the relationship between precipitation variability and climate change and their direct implications on food security among pastoralists. Drought and low precipitation are common occurrences in the harsh environment of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In 1972 and 1973 and in 2015, it is estimated that these two regions experienced at least seven drought spells. It can, therefore, be argued that drought is a short-term expression of long-term climate change.

Climate change does not directly result in conflict; it can be a catalyst for conflict because it contributes to the shrinking of the environmental resources (water and grazing land for livestock and agricultural production) used for the production and reproduction of livelihood. It affects the adaptive strategies pursued by pastoralists. Thus, competition over scarce resources can escalate into conflict.

Three adaptive strategies can contribute to conflicts. First, historically, pastoralists and farmers affected by long recurrent drought spells migrated from the edge of the Sahara Desert in the north to the rich savannah in the south. Because the southern zones are more densely populated and land rotation for farming is frequent, conflict between the migrating pastoralists and farmers tends to intensify in these regions. For example, UNEP (2007) linked the conflict in Darfur to climate change, desertification and land degradation, arguing that these factors had brought farmers and herders into conflict over dwindling resources. Similarly, in relation to Lake Chad, which has contracted by 90 per cent during the last 50 years, the volume of water used for irrigation was four times larger in 2007 than during the previous 25 years. Furthermore, the population in the region increased from 13 million in 1960 to more than 35 million in 2007, and it is expected to continue to grow by 75 per cent by 2025. Conflicts over land and water have intensified between the more than 300 ethnic groups that live around Lake Chad (UNEP 2011, p. 61).

Second, data compiled and analysed by Nyong (2012) show that only 8 per cent of the land area in the western part of the Sahel is suitable for farming, and irrigated
agriculture currently occupies about 5 per cent of this land to meet the growing need for food. Given the limited availability of cultivatable land, farmers are expanding into marginal land traditionally used by pastoralists, heightening competition between producers of livestock and producers of agricultural products. Increased population pressure and the concomitant loss of corridors between wet and dry season grazing areas increasingly hamper livestock movement, further exacerbating conflict between and within groups.

Third, displacement results from impaired pastoral livelihoods reaching a critical threshold below which pastoralism is not sustainable. In particular, when the herd size falls below this critical threshold, pastoralism ceases to be viable and pastoralists become displaced – either spatially or sur place. Another factor that causes displacement is conflicts, as mentioned earlier. For example, it is estimated that 60 to 70 per cent of Somalis displaced by conflict (internally or as refugees) are pastoralists. Similar figures can be seen regarding the internally-displaced pastoralists and agropastoralists in the 2006 drought in Burkina Faso, Mali, and the Niger. Droughts of varying degrees of severity occur in two out of every five years, making harvests of the major food and cash crops highly uncertain (Hengsdijk and van Keulen, 2002). Climate variability, therefore, poses one of the greatest obstacles to the achievement of food security and poverty reduction in the region. Kandji, Verchot and Mackensen (2006) conclude that even though rainfall has come back to near normal and food security has improved in recent years, the Sahel remains an environmentally sensitive region, and climate change is likely to exacerbate the vulnerability of its ecological and socioeconomic systems.

In this section, the authors attempt to bring together some salient features and factors that shape the current conditions of pastoralists in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. These factors are complex, inseparable and, more often than not, reinforcing and interdependent, thus highlighting that the climatic conditions, poverty and livelihood crises are important factors in looming conflicts and food insecurity. Moreover, these factors are not static; they are so fluid that they can sometimes change for the better, but they often return, instigating a new cycle of drought, food shortage and poverty among the majority of the population. As the following sections show, new fringe pastoralism has emerged as a result of these dynamics that shape the pastoral system of production, which is increasingly integrated beyond the national livestock markets to assume a significant regional presence.
3. State-pastoralist relations

Generally, the relationship between the State and African pastoralists has been marred by mutual suspicion, mistrust and more hostility than cooperation. This can be attributed to the following factors:

The State policies and administrative structure designed to develop pastoralism are perceived by pastoralists as mere infringements in local sovereignty and contributors to the erosion of local governance. In interviews, pastoralists voiced the view that post-colonial African States have imposed or reinforced colonial administrative boundaries and local government structures that are detrimental to their way of life. For example, a common complaint is that the State has challenged traditional organization and local system rule or altered their migratory patterns and adaptive strategies in favour of large-scale land concessions for foreign or national private interests. On the other hand, the pastoralists’ rejection of centralized rule and the State’s authority has incapacitated the State’s capacity to impose transformative administrative control movement (at best) or restrict their movements (at worst) (Azarya, 1996; Catley, Lind and Scoones, 2012; Fratkin, 1997).

The State is the only institution in society that enforces public policy and maintains control over the distribution of public goods, including land, and implements livestock development policies. For pastoral societies, the function of the State is to provide development programmes, such as health care, education, water and access to State institutions, for the pastoralists before embarking on livestock development programmes. Subsequently, while the State is interested in livestock development, the pastoralists are interested in pastoral development or development for the people. This perception gap in what development means for the pastoralists and the State was a major factor behind the failure of most resettlement programmes, which were either met with resistance, fell short of realizing their objectives, or proved to be unsustainable (de Haan, 1993; Mohamed Salih, 1990; Vedeld, 1994). Settlements were used for movement control, organized labour for public works, tax collection and imposition of new administrative rules and regulations, often without consultation. These developments have also distorted traditional governance roles, such as chiefs and elders, and have had an impact on their sanctioning capacity (Mohamed Salih, 2000; Tache and Irwin, 2003; Catley, Lind and Scoones, 2012).

In countries where transhumant pastoralists cross porous borders or are of transboundary citizenship, seasonal mobility for water and pasture has become increasingly difficult. African States often question the loyalty of transboundary citizens, particularly pastoralists, because of their aloofness towards the State and disrespect for its borders (Pavanello, 2012; Zaal and others, 2006; de Haan and others, 2014). Despite regional declarations intended to facilitate pastoralists’ cross-border movement, the State’s lack of response to demands for greater autonomy has pushed some pastoral communities to be more resistant to the State authority. In a sense, pastoralists’ struggle for self-determination or their decision to resort to armed struggle and violence is partly due to difficulties they experience in practicing their traditional seasonal movement patterns (Zaal and others, 2006; de Haan and others, 2014).
Pastoralists are not passive actors in state, social, and national relations and the State’s quest for political modernization. While they initially have resisted the imposition of institutions alien to their social organization, they have been gradually incorporated into the administrative structures of the modern State. Pastoralists’ educated political elite not only administer the local affairs of their people, some join national political parties or engage with regional and national non-governmental organizations and pastoral unions and networks. In the post-1990 period, political openness and democratic ascendancy was particularly instructive in incorporating pastoralists in national politics. State-pastoralist relations oscillated between conflict and cooperation and produced winners and losers from administrative controls and development interventions.

### 3.1 Pastoralism and the land question

The role of State-pastoralist policies, or lack thereof, is a major cause of pastoralists’ vulnerability to economic and environmental shocks. Policies are determinant factors in security of tenure, access rights to migratory routes and market and price structure; as such, they play a pivotal role in cooperation or conflict between the State and pastoralists. Moreover, inadequate responses to fundamental, environmental issues, such as recurrent drought and food insecurity, lack of public amenities and market failure has further marginalized pastoralists. Low education penetration in pastoral areas, for example, is a major factor in pastoral communities lagging behind in education and their lack of participation in shaping national policies, with direct consequences for their well-being.

**Table 3: Pastoralists and the land question in 15 countries in the Sahel and Horn of Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Current pastoralist or pastoralist-related policies</th>
<th>Brief description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>The Rural Land Act No 2007-03. The Land Policy (2010) and the Code on Private and State-owned Land (2013). Rural Land Certificates were created to be issued to traditional rural landholders as evidence of their ownership rights.</td>
<td>Land certificates were issued in Fulani grazing reserves, thus restricting their movements and contributing to their migration to neighbouring countries, particularly Ghana and Togo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Country</td>
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<td>Brief description</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>The current land law has not been updated since 1967. Decree No. 215 of 24 April 2001 established the Land Tenure Observatory. Law No. 7 of 5 June 2002. Consultations on a setting new land policy began in 2015.</td>
<td>The nomadic pastoralists have absolutely no land security, and land conflicts are becoming increasingly common and violent around Lake Chad and in the South where the climate is more moderate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>There is no national tenure legislation. Djibouti upholds (or, with an absence of other legislation, at least does not contradict) the traditional tenure rights and management practices of pastoralists. There is little pressure or concern to codify pastoralist grazing rights or to title their tribal land.</td>
<td>Independent families, in accordance with tribal authorities and traditions, continue to manage the majority of the grazing land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Proclamation No. 58/1994 revolutionized land tenure in Eritrea by conferring ownership of all land upon the State. It created a system of individual usufruct rights over the land, while allowing the Government to retain final dispossession rights.</td>
<td>The pastoralists are often forced to either accept the boundaries and become sedentary or resist the enclosures, thus contributing to violence.</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>The Constitution (1995) stipulates that pastoralists have a right to free land for grazing and cultivation and the right not to be displaced from their own land. The implementation of this right shall be specified by law.</td>
<td>Pastoralists are explicitly included in national plans and strategies, and pastoral community projects have been implemented.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>The Constitution (2010, Article 63/1), recognizes communities’ right to manage their own affairs and advance their development through self-governance and increased participation in decision-making.</td>
<td>The Constitution and the Trust Land Act implicitly consider community land as land that is not owned but rather is available for county councils and other government departments to appropriate through the setting-apart procedure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>The 1986 Property Code did not explicitly address the issue of rights to rangeland. However, it is assumed that these resources fall into the category of &quot;non-registered&quot; land and are thus defined as State property.</td>
<td>Land conflicts among pastoralists and between farmers and pastoralists have intensified because of the lack of land security among pastoralists. As land registration has not progressed in pastoral areas, they have become more vulnerable than other land users, such as farmers, with regard to statuary land concessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>The 1983-1984 land reforms established individual private property through registration, thus abolishing customary land. All land that were not in the public domain or private property were covered by Islamic law.</td>
<td>The land reforms literally dismantled customary authorities, resulting in farmers and pastoralists losing their rights to private investors. Consequently, conflicts between traditional users and new owners have been exacerbated (by law).</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>The Niger</td>
<td>The Rural Code (Ordinance 93-015 of March 1993) was introduced to increase rural tenure security and to better organize and manage rural land. Of direct relevance to pastoralists is the country’s rural and water codes.</td>
<td>Despite the promulgation of the Rural Code, customary land tenure practices continue to govern all types of land, including agricultural land, pastureland, and housing plots. Pastoralists’ land-use rights are directly linked to water-use rights. Individuals and groups who control access to water points exercise de facto control over access to surrounding land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>According to the Land Use Act (1990), all land is held by state governors in trust for the people of Nigeria. The Land Use Act, Cap L5, 2004. By the provisions of the Act, the Government is the holder, investor and the governor of land.</td>
<td>Community land-holding is still strong in Nigeria; however, the increasing importance of private tenure and decreasing importance of community rights has negative consequences for pastoralists’ access to grazing land.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Land legislation passed in 1975 officially transferred control of tenure rights over all Somali land from traditional authorities to the Government of Somali.*</td>
<td>The 1975 land policy has not been reformed since the collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic in 1991. These policies have increased land concentration, displaced landholders, and increased tenure insecurity for the remaining landholders without leasehold rights.</td>
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</table>

* Former name of the Federal Republic of Somalia.
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>The 2011 Transitional Constitution (Part 12, Chapter II) and the 2009 Land Act (Chapter II, Section 7) recognize communal ownership and customary land rights. The Land Act stipulates that “all land in Southern Sudan is owned by the people of Southern Sudan and its usage shall be regulated by the Government”.</td>
<td>Weak land management institutions and the lack of enabling legislation have contributed to uncontrolled large-scale land dispossession. Investors in oil, minerals and large-scale agricultural schemes have already displaced a large number of pastoralists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The Sudan</td>
<td>In 2010, the Sudan introduced the Agriculture and Animal Producers’ Legislative Act, which repealed the Organizations of Farmers and Pastoralists Act of 1992. The Act eliminated traditional representation of pastoralists and replaced it with a new system that induces support for Government policies.</td>
<td>Despite the promulgation of the 2010 Agriculture and Animal Producers’ Legislative Act, pastoralists were dispossessed through the national development tenure provisions. These provisions ensure that the State can use any land with proven natural resources of national significance (oil, minerals, gas, forests or agriculture).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>The Land Act (1998) was designed to deal with land disputes and offers some legal basis for pastoral land rights. The Land Act provides for the establishment of communal land associations.</td>
<td>The establishment of communal land associations has not been implemented. Pastoralists lack security of tenure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Four key observations can be drawn from table 3. First, despite differences in focus in the different countries, land policies, there is a general tendency to move pastoralism under the broad category of agriculture, assuming similar tenure arrangements (Benin, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, and the Sudan). Second, in the majority of countries, land reforms tend to distort or to dismantle customary land management, leading to the loss of land rights to private national or transnational investors (Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, the Sudan and Uganda). Third, in most cases, land allocation priority has been given to development projects, which in some cases require large-scale concessions without compensation or proper redress (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda). Fourth, in some countries, communal rights policies have been promulgated without being implemented (Kenya, the Niger, Nigeria and Uganda).

Land policies that restrict pastoralists’ movements contribute to forced settlement, change migratory routes and patterns, or force migration to areas not yet demarcated for large-scale land concession. In all 15 countries, such policies are the main drivers of conflicts among pastoralists and between farmers and pastoralists. They also mobilize farmers and pastoralists against land alienation by the State. In countries such as
the Central African Republic, Mali, Mauritania and the Sudan, lack of land security and frequent land appropriation by the State have intensified conflicts. Because land registration has not been introduced in pastoral areas, pastoralists have become more vulnerable than farmers and large-scale investors to statutory land concessions.

3.2 A shift to regional pastoral development programmes

During the last decade, African regional organizations have been proactive in conceiving and developing policies aimed at protecting the rights of pastoral peoples. The African Union Commission initiated discussions with the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs, in July 2007, on a potential pastoral policy initiative, with a view to developing a framework to facilitate the development and implementation of pastoral policies that could contribute to securing and protecting the livelihoods and rights of pastoral peoples. These discussions culminated in the development of the Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa.\(^5\) The framework contains guiding and cross-cutting principles, two main objectives, and a set of strategies for each objective. The two objectives of the framework are (a) to secure and protect the lives, livelihoods and rights of pastoral peoples and ensure continent-wide commitment to political, social and economic development of pastoral communities and pastoral areas; and (b) to reinforce the contribution of pastoral livestock to national, regional and continent-wide economies.

Recognizing the development-conflict nexus in African pastoral areas, in the policy framework, it is emphasized that: “The key principles of this initiative were in line with, and contributed to, the strategic pillars of the Commission, namely promotion of peace and security, cooperation, partnership and development, shared vision and institutional capacity strengthening.”\(^6\) The policy framework is the first effort of its kind to promulgate a pan-African pastoral policy, with the African Union urging its member States to integrate pastoral development into their national development policies.

The N’Djamena Declaration on the contribution of pastoral livestock to the security and development of the Saharo-Saharan areas is an African Union initiative aimed at improving the security situation by developing the pastoral areas.\(^7\) The declaration acknowledges the importance of pastoralism as a way of life and a significant contributor to the diet and national economies of the Saharo-Saharan States. However, it also points out that: “a new threat began to plague these communities in the past decade. The areas in which they live and earn their livelihoods are affected by chronic and fast-shifting cross-border insecurity. Illicit trafficking is feeding and being fed by many mafia-like and terrorist groups, destabilising the entire region, causing concern in the wider world and threatening to transform the Sahel and the Sahara into a vast no-go area.”\(^8\) Evidently, at the time when the N’Djamena Declaration was adopted, some bloody conflicts involving mainly pastoralists plagued Sahelian countries, such

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6 Ibid.
7 Adopted in N’Djamena on 9 May 2013.
8 N’Djamena Declaration 2013, p. 3.
as those in Kenya and Somalia (Al-Shabaab), Mali (Tuareg), northern Nigeria (Boko Haram), and the Sudan (several pastoral groups in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile region).

The N’Djamena Declaration recognizes the link between policy failure and poverty, vulnerability and conflict among pastoralists, as reflected in its main objectives: improving governance; strengthening the resilience of pastoral communities; enhancing the economic sustainability of the pastoral livestock sector; and enhancing the social sustainability of communities in the Saharo-Sahelian areas. More specifically, the declaration has called upon "pastoralists’ organisations and associations to pursue and strengthen their structuring at the national, subregional and regional levels with a view to improving the design, implementation and monitoring of public policies. They are also invited to reinforce the quality of services they provide for their members and, as a result, build a stronger local base."\(^9\) The quest for pastoralists’ participation in strategy development highlights a new strategic vision in which pastoralist associations are called upon to work with policymakers and empower their communities to demand as well as to ensure improvements in the quantity and quality of services.

At the subregional level, there are two initiatives that merit particular attention: the Nouakchott Declaration on pastoralism: Mobilizing jointly an ambitious effort to ensure pastoralism without borders; and the establishment of a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Regional Livestock and Pastoralism Forum. These initiatives are discussed below.

The objectives of the Nouakchott Declaration on pastoralism: Mobilizing jointly an ambitious effort to ensure pastoralism without borders are to secure the lifestyle and means of production of pastoral populations and to increase the gross output of livestock production by at least 30 per cent in the six signatory countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger and Senegal) over a five-year period from when the declaration took effect, with a view to significantly increasing the incomes of pastoralists within a period of 5 to 10 years. The programme of action involves action on three pillars, namely: enhancing production services; improving the competitiveness of the livestock sector and market access; and strengthening the security of the assets, rights, and lifestyles of pastoral people, access to basic services and political inclusion.

In the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, COMESA is entrusted with developing a regional policy framework on pastoralism. This initiative, which is supported by a project called Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (PACAPS), recognizes that within the COMESA region, pastoralists are among the most vulnerable and food-insecure communities. To assist COMESA in strengthening its capacity with regard to pastoralism and livestock issues, the PACAPS project includes the secondment of a senior policy adviser to the COMESA secretariat, plus assistance with convening the Regional Livestock and Pastoralism Forum as a means to foster consultation with a range of governmental, private sector and civil society stakeholders. In addition to these activities, PACAPS

\(^9\) Ibid. 2013, p. 7.
works with COMESA to design specific training courses covering key aspects of pastoralism and policy.

The objectives of the Regional Livestock and Pastoralism Forum are to provide COMESA with information on pastoralism and livestock issues and with stakeholder opinions on priorities for regional policy development; provide a forum through which COMESA can propose policy and programming options; and seek feedback from stakeholders on the relevance and likely impact of such options. Similar to the Nouakchott Declaration, the Forum aims to achieve these objectives in cooperation with the African Union; IGAD; the East African Community; regional trade associations; key development partners, such as donors with a particular interest in or commitment to livestock and pastoralism; and relevant agencies of the United Nations system.

Furthermore, IGAD has undertaken a series of activities that include elements related to pastoralism. The tenth Ordinary IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government in 2003 entrusted its secretariat with the task of drawing up a comprehensive regional peace and security strategy. In particular, the IGAD Division of Peace and Security was mandated to coordinate the development of a regional peace and security strategy. The IGAD Peace and Security Strategy focuses on border demarcation of IGAD member States and its implications, cross-border economic cooperation in the IGAD region, landlocked States’ access to the sea, cross-boundary water resource management, and cross-border cooperation on countering terrorism. The general aim of the strategy is to achieve sustainable peace and security for the attainment of economic integration and development in the IGAD region. The strategy has four priorities:

a. Strengthen and streamline conflict prevention, management and resolution in the IGAD region;

b. Strengthen preventive diplomacy in the IGAD region;

c. Promote cooperation to deal with emerging common peace and security threats relating to terrorism, maritime security, organized crime and security sector reform within the IGAD region;

d. Enhance cooperation in other areas incidental to peace and security, including environmental protection, disaster prevention, management and response, transit corridor management and management of transboundary water resources, energy resources and prevention management and resolution of challenges relating to refugees and internally displaced persons. (IGAD, 2010, p. 6)

The IGAD Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project commenced in January 2015, with the main objective of enhancing the livelihood resilience of pastoral and agropastoral communities in the cross-border drought-prone areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. It also aims to improve the capacity of these countries’ Governments to respond promptly and effectively to relevant crises or emergency situations.
The activities of IGAD activities in pastoral areas are guided by its Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD), which collaborates with other centres, including the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, the Security Sector Program and the Climate Prediction Center. The mandate of ICPALD is “to promote and facilitate gender-, conflict- and environment-responsive sustainable and equitable livestock and complementary livelihoods development in arid and semi-arid areas of the IGAD Region.”

The Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project is institutionally supported by four sectors in an integrated approach, in which pastoralism resilience is also treated within the broader context of climate change, early warning systems, and peace and security. The regional nature of the programme adds significance to the current trends in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel.

The IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative was launched by IGAD member States in 2011 as part of their commitment to treat disasters as a regional concern that traverses countries. It is an integrated drought intervention programme that combines mobility, disease control, conflict and proactive risk management. This 15-year programme adopts a holistic approach, involving environment and natural resource management; market access, trade and financial services; livelihood support; and the provision of basic social services. Other major activities relevant to the Horn of Africa are disaster risk management, preparedness and response; research and knowledge management and technology transfer; conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding and coordination; institutional strengthening; partnerships; and resource mobilization. These activities are integrated in IGAD member States’ national pastoral development programmes in the Horn of Africa arid and semi-arid land.

In March 2016, the World Bank launched the Pastoralism and Stability in the Sahel and Horn of Africa project. The main objective of the project is to enhance monitoring and evaluation systems and knowledge on the link between pastoralism development and stability for regional organizations and programmes. It uses a regional approach, dealing specifically with improving knowledge about the impact of pastoral interventions on preventing conflicts and promoting stability. Other objectives include increasing capacity of regional pastoral projects in terms of conflict sensitivity; and improving learning and use of knowledge about local, national, and regional conflicts at IGAD and at the national Government level, among others.

In essence, the current prevalence of integrated regional pastoral development programmes shows that policymakers have come to realize the transboundary nature of pastoral production. Also, being realized is that skewed pastoral development policies are among the major factors fuelling the conflicts that have plagued pastoral areas in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel. In this report, it is clear that land policies and reforms intended for development were implemented without consultation or compensation to pastoralists.

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11 It is estimated that the cost of the ongoing pastoral resilience projects in the Horn of Africa are as follows: Ethiopia – $192 million (8 Projects); Sudan – $ 687 million (19 Projects); Uganda – $1.65 billion (65 Projects); Kenya – $1.80 billion (96 Projects).
Some pastoral development policy reforms have contributed to forced settlement and the distortion and undermining of customary laws governing land rights and access and consequently have made pastoralists vulnerable to market and climate shocks. Development projects requiring large-scale land concessions for agricultural expansion or exploitation of mines, gas and oil has intensified land dispossession and engendered grievances among large numbers of pastoral communities across the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Land alienation has contributed to the intensification of conflicts among pastoralists, between pastoralist and farmers and between pastoralists and national and international investors in almost all countries of the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.

In response to the intensification of conflicts, Governments and their international partners have begun to experiment with the adoption of regional policies rather than continuing with conventional national pastoral development. These programmes have recognized the linkages between climatic variability, livelihood vulnerability, underdevelopment and conflict. Major multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, and African regional organizations such as IGAD and COMESA, have begun implementing region-wide pastoral development programmes that combine poverty reduction, resilience improvement and conflict management in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, particularly in transboundary situations. These developments represent major shifts, which have contributed to the emergence of new fringe pastoralism; this concept is defined and explained in the following chapter.
4. New fringe pastoralism

The concept of new pastoralism or post-pastoralism implies that new forms of pastoralism have emerged that have parted with the traditional pastoral way of life as a result of pastoral transformation. New fringe pastoralism refers to the activities of a small number of pastoralists who have become increasingly involved in both transnational licit and illicit activities; the illicit activities include facilitating illegal international migration, human trafficking and trading in arms, drugs and contraband. Some new fringe pastoralists are directly involved in insurgencies and transnational religious extremism or indirectly facilitate the activities of these groups. Although these pastoralists are small in numbers, their activities have far-reaching implications for the majority of pastoralists, most of whom lead peaceful and dignified lives.

4.1 Formal and informal transboundary trade in the Horn of Africa

4.1.1 Formal and informal cross-border trade in Moyale, on the border of Ethiopia and Kenya

In Moyale, informal cross-border trade plays an important economic role as a critical source of livelihood for the pastoral inhabitants in the town and surrounding areas (Mahmoud, 2010). During peacetime, informal cross-border trade takes place along the border between the two countries, with significant quantities of goods flowing in and out with great ease; the Borana, Gabra, and Garri pastoralists are major actors in this process. A large number of these pastoralists are fully engaged in such business, having abandoned the pursuit of cattle herding.

Others, however, engage in informal and unofficial cross-border trade activities as urban-based pastoralists. The members of this group are relatively well-off community residents who own large shops and houses and manage big bank accounts in Moyale. In addition, they remain attached to pastoral pursuits by raising livestock in distant villages through hired labour. As necessary, they travel to the villages to visit families there and to check the proper management of their stock herds. As they do so, they move resources back and forth between the town and villages to manage their trade and herding activities, in addition to using their opportunities as urban dwellers to provide education to their children in Moyale.

Therefore, these are not pastoral people in the traditional sense of the word. They are business people who are intent on engaging in both licit and illicit trade, while raising livestock at the same time. In addition, their children may also be involved in informal cross-border trade. As a result, these community members of pastoral background and orientation have been able to generate wealth and become wealthy by local standards. When the drought of 2013 struck the area, they successfully coped with water shortages in their pastoral villages. During the two months of the drought, they managed to buy water for their animals from the town and deliver it in tankers at a cost of 4,000 Ethiopian birr (Br) (185 US dollars) every other day.
Another group of people engaged in illicit and contraband trade practices are poor pastoralists belonging to the Borana, Gabra and Garri cross-border communities, who conduct business to supplement their meagre household income from livestock herding. Their main role is smuggling commodities back and forth to Moyale between Ethiopia and Kenya. They transport the goods by motorbike, vehicles, on donkeys or on their own backs. To avoid the risks of arrest and confiscation, they manoeuvre around police checkpoints by travelling through the bushes, and, if they get caught, bribes are paid to members of the customs police. For their smuggling services, they charge commissions from the contrabandists, who include pastoral traders, calculated based on their expenses and the risks they face in the course of their movements.

The State, however, views informal and unofficial cross-border trade as illegal and is seeking to put a stop to the practice. Thus, State actors and the local people perceive informal cross-border trade differently. Basically, the local population views it as a vital means of livelihood, generating income for thousands of pastoral and non-pastoral households, particularly in areas alternative employment opportunities do not exist. Subsequently, the Government of Ethiopia has adopted an initiative called “Petty Periphery Cross-Border Trade”, which allows for a limited scale of such trade. The aim of the initiative is to curb illegal and informal trade across the border by making it possible for local traders to import basic commodities that do not reach the border area or are expensive because of the distance of border communities from the centre. As a result, the Government has initiated cross-border trade with its four neighbouring countries, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and the Sudan, by putting into effect legal directives to regulate it. One such regulation is Directive No. 4/1992, which governs the cross-border trade between Ethiopia and Kenya. This directive defines the radius within which cross-border trade is permitted between the two countries and the types of commodities allowed for import and export. Accordingly, traders can only move within a 200 km radius from Moyale, with a maximum monthly capital of Br 20,000, and may enter Kenya no more than twice per month.

Unofficial records of cross-border trade suggest that livestock and livestock products comprise the largest traded goods imported from Ethiopia to Kenya. This is also consistent with official records, which indicate that the levels of trade in livestock and livestock products are second only to coffee. Livestock in the southern and south-eastern pastoral rangeland are major products that are unofficially exported. On the other hand, unofficially imported goods from Kenya to Ethiopia tend to be manufactured or processed goods, which are similar to the items that are brought in through official trade (Teka, Azeze and Gebremariam, 1999; Adugna, 2015).

Livestock trade is a dominant informal and official business both in terms of volume and revenue. There are three major livestock markets in Moyale, two on the Ethiopian side and one on the Kenyan side. The Ethiopian part of Moyale is divided between two States, namely Oromia and Somali, with one livestock market in each. The market in Oromia specializes in cattle and small ruminants, while the one in Somali specializes in camels and small ruminants (Adugna, 2015).

Two main routes of livestock trade are used, one leading south to Nairobi, and the other going north to urban centres in Ethiopia, such as Addis Ababa, Bishoftu, and Adama. According to the Kenya Meat Commission, Moyale alone accounted for up
to one third of the cattle supplied to the commission from northern Kenya between January and May 2009 (Pavanello, 2010, p. 19, quoting the Kenya Meat Commission). Likewise, trekkers drive camels from Mandera in north-eastern Kenya and areas of southern Somalia to the livestock market in Moyale located in the Somali region in Ethiopia. The camels are taken further inland on trucks to Adama, and, from there, they are exported to countries in the Middle East. As Tegegne and others (1999) and Adugna (2015) state, a large proportion of camel exports from Ethiopia to the Middle East comes from the informal trade originating in these border areas, which becomes formal in nature at the Moyale markets with the purchase and transport of the camels to central areas by traders (see also, Aklilu and Catley, 2010; Pavanello, 2010). Market prices are a determining factor as to where the traders take the livestock they buy at the local markets. In turn, the prices at local livestock markets are dependent on demand at the destinations in the central parts of Kenya and Ethiopia. Pavanello writes that cross-border trade accounts for 75 per cent of the livestock traded through the Ethiopian side of Moyale. The Moyale office of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority estimates that between 300 and 600 castrated bulls are transited to Kenya from the Oromia part of Moyale every day (Pavanello, 2010, p. 22).

Apart from livestock, food items such as cereals and dairy products, are also unofficially traded across the border from Ethiopian Moyale to the Kenyan side. Conversely, commodities such as clothes, shoes, electronic devices, cigarettes, medicines, and cosmetics, are smuggled from Kenyan Moyale to the Ethiopian side of the border town (Teka, Azeze and Gebremariam, 1999). In particular, it is reported that large quantities of counterfeit medicines are also imported in this way, significant amounts of which are seized from time to time at different checkpoints along the Moyale-Addis Ababa road. Lack of documentation makes it difficult to establish the exact size of contraband commodities smuggled across the border. However, the estimated value of the contraband goods seized by the Moyale office of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority is an indicator of the volume of the informal cross-border trade in the area.

Based on the reports of that office, the volume of formal exports through Ethiopian Moyale amounted to Br 314,843,740.93 and Br 157,926,074.10, in 2014/15 and the first six months of 2015/16, respectively. To illustrate, large numbers of livestock are smuggled both directions across the border between the two sides of Moyale, yet, the seizure of live animals by the customs office is grossly underreported. According to informants, this is because customs authorities charge the smugglers taxes and let them through, rather than confiscate the livestock.

4.1.2 Women and informal cross-border trade in Moyale, on the border of Ethiopia and Kenya

In addition to men, pastoral women in Moyale, as in other places in the border areas, are also involved in informal cross-border trade, benefiting from the income opportunities it offers. Women play a particularly crucial role in this activity in the context of conflict-ridden Moyale, where most of the residents are destitute former pastoralists without any viable source of livelihood. Under these circumstances, women have proved to be highly adaptable to their changed situation.
As a result, women take an active part in informal and unofficial cross-border trade, with their involvement ranging from carrying goods across the border on their backs or on donkeys, to helping traders get around border checks, to becoming successful business traders themselves.

Three groups of women who play different roles in informal cross-border trade can be identified. The women belong to the Borana, Gabra, Garri and Burji ethnic communities, and mostly live along the Ethiopia-Kenya border. The first group includes smugglers who buy goods from the hinterland of Kenya and smuggle them to the border area. These women engage in the contraband business for profit rather than for survival, and they are often the wives of urban-based pastoral traders, running businesses in Kenyan or Ethiopian Moyale. The second group are women of similar ethnic identities, whose role is to transport contraband goods across the border, carrying them on their heads or backs or loading them on donkeys. Included in this group are women who facilitate the cross-border movement of contraband goods by travelling ahead of those carrying the merchandise to scout the land and provide them with information regarding the presence and activities of border guards. For their role in carrying the goods across the border or supplying information to ensure the safety of their movements, these women charge the smugglers negotiated sums of money, taking into account the risks and hardships involved. Belonging to the third group are women who may be considered pastoral survivalists or petty traders, whose intentions are to eke out small profits from the business to provide for their households. These are rural women who buy goods from the smugglers to sell them to people in the villages.

Being physically demanding and strenuous, informal cross-border livestock trade was traditionally considered the domain of men. However, with many pastoral women engaged in the trade, this perception has changed in Moyale. Women buy livestock at the market and hire trekkers to take them to different destinations.

The sale of camels and cow milk is another type of informal cross-border trade that is entirely carried out by Borana and Gabra pastoral women on the Ethiopian side of the border. Rural women traders collect the milk in small amounts from women producers in the villages to fill large containers. They then transport the product by lorry to Ethiopian Moyale to supply urban-based pastoral women traders. In turn, the latter smuggle the milk across the border to Kenyan Moyale using different means of transport and sell it there for higher prices. The cross-border women traders based in Ethiopian Moyale pay the milk suppliers after deducting their proceeds. In peak milk yield seasons, when water and pasture are abundant in pastoral villages, milk is collected in bulk and is transported and supplied in large quantities, loaded on lorries shuttling between the town and villages on a daily basis.

Despite their proficiency in these endeavours, women are no longer in a situation where they can trade livestock or other commodities without risks, especially in conflict zones. Previously, conflict actors treated women and children with special consideration, regardless of which side they belonged to. This has, however, changed in recent times, and both men and women are forced to abandon informal cross-border trade when conflict is raging (Adugna, 2015).
In the last few decades, droughts, conflicts, drugs, demographic changes and urbanization have altered gender roles and perceptions. While most men are engaged in herding activities, increasingly others are involved in khat chewing or drugs, which renders them almost idle or unemployed. Major changes among women include involvement in petty trade both locally and far into other clan areas. It has been noticed that in Chad and Somalia, including Somaliland, pastoral women are involved in farming and water and soil conservation. Other activities in which women are engaged include microcredit (known in Somalia as Hagbad) and rotating funds, management of small businesses in rural villages, the purchase and sale of livestock in urban markets, milk sales and petty trading. Less than a decade ago, these roles were exclusively the purview of men. According to Ahmed (2016): “these changes gave women voice and space in decision-making and resource management and improved their status within the community”.

However, some negative social norms persist. Regardless of changing roles, women are excluded from major decision-making processes and this weakens them in society. Gender imbalances and inequalities still exist and prevent the realization of the full potential of women in social and economic spheres in rural areas. Women usually are not included in village or community development committees and, if involved at all, it is often only on the insistence of external development agencies (Ahmed, 2016). In essence, the marginalization of pastoral women in development interventions is symptomatic of similar patterns in development in general, which requires the attention of policymakers and stakeholders to enable women to participate fully in development and public life.

### 4.1.3 Conflict and informal cross-border trade

In the Horn of Africa, borderlands have always been conflict-prone. Conflict has been exacerbated and sustained by socioeconomic and political factors, such as resource scarcity, underdevelopment of infrastructure, exclusive national policies, and multiple forms of marginalization. Consequently, States in the Horn of Africa have generally perceived populations of the borderland, predominantly pastoralists, as sources of concern, if not as direct threats to security in the area. Moyale is no exception; in fact, it represents an extreme case in this scenario (Adugna, 2015). Since the 1960s, the Ethiopia-Kenya border has been the scene of violent and protracted conflicts involving the pastoral Borana, Garri and Gabra communities inhabiting either side of the common border.

Formal and informal cross-border trade have been heavily affected by the prolonged inter-ethnic conflict in Moyale. Pitted against each other in these conflicts are the pastoral groups inhabiting both sides of the Ethiopia-Kenya border. Easy movement of people and smooth informal cross-border trade require strong ethnic, clan, and kinship ties across the common frontier. This is highlighted in several studies, which point out that informal cross-border trade depends more on mutual trust than on regulatory frameworks.

In Kenyan Moyale, most of the big stores where traders from the Ethiopian side buy commodities are owned by Burji12 and Garri business people. To avoid border checks,
Ethiopian informal cross-border traders smuggle the goods through Bulide, a Garri village in Ethiopian Moyale. During times of conflict, security risks make it difficult for Borana traders to buy goods at stores owned by the Garri in Kenyan Moyale, and to smuggle them across the border into Ethiopian Moyale through “Garri territory”. On the other hand, the bulk of the foodstuffs smuggled to Kenyan Moyale come from central Ethiopia and is transited through Shewa Berri, a village inhabited by the Borana. Likewise, it is difficult for Garri, Gabra and Burji to use this route for trade during conflict periods (Adugna, 2015).

Similar security risks are experienced in the case of livestock trade. In conflict situations, no Garri pastoralist or trader would risk going to the Moyale livestock market in Borana-inhabited Oromia to sell or buy livestock. The case is the same for Borana pastoralists or traders, who, due to security concerns, are cautious about visiting the livestock markets in the Somali part of Moyale to sell or buy animals. Indeed, conflicts at times become so intense in Moyale on either side of the border that people in general do not feel secure enough to trade animals, resulting in the complete abandonment of the livestock markets (Adugna, 2015).

The security situation is further aggravated by the deployment of armies by the two neighbouring countries in times of conflict to patrol the border area and normalize the relations between the conflicting parties. Inevitably, the presence of armed border patrols in unusual numbers makes cross-border movements difficult and significantly curtails the informal trade. Therefore, conflicts seriously affect the income sources of the pastoral populations in the area by reducing the volume of petty trade activities carried out across the frontier between the two countries (Adugna, 2015).

The impact of this trade disruption reaches far beyond Moyale and surrounding places. To reach central Ethiopia with their goods, traders cross a vast Borana-inhabited territory inside Ethiopia. Similarly, traders must travel through Borana and Gabra villages inside Kenya to deliver commodities and livestock to the centre of the country. In December 2013, at the height of an armed conflict in Kenyan Moyale, Adugna (2015), based on interviews with Moyale informants, reported that three truckloads of goods belonging to Gabra traders heading to Nairobi were seized and looted in Sololo, a town located in Borana territory. The next day, in retaliation, the Gabra seized and looted two truckloads of Borana goods bound for Nairobi from Moyale at a locality called Bubissa, located in the Gabra area. Under these circumstances, the alternatives that traders face are either to suspend business until the situation stabilizes or to use routes passing through communities where they have ethnic alliances.

The income from informal cross-border trade may be used as a resource to build and maintain the economic and political influence of certain groups. Moyale informants interviewed by Adugna (2015) explained that the Burji, who are a minority in northern Kenya, are known for their successful engagement in informal cross-border trade. Most of the big stores in Kenyan Moyale belong to the Burji, giving them the power to be influential actors in the politics of northern Kenya and the conflicts in Moyale.

towns of Moyale and Marsabit, and a few live in Nairobi. In Ethiopia, besides their homeland of Burji Woreda, they have established themselves in several strategic towns on commercial route towns in southern Ethiopia.
Indeed, it is alleged that the Burj finance the operations of the militia of Garri and the Gabra, groups allied to the Burji, and bribe security officials to intervene in their favour. During the deadly conflict in Kenyan Moyale in December 2013, Borana youths, who resented the alleged involvement of the Burji on the side of the Garri and Gabra, destroyed and looted several shops belonging to the Burji.

Money obtained from the informal cross-border trade is sometimes used to buy firearms, thus demonstrating that cross-border trading has an impact on conflict. For this reason, in times of conflict, firearms become the dominant item of trade. Adugna (2015) notes that the Garri are the main players in the informal cross-border firearms trade. Their active role in this business is facilitated by their strategic geographic position close to Somalia and the relationships they enjoy with the arms traders there. As businessmen, they sell firearms to friendly groups as well as to enemies.\(^\text{13}\)

Ayalew and Adugna (2008) and Adugna (2015) state that, despite allegations to the contrary, it is difficult to establish a clear connection between informal cross-border trade and its role in financing the activities of other conflict actors in Moyale, such as the Oromo Liberation Front and Al-Shabaab. The Garri and Gabra, on the one hand, and the Borana on the other, trade accusations about working with those groups. The Garri and Gabra accuse the Borana of having connections with the Oromo Liberation Front, while the Borana accuse the Garri and Gabra of having connections with Al-Shabaab. The accusations range from receiving military support from these forces to their direct armed interference in the conflicts by sending in their militias to fight on the side of their allied groups.

In the case of the border disputes involving the Messeriya, Dinka and Nuer on the border of South Sudan and the Sudan, one key issue is that much of the border’s land surface was not surveyed or properly recorded during British rule, adding to the confusion. The Government of the United Kingdom has been accused of having a light footprint over the localities it ruled, and for this reason, the borders were not found to be reflective of the communities that lived around them. The disputed area of Abyei is a case in point, where the Abyei Boundary Commission still largely contradicts the legal importance of the border established upon independence in 1956. (Small Arms Survey HSBA 2014, p.30)

One of the most significant reasons behind this irreconcilable dispute is the dual character of the conflict. Nationalism has progressively become the slogan for promoting claims over Abyei. This is a reflection of how national politics and interests are displayed in what used to be a simple community-managed dispute over natural resources along the border.

The recent interplay of geopolitical factors over the Sudan and South Sudan border has had a significant impact on the traditional (people-to-people) resolution mechanisms. The manifestation of this impact can be seen in the insistence of the Government of South Sudan in taking the lead, in place of the traditional leaders (sultans), in negotiating Baggara access to grazing land. The Government of the Sudan, on the

\(^{13}\) Interview report by Adugna (2015) carried out with two anonymous informants, Moyale, September 25, 2015.
other side, has prevented community initiatives led by the traditional administration and tribal elites to negotiate grazing and cross-border trade outside of its control. The Government of the Sudan security forces monitor any move by the Messeriya elite and traditional administration towards making bilateral grazing peace deals across the border. This attitude reflects a continuation of the long-standing Government of the Sudan policy of arming and militarizing the pastoral Messeriya to help in its proxy wars against the South – a policy that has disrupted those pastoralists’ historical relationship with the Dinka. The border, which has become infested with all sorts of small arms, is now resisting any future disarmament efforts. This change from being local community-based border discussion to ones that are politically motivated and complex national forums, which usually do not deliver results, is currently adding to the complexity of the pastoral grazing dilemma.

4.2 Transboundary pastoralists’ mobility across the Sahel

The dynamics of informal trade across the border between the Lagos area in Nigeria and southern Benin are an often-described phenomenon: huge volumes of fuel are smuggled out, while inward flows include a wide range of consumer goods, vehicles and food imported through the Port of Cotonou. However, this coastal corridor is only one of the numerous trading routes that connect Nigeria to its neighbours, where a large proportion of activity passes unrecorded by Government agencies. Entire cross-border regional economies and sectoral patterns of trade are barely recorded in official data, such as the flow of Sahelian livestock into the north of Nigeria and imports of dried fish from Lake Chad or food crops from Benin. Outbound business includes major trade in grain trucked northwards to Mali and the Niger, and the export of Nigerian manufactured products to markets across West and Central Africa. Trade flows are affected by regional instability across the Sahel, in countries such as Mali, or in the Lake Chad basin; these can generate additional import demand as local output is disrupted, but insecurity also naturally disrupts traffic along some trade routes.

Large numbers of livestock also cross the Niger–Nigeria border. There are two main components to this activity. In traditional patterns of transhumance, nomadic pastoralists move their animals between grazing areas in the Niger to the south in Nigeria, Chad and even the Central African Republic, through a seasonal cycle in response to patterns of rainfall and resulting fluctuations in the availability of grazing in different regions. In eastern areas, this traffic has been partially disrupted by the insecure conditions created by the presence of Boko Haram, putting strain on more central and western transhumance corridors. Moreover, there is also extensive export trade in animals raised in the Niger, the largest livestock producer in West Africa. An estimated 80 per cent of those exports go to Nigeria, particularly to the populous urban consumer markets.

This trade is culturally distinct from the transhumance of pastoralists, who regard their animals as a foundation of their wealth and social standing and only sell them occasionally. The importance of the Nigerian market for the livestock sector of the Niger, and the pull that it exerts on trade patterns, may be reflected in the fact that meat prices are generally lower in Abuja than they are in Niamey. However, the influences on price are hard to gauge accurately; meat is also cheaper in the capitals
of other countries that import it from the Niger, even though they are much smaller markets. Business and Government infrastructure in the Niger has been developed to support the livestock trade. Large volumes of both formal and informal livestock trade pass through border posts, with official figures collected by the Government encompassing both. This close monitoring of the traffic is possible because of the infrastructure that the Niger has developed to support a sector that is critical for the economy and for individuals' livelihoods. The Niger has 635 livestock markets, 80 of which are monitored by the Government, which has also established a network of veterinary posts. Likewise, ECOWAS operates a system of livestock passports to keep records of the size of herds, vaccinations and other welfare data. As noted above, major border markets, such as those in Illela in Sokoto State, Nigeria and Konni in the Niger, have developed as markets for grain and livestock (Odozi, 2015).

African regional economic commissions and multilateral financial institutions are actively promoting and improving pastoral livelihood resilience through market access, information systems and secure transboundary trade. However, in most cases, little or no attention is given to pastoralists' views or their participation in policy deliberations. This has often complicated rather than improved livestock trade – traditionally conducted independent of governments' trade institutions. Calls to formalize regional markets, such as Moyale, in the Horn of Africa or those in the Sahel have not been received with enthusiasm by pastoral traders and communities.

### 4.2.1 Drug trafficking in the Sahel

Drug trafficking in the Sahel originated in sophisticated trade networks for smuggling goods from Algeria and Libya into northern Mali and the Niger. Subsidized fuel and manufactured goods, along with cigarettes, vehicles, and foodstuffs have been smuggled by Malian Berabiche Arabs from the merchant class of Timbuktu. Their ethnic affiliations with Mauritania and the Algerian Tuareg gave the Malian Tuareg a large network of trade built on trust (Brown, 2013).

Cocaine first entered the Sahelian illicit trade networks in 2002, when South American wholesalers began to use West African ports as an intermediate step in reaching consumers in Europe. The consequent rise of organized criminal syndicates in coastal States such as Ghana and Nigeria has gained the attention of international bodies and policymakers. As a result, many analyses of organized crime and drug trafficking in West Africa have focused on the structure and sophistication of these groups and the extent to which they are challenging more traditional mafia-like networks for primacy in markets outside of Africa (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2014, p. 4).

Drugs smuggled from Latin America into ports in coastal hubs, such as Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Togo travel north through southern Mali, into northern Mali, and eventually into Algeria. However, traffickers, interlocutors and government officials alike maintain that only a small amount of the narcotics trafficked through northern Mali passes through Bamako. Instead, they claim that the majority of product enters Mali from Mauritania. Although some cocaine is sent by boat or
plane directly to Mauritania and Morocco, the main ports of entry for South American wholesalers to the region are from Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.¹⁴

Large amounts of cash from drug trafficking had distorted local markets in northern Mali and across the Sahelian network. Increased profits and the emergence of new economic opportunities for previously marginalized groups had fuelled rivalries between traditionally "dominant" clans and tribes and their economically ascendant "vassal" counterparts. Trafficking rivalries pitted foghas Tuaregs, Idnan Tuaregs, and Kounta Arabs against Berabiche Arabs, who had sided with the traditionally "vassal" Tilemsi Arabs and Imghad Tuaregs. This also explains the proliferation of the Tuareg self-determination movement and the creation of several competing groups (Aning and Pokoo, 2014).

4.2.2 Khat trafficking in the Horn of Africa
Countries in East Africa are largely transit points rather than destinations for drug trafficking activities. The low figures reported by Governments on the seizure of drugs are more an indicator of weak border controls and lack of the required resources than of the non-existence of drug trafficking practices. Ineffective border controls and limited cross-border and regional cooperation, coupled with serious deficiencies in criminal justice systems, make the region attractive to international drug trafficking syndicates that are quick to exploit these situations to their advantage (UNODC, 2009).

The available statistics indicate that traditional drugs, such as khat and cannabis, continue to be trafficked in large volumes throughout the region. Khat is not widely used in the Horn of Africa, although it is not officially banned. Nonetheless, the inclusion of its main ingredients (cathinone and cathine) in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 has made the plant illegal in a number of countries outside the region, such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, Poland, Sweden, and the United States, among others. As a result, countries in East Africa are becoming concerned about the medical and socioeconomic consequences of khat consumption, trade and trafficking (UNODC, 2009).

Cannabis, on the other hand, is the most widely cultivated, consumed and trafficked illicit drug in this region. Moreover, there are unverified stories that the profit from cannabis trade in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and surrounding countries is used to fund Islamic fundamentalist groups that operate in the area.

Field studies conducted on new fringe pastoralism show that cannabis is a widely trafficked drug in the Ethiopia-Kenya borderland. Cannabis is cultivated in many areas in Ethiopia, mainly in Haro Maya woreda in the Eastern Hararghe zone, Shebedino

¹⁴ Narcotics from South America were first introduced into well-established Malian trafficking networks in the early 2000s. These networks, primarily run by Arab businessmen and Tuareg smugglers, grew out of the trafficking of licit and illicit goods from Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania into northern Mali. Many communities in northern Mali, notably Arabs and Tuaregs, are organized along tribal and clan structures that have traditionally designated certain groups as "vassals" or "subservient" and others as "noble," "free," or "dominant" groups. Though these structures are not codified into Malian law, they do, in many ways, form the basis of informal economic, political and security arrangements and account for underlying attitudes and animosities between various groups in northern Mali (GITOC, 2014).
woreda in the Sidama Zone, Shashemene in the Western Arsi zone, and Debre Berhan in the North Shoa zone. Particularly famous for the quality of its cannabis is Shashemene, a town located only 20 km from Hawassa, the capital of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s region of Ethiopia. The plant was introduced into the area and continues to be cultivated by the Rastafarians (or “Rastas”), who immigrated to Ethiopia from Jamaica starting in 1963. Emperor Haile Selassie I, called Ras Tafari until his coronation, and whom Rastafarians consider to be God incarnate, granted these immigrants 500 hectares of land around Shashemene to settle on.

Cultivated in farm fields at a particular location called Melka Odda, cannabis is transported on trucks, camouflaged as other crops, to Ethiopian Moyale. To avoid interception at the checkpoint near Moyale, the cannabis is unloaded a certain distance from the town and then delivered by motorbikes across the border to Kenyan Moyale, bound for Nairobi, which is a major market destination. The line of the route, whereby the drug is carried from the place of cultivation to market destination, is shown in figure 4.

**Figure 4:** The routes by which drugs are trafficked from Shashemene (Ethiopia) to Nairobi (Kenya)

![Figure 4](image_url)

*Source:* Ayalew (2016), developed from fieldwork notes.

Said to be organic and strong, the cannabis from Shashemene is the preferred variety among consumers in Nairobi, compared to others grown in the region. As a result of its quality, the cannabis from Shashemene sells well on local and international markets. The price of one kilo of cannabis around Shashemene ranges from Br 600 to 800. In Kenyan Moyale, the price per kilo increases to Br 2,500 (10,000 Kenyan shillings (K Sh) ($123)). In Nairobi, this doubles to between Br 4,000 and 5,000.

The main actors in cannabis trafficking are the Garri pastoral traders who live on both sides of the common border. These pastoralists are known for being business savvy, and are able to smuggle the drug across the border by motorbike and get around police checkpoints using corrupt means when intercepted.

### 4.3 The Rashaida, their transnationality and migrant smuggling

The Rashaida immigrated to eastern Sudan from Saudi Arabia during the middle of the nineteenth century. The present Rashaida population is estimated to be about 80,000. Socially, they have maintained their identity by not intermarrying nor entering into political alliances with other groups, and retaining much of their Saudi-Bedouin identity and customs. The majority of the Rashaida are nomadic camel breeders and only raise sheep and goats and move within a much more restricted radius. Members of the Rashaida tribe have also been quite adept at finding jobs in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which has enabled them to provide substantial financial support to
their pastoral relatives (Young, 1996). There are a number of transnational subgroups of the Rashaida, which have no single abode or defined territory. They have spread across the Sudan–Eritrea border and live along the Red Sea from the Sudan to Egypt.

The Rashaida of Eritrea are aloof from or avoid political engagement. Eritrean authors describe them as being the only one out of the nine ethnic groups in the country that are exempted from military conscription (Estefanos, 2011). However, the Sudanese Rashaida have developed an appetite for politics. In early 2000, they created an armed opposition led by Mabrouk Mubarak Salim. They joined the Eastern Front as part of the National Democratic Alliance, consisting of the Beja Congress and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army and Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement. The movement has subsided with the signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement in 2006.15

Although a very small minority of Rashaida are involved in human trafficking, the few who are have earned the whole group a litany of chilling descriptions by academics, the United Nations and journalists alike, as bandits, human smugglers, kidnappers, and abductors. For example, the 2013 report on human trafficking in eastern Sudan by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is entitled: “Refugees and Rashaida: Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Eritrea to Sudan and Egypt”. Several reports indicate that the Rashaida have established organized syndicates across the borders of Egypt, Eritrea and the Sudan, where they also cooperate with Bedouins in the Sinai Peninsula to smuggle the refugees on into Israel. They also operate with Egyptian human smugglers to ferry the refugees to Europe or across the Sahara to Libya.

Like the Tuareg, the Rashaida merchant class has accumulated large sums of cash from smuggling across the borders of Egypt, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan, in addition to human trafficking of Eritrean young people determined to escape national military service or to flee poverty and unemployment. The differences in the illicit networks in which the Tuareg and Rashaida are involved do not change the fact that both are part of a globally networked community of interests that transcends their countries. They are all involved in transnational webs of illicit activities, which may seem separate and isolated at first glance but, in reality, are linked at the regional level. Eritreans wishing to migrate to Europe cross the Sahara through the Sudan and Libya and link up with other immigration migratory patterns from West Africa. Human traffickers from the Horn of Africa also link up with the Sahara routes across the Sudan, Libya and Egypt. Essentially, although illegal international migration and human trafficking may commence in villages and towns south of the Sahara, the immigrants from all these countries come together at the shores of the Mediterranean en route to Europe.

4.4 Somali migrant smuggling networks16

The information obtained from the immigration office in Tog Wajale, a town straddling the border of Ethiopia and Somalia, and from migrants who have returned after being

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16 All of the material presented in this section was obtained from field work (formal and informal interviews.
intercepted by the police, indicates that Somali pastoralists, who live on both sides of the Ethiopia-Somaliland border, including those in Puntland, are involved in the migrant smuggling operation along two subroutes. Smuggling networks operate at different levels, as members of Somali criminal syndicates, who belong mainly to Gedabursi and Isaaq clans, are networked with smuggling groups in the Somali region of Ethiopia and groups in the states of Somaliland and Puntland in Somalia.

Members of the Somali criminal syndicates on the Ethiopian side of Tog Wajale act as local brokers, tracking and receiving the migrants who are on their way to the border area, and giving them a temporary place to stay. After arranging a means of transport, the local brokers hand the migrants over to more organized smuggling syndicates in the Somali side Tog Wajale and further away, up to Bossaso. Members of the criminal syndicates along the migrant subroutes operate on the basis of family, clan or close friendship links within specific territories in which the migrants repeatedly change hands on their journey.

Some of the Somali pastoralists involved in the migrant smuggling are traders who own or hire transport vehicles for their side business. Others, who are members of the syndicates, are even better off former pastoralists who have their own large trucks and pickup vans. These well-connected Somali, on both sides of the border, are able to transport the migrants past the towns along the smuggling subroutes, exploiting their kinship and clan ties as well as paying bribes to anti-smuggling agents. As returned migrants told the research team, local police and immigration officers in Ethiopian Tog Wajale release migrants they have detained on the receipt of bribes from Somali brokers who work with organized smugglers. The released migrants have to pay the local brokers additional fees in order to continue their journey across the border.

The Somali pastoralists are engaged in migrant smuggling operations at different levels. They receive substantial financial benefits for their part in smuggling migrants across the border and up to Bosaso, Somalia. The services they provide to the migrants include renting their houses as temporary residences for the travellers, supplying vehicles for transport, guiding migrants on foot around police checkpoints, facilitating communication on their mobile phones and connecting migrants to the next group of smugglers. They get paid for their role as members of the smuggling networks, calculating the costs from the beginning to the end of the journey to the desired destination (for example, to Europe, Saudi Arabia, South Africa or the United Arab Emirates).

Similarly, on the Ethiopia-Kenya border, the involvement of pastoralists from the Borana, Gabra, Garri and Burji groups in the migrant smuggling business in both sides of Moyale is significant. As members of the smuggling group, the pastoralists play an important role by tracking the migrants, giving them a place to stay, transporting them across the border to Kenyan Moyale and on to Nairobi using motor bikes and other vehicles, and handing them over to the next group of smugglers. The journey to Nairobi is not direct for the smugglers and the migrants; it involves taking footpaths

with relevant people) conducted in Jigjiga and Tog Wajale (13 February to 20 February 2016) and Yabello and Moyale (21 February to 28 February 2016).
away from the main road and across bushland. In addition to guiding the migrants along the twisting paths, they also offer them food and water, and shelter made of plastic sheeting. Moreover, taking advantage of their knowledge of the local languages and other connections, they deal with border guards and police to get the migrants released in the case of interception, including through the payment of bribes. Moreover, they assist the migrants in obtaining either counterfeit or genuine travel or refugee status documents through corrupt practices.

4.5 Proliferation of small arms among pastoral communities

African pastoral communities have become synonymous with high levels of armed violence and severe underdevelopment. Governments and international agencies alike often frame pastoralism as a thorn in the side of State-led development and violence reduction policies. There are a number of reasons for this, including, among them, the fact that many pastoral communities function outside State administrative and security frameworks, the view that the pastoral lifestyle is fundamentally incompatible with the State, malfunctioning conflict mediation systems within pastoral communities and the apparent contradiction of the pastoral mode of production to agrarian economies (UNDP, 2007, p. 2). Livestock raiding has been a source of conflict among and between pastoral societies in Africa for hundreds of years. However, more recently, these raids have become more violent and have triggered much more organized retaliations. Often, the raids are perceived as being motivated by ethnic grievances and competition over resources (Triche, 2014, p. 92).

4.5.1 Proliferation of small arms among pastoralists in the Horn of Africa

The use of modern weapons is increasingly becoming a common feature of conflicts in pastoral areas of the Horn of Africa and beyond. It is, therefore, no surprise to see young people from pastoral communities carrying arms around homesteads, in bushy areas, or even in towns. Indeed, owning a rifle is already a dream of the average young person in those communities. In the case of hostile neighbouring pastoral groups, such as the Afar and Issa Somali of Ethiopia, this “rifle culture” is rooted in their long history of inter-group conflict and violence over the control of pastoral land and other resources. Accordingly, pastoralists perceive that access to arms will improve their capacity to assert ownership of, compete aggressively for, retain and ensure the upper hand over environmental and economic resources (Bekele, 2011).

However, conflict technologies can drain meagre pastoral resources, significantly reducing investment in productive methods and techniques. Conflict in pastoral areas of the Horn of Africa may, by and large, be attributed to economic and cultural factors. These have led to a general state of instability and insecurity in the region. As a result, the circulation of small arms has steadily increased to the level of high prevalence and proliferation (Ayalew, 2010). Consequently, violent conflicts within and across the borders of countries in the Horn of Africa have become factors that fuel the ongoing illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. As evidence shows, there has been a growing connection of arms trafficking to migrant smuggling and
piracy, as the groups involved in these operations try to expand their influence in the region (UNODC, 2009).

In particular, the long-running conflict in Somalia has made it easier for firearms to be trafficked across the region. As a result of the persisting instability, the country has become a gateway for the illicit flow of arms, with vast shipments of weapons being smuggled in through the Gulf of Aden. In addition, arms trafficking has been aggravated in this part of the Horn of Africa by the existing lax border controls and the wide, porous frontiers between Ethiopia and Somalia. In the case of surrounding countries that are conflict-ridden because of separatist or rebel movements, arms may be trafficked through clandestine operations to other places through the involvement of corrupt government officials (UNODC, 2009). Common firearms trafficked in the region include AK-47s and G-3s, which are used by civilians for self-protection; by pastoralists during inter- and intra-group violence; and by criminal gangs, militia and terrorist groups (UNODC, 2009).

Armed violence between different groups is used by traffickers to circulate firearms from one conflict to another, resulting in the prolongation and intensification of instability and a slowdown in economic and social progress. The Ethiopia-Kenya frontier is known for the armed violence that has long taken place between diverse pastoral groups on both sides of the common border. An overview of this conflict profile provides a general picture of the circulation of arms in multiple conflict situations. The major conflict actors who live on the Ethiopia-Kenya borderland are the Borana, Garri, Gabra, Degodia, and Ajuran pastoral groups.

For the cross-border communities, shared ethnic identity and clan affiliation is more important than boundary markers. As a result, conflicts that take place on one side of the border are highly likely to spill over to and involve communities living on the other side. Inter-ethnic cross-border support and solidarity in such instances is therefore the norm rather than the exception. Such support and cooperation may take the form of taking sides with fellow clan members in fighting, supplying money and information, or smuggling across arms and ammunition (Ayalew and Adugna, 2008).

**4.5.2 A case of hybrid local violence**

Hybridity in this case refers to how conflicts among pastoralists are about local issues, such as identity politics and resource competition, and controlling local government positions and competing in local elections. For example, when the Borana and Gabra are in conflict, the latter buy arms and ammunition from Garri arms traffickers. Garri traffickers obtain the weapons in Somalia and smuggle them across to the Takaba district in Kenya and then to neighbouring Mubark woreda in Ethiopia. The weapons are smuggled into Ethiopian Moyale, where the Gabra buy them to arm themselves. For their part, the Borana are supplied firearms by Degodia traffickers. The Borana who receive the arms live in Sololo District, located in Eastern Province, Kenya on the border with Ethiopia, and in both sides of Moyale. The Degodia belong to a Somali clan of a pastoral group inhabiting Wajir County in north-eastern Kenya and the Hudet and Dollo woredas of the Liben zone in the Somali region of Ethiopia.

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17 The data on arms trafficking and conflict in the Ethiopia-Kenya borderland were obtained from in-depth interviews held with Borana, Garri and Gabra informants in Moyale, 21-28 February 2016.
According to Gabra and Garri informants, in conflict situations involving the Borana, the Oromo Liberation Front, based in the Sololo District, supplies arms to Borana because of their ethnic affinity, in return for access to information and sanctuary.

Frequent and persistent conflicts also take place between the Borana and Garri, who are historical enemies. At such times, arms traffickers belonging to the Gabra, who live in the Chelbi border district of Kenya and the two Moyales, are major suppliers of arms to the Garri, who live in Mandera County and the Takaba district in North Eastern Province in Kenya and the Liben zone in Ethiopia. The Garri are also supplied arms by the traffickers of Ajuran Somali in Wajir County in Kenya. On the other hand, the Borana get their supplies of weapons from Degodia traffickers. In Garri–Degodia conflicts, the former get arms from Gabra and Ajuran traffickers and the latter from Borana arms traders. In the Degodia–Ajuran scenario, Borana arms traffickers supply weapons and ammunition to the former, and Garri and Gabra traffickers supply them to the latter.

The case of the 2013 local elections in Kenya and subsequent violence illustrate the dangers posed by transboundary conflicts increasingly augmented by small arms and light weapons trafficking by organized business tycoons. Following the local elections in April in Marsabit County, Kenya, a protracted and bloody conflict erupted between the Borana and Gabra groups there. The cause of the violence was reported to be the loss of the Borana candidate to the Gabra rival in the elections. The violence was worsened by the involvement on the Ethiopia side of the border of the Borana, who were drawn into the fighting to show their ethnic solidarity. Borana and Gabra clan leaders across the border in Ethiopia mobilized arms and ammunition for their respective kinsmen involved in conflict by setting quotas for the purchase of firearms by each lineage belonging to the different clans. As a result, large quantities of arms and ammunition were mobilized and delivered to the fighting groups. The suppliers to the Gabra were Garri and Ajuran arms traders. On the side of the Borana, Degodia arms traffickers were the chief suppliers. Informants have reported that because of the increased demand, the prices of arms and ammunition increased dramatically, with one AK-47 selling for Br 35,000, an increase of Birr 25,000. The price of one bullet also rose, from Br 30 to Br 70.

Three observations can be made from this example. First, conflicts among transboundary pastoralists also involve transboundary resource competition and identity politics struggles. Second, current pastoral cooperation and conflicts blur geopolitics and therefore engulf multiple actors and multiple competitions among the many pastoral groups in relations characterized by conflict, cooperation and short- or long-term alliance building. Third, the proliferation of small and light weapons has altered ethnic relations, in the sense that military superiority is now not based on demographic superiority but rather on the ability to access modern weapon systems. Therefore, regional approaches to conflicts are necessary not only at the national level but also at the local level when transboundary resources are at stake.

4.5.3 Small arms and light weapons in the Sahel
The factors that have contributed to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons among pastoralists in the Sahel are similar to those in the Horn of Africa. The Tuareg protracted armed struggle for self-determination began during the 1960s and
continued until it fragmented into various secular and religious extremist groups in the aftermath of the collapse of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2012. Likewise, the Chadian civil wars (1965–1979 and 2005–2010) also contributed to weapons proliferation. The situation was aggravated by the conflict in Darfur, the Sudan, which intensified during the build-up to the independence of South Sudan and continues to date. In the Central African Republic, the security situation deteriorated because of internal factors, such as army mutinies, a dozen military coups, disputes between Christians and Muslims, and conflicts between pastoralists and farmers. The Central African Republic was flooded with large amounts of weapons brought into the country by Chadian and Sudanese rebels, who mingled with the refugees and internally-displaced persons.

In the past, traditional weapons such as spears, knives, bows and arrows, were used in cattle raids or conflicts over grazing land and water. Today, however, modern small and light arms are the weapons of choice. Four major types of violence in which pastoralists use small and light weapons are common in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and probably also in other pastoral regions. The first of these is cattle rustling or raiding to increase or compensate for herd loss. Second, commercialized raiding is facilitated by the abundance of small and light weapons, improvement of transport and the location of meat markets in expanding urban centres. Third, the encroachment of subsistence and large-scale farming in grazing land have contributed to conflicts over land between pastoralists and farmers, as described earlier. The fourth type of violence involves pastoralist-dominated liberation movements, either vying for self-determination or as militia armed by the State to support the regular army (UNDP, 2007, pp. 3-4).

Recently, another form of violence has emerged, which is associated with the rise of transnational Jihadist groups, such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and Al-Qaida. These groups exploit poverty among pastoral youth by taking advantage of the remoteness of pastoral communities from government authority and security forces and using them as bases for recruiting fighters.

In the case of Nigeria, over the last decade, modern weapons have become more prevalent and the manufacturing of local guns has been revived. Although armed robbery has long been a problem in Nigeria, there has been an unprecedented rise in raiding, banditry and clashes over access to natural resources, especially in rural areas. Ethnic and religious clashes have become more common, and political assassination is now a regular occurrence. Despite this, there is very limited information about how the weapons are distributed and the Government has not done anything to prevent the spread of them. Donor efforts have focused on conflict prevention or reduction through formalized reconciliation processes, but there is little evidence that these exercises have had much of an impact, especially because the non-governmental organizations and quasi-governmental institutions lack credibility.

Nigeria is densely populated, has large urban areas and is saturated with ethnic and religious divisions, which are exacerbated by laissez-faire governance. As a consequence, civil conflict is common and has increased markedly under the present democratic regime, partly because of local perceptions of the self-absorption of politicians and officials. These conflicts are usually only weakly covered in the media,
especially when they are in rural areas. Sometimes they are settled by various conflict resolution processes (Blench and others, 2005).

Over the past few years, a large number of older models of locally made guns have been replaced with modern weapons, especially semi-automatic weapons. Hunters’ guns – the so-called Dane guns – were based on 18th century flintlocks and were made by blacksmiths in villages. These have been replaced by a wide variety of more lethal weapons. Foreign weapons are generally imported second hand. The major weapons categories recorded by the survey conducted during the field research for the drafting of this report were: AK-47 semi-automatic; automatic pump action short gun; bazooka; beretta pistol; browning pistol; carbine rifle; double-barrelled long gun; double-barrelled shot gun; G-3 rifle; general purpose machine gun; K-2 rifle; Lee Enfield mark 4 rifle; locally made pistols; revolver; single-barrelled short gun; smoke pistol, and submachine gun.

The Niger Delta, especially the city of Warri, Nigeria, is the major focal point of weapons imports, although Lagos is also important. Weapons are believed to be supplied with forged documentation through third parties. The weapons are then moved to important towns in the south-east. From there, they are sent to secondary distribution points throughout the middle belt area of Nigeria and then to their eventual destination in the north. Weapons also come into the country from the francophone countries surrounding Nigeria, particularly Benin, Chad and the Niger. Most of the weapons from those countries are left over from civil wars and other disturbances. A recent trend in Nigeria has been the local production of sophisticated weapons in local metal workshops. Another source of weapons, and particularly ammunition, appears to be sales by policemen and the military. It seems that arms are regularly “stolen” from depots or snatched on the road. The beretta pistol that is locally manufactured by the Government is commonly available. Finally, in recent times, some sectarian groups have carried out raids with the express purpose of stealing weapons, notably including the Taliban, in Yobe State in 2004.

Despite the efforts of cross-border security agencies, such as the Nigerian police and customs and immigration services, the country’s borders are porous, enabling illicit arms trafficking, which leads to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Nigeria is a country of origin, transit and destination for illicit and illegal arms trafficking. Even small arms and light weapons that have been legally acquired for various security agencies by the Government of Nigeria, eventually illegally find their way to militia groups (Yacubu, 2005; Adejo, 2005; Nte, 2011).

Not surprisingly, out of the 640 million small arms circulating globally, it is estimated that 100 million are in Africa and about 30 million are in sub-Saharan Africa. Of these, it is estimated that there are eight million small arms and light weapons in West Africa alone. The majority of these (about 59 per cent) are in the hands of civilians, while 38 per cent are owned by government armed forces, 2.8 per cent by police and 0.2 per cent by armed groups. The gun trade is worth $4 billion annually, of which up to $1 billion may be unauthorized or illicit. Eight million new guns are manufactured every year by at least 1,249 companies in 92 countries. Ten to fourteen billion units of ammunition are manufactured every year – enough to kill every person in the world twice over. African countries spent more than $300 billion on armed conflict
between 1990 and 2005, equalling the sum of international aid that was granted to the continent within the same period. An estimated 79 per cent of small arms in Africa are in the hands of civilians (Ibrahim, 2003; Stohl and Tuttle, 2009; Nte, 2011).

Between 1999 and 2003, more than 30 communal clashes, instances of sectarian violence and ethno-religious conflicts occurred, with each claiming hundreds of lives and properties and resulting in the internal displacement of many women and children. The proliferation and use of small and light arms in ethno-religious clashes and armed robbery have killed more than 10,000 Nigerians, an average of 1,000 per year since 1999. The majority of casualties (about 66 per cent) in the riot in Kano in 2004 were victims of small arms and light weapons and sustained permanent disabilities. Injuries due to such weapons have increased as much as tenfold in urban Nigeria, and most homicides are committed using them (Ime and others, 2007; Nte, 2011). Armed violence and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons are exacerbated by the inability of the police to reduce violent crime, ensure law and order, and provide adequate security to the populace. None of the security agencies currently have had the training or have the resources or personnel to perform their duties effectively because of the length and porous nature of the country’s borders (Hazen and Horner, 2007). Nte (2011) posits that there is a direct link between the acquisition of weapons, such as small arms and light weapons and the escalation of conflicts into full-blown war. Nonetheless, none of these scholars have been able to sufficiently address the fundamental issues and root causes of the proliferation of these weapons and ethno-religious violence in Nigeria.
5. Summary: conflict, insecurity and development

Pastoralism is a major wealth-contributing sector in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Findings from data on 16 countries in the region indicate that the mean agricultural sector contribution to GDP is 27 per cent, with livestock contributing, on average, 38.8 per cent of agricultural GDP. As for individual countries, Djibouti (90 per cent), Burkina Faso (55 per cent), Mauritania (53 per cent), Chad (44 per cent), Kenya (43 per cent), Benin (41 per cent) and Somalia (40 per cent) contribute the most livestock to the agricultural GDP.

Despite their vast livestock wealth, countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria are net importers of livestock to satisfy a growing appetite for meat among their increasing population and rising middle class. Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger are livestock exporters (Thornton and others, 2006; OECD, 2008). Pastoralists and nomads in those countries, therefore, have created a subregional livestock trade and marketing zones linked to historically known transboundary migratory routes and patterns. Ironically, the Sahelian countries export livestock to the coastal countries, which spend a considerable part of their income on animal product imports (milk and meat) (OECD, 2008). In terms of exports, the coastal countries derive less income from animal products than those in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Benin and Côte d’Ivoire are exceptions to this with regard to meat and milk, respectively, but the figures certainly refer to re-exports to the interior of the region. Data on financial flows reflect a chronic deficit in the balance of trade in animal products. This deficit is greater for dairy products than meat, the zone is still dependent on imports to satisfy the growing demand resulting from rapid population increase and changes in food habits, especially in towns (OECD, 2008, p. 49).

Pastoralists have undergone major socioeconomic and political transformations, which have changed their relationships with their neighbours and with the environment. A variety of internal and external factors, which have become intertwined are propelling these transformations. Internally, human and livestock populations have put considerable pressure on the dwindling resources as a result of recurrent droughts and climate change, not to mention the effects of the El Niño phenomenon. In the Sahel, the recurrent droughts have depleted grazing land and water sources, making them unable to support pastoral livelihoods. It has been estimated that the Great Sahelian Drought and Famine of the 1960s and 1970s forced pastoralists (such as the Fulani and Tuareg) to migrate hundreds of kilometres from Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger southward into Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria. Similarly, in the Horn of Africa, recurrent drought and famine forced pastoralists (such as the Fur, Baggara, Somali, Afar and Karmajong) to migrate southward into moderate climates and rich savannah land in Kenya, the Sudan and Uganda or close to perennial water sources in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia.

A large number of undocumented, impoverished pastoralists who had lost their herds and suffered hunger and famine have settled voluntarily either to become farmers in rural areas or to join the urban poor in overpopulated squatter settlements. Settled
pastoralists have been able to combine livestock husbandry with farming (or agro-pastoralism) as an adaptive strategy against recurrent droughts and precipitation variability. For those who have migrated to towns, the terms “pastoralists in town” and “urban-based pastoralism” have been coined to refer to the presence of a large number of pastoralists who keep small ruminants and cattle for milk and meat production. Others have combined urban-based pastoralism with traditional migratory patterns, which has led to the creation of new and more resilient livelihood strategies.

It is certain that the growing competition between farmers and pastoralists and sedentary populations for access to water, grazing land, transhumance routes, transport infrastructure and markets has exacerbated conflicts and posed a security risk. The pressure on resources has likewise increased on the back of rapid population growth and the lack of concerted action to ensure adequate access to dry season grazing and water. At the heart of these developments is land alienation, with government land policies aimed at moving away from communal or common property rights to individual tenure. In many countries, such policies have left the pastoralists either landless or with grazing land that is far below the carrying capacity to sustain their herds, let alone to allow them to practice farming.

The discovery of commercially viable oil and gas reserves, uranium and gold in pastoral areas in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa has intensified resource conflicts and brought about a new dynamic characterized by extreme violence, involving both State and non-State actors, across these regions. The exploitation of oil, gas and minerals in pastoral areas has made a bad security situation worse. Obviously, land alienation in pastoral areas is no longer a factor of traditional localized conflicts between traditional land users alone (farmers and pastoralists); instead, the conflicts involve global interests of transnational corporations, and governments and elites’ desire for revenue and to exploit the large financial rewards oil brings.

Unfortunately, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa have been blighted by sporadic, protracted and unrelenting civil wars in the Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan and north-Eastern Uganda. Some of these civil wars ended during the early 1990s, while others are still continuing. These conflicts have taken at least two forms: State-based conflicts, where the State and insurgency groups battle for supremacy, and non-State conflicts, which pit pastoralists against farmers or other pastoralists. Whether these conflicts are perceived to be for self-determination, greater autonomy from the State or separation, they, together with climatic change, have turned the Horn of Africa and the Sahel into the regions with the largest numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees in the continent. The majority of the internally displaced persons in these two regions are pastoralists or people of pastoral origins.

Civil wars have had devastating human and economic impacts, contributing to the spread of and easy access to large numbers of small arms and light weapons, which have turned traditional inter-ethnic or inter-clan violence into modern warfare fought with modern weapon systems. In addition to the loss of life and livestock and other sources of livelihood, this has created a situation of political instability that has delayed or derailed development interventions. The dialectical relationship between conflict
and development requires that development be delayed until conflict is resolved and peaceful conditions are created for development.

New fringe pastoralism has emerged within the new global context of development, involving activities that are mostly new even to the small proportion of the pastoral population that is involved in them. As mentioned earlier, activities, such as regional trade and markets, are not new, but they have intensified because of infrastructure improvements and accessibility of better transport, information and communications technology (ICT) and currency exchange facilities. Regional and national markets for livestock products (meat, dairy products, hides, etc.) are increasingly competing for exports and imports with international markets.\(^\text{18}\)

In short:

1. Pastoralists have experienced profound transformations as a result of globalization, defined by Scholte (2005) as the emergence of globally networked societies or the spread of transplanetary – and, in recent times, more particularly supraterриториal – connections between people. Pastoralists, particularly new fringe pastoralists, are ultimately connected with these globally networked societies. These activities, combining the old and the new, have dominated the relationship between an emergent new fringe pastoralism and these globally networked societies.

2. The emergence in the Sahel and Horn of Africa of transnational jihadist groups inspired by and having pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida (and later to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) in Mali, Nigeria and Somalia have aggravated the conflicts and added a new and more complex dimension. Currently, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria and a plethora of Al-Qaida affiliates are exploiting the remoteness of pastoral areas, the relative absence of State institutions and the widespread poverty to mount their attacks on security forces and civilians. De Haan and others (2014) summarized this situation as follows: “There are indications that armed groups emerge from the poorer pastoralists groups; however, the rich may also support illegal gangs because they are disappointed with the central government and their broken promises.”

3. As some pastoralists are settling voluntarily around large urban centres, pre-emptive urban planning is needed to deal with future urban growth and to address expanding needs for services, infrastructure and employment. The ultimate aim should be inclusive development in pastoral areas, including for women and young people, through education, health care, and skills development. To accomplish this, long-term planning and not short-term fixes are required (Yemeru, 2016).

4. Very few pastoralists are engaged in human and drug trafficking, particularly as part of the complex infrastructure that supports illegal international migration. Therefore, this can be described as a truly new fringe pastoral activity. De Haan and others (2016) explained that “pastoralists are

\(^{18}\) For more detailed account of livestock markets refer to, Aklilu and Catley, 2010, for livestock markets in the Sahel and Majid, 2010, for livestock markets in the Horn of Africa.
attractive recruits for their knowledge and control of roads that enable illegal trade. Thus, if pastoralism is to be attractive, the current inequity and vulnerability of poor and young pastoralists needs to be addressed, to provide attractive sources of alternative income to compete with the illicit sources ones.19 Three consequences of the small number of new fringe pastoralists involved in this activity that negatively affect the wider pastoral community and beyond are:

i. Illicit activities undermine the authority of the State and traditional institutions by creating an illegal alternative power base, supported by extortion, bribery and unlawful wealth creation, which questions the State's ability to maintain peace and order and to control the sovereign territory under its jurisdiction.

ii. Rich pastoralists who invest their proceeds from illicit activities in livestock exacerbate inequality and envy, as has been reported in the case of Mali.

iii. New fringe pastoralist activities (such as kidnapping for ransom and insurgencies targeting local and foreign citizens and tourists) have negative nationwide impacts on economic growth and tourism. What is important here is not the number of pastoralists involved in new fringe pastoralist activities but rather the damage that new fringe pastoralism inflicts on the broader pastoral communities across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.

Drugs are trafficked through globally networked interests across the Atlantic Ocean to the Sahel en route to Europe, while arms are smuggled, using similar routes from Europe and Asia to the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. As the cases of the Tuareg and Rashaida illustrate, the trafficking of desperate illegal immigrants is also part of a globally networked community of interests that transcend countries and regions. Tuareg and Rashaida fringe pastoralists are involved in transnational webs of illicit activities, which may seem separate and isolated at first glance, but, in reality are linked at the regional and global levels. Illegal immigrants or trafficked women and children from the Horn of Africa and across the Sahara to Europe are linked to globally networked criminal syndicates and communities of interest.

New fringe pastoralists make use of and undermine some of the positive aspects of global legal trade networks, the flow of remittances, and investments by immigrant pastoralists in their communities. However, the negative human and economic impacts of the illicit activities in which the new fringe pastoralists are involved probably outweigh the benefits. More significantly, they make it apparent that pastoralism of the twenty-first century cannot be treated as a mere continuation of pastoralism of the twentieth century. This fact must be taken into account in future policies and engagement with the majority of pastoralists as well as with new fringe pastoralism.

19 For more on illicit activities such as drugs trafficking among pastoralists, refer to Peter Tinti, 2014, Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Past, present and future.
Although it is not free from challenges, which include conflict, insecurity, drought and now new fringe pastoralism, pastoralism as a whole has large transformative potential, meaning there is need for a positive narrative on pastoralism or a paradigm shift in order to harness this potential. New approaches could involve strengthening skills, technology, markets and links to value chains, and investments so that pastoralists can benefit from emerging trends. An obvious solution that is not taken seriously is to focus on the integration of pastoralists into national, regional and international value chains — this is happening spontaneously, but should be supported through specific policies and strategies (Yemeru, 2016).
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