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Regional and international agendas and other special initiatives—Eastern Africa

From national development visions to implementation: advancing the SDGs and Agenda 2063 in Eastern African countries

Note by the secretariat*

Summary

Eastern African countries pursue national development visions that reflect their own priorities while contributing to the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063. Plans converge on human capital, industrialisation, agriculture, climate resilience, governance, infrastructure, trade and digital transformation, and country experience offers practical strengths, including institutional continuity and monitoring in Rwanda, plan costing and financing disclosure in Uganda, annual and local reviews in Kenya and statistical progress in Somalia. Four gaps impede delivery, namely weak mapping between national priorities and the two agendas, fragmented institutional and national and local coordination, financing strategies that rest on uncertain revenue, investment or external support, and incomplete, inconsistent and insufficiently disaggregated data. These gaps weigh most in energy, cities, ecosystems, climate resilience and debt sustainability, where regional trends are weak. The note invites member States to strengthen the links between priorities, budgets and measurable results and to institutionalise an annual or biennial national implementation review, supported by the ECA Integrated Planning and Reporting Toolkit and by voluntary peer learning.

* The present note summarises the draft paper of 4 November 2026 prepared for the Joint ICSOE, which contains the annex tables and charts and the full list of sources.

Introduction

1. African Union member States are pursuing long-term national development visions while implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063 at the same time. The present note summarises a paper prepared for the Joint Session of the Intergovernmental Committee of Senior Officials and Experts (ICSOE) for Eastern and Southern Africa on how Eastern African countries translate national development visions into implementation, alongside the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063. It covers the 14 countries of the sub-region.[1] It asks how visions are being implemented, what constraints impede delivery, and which measures could help accelerate national development goals, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Agenda 2063 together.

2. The central challenge is not whether the frameworks share broad aspirations, but whether national priorities, institutions, financing systems and accountability arrangements can turn them into measurable results. Research covering the continent finds that only about 6 per cent of measurable SDG targets are on track, and that investing in industry, innovation and infrastructure (SDG 9) brings the largest gains for the other goals, especially where governance is stronger.[2] Global assessments point the same way, and in Eastern Africa only seven of 234 indicators are on track.[3]

3. The regional picture is mixed. Plans commonly stress human capital, industrialisation, agriculture, climate resilience, governance and digital transformation, yet implementation takes place amid constrained fiscal space, debt vulnerability, climate shocks, conflict, uneven administrative capacity and major data gaps.[4] Performance varies widely, with Kenya leading the group on the SDG Index 2026 at 65.6 points and South Sudan scoring 39.9.[5] Experience in Tanzania suggests that delivery is held back less by the plans themselves than by unclear responsibilities, weak coordination and limited data.[6]

4. The paper is a desk review of national development plans and official summaries, recent Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs), the SDG Index 2026, ECA assessments of progress towards the 2030 targets and the Africa Sustainable Development Report 2026. It treats plans as statements of policy intent and compares them with reported outcomes, financing arrangements and implementation evidence. The analysis rests on five dimensions, namely national vision, policy coherence and links with the two agendas, institutional arrangements, financing and resources, and implementation and results. It does not rank countries or assume that they share a common trajectory.

5. The findings are limited by differences in the availability, coverage, publication dates and definitions of the official documents reviewed, and some countries and dimensions are documented more fully than others. They reflect the detail of the available evidence and do not amount to a comprehensive assessment of each country.

6. The note follows the structure of the paper. Chapter I examines national visions and policy alignment, chapter II the passage from ambition to implementation through institutions, financing, monitoring and country context, and chapter III the common challenges and opportunities for learning. Chapter IV sets out recommendations for consideration by member States, and chapter V offers conclusions. Annex tables and charts are in the full paper.

[1] The grouping follows the coverage of the ECA Sub-Regional Office for Eastern Africa and may differ from other country classifications. All 14 countries have presented at least one Voluntary National Review, although Madagascar has not reported since 2021, the 2024 review of Eritrea covered three goals only and the 2026 review of Tanzania is documented here only through press coverage.

[2] Li and others (2026) analyse SDG indicators for 41 African countries using network analysis and Granger causality. The sample covers the continent and not Eastern Africa alone.

[3] The SDG Report 2026 places 36 per cent of the 139 targets with trend data on track or advancing moderately, 49 per cent advancing too slowly and 15 per cent below their 2015 levels, while the Sustainable Development Report 2026 projects that only 16 per cent of targets will be met by 2030. Seven of 234 indicators are on track in Eastern Africa.

[4] The 2026 Africa Sustainable Development Report puts average tax revenue at around 16 per cent of GDP in Africa and counts over 20 African countries at high risk of debt distress or already in it. Ethiopia (9.2 per cent of GDP) and Uganda (14.5 per cent) both fall below the African figure.

[5] The 25.8-point spread within the region exceeds the 14.5 points between the regional average (53.6) and the world average (68.1). Seychelles is not ranked, so the figures cover 13 of the 14 countries.

[6] Jönsson and Bexell (2021), drawing on a document review and 28 interviews held in 2017–2019, find progress on policy alignment, statistics and awareness, but delivery held back by unclear allocation of responsibility, insufficient co-ordination, high turnover in key positions, limited data and scarce resources.

I. National development visions and policy alignment

7. The countries are at different points in their planning cycles, but most current plans form part of longer national visions (table 1). Kenya's Fourth Medium Term Plan completes the period covered by Vision 2030, Djibouti works towards Vision 2035, Burundi and Uganda towards Vision 2040, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Tanzania towards 2050 and Somalia towards 2060, while Seychelles uses Vision 2033 and the ten-year plan of Ethiopia runs to 2030.[7] These horizons give governments a national frame for adapting global and continental commitments to domestic priorities.

Table 1
National development plans in force in Eastern Africa

Country	Current plan and period	Headline priorities and targets
Burundi	National Development Plan 2018–2027 (revised)	Emerging economy by 2040; rural-focused structural transformation
Comoros	Plan Comores Emergent 2030	Emergence by 2030; blue economy; renewables at 40 per cent of capacity
DRC	National Strategic Development Plan 2024–2028	Step towards Vision 2050; cost of about US$94 billion
Djibouti	National Development Plan 2025–2030	Growth of 9 per cent a year; at least 10,000 decent jobs a year; poverty below 30 per cent
Eritrea	No published successor to the 2014–2018 plan	Self-reliance and homegrown growth
Ethiopia	Ten Years Perspective Development Plan 2021–2030	Industry-led shift; manufacturing from 6.9 to 17.2 per cent of GDP
Kenya	Fourth Medium Term Plan 2023–2027	Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda; growth from 4.8 to 7.2 per cent
Madagascar	Plan Emergence Madagascar 2023–2038	Human capital, accelerated growth, environment; food self-sufficiency
Rwanda	National Strategy for Transformation 2024–2029	Growth of at least 9.3 per cent a year; exports from US$3.5 billion to US$7.3 billion
Seychelles	National Development Strategy 2024–2028	Six priorities, including a transformative economy and climate resilience
Somalia	National Transformation Plan 2025–2029	Four pillars: governance, economy, human capital, climate resilience
South Sudan	South Sudan Development Plan 2026–2036	Peace, jobs, services, less dependence on oil
Tanzania	Fourth Five-Year Development Plan 2026/27–2030/31	Real growth of 10.5 per cent and per capita income of US$1,638 by 2030/31
Uganda	Fourth National Development Plan 2025/26–2029/30	Industrialisation and value addition; growth reaching 10.13 per cent; 885,000 jobs a year

Source: ECA, based on the plan documents of each country.

8. Plans converge on a recognisable core of priorities, namely human capital, industrialisation and value addition, agriculture and food security, climate resilience, governance, infrastructure, trade and digital transformation, although emphasis and sequencing vary with each economic structure. The common thread is a shift from raw output towards productivity and value addition, which several plans anchor in quantified targets, such as the aim of Ethiopia to lift manufacturing from 6.9 to 17.2 per cent of GDP by 2030 and that of Rwanda to raise exports from US$3.5 billion to US$7.3 billion. Headline growth targets are ambitious, at least 9.3 per cent a year in Rwanda, 10.5 per cent by 2030/31 in Tanzania, 10.13 per cent in Uganda and an average of 9 per cent a year in Djibouti, and several plans pair them with job targets, such as 885,000 jobs a year in Uganda. Trade and digital transformation are often linked, with logistics, customs modernisation and digital skills treated as shared routes to competitiveness, as in Djibouti, where container traffic rose from 0.92 million in 2019 to 1.32 million in 2024.

[7] Eritrea has no published successor to its 2014–2018 plan, so 13 plans are identified. Six of them end before 2030 (Burundi, Kenya, the DRC, Seychelles, Rwanda and Somalia), while those of Madagascar and South Sudan run to 2038 and 2036.

9. Agriculture appears in plans of quite different design, from a dedicated chapter in Burundi to the aim of Madagascar to reach self-sufficiency in rice and the targets of Ethiopia for annual agricultural growth of 5.5 to 6.2 per cent. Human capital is the area in which targets are most often quantified. The divergence lies less in what plans value than in where they begin. Industry leads in Ethiopia and Uganda, rural transformation in Burundi, and the blue economy and the environment in the island economies of Seychelles and Comoros, while governance comes first in Somalia and the consolidation of peace in South Sudan. Energy shows the same unevenness, since few plans set targets for it, among them the aim of Ethiopia for 96 per cent grid connection by 2030, the goal of Comoros for 40 per cent renewable capacity and the plan of Somalia to halve electricity tariffs.

10. Several governments state that their plans align with the SDGs and Agenda 2063, among them Kenya, Seychelles, South Sudan and Uganda, and Seychelles reports that its six national priorities cover all 17 goals. Alignment is nonetheless often asserted rather than demonstrated. Few plans publish a transparent mapping from national objectives and budgets to specific SDG targets and Agenda 2063 goals.[8] Plans and VNRs also use different reporting languages, plans focusing on growth, jobs, exports and projects and reviews on SDG indicators and the shares of targets progressing or regressing, which makes it hard to trace how a priority contributes to a target, how much financing supports it and whether implementation delivers the intended outcome.

11. The thematic fit is also uneven. Human capital receives strong attention and matches areas of regional progress, including under-five mortality, education equality and immunisation (table 2).[9] By contrast, energy, sustainable cities, ecosystems and debt sustainability are often treated as enabling issues rather than quantified priorities, although regional evidence shows pronounced reversals in these areas.[10] Alignment should therefore be judged by whether a theme carries targets, financing, institutional ownership and measurable indicators, and not only by whether it appears in a plan.

Table 2
SDG indicators on track in Africa and Eastern Africa

Indicator (target)	Africa	Eastern Africa
Prevalence of malnutrition (2.2.2)	On track	Not on track
Under-five mortality (3.2.1)	On track	On track
HIV infections (3.3.1)	On track	Not on track
Hepatitis B (3.3.4)	Not on track	On track
Inequality indices for education indicators (4.5.1)	On track	On track
Population covered by a mobile network (9.c.1)	On track	Not on track
Protected marine areas (14.5.1)	On track	On track
Government expenditure related to approved budget (16.6.1)	On track	On track
Population representativity in public institutions (16.7.1)	On track	On track
Commitment to public-private and civil society partnerships (17.17.1)	Not on track	On track
Resources made available to strengthen statistical capacity (17.19.1)	On track	Not on track

Source: ECA, based on SDG Progress 2025, ECA Stats. Seven of 234 indicators are on track in Eastern Africa. Regional classifications rest on aggregated data and do not show which countries drive a result, as with mobile network coverage.

II. From development ambitions to implementation

A. Institutional capacity

12. Implementation capacity varies substantially. Rwanda shows how institutional continuity, monitoring and investment mobilisation can support measurable results, Uganda has established an SDG Secretariat and works through national planning structures, and Kenya combines national reporting with annual

[8] Uganda's third plan is reported as more than 95 per cent aligned with the SDGs, against 70 per cent for the second, without a statement of how alignment was measured (2024 Voluntary National Review).

[9] Under-five mortality and education inequality are on track in both Eastern Africa and Africa, whereas hepatitis B is on track for Eastern Africa but not for the continent. The fall in child mortality is linked to wider immunisation, skilled birth attendance and community health workers (UNICEF, 2024).

[10] ECA's assessment records reversals on SDGs 7, 8, 11, 13 and 15 in Eastern Africa, although country experience differs. In Ethiopia, for example, the draft National Energy Compact puts overall electricity access at 44 to 47 per cent in 2018, with more than 60 million people unserved. Debt service, fossil-fuel subsidies and economic losses from disasters head the indicators expected to move furthest from their 2030 targets.

progress reports and emerging Voluntary Local Reviews at county level (box 1).[11] In conflict-affected settings, including the DRC, Somalia and South Sudan, institutions must implement plans while responding to insecurity, displacement, humanitarian needs and climate shocks.

13. Arrangements are strongest when responsibility is clear across ministries, central and local government, statistical offices and finance authorities. They are weakest when coordination is ad hoc, local actors have limited authority or resources, and implementation depends on projects that are not embedded in regular budgets and performance systems.

Box 1

Country experiences that offer lessons for voluntary learning

Rwanda illustrates the value of institutional continuity, monitoring and investment mobilisation. Growth of 9.4 per cent was reported for 2025, just above the 9.3 per cent annual average targeted in its second National Strategy for Transformation, and poverty fell from 39.8 per cent in 2017 to 27.4 per cent in 2024, although both figures are government statements and a single year is not strictly comparable with a plan-period average.

Uganda offers lessons in costing a plan, publishing a financing split and expanding data coverage, with indicators for which data are available rising from 41 in 2016 to 135 in 2024. Kenya provides experience with annual progress reporting and Voluntary Local Reviews. Somalia shows that statistical coverage can improve rapidly in a conflict-affected setting, rising from about 39 per cent in 2022 to about 70 per cent in 2026. Seychelles and Comoros have experience in linking planning with climate resilience, the blue economy and integrated financing. Learning should focus on transferable functions and not on institutional labels.

Source: ECA, based on the Voluntary National Reviews and plan documents of the countries concerned.

B. Financing development priorities

14. Financing models differ sharply (table 3). The plan of Uganda is costed at about UGX 594 trillion, with 69.6 per cent expected from the public sector,[12] Tanzania expects the private sector to provide about 70 per cent of investment needs, domestic resources in the DRC reportedly cover only a small part of the cost,[13] and the plan of Djibouti, which costs FDJ 1,215.6 billion, has about 42 per cent, or FDJ 511.6 billion, without identified financing. These structures expose different dependencies, namely tax effort and debt sustainability in public-led models, investor confidence in private-led models and external support where sources are not specified.

Table 3

Expected financing of selected national plans

Country	Plan cost	Expected sources (per cent)
Uganda	UGX 594 trillion	Public sector 69.6; private sector 30.4
Tanzania	TZS 477.7 trillion (US$183 billion)	Private sector 70; central and local government 22; public corporations 8
DRC	US$94 billion	Domestic resources 20; domestic resources and partners 38
Djibouti	FDJ 1,215.6 billion	Financing gap of about 42

Source: ECA, based on the plan documents of Uganda, Tanzania and Djibouti and a ministerial statement reported for the DRC.

15. The financing environment is becoming harder. Official development assistance fell by 23.1 per cent in real terms in 2025, the largest annual decline on record, debt service is among the weakest-performing indicators in the region, and tax revenue remains low relative to financing needs.[14] Plans often assume faster growth, higher revenue, stronger private investment or continued partner support without specifying the reforms and risk-sharing arrangements needed to secure them. Integrated national financing frameworks can connect objectives, budgets, private finance and external support, provided that they are operational and not stand-alone exercises.

[11] Kenya's counties have begun to prepare Voluntary Local Reviews and Uganda has committed to implementing the goals through its Parish Development Model. Both are commitments or work under way, so their effect on outcomes has still to be established.

[12] Uganda's fourth plan projects revenue rising from 14.5 to 18.7 per cent of GDP and public debt from 46.9 to 52.5 per cent by FY2029/30, after revenue averaging 13.7 per cent of GDP since FY2021/22. A public-led structure therefore turns largely on tax effort.

[13] The figures for the DRC come from a press report of an October 2024 ministerial statement and not from the plan document. They imply that domestic resources alone leave 80 per cent of the cost to be financed.

[14] Preliminary OECD data show official development assistance falling from US$215.1 billion to US$174.3 billion in 2025 (OECD, April 2026).

C. Implementation, monitoring and results

16. Data coverage determines what governments can manage and what citizens can scrutinise. Uganda raised the number of SDG indicators with available data from 41 in 2016 to 135 by 2024, and Somalia raised coverage from about 39 per cent in 2022 to about 70 per cent in 2026, which shows that statistical capacity can improve substantially between review cycles.[15] Large gaps remain. A civil society review in Burundi estimated that 35 per cent of targets could not be assessed, and Kenya reported data for only about 68 per cent of the indicators it tracks.

17. VNRs are useful accountability instruments but differ in methods, definitions and coverage. Recent results (table 4) show the range of experience, from reported falls in poverty in Rwanda and Somalia to rising poverty and food insecurity in Kenya and severe deprivation in South Sudan.[16] Stronger systems would connect national plan indicators, sector performance frameworks, budgets, SDG indicators and Agenda 2063 measures in a single results chain. Annual national implementation reviews could then complement periodic VNRs and provide a regular forum for government, parliament, local authorities, civil society and development partners to examine delivery.

Table 4
Selected results reported in recent Voluntary National Reviews

Review	What it reports
Burundi 2026	49 per cent of targets improved since 2015 and 16 per cent worsened or stalled; civil society puts the share that cannot be assessed for lack of data at 35 per cent.
DRC 2026	14.8 per cent of targets on track and more than a third regressing; insecurity in the east and an Ebola outbreak are slowing progress.
Rwanda 2026	Poverty down from 39.8 per cent (2017) to 27.4 per cent (2024); youth unemployment down from 22.7 per cent (2023) to 19.8 per cent (2025); 4G covers 99 per cent of the population.
Somalia 2026	Poverty down from 69.0 per cent (2017) to 54.4 per cent (2022); undernourishment down from 56 to 33 per cent; but 4.8 million people in IPC Phase 3 or above in January 2026 and the 2025 humanitarian plan 20.2 per cent funded.
Ethiopia 2025	Growth averaged 7.6 per cent over 2016/17 to 2023/24; the safety-net programme supports 9.7 million people; wheat imports were replaced by 2021/22; adaptation finance is the main shortfall named.
Uganda 2024	26.1 per cent of targets on track, 54.2 per cent with limited progress and 19.7 per cent stagnating; indicators with data rose from 41 in 2016 to 135.
Kenya 2024	Of 168 indicators, 60 per cent progressing, 12 per cent stalled, 17 per cent regressing and 11 per cent not assessable; no goal on pace for 2030; poverty up from 33.6 per cent (2019) to 39.8 per cent (2022) and severe food insecurity from 17.0 to 30.5 per cent.
South Sudan 2024	80 per cent of people below the poverty line and 86 per cent multidimensionally poor (preliminary 2024 index); 7.1 million food insecure and 2.8 million children out of school.

Source: ECA, based on the main messages and statements of each review, and a civil society declaration for the DRC. Definitions and reference years differ between reviews, so the figures are not directly comparable.

D. Country context and differentiated pathways

18. A single regional pathway would obscure important differences. Rwanda combines ambitious targets with relatively strong institutions and reported gains in growth, poverty reduction and connectivity. Kenya leads the region on the SDG Index but reports poverty rising from 33.6 per cent in 2019 to 39.8 per cent in 2022 and no goal on pace for 2030, so that aggregate performance does not automatically produce broad welfare gains. Somalia remains low in international rankings but has improved poverty measures, debt management and statistical coverage, even as drought, food insecurity and underfunded humanitarian needs, including 4.8 million people in IPC Phase 3 or above in January 2026, threaten those gains.

19. Conflict-affected States need models that integrate peacebuilding, humanitarian action, climate resilience and basic service delivery. Small island and coastal States need more emphasis on climate finance, the

[15] Both gains are reported by the governments concerned, and indicator coverage measures the availability of data and not the progress those data show. Kenya's share follows from data for 168 of 248 indicators (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2024), which adds that administrative sources supply about 65 per cent of SDG data.

[16] Uganda reports in three bands, so its 26.1 per cent of targets on track and 54.2 per cent with limited progress cannot be set strictly against the global 36 and 49 per cent. Reference years and national poverty lines differ between countries, so the figures indicate direction rather than magnitude. The Burundian estimate of data gaps comes from a civil society statement on the 2026 review, and later analysis of food insecurity in Somalia is higher, with 6.5 million people in IPC Phase 3 or above in February and March 2026 (UNICEF).

blue economy and external vulnerability, and more diversified economies can focus on productivity, jobs, value addition and fiscal reform. Differentiation should therefore shape policy sequencing, financing instruments, technical support and the benchmarks used to judge progress.

III. Common challenges and opportunities for learning

20. Four gaps impede delivery across the region. The first concerns policy coherence. Plans do not consistently map objectives, programmes and budgets, and growth, jobs and export targets are often presented without a results chain showing their effects on poverty, inequality and resilience. Priority areas with worsening trends, notably energy, cities, ecosystems, climate resilience and debt sustainability, often lack quantified targets, and several current plans end before 2030 and will need strong transitions to successor plans.

21. The second gap is institutional. Responsibilities are fragmented across planning, finance, sector ministries, statistical offices and subnational government, and local authorities and non-State actors are not consistently involved in implementation and monitoring. Capacity is weakest where conflict, displacement, climate shocks and humanitarian pressure compete with long-term priorities, and periodic reviews are not always connected to budget execution, public investment management and performance accountability.

22. The third gap lies in financing. Costed plans frequently rely on optimistic assumptions about growth, revenue, private investment or external support. Large shares remain unidentified in some countries, while others assign major responsibilities to the public or private sector without sufficient risk analysis, and financing is not consistently tagged to SDG and Agenda 2063 outcomes, which limits accountability for how resources support stated priorities.

23. The fourth gap concerns evidence. Indicator coverage is incomplete and uneven, and plans, VNRs and regional reporting systems use different indicators, baselines and reporting periods. Self-reported results are not always independently validated or disaggregated by location, sex, age, disability and income, and limited subnational data make it difficult to identify who benefits from implementation and where progress is lagging.

24. The diversity of approaches nonetheless creates practical opportunities for voluntary learning, without implying that one model should be copied wholesale. Learning is most useful when it concentrates on transferable functions, namely mapping national priorities to both agendas, costing and financing results, assigning responsibility, producing timely data, involving local government and civil society, and conducting regular implementation reviews. Peer exchange works best when it is voluntary, problem-focused and followed by country-owned adaptation.

IV. Recommendations

25. Member States may wish to consider the following, taking account of their different contexts and priorities:

(a) Link planning with financing: develop comprehensive costing and realistic financing strategies that distinguish public revenue, borrowing, private investment, public-private partnerships and external finance; tag resources in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets to national outcomes, SDG targets and Agenda 2063 priorities; and stress-test financing assumptions against slower growth, higher debt service, climate shocks and lower aid;

(b) Improve institutional coordination and accountability: establish clear leadership for implementation while retaining joint responsibility among planning and finance ministries, sector institutions, national statistical offices and subnational authorities; guide cabinet and parliamentary oversight by a common performance framework; and involve civil society, the private sector, academia and local communities in monitoring, with clear feedback and response mechanisms;

(c) Strengthen data and monitoring systems: harmonise the indicators used in national plans, budgets, VNRs and Agenda 2063 reporting; invest in administrative data, censuses, surveys and geospatial systems; increase disaggregation; fund statistical capacity from national budgets as well as partner support; and use public dashboards to improve timeliness and transparency;

(d) Tailor implementation support to national circumstances, including conflict exposure, fiscal space, institutional maturity, economic structure, climate exposure and data capacity, through integrated peace, humanitarian and development approaches in conflict-affected countries, enhanced access to climate finance and risk instruments for small island and climate-vulnerable States, and productivity reforms, domestic resource mobilisation and mechanisms to crowd in responsible private investment where systems are stronger;

(e) Promote voluntary policy learning: ECA, in collaboration with the African Union Commission and other regional institutions, could facilitate peer exchanges on plan costing, financing frameworks, subnational reviews, data integration and performance reporting, documenting the enabling conditions, costs and limitations of each practice so as to support adaptation and not replication;

(f) Institutionalise a national implementation review, held annually or every two years, that brings together progress on national plans, the SDGs and Agenda 2063 and assesses policy commitments, budget execution, delivery milestones, outcome indicators, distributional effects, risks and corrective actions, with findings that inform the next budget and planning cycle, feed into VNRs and continental reporting, and are made public; and

(g) Strengthen the connection between national visions, the SDGs and Agenda 2063 by publishing an alignment matrix that links vision outcomes, plan programmes and flagship projects to specific targets and goals and identifies indicators, baselines, milestones, responsible institutions and financing sources, carried forward into successor plans, with the support of the ECA Integrated Planning and Reporting Toolkit for mapping, monitoring and integrated reporting.

V. Conclusions

26. Member States are translating national visions into implementation through medium-term plans, sector programmes, financing strategies and review mechanisms, but the strength of the connection varies. Broad policy alignment is common, whereas operational alignment through costed targets, budgets, institutions and comparable indicators is not. Outcomes depend heavily on institutional capacity, fiscal space, data systems and exposure to conflict and climate shocks.

27. The regional evidence points to both urgency and possibility. Human capital outcomes and statistical coverage show that sustained investment can produce progress, while reversals in energy, cities, ecosystems and debt-related indicators show where policy attention is insufficient. The most useful response is neither a uniform regional template nor a collection of disconnected national initiatives, but a country-owned implementation architecture that links visions to continental and global commitments, connects plans to financing, assigns accountability, produces credible evidence and supports regular correction.

28. A national implementation review framework, reinforced by voluntary peer learning, would make that architecture practical. It would allow member States to test whether ambitions are funded, whether institutions are delivering, whether progress is inclusive and what must change before the next planning and budget cycle, strengthening implementation through 2030 while building the institutions required to advance Agenda 2063 over the longer term.