African Migration

Migration Governance

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Draft Report

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Introduction

Migration governance means the collection of national laws, policies, and practices, complemented by relevant regional and international norms and an international framework for cooperation that states need in order to manage migration effectively. This involves, national migration schemes that address the entry, exit, stay, and return of non-nationals, operate in parallel to a number of bilateral, regional and intergovernmental arrangements. While the majority of migration governance resides squarely within states, the New York Declaration (GCM) points to the need and desire of states for greater international cooperation.

Analyses of African migration governance often ignore the role of African governments through their focus on the actions of European and other ‘destination’ countries to manage African migration. This is symptomatic for a migration debate that is often dominated by the interests and preoccupations of European and other Western governments. As we have seen, this bias is problematic, because most migration takes place within the continent, and many African countries are important destination countries in their own right. This bias is linked to the media coverage for Mediterranean ‘boat migration’, which started with the introduction of visa for Maghreb citizens by Spain and Italy around 1991, and a quarter of a century of attempts by European governments to seek collaboration from African countries to prevent the exit and transit of prospective migrants and asylum seekers. While the immigration restrictions and border controls put in place by European destination states – sometimes in collaboration with ‘transit’ and origin states in North and West Africa (Collyer 2016; Infantino 2010; Lutterbeck 2006) – have received ample attention, the major role of African states in shaping migration processes has received much less attention (Flahaux and De Haas 2016). This exemplifies the necessity to go beyond the usual focus on

1. African migration to Europe, because most Africans move within the continent and there is substantial migration to other regions such as the Gulf, North America and China;
2. Unauthorized ‘boat migration’, because the majority of Africans migrate legally and the main source of unauthorized migration is people ‘overstaying’ their visas; and
3. African out-migration, because many African countries have been significant destinations in their own right, mainly for other Africans but increasingly also for migrants from China, Europe and elsewhere.

African countries pursue their own immigration policies with the goal to influence the selection of immigration and emigration through giving migrants access to particular rights or, conversely, denying such rights, thereby increasing their vulnerability to abuse and exploitation on labor markets. In an efforts to sketch a balanced perspective, this following analysis provide an overview of ways in which African and non-African states have dealt with the governance of African migration, and how this has shaped and affected trends and patterns of African migration.

Immigration policies of African states


In general, and with a few exceptions, immigration policies of African governments are rather restrictive, as is exemplified by tight visa regimes, restrictions around settlement and legal employment of foreign nationals and difficult – or even impossible – access to citizenship rights (Fall 2017; Kamdem 2017; Kihato 2017; Ndegwa 2017; Zohry 2017). Decolonisation heralded a phase of state formation, in which newly established African states and their government have endeavoured to instil a sense of national unity in ethnically diverse societies, which often created considerable internal tensions and has regularly erupted in violent conflicts (cf. Davidson 1992). This frequently increased the urge among leaders of newly established states to assert national sovereignty by introducing immigration restrictions and border controls and to portray immigrants as a threat to sovereignty, security and ethnic homogeneity or stability in a bid to rally political support (cf. Vigneswaran and Quirk 2015).

Particularly when governments have embarked upon a more protectionist political and economic track, this often coincided with increasing immigration restrictions and nationalism. This also created a tendency to exclude foreigners from access to full citizenships or even permanent residency. In this context, African governments have frequently resorted to deportations. Adepoju (2001) counted 23 mass expulsions of migrants conducted by 16 different African states between 1958 and 1996. Political tensions and military conflict has frequently led to the closure of several borders between hostile governments, such as between South Africa and ‘frontline’ states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) as part of the anti-Apartheid struggle and between Morocco and Algeria as part of the dispute around the Western Sahara.

The earlier observation that African migration rates have been rather stagnant may thus partly be explained by the fact that post-colonial African states have maintained rather restrictive immigration regimes. This is corroborated by a recent analysis of global travel visa data between 1973 and 2013 showed that many African countries maintain some of the most restrictive visa policies of the world (Czaika, de Haas and Villares-Varela 2017; Flahaux and De Haas 2016).

In order to estimate policy restrictiveness, we calculated a *inbound entry visa restrictiveness*, which is the percentage of foreign citizens that need a visa to travel to those countries\(^1\). The analysis showed that Africa is the world region with the highest levels of visa restrictiveness. Over the past decades, this inbound visa restrictiveness has actually been increasing in West Africa, East Africa and Central Africa. North Africa shows a mixed pattern, with Libya and Algeria showing increasing restrictions, and Morocco and Egypt relatively stable regimes of comparatively liberal inbound visa regimes. Southern Africa is the only region in which levels of visa restrictiveness have decreased since the 1990s, which seems to be related to the end of the *apartheid* regime, and the relaxation of previously strained relations with ‘Frontline States’ (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe).

Figure 23 shows that, on average, African countries impose a nearly equally high degree of travel restrictions (around 80 per cent) for other African citizens as for citizens of other world regions. In Africa, numerous international regional unions and other organizations have been created for the purpose of removing barriers to trade and the free movement of goods, capital, and people. Although regional organisations such as the Economic

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\(^1\) The value of inbound restrictiveness is thus 1 if foreign nationals of all countries need a travel visa, 0.5 if nationals of half the countries in the world need travel visa, and 0 if foreigners of all nationalities are visa-exempted. For methodological details, see Flahaux and De Haas 2016 and Czaika, de Haas, and Villares-Varela 2017.
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community (SADC), The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) have introduced rules for free movement of nationals between their member states, and although their member countries are signatories to various relevant international treaties, the full implementation, particularly with the right settle and work is still only partial and faces many obstacles on the national implementation level (Fall 2017; Kamdem 2017; Kihato 2017; Ndegwa 2017).
Figure 23. Inbound entry visa restrictiveness of African countries, by origin

Figure 24. Inbound entry visa restrictiveness for African nationals, by region of destination

Figure 25. Entry visa restrictiveness of African countries for nationals from OECD countries

Sources: DEMIG VISA database, see Flahaux and de Haas 2016
For ECOWAS, figure 26 shows that nominal free travel has been implemented within the block particularly since 1994, but that restrictions for other African nationals have remained high at levels of around 70 per cent. For instance, in the ECOWAS zone, migrants are vulnerable to harassment, extortion and bribery by border guards and other state officials (Akokpari 2000: 77). While ECOWAS has been comparatively the most advanced regional bloc in terms of establishing free mobility despite persisting problems on the level of implementation (Fall 2017), the intra-regional free movement vision of SADC, EAC and other regional organizations has not yet become reality (Kamdem 2017; Kihato 2017; Ndegwa 2017). For instance, South Africa still restricts migration from other SADC states despite the existence of far-reaching 1995 SADC Draft Protocol on Free Movement (Oucho and Crush 2001). As the sub-regional reports have shown, most African countries are signatories to important international conventions protecting the rights of migrants and refugees, but the key obstacle is the lack of implementation on the ground (Fall 2017; Kamdem 2017; Kihato 2017; Ndegwa 2017; Zohry 2017). And even within ECOWAS, implementation still leaves much to be desired. (Fall 2017).

Figure 26. Internal vs external inbound visa restrictiveness of the ECOWAS zone

As Kihato (2017) observes that regional migration policies within the SADC is primarily driven by bilateralism in the negotiation of visa requirements, labour agreements (as between South Africa and Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland) and unauthorized migration (Malawi-Mozambique, South Africa-Mozambique, South Africa-Mozambique-Swaziland, South Africa-Lesotho) (Kihato 2017). This bilateral approach results in a lack of coordination and harmonisation between border agencies, the duplication of services, and a general ineffective management of mobility across regional borders (Kihato 2017). In Central Africa, immigration policies are particularly restrictive, and migration governance in the region is affected by political authoritarianism as well as a rather hostile social climate towards migrants (Kamdem 2017).
All in all, this somehow challenges stereotypical images of Africa as a continent of ‘porous borders’ or as a region in which most migration would acquire disorderly dimensions. Although many African borders may be relatively easy to cross, particularly when states’ enforcement capacities are weak, others African borders are not easy to cross at all and can be heavily militarized, such as is the case in North Africa. In addition, as this is the case in Europe and elsewhere, immigration controls have increasingly become ‘internal’, through the exclusion of unauthorized migrants from social, economic and political rights, or subjecting them to harassment, violence, and discrimination. In fact, with a few exceptions, Africa is characterized by rather stringent immigration regimes and a lack of legal facilities to encourage their integration and naturalization and to protect migrants from abuse (Fall 2017; Kamdem 2017; Kihato 2017; Ndegwa 2017; Zohry 2017).

Figure 27 Inbound visa restrictiveness within and between world regions

![Graph showing inbound visa restrictiveness within and between world regions.](image)

Source: Czaika, de Haas and Villares-Varela (2017) based on DEMIG VISA data.

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2 Grey bars show intra-regional visa restrictiveness whereas black bars respective rates against nationals of other continents.
There has been a rise of ‘autochthony discourses’ throughout much of Africa which would reveal an increased politicisation of migration (Mitchell 2012); quite in parallel to the rise of anti-immigrant discourse in Europe (Fall 2017, Kihato 2017). Perhaps paradoxically, the rise of autochthony and xenophobic discourses in sub-Saharan, have acquired a great political mobilising force since the onset of democratisation in the early 1990s (Geschiere 2005). In several countries there seems to be a hardening of anti-migrant attitudes, such as in South Africa (Dodson and Crush 2015; Kihato 2017), in Côte d’Ivoire (Mitchell 2012), in Kenya (towards Somali refugees), or in Libya since Gaddafi started scapegoating sub-Saharan workers as a strategy to garner political support, and where they have been subject to systematic violent and arbitrary detention since at least the early 2000s (Hamood 2006; Pliez 2005).

Most African countries are characterized by a weak protection of migrant rights, and as elsewhere in the world, migrants are often scapegoated and in the past mass deportations have regularly occurred, particularly in times of economic crisis (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014). In post-apartheid South Africa, ethnic exclusion and race continues to define patterns of urban (Kihato 2017) segregation (Vigneswaran and Quirk 2015), and ‘indigeneity’ is often the only way to acquire resources and stable jobs (Neocosmos 2008). Also ethnic minorities, such as the Lebanese in Ghana (Akyeampong 2006) and Sierra Leone (Van Hear 1998) or the Mandingo in Liberia (Konneh 1996), have found it difficult to get full recognition as full and active political citizens within a broader context of national ideology fervour. Despite the existence of zones in which there is nominally freedom of movement, these rights are not always protected, and particularly in times of economic crisis, migrants are often scapegoated.

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3 This graph displays the difference of inbound visa openness between members and non-members of regional blocks based on the 1973-2003 average. A high difference between internal and external visa openness shows a high degree of internal opening coinciding with a high degree of external closure. AFTA: ASEAN Free Trade Area; CACM: Central American Common Market; CAN: Andean Community; CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; EAC: East African Community; LAIA: Latin American Integration Association.
In general, it is very difficult for immigrants to access residency rights and only few African countries provide migrants' right to nationality in their constitutions and other legislations, even for stateless children born on their territory (Manby 2016). This can lead to the multi-generational exclusion of residency and citizenship rights, sometimes for political reasons, such as is the case for Palestinian, Somali and Sudanese refugees in Egypt and their descendants in Egypt (Al-Sharmani 2003; El Abed 2003; Grabska 2005; Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003). Many countries lack refugee policies, and not all are party to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. There are few domestic laws concerning the right of asylum, and this often remains unclear and discretionary.

National governments as well as international organizations such as UNHCR often have difficulties to come to terms with the increasingly de facto permanent nature of migrant and refugee settlement. Based on his research on 'self-settled' Angolan refugees in Zambia, Bakewell (2008c) for instance observed that those who are seen as self-repatriating refugees by the government and UN bodies actually have come to see themselves as villagers in search of better livelihood, and therefore generally prefer to stay, also after the end of conflict. In some cases this has led to governments coming to terms which such new realities. In Morocco, for instance, King Mohammed VI embarked upon a legalization campaign of unauthorized migrants and refugees (Gheri and Collyer 2015; Natter 2013; Zohry 2017), and also the Ugandan government has granted refugees rather extensive economic rights.

Emigration and exit policies of African states

The attitudes of African states towards the emigration of their own citizens have often been ambiguous. On the one hand, they often see emigration as a potential source of remittances and a political-economic ‘safety valve’. On the other hand, they often see it as a potential cause of ‘brain drain’, one-sided remittance dependency, and a potential source of political unrest and violence in the form of Diaspora political activism. In the context of post-colonial state formation, anti-colonial sentiment, increasing nationalism, xenophobia and protectionism, compelled several African governments to control, restrict or actively discourage the emigration of their own populations alongside measures to restrict and tightly control the immigration of foreigners, such as was the case in post-independence Algeria (Miller 1979; Natter 2014; Samers 1997), Egypt under Nasser (Choucri 1977; Sell 1988), and Ethiopia under the Derg regimes (Fernandez 2011), which saw unfettered emigration (and immigration) as endangering national interests.

Other African governments, particularly those adhering to more liberal economic models and with a more pro-Western political orientation, have stimulated emigration of workers, mainly because they saw it as a political-economic “safety valve”, which could generate remittances, reduce unemployment and poverty, and diminish the pressure for political reforms. Such considerations have been a major factors in Morocco’s and Tunisia’s active collaboration with the recruitment of workers for Europe’s industries from the 1960s (Bel Hadj Zekri 2004; Berriane 2014), the migration of workers from Senegal and Mali to France, in Egypt’s (under Sadat) mass labor export program to the Gulf from the 1970s (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003) and the more recent emergence of the Ethiopian state as a ‘broker’ in migration of domestic workers to the Gulf (Fernandez 2011), or the cooperation of several West African governments with migration to Libya in the 1990s and 2000s (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; Pliez 2005).
However, in recent decades their seems to be a general tendency towards opening up under the influence of a more general process of political and economic liberalization, which has made it generally more difficult to deny citizens mobility rights. Although high skilled emigration is still raises concerns, particularly in the health care sector, most African governments have abandoned the largely unsuccessful attempts of the past to stop emigration and have instead developed policies to maintain ties with emigrant population and to encourage remittances, investments and the circulation or return of migrants (cf. Fall 2017; Kandem 2017; Manuh 2005; Ndegwa 2017; Zohry 2017). In 2008, about 20 per cent of African countries maintained some form of exit visa (Czaika, de Haas and Villares-Varela 2017), which is still rather high by international standards.

**Immigration policies and border controls by European countries**

In European destination countries, in the 1960s and 1970s citizens from Maghreb countries and several other African origin countries faced relatively low immigration restrictions, and until 1991 many did not need a visa to enter southern European countries. Because of such mobility freedom, many Moroccans, Tunisians and other Africans such as the Senegalese would often migrate to Europe in largely circular patterns (Heinemeyer et al. 1977; Toma and Castagnone 2015). Partly driven by the imposition of common Schengen visa rules in Europe, almost African citizens now need visas to travel to Europe. This is exemplified by the analysis of visa data since 1973, which show that levels of ‘outbound visa restrictiveness’ are comparatively high in Africa and clearly increasing in most countries that enjoyed relatively high degrees of visa-free travel opportunities in the 1970s, such as Kenya, Uganda, Namibia, Botswana and Tunisia, and to a certain degree also for countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Ghana and Senegal. South Africa is one of the few exceptions where visa-restrictiveness for travel abroad has decreased (Czaika, de Haas and Villares-Varela 2017).

Figure 29 illustrates that almost all African citizens now face travel restriction to travel to OECD countries, and figure 30 shows that the closure of open borders of former colonizing nations has played a major role in this trend. The map in figure 31. shows that, together with South Asia, Africans face the highest travel restrictions to move to other countries in the world, with citizens from North-Eastern and Central African countries facing the highest restrictions. This reflects broader restrictions towards the legal migration and settlement of Africans abroad.

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4 More recent data is unfortunately not available.
Figure 29. Average OECC inbound visa restrictiveness for African nationals, 1973-2013

Source: DEMIG VISA database.

Figure 30. Average OECC inbound visa restrictiveness for African nationals, by type of link, 1973-2013

Source: DEMIG VISA database.
In a partial response to the tightening of visa and immigration policies by European countries there has been an increase of unauthorized migration through West and North African countries towards Europe, such as from sub-Saharan Africa through Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria and Libya (Farrag 1999:74) or from the Horn of Africa towards the Gulf region. Such ‘transit migration’ is a source of considerable tension. Since the 1990, European governments have pressured countries in North Africa and the Middle East to control their borders and to curb irregular migration. On the one hand, this has led to increasing collaboration in joint border controls and re-admission policies, particularly with countries in Northern and Western Africa, generally in return for aid packages, temporary migration programmes, or the lifting of sanctions (in the case of Libya under Gaddafi) (Collyer 2016; El Qadim 2007; Lutterbeck 2006; Paoletti 2010; Pian 2010).

On the other hand, these of origin and transit are often reluctant to fully play the role of Europe's border guard, which is for instance expressed through lukewarm or erratic collaboration with border control policies and their general reluctance to comply with readmission policies for 'third country nationals'. Several African governments may adopt a strategy in which they use the migration issue as a bargaining chip in negotiating aid, economic relations and immigrant quota. At the same time, African governments have little real interest in stopping transit migration of 'third country nationals' and the emigration of their own citizens, in order not to harm relations with other African governments, and because for many countries emigration represents a considerable development potential in the forms of remittances, and the knowledge, ideas and skills their citizens may obtain abroad.

In southern European countries such as Spain, Italy and Malta, growing public and political concern about irregular migration from Africa led to an increase in land and maritime border controlling by EU countries since the late 1990s. Rather than stopping migration, this has rather led to a geographical reorientation and general diversification of overland and maritime crossing points towards places east of the Strait of Gibraltar, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia. Increasing border enforcement in the early 2000s in the central Mediterranean route lead to a partial reorientation of crossing point to from West Africa to the Canary Islands (de Haas 2007a). In response, Frontex, the EU's border control agency, and individual countries also started patrolling the shores of Senegal and Mauritania in the mid 2000s. In the wake of the 2011 'Arab Spring' uprisings in Tunisia

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5 This measure reflects the ease of travel for citizens of each country in terms of the percentage of countries they can enter without a visa.
and Libya, there was a temporary hike in trans-Mediterranean boat migration (mainly by Tunisian) from the Tunisian coast.

After a slowdown, the civil war in Syria and a resurgence of violence in various African countries caused another increase in trans-Mediterranean boat migration from 2015, in which increasing border enforcement along the Turkish-Greek border as well as in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the tightening of policies towards refugees by North African countries led to an increasing trans-Mediterranean migration, particularly from the Libyan coast. The main effect of increased border patrolling has therefore been the diversion of overland and maritime migration routes, in which migrants are compelled to take longer and more dangerous itineraries (Brachet 2012; Mechlinski 2010).

**The effectiveness of migration policies and border controls**

The history of 25 years of Mediterranean border controls illustrates the fundamental dilemmas governments of origin, transit and destination countries face in controlling migration. While immigration restrictions border controls do generally reduce inflows at the targeted crossing point, they tend to have unintended consequences that can partly undermine their long-term objective, particularly through redirecting migration and pushing (both authorized and unauthorized) migrants into permanent settlement (Czaika and Haas 2016). The increase in unauthorized boat migration was a direct consequence of the introduction of visa requirements and immigration restrictions for North Africans. The diversification of maritime and terrestrial (Saharan) migration routes, the increasing reliance of migrants and refugees on smugglers, and a significant death toll (Crawley et al. 2016a), was the consequence of increasing border patrolling and attempts to ‘push back’ migrants.

Such restrictions also prompted legal migrants to cancel return plans and to stay, and encourage temporary visitors to overstay their visas. Also governments of African countries of transit and origin a fundamental policy dilemma, as for them emigration has been a political-economic safety valve, while the money remitted by migrants are an important source of foreign exchange and contribute significantly to standards of living in origin regions. Therefore, for African governments blanket collaboration with the readmission policies can represents a political risks vis-à-vis their constituencies (in the case of deportation of their own citizens) as well as a diplomatic risk vis-à-vis governments of other African countries (in the case of the readmission and deportation of citizens of other African countries).

There is substantial evidence that increasing immigration restriction and the imposition of blanket visa requirements for African citizens interrupted circulation and stimulated labour migrants to settle permanently, which subsequently triggered substantial secondary migration through family reunification (de Haas 2014b; De Mas 1991; Flahaux 2014). A recent statistical study of bilateral flow data from around the world shows that, on average, restrictions can reduce return by about the same rate as immigration (Czaika and Haas 2016). Using DEMIG C2C data, figure 32 shows that while legal migration from Africa to European countries has increased, the level of returns has remained stable. The fact that return rates have particularly decreased since the early 1990s seems to confirm the idea that migration restrictions have pushed migrants into long-term or permanent settlement.
Government intervention seems to be relatively effective in preventing or establishing initial migration linkages. However, once significant communities have set up at the destination, networks tend to make migration partly self-perpetuating as migrants start to self-organize the migration of family and community members (de Haas 2010c). Such network dynamics also partly explain the expansion of Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees diasporas in neighboring African countries, Europe and North America over the past decades (Lindley 2009; Ndegwa 2017).

As soon as networks are in place and as long as the developmental causes of migration persist, migration restrictions and border controls do not so much stop migration, but rather tend to lead to a number of unintended or ‘substitution’ effects which tend to limit or undermine the effectiveness of migration controls policies by (1) diverting migration through other geographical routes and destinations (spatial substitution) or through (2) other legal and unauthorized channels (categorical substitution), (3) by triggering "now or never" migration surges in anticipation of restrictions (intertemporal substitution) and (4) by discouraging return and interrupting circulation (reverse flow substitution) (de Haas 2011). These effects show the need for careful policy design, and expose fundamental policy dilemmas, for instance the difficulty of reconciling the policy aims of reducing immigration while stimulating circulation. This also highlights the limited ability of governments to control migration and the need for policies to be grounded in a profound understanding of the developmental root causes of migration. After all, migration policy ineffectiveness or failure is generally explained by an incomprehension or unwillingness to take into account the complex and often counterintuitive ways in which structural social, economic and political factors affect migration in mostly indirect, but powerful ways, which generally lie way beyond the reach of migration policies.

Conclusions
Migration governance is complex, with regulations spanning international, regional and national spheres. The regional consultative groups recognized that the migration

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6 EU15 countries include Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, UK, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden. These countries constituted the EU before the 2004 enlargement.
The dynamics between different countries and regions across the globe were unique and called for varied regulatory principles and responses.

On the issues of respect and reciprocity African states have noted that the migration agenda is currently influenced by Western countries which are imposing their governance and regulatory frameworks on African countries. As Africans do not dictate how Europeans manage their borders, we would like to demand the same respect and reciprocity when determining ours.

The key priority for Africa is how to support effective global, regional and bilateral migration management among African countries of origin, transit and destination.

**Actionable Commitments**

The need for international cooperation and governance has been necessitated by a number of factors. First, the globalized world in which nearly instantaneous connectivity resulting from social media, together with fast, cheap, accessible transportation from even remote areas, have direct impacts on migratory behaviour. Second, the capacities for migration governance in resource-poor countries have not kept pace with the increase in South-South migration or intra-Africa migration.

- States need to harmonize internal/African migration policies and ensure that these are not driven by external interests, this would require ratifying REC protocols and AU agreements.
- States must strengthen global cooperation along migration routes including origin, transit and destination countries in ways that harness the development benefits of migration and mainstream migration into Africa’s development agenda and SDGs.
- Migration has positive effects in enabling the circulation of knowledge, trade, investment, and cultural exchanges. As such, mobility should be seen as a catalyst to support the implementation of SDG and Africa’s development agenda. To this end, all states need to ratify the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families and implement regional instruments on the protection of migrants.
- The protection of the rights of workers must include strengthening cooperation and the governance of migrant social security benefits and develop standards for the Portability of Benefits and savings.
- African states need to strengthen global cooperation around Africa’s brain drain including negotiating ways of mitigating the loss of skills in African countries e.g. negotiating recompense for the West’s net gain of African professional, artisanal, and domestic skills.
- Africa should support labour circulation within the continent. This however, requires strengthening human rights across the continent including the rights of labour migrants. This can be done through encouraging bilateral and multilateral agreements between countries which support student exchange programmes, circular migration programmes, bilateral temporary work schemes and business support initiatives etc.

There is an important opportunity for strengthening partnerships between host and origin countries and migrants. This tripartite collaboration provides and important opportunity to interface migration and development. An example of the power of such cooperation exists between Senegal and France and Senegalese migrants in France through the Programme d Appui aux initiatives de Solidarite pour le Development
(PAISD) which supports development investment in the country of origin, but also in host communities.
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