
Prof Dr Thoko Kaimo
14 December 2020
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Introduction, including the analytical framework</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Overview of the Southern Africa Subregion</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1 Why development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian action?</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2 Why interlinkages as an approach: A new conceptual model</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.3 Consolidating the Triple Nexus: Human rights as a fourth pillar</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.4 Methodology</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.5 Literature review</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.6 Questionnaire survey</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.7 Case studies</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.8 Consultations and collaborative approaches</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 The state of development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian action in the sub region, interfaces with other sub regions, transboundary issues and implications for regional responses</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1 Overview</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.2 Isolated armed insurgencies</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.3 Crises of governance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.4 Socio-economic development deficit</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.5 Southern Africa’s peace and security institutions</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Key issues pertaining to the synergistic and complementary implementation of interventions aimed at addressing peace and security, human rights, humanitarian and development situations in the sub region, taking into account gender and youth issues and the UN-AU Cooperation frameworks</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.1 Threats to peace and security</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.1.1 Special focus: Land conflict</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.1.2 Special focus: Xenophobia</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.2 The situation with regards to development</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.3 The human rights situation</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.4 Findings on the humanitarian situation</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.5 Perspectives on interlinkages</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Challenges, and opportunities for harnessing the interlinkages between the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars, taking into account the COVID-19 pandemic</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.1 Overview</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.2 Understanding the normative frameworks available to key actors in Southern Africa</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.3 Mandate-focused institutions make for a challenging institutional framework</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.7 Methodologies and tools for harnessing the interlinkages and promoting complementary implementation and approaches, and associated capacity building needs .......................... 26

1.7.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................. 26

1.7.2 Developing institutional resources for delivering the interlinkages ................................. 26

1.7.2.1 Build on, strengthen, and adapt the existing collaborative and coordination mechanisms, partnerships, and plans between the interlinkages rather than create new ones; 26

1.7.2.2 Upscaling opportunities for collaboration and sharing organisational capacity .......... 27

1.7.2.3 Leveraging the sub-regional institutional and inter-agency collaborative platform and issue-based coalitions for policy advice, cross-country exchange of experiences in the application of the interlinkages between the four pillars ......................................................... 27

1.7.2.4 Building holistic and integrated contextual analysis that is based on shared vision, collaborative approaches and continually reflexive learning ........................................... 27

1.7.2.5 Continually investing in skills development and investment in adaptive management 28

1.7.2.6 Centring on the inclusion of women and youth in peace-making and peacebuilding planning 28

1.8 Conclusions and recommendations .......................................................................................... 29

1.9 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 30

1.9.1 UN documents ................................................................................................................... 30

1.9.2 AU documents ................................................................................................................... 30

1.9.3 SADC documents ............................................................................................................... 31

1.9.4 General literature .............................................................................................................. 31
1.2 Introduction, including the analytical framework

This study report addresses the interlinkages between development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars in Southern Africa. It is intended to provide guidance towards a comprehensive and robust study report on the interlinkages between the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars for the Southern Africa sub region.

The study report is aimed at promoting synergistic and complementary and joined-up implementation of interventions addressing peace and security, human rights, humanitarian and development situations in the sub region, to contribute to effective and lasting solutions to conflict in the sub region. The report will also address transboundary issues as well mainstream COVID-19, gender and youth issues.

The study report contributes to enhancing awareness on harnessing the interlinkages between the four pillars to inform policy and practice in conflict prevention and resolution in the subregion. In addition, it will contribute to informing future work on the development of methodologies and tools for mainstreaming the interlinkages into policies and strategies, including those addressing Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda. This Southern Africa specific study is one of four subregional studies which will feed into a regional (continental) study.
1.3 Overview of the Southern Africa Subregion

Whilst the subregion has largely enjoyed a peace dividend over the past two decades, and the incidence of inter-state armed and violent conflicts have significantly reduced, the region is not immune to challenges to peace and security, armed conflict, political crises, democracy and governance deficits. For example, Angola and Mozambique have experienced bouts of armed conflict whilst challenging political problems have set back democratic governance in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. South Africa has convulsed with repeated cycles of xenophobic attacks. Unresolved land issues continue to exert serious governance issues in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and other states. At the same time, the development track for the subregion has not been even. Despite the region experiencing an admirable average growth rate of 4.8 percent per annum between 2000 and 2019, the economic indicators show that the benefits of such growth have been uneven. Poverty and inequality have deepened and unemployment rates have remained quite stubborn if not regressing within many economies. Another overarching issue is corruption which has the potential to reverse governance gains and deepen civil unrest. Such a background poses increasing risks to peace, security, development and human rights.

In order to address these challenges, a number of initiatives have been undertaken at the subregion level. For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has deployed institutional mechanisms including the Summit, the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), the Troika and various ministerial committees for peace to address peace and security issues within member countries including Angola, Madagascar, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Similarly, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) established the Governance Peace and Security (GPS) Programme in recognition of the fact that regional economic integration can only be achieved when peace and security is guaranteed COMESA’s GPS focuses on the interlinked areas of capacity for governance, conflict prevention, conflict management, security and peace building interventions.

These subregional initiatives have been supported by the African Union, on the one hand and the United Nations on the other. The AU on its part has committed itself to Agenda 2063, an ambitious blueprint for the economic, political and social transformation of the continent with a very specific focus on policy coherence, bottom up approaches, and a result-focused orientation as key attributes. Supporting this overarching framework are key policy instruments and structures of the African Union including the African Union Peace and Security Architecture; the draft AU-UN Human Rights Framework; and the AU-UNOCHA MOU on Humanitarian Action. These instruments are key in clarifying the overall objectives of humanitarian action as well as establishing pathways for cooperation from the global to the subregional level. Complementing this approach at the UN level is the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as encapsulated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – which seeks to address root causes of conflict and more closely interlink the UN pillars of peace and security, human rights and

---

Buttressing this is the Agenda for Humanity with its New Way of Working” (NWOW). Initiated as a UN reform process to the humanitarian system in 2016, the NWOW fosters working towards collective outcomes. This is based on joint action in areas such as data collection, joint assessments, planning processes and reforming financing modalities with a view to address needs, risk, and vulnerability.

Consequently, at the policy level at least, both the AU and the UN recognize the need for an interlinked, systemic approach to an often-overburdened aid system. In this regard, the policy response frameworks envision a response to humanitarian needs whilst also tackling entrenched and underlying development challenges and mitigating impacts of armed conflict in times of limited financial resources. Given this background, there is clear recognition by key institutional players in the subregional, regional and international system that collaborative and complementary approaches to understanding the linkages as well as harnessing their potential is key. This study report contributes to knowledge that operationalises this ambition by focusing on the specific context of the Southern African subregional context. The primary beneficiaries of the report include member states of the Southern Africa subregion including Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Eswatini, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It also includes the two African Union recognized Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Southern Africa, namely Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). The study was conducted in close consultation with these two RECs and the secondary beneficiaries of the study are the AUC, AUDA-NEPAD and APRM who will benefit from the study findings.

Member states will benefit from this study through an evidence-based and practical understanding of the interlinkages between development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars in their own policy development and implementation strategies. Additionally, the analysis and utilisation of case studies alongside the policy architecture available at the subregional and regional levels will highlight the practical opportunities for collaborative and complementary approaches to harnessing the interlinkages between member states and the subregional organisations. The articulation of these opportunities will contribute towards promoting synergistic and complementary and joined-up implementation of interventions addressing peace and security, human rights, humanitarian and development situations in the sub region and therefore contribute towards effective and lasting solutions to conflict in the sub region.

1.3.1 Why development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian action?

Debates around linking better immediate relief with long-term development activities as well as peace are far from new. Since the 1980s discussions on how to overcome output-oriented aid operations in silos with limited coordination used terminology such as Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD),

---

coherence or resilience. While in the early 1990s the focus was on improving the transition between humanitarian action and development cooperation, the debate shifted in the late 1990s, and included linking assistance more closely with state and peacebuilding objectives in fragile states. This was known as ‘early recovery’ or ‘whole-of-government’ approach. In recent times, these context-led approaches have been captured under the guise of the “Triple-Nexus” approach. The humanitarian–development–peace and security nexus (often referred to simply as the ‘nexus’) refers to the interlinkages of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding aims and interventions and the cohesiveness of the agencies that pursue them. Though widely discussed in the NWOW, the nexus as a policy concept has largely remained centred on the United Nations and has had little impact in terms of its translation into programming and operations (IASC, 2017).

More recently, the idea of a ‘triple nexus’, i.e. also including security, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, has become prominent. This has come into being mainly out of a concern that, in conflict contexts, humanitarian aid can easily exacerbate the situation. Indeed, aid can disrupt existing power dynamics, be perceived as a ‘resource’ to contest, and be instrumentalised as a means of achieving political gains (for example by serving or depriving certain communities). Aid can also sustain warring parties or allow governments to shift resources to military budgets, by providing essential services no longer delivered by the state (Lange and Quinn 2003).

Figure 1: Triple Nexus

---

However, despite appearing in many policy assessments, the nexus approach remains largely conceptual, with differing definitions, terms, understandings and interpretations of the concept by different aid actors (De Castellarnau and Stoianova, 2018) particularly in relation to how existing governance structures both at the member state and supra-state level could be deployed to realise its full potential. Typical challenges to the use of nexus approaches in practice are:

- Different normative frameworks: Development cooperation pursues openly political objectives, including strengthening governance and transforming economies, while humanitarian assistance is based on the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence (OCHA 2012: 1). On the one hand, these principles are central to establishing and maintaining humanitarian access and providing assistance and protection according to needs. In complex conflict situations such as Somalia, the role of the international community is such that it is difficult, if not impossible, to be perceived as neutral and impartial by the local population.

- Institutional incompatibility: Development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding are fragmented, both conceptually and in their implementation. As a result, they come with different time frames and lines of funding. This often limits their flexibility and interoperability.

- Capacity and nexus skills within organisations: Humanitarians may lack the skills (or the time) to integrate conflict analysis in their work, while many peacebuilding organisations have neither the technical capacity nor the financial resources to engage and collaborate with their development and humanitarian counterparts. There is also no consensus on what a triple nexus precisely entails. Some interpret it as an approach to coordination (with each actor playing its own respective role), while others see it as an attempt to make peacebuilders out of development practitioners and development actors out of humanitarians.

1.3.2 Why interlinkages as an approach: A new conceptual model

It is now widely recognized that different iterations of the Triple Nexus have so far not adequately facilitated a continuous and reliable transition between humanitarian and development work. Key challenges as to why the gap continues to exist include a divided and disparate aid structure, separated donor funding, and profoundly different modus operandi and mandates. At the same time, due to progressively worsening conflicts and humanitarian crises, the pressure to achieve better outcomes by working in a more integrated, effective and efficient way is high. There is growing recognition that including considerations relating to human rights has the potential to add coherence to the application of the Nexus concepts.

1.3.3 Consolidating the Triple Nexus: Human rights as a fourth pillar

---

Whilst analyses of the Triple Nexus are aplenty including studies on conflict and humanitarian management in the Southern African sub-region, the inclusion of human rights as pillar in this context adds fresh impetus to an urgent problem. The nexus between human rights and peace and security is important because to be able to find durable solutions to conflicts, human rights must be guaranteed, and to safeguard human rights, violent conflicts must be kept at bay. Contemporary human rights research and policy-making are concerned with a wide spectrum of programmes focusing on civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights and with many principles and processes that can influence all programmes regardless of their goals. Contemporary peace and security research and policymaking is likewise a wider endeavour focusing on all different phases of the conflict circle including submerged tensions, rising tensions, violent conflict and post-conflict situations. The creation of structural stability is an overarching question for peace and security to avoid getting into or going back to violent conflict. If one takes the wider view on both areas, it becomes even clearer that human rights-promoting policies and peace-building policies go hand in hand towards sustaining peace. To focus on one set of policies without the other is at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive. Both fields focus on empowerment, equality, participation and inclusion and reinforce each other and development. This appears to be a solid base on which to further build co-operation. In the final report, the relationship between the Triple Nexus and the four pillars will be analysed. Such an approach recognises the equal roles that the pillars have in resolving conflict and maintaining peace. The study will ensure that this balanced approach is reflected in the analysis.

A key question remains what normative and institutional frameworks provide the most robust means for synthesizing the work of the various agencies under the four pillars. A review of the policy framework under the relevant regional documents, such as the AU-UN cooperation frameworks, UN-AU Peace and Security Framework, AU-UN Development Framework, Draft AU-UN Human Rights Framework, and AU-OCHA MOU on Humanitarian Action reveals the normative and institutional priorities that are required in order to efficiently deliver the interlinkages.5

Bearing in mind that sustainably addressing the challenges posed by development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian action are neither sequential nor compartmentalized, especially not in states affected by conflict, this study therefore centres the analysis of the key issues, challenges and opportunities, modalities and tools for harnessing the interlinkages on the gaps that hampered the effective delivery of the Triple Nexus by enhancing the integrative role of the human rights pillar with a view towards a more coherent and complimentary governance frameworks both from its institutional and normative guises.6 In this regard, it is pertinent to note that all member states in the Southern Africa sub-region are parties to the African Charter and are therefore bound by regional human rights

---

5 ECA, 2016. Human and Economic Cost of Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Implications for a Transformative and Inclusive Post-Conflict Development

mechanisms. Coupled with this fact, the recent articulation of overarching policies on human rights and sustainable development by the core Southern African RECs which complement the policy frameworks set by the African Union and at the UN level, present an opportunity to reframe the coherence and sustainability aspects of action in a comprehensive and more integrated way. A revised conceptual model of the nexus would therefore locate the four pillars as an encompassing base that provides both institutional as well as normative support to the interlinkages with a view to conflict resolution as the ultimate goal. In particular, it is critical that governance structures within states and within institutions within the subregion are enabled to deliver coherent and complimentary action towards conflict resolution.

Figure 2: Four-pillar interlinkages

This study builds on the practice and application of Triple Nexus by Southern African states, sub-regional and regional institutions in their peace and security, humanitarian and development mandates with a view to building on the experiences of the Triple Nexus with a fourth crucial pillar: human rights. Whilst paying due regard to the four AU-UN cooperation frameworks, these understandings will be supplemented by lessons of the Nexus’ application in other subregions and other parts of the world through analysis of cross-cutting governance issues which are evaluated through their normative and institutional functions. This addition to Nexus thinking is crucial because it recognizes the interlinkages between development, peace security, human rights and the humanitarian pillars. Evidence from various protracted crises in the Southern African region shows that development cannot happen when there is no peace, and without development peace is precarious, whilst without respect for human rights, it is unlikely that the peace and security necessary for development will be achieved.

---

1.3.4 Methodology

The study is informed by primary data and information obtained through a questionnaire survey, and secondary data and information obtained mainly from desk reviews of relevant documents, including, but not limited to those pertaining to the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars and their interlinkages, with particular attention paid to regional and subregional development frameworks and priorities, including Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the UN-AU Peace and Security Framework, the AU-UN Development Framework, the UN-AU Human Rights Framework, the MOU between the UN and AUC on Humanitarian Action, the guiding and operational frameworks and mechanisms related to the pillars and COVID-19 reports and publications relevant to the assignment.

Furthermore, it is crucial that in addition to lessons drawn from other subregions of Africa and parts of the world, sub-regional perspectives and experiences from Southern Africa are prioritized to ensure that recommendations from the report are grounded within the context and background of the subregion and that they enjoy the support of key stakeholders within the sub-region right from the inception. The study will therefore ensure these outcomes by maintaining collaborative approaches throughout the steps described below.

Finally, a study focused on articulating more collaborative and integrated working must engage a wide-ranging set of stakeholders. Southern Africa region member states and subregional institutions such as the RECs, NEPAD and other agencies have had experience in applying the Triple Nexus approach. Further, a number of countries within the region, such as Angola, DRC and Mozambique have had experiences in the transitions from conflict, towards sustainable peace, security and development. The participation of these stakeholders in the preparation of this report was key in ensuring a bottom-up approach and is critical in ensuring ownership of the outcomes and recommendations, whilst maintaining the primacy of the coordinating and integrative role of international mechanisms and frameworks.

The study therefore combines robust desk-based reviews, a comprehensive survey and the definition of case studies that engage multilevel policy and governance structures alongside the perspectives of multiple stakeholders identified in consultation with the Commission. The production of these resources will involve close consultation with other consultants from the sub-regions. These key aspects of the methodology are outlined below.

1.3.5 Literature review

A comprehensive review of the literature was undertaken to establish the state of the art in relation to the interlinkages between development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars in southern Africa. The literature review identified the challenges and opportunities, modalities and tools for harnessing interlinkages. Key primary documents that form the legal and policy framework for member states selected from the Southern Africa subregion were examined alongside material from subregional, regional and international institutions including but not limited to COMESA, SADC, the AU and was analysed alongside commentary from secondary
analysis. This stage of the analysis is crucial as it lays the baseline and conceptual framework as well as setting the context for the questionnaire survey.

1.3.6 Questionnaire survey

A questionnaire designed in consultation with the ECA Southern Africa subregional office provided better context for the issues raised by the TOR, particularly by highlighting the specialties of the Southern Africa region including raising key capacity development challenges and opportunities, particularly those that flow out of the Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, taking into account the four AU-UN cooperation frameworks. For better fit, the survey instrument was adapted depending on the informant whether they were an official of a member state or an office of a subregional institution etc. Such an iterative and adaptive process ensured that relevant information is obtained.

1.3.7 Case studies

Alongside the above approaches, the study utilises a case study approach and describes at least two case studies drawn from the subregion. These case studies were selected in consultation with the ECA Subregional Office for Southern Africa based on criteria emerging from the subregional survey ensuring that the themes sought to be examined by this study were present. Thus, the general questions outlined in the conceptual analysis above were used to include or exclude countries from the case study selection. In particular, the study identifies and analyses issues of a transboundary nature relevant to coherent and joined up responses to conflicts across the various subregions and Africa as a whole.

1.3.8 Consultations and collaborative approaches

Consultations with key regional stakeholders on early drafts and recommendations formed a key part of establishing ownership. Due to the ongoing COVID_19 pandemic, these consultations took place over digital platforms. Stakeholders consulted included the Southern Africa RECs, selected member States, Relevant African Union Commission (AUC) Departments, AUDA-NEPAD, APRM and other relevant AU organs and agencies. Furthermore, given the reports contribution to a unified Africa region study, it is important to include in the methodology a structured programme of review involving the sub-regional consultants. This ensures consistency with the analytical base established by the TORs. In this regard, regular digital consultations with the other consultants for methodological and analytical discussion will be scheduled. This collaboration will include peer review of the report, will incorporate adjustments to the conceptual framework following consultation, and provision of support to the validation process, including the validation meeting and finalization of the report.
1.4 The state of development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian action in the sub region, interfaces with other sub regions, transboundary issues and implications for regional responses

1.4.1 Overview
Although Southern Africa has seen the cessation of inter-state armed and violent conflicts the region is not immune to challenges to peace and security, armed conflict, political crises, democracy and governance deficits are still pressing concerns. Ongoing violent conflict in northern Mozambique and repeating cycles of xenophobia and violence in South Africa as well as governance deficits in countries like Madagascar and Zimbabwe and increasingly in Zambia pose ongoing threats. Additionally, uneven development benefits which have seen increased poverty in the face of abundant natural resources continue to fuel instability and humanitarian crises. These dynamics in turn have led to an increasing democracy and human rights deficit across a number of states.

1.4.2 Isolated armed insurgencies
While Southern Africa has gradually emerged from the large-scale wars that, in some instances, dated back to the Cold War and the apartheid era, the region continues to be plagued by isolated armed conflicts that have their roots in the region’s violent colonial and post-colonial past. In contrast to the intertwined anti-colonial wars against white minority regimes in the Cold War era and the Congo wars that involved external belligerents, contemporary conflicts in Southern Africa are overwhelmingly national rather than international. Aside from the ongoing war against armed groups in eastern DRC, in recent years smaller armed conflicts have flared up again in both Mozambique and Angola. Mozambican Renamo rebels took up arms in 2012 and, although they lacked the military capacity to rekindle a civil war, they did attack government troops and transport routes, creating economic disruption and insecurity. Driven by the rebel leader’s political ambitions and the social grievances of marginalised fighters, the insurgency compelled the country’s government to concede territorial autonomy, political privileges and economic benefits. A truce halted the violence and the death of the long-standing Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, provided an opportunity for a meaningful peace process. But this peace dividend has not lasted long with an Islamist insurgency emerging in the northern Cabo Delgado Province. Since 2019, the Ahlu Sunna wa Jama (ASWJ) insurgency in northern Mozambique has increased its warfighting capacity, while the government has continued to rely on the use of force as its counterinsurgency strategy. At the same time, the humanitarian situation continues to decline, and civilians find themselves caught between two armed actors who have shown little regard for human rights. Between January and October 2020, ASWJ launched an estimated 395 attacks, double the number it conducted during the same period last year, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). The quality of these operations has improved significantly, as the group has shifted from attacks against isolated villages to ambushes against Mozambican security forces and sophisticated attacks against district capitals. ASWJ has been strategic in its targets and priorities, taking control of primary transportation routes, destroying infrastructure, and clearing civilians from its areas of operation. ASWJ has also
tightened control of the Mocimboa da Praia port, which it captured in August, increasing its maritime operations and attacking islands off Cabo Delgado’s coast that had served as a refuge for civilians fleeing the conflict. The conflict has also taken on transboundary attributes. In October 2020, the ASWJ extended its operations into southern Tanzania, publishing videos of its attack against police and civilian infrastructure and criticizing Tanzanian president John Magufuli. ASWJ’s ability to operate simultaneously in multiple areas suggests the group has grown its number of core fighters, likely using familial and social networks, kidnappings, and financial incentives to fill its ranks. Meanwhile in Angola, a low-level conflict which has been part of a long-standing separatist struggle continues to fuel conflict and insecurity in the country’s oil-rich province Cabinda. Throughout 2020, armed insurgents launched a series of attacks on government troops in the Cabinda province and disrupted extractive activities. The enduring low-level insurgency arguably does not have the potential to destabilise the central state, but it has led the Angolan government to maintain tight security in Cabinda and indeed the country for the last two decades.

1.4.3 Crises of governance

The most acute crises in Southern Africa states in the past 10 years have been sparked by issues of governance, including electoral stalemate, authoritarian rule, government unaccountability and the abuse of state resources in a bid to hold onto power. Constitutional crises resulting from the undermining of democratic institutions by authoritarian regimes and the military have been temporarily contained by the formation of transitional governments in Zimbabwe, Madagascar and the DRC. But the enduring crisis of governance in Zimbabwe recently prompted the military to take a decisive role in deposing President Mugabe, who had served a leader since independence. Elections in Malawi and Tanzania were fiercely contested and the DRC’s transition between presidential terms is showing signs of strains and threatening constitutional order. Meanwhile Eswatini remains an absolute monarchy with severe governance deficits, and Lesotho continues to suffer from political instability and military interference in civilian politics. Governance deficits, political conflict and electoral violence even affect the consolidated democracy of South Africa, as well as otherwise peaceful states like Zambia. The prevailing political culture in many Southern African countries, shaped by decades of war and often dominated by former liberation armies, leaves little scope for political competition and a resultant democratic and human rights deficit. Whilst it is certainly true that democracy is neither a guarantee of nor a prerequisite for peace and stability; however, over the past two decades the democratic deficit, poor governance and lack of accountability in even some of the most democratic Southern African states have resulted in a range of intrastate crises, covering elections, change of government, mismanagement of public affairs and disregard for citizens’ human rights. Governance deficits may therefore be said to constitute the most immediate threat to peace and security, development and human rights in Southern Africa.
1.4.4 Socio-economic development deficit

Southern Africa has some of the world’s most unequal societies, with enormous social cleavages that were forged by settler colonialism and racial segregation, but that have persisted in the post-colonial period. Given this, it is unsurprising that socio-economic grievances should not only impinge on human security, but also represent a formidable challenge to peace and stability in the region over the longer term. In virtually every SADC country, vast swathes of the population continue to subsist below the national poverty line. Investments in human capital and the creation of economic opportunities have been impeded by sluggish growth rates, and over the past decade unemployment has risen steadily across much of the region impact the youth and women more significantly. Some 34.2 percent of the population of Southern Africa is below the age of 25, and that proportion is growing rapidly. In the absence of improved economic and educational opportunities, the region is likely to experience more social unrest in the foreseeable future. In South Africa, lack of economic opportunities has sustained social protests that have been fuelled by extreme inequality have often turned violent and xenophobic in the last ten years. Meanwhile, in Angola, rampant inequality and the flagrant accumulation of wealth by the ruling elite have triggered youth protests against the government, which has responded with violence and repression. Similarly, in Zimbabwe economic despair and frustration with a complacent and corrupt government has sparked a wave of social media-driven protest in 2019. In Mozambique, economic grievances and a feeling of marginalisation have led to social unrest in the capital and have allowed political entrepreneurs to mobilise fighters for the Renamo rebellion and the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Meanwhile several consecutive years of drought and extreme weather conditions – phenomena that are likely to become more frequent, owing to climate change – have exposed vulnerable communities to acute food shortages.

1.4.5 Southern Africa’s peace and security institutions

Southern African RECs have set in place institutional processes to manage conflict. For example, in addition to the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, that was incorporated into its framework in 1996, SADC has created a set of institutions that – together with structures of the AU and other regional economic communities – form part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The development of SADC’s peace and security institutions is continuing to evolve. In the past decade, SADC has taken part in a number of crisis interventions and its track record in promoting the peace and security, development and the democratic principles that are enshrined in its founding documents has increased. Institutions enshrined in the SADC Treaty designed to protect citizens’ rights against arbitrary rule such as the Parliamentary Forum and the SADC Tribunal are still searching for a coherent mission. However, some progress has been made on election management, the establishment of a mediation infrastructure, SADC’s peace-keeping and early-warning capacities, and the regional coordination of policing and fighting crime. Additionally, the COMESA the Governance Peace and Security (GPS) Programme has produced impactful interventions on the interlinked areas of capacity for governance, conflict prevention, conflict management, security
and peace building interventions. However, despite these successes, it is clear also that there remain some pressing challenges to peace and security.
1.5 **Key issues pertaining to the synergistic and complementary implementation of interventions aimed at addressing peace and security, human rights, humanitarian and development situations in the sub region, taking into account gender and youth issues and the UN-AU Cooperation frameworks**

This chapter will highlight the interlinkages between the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars in the Southern Africa region with a view to articulating the challenges and opportunities for more synergistic and integrated and deeper collaborative working as they relate to conflict situations. It will accomplish this by outlining the methodologies that utilize practical tools to integrate the four pillars. In doing so, it will examine how UN, AU, COMESA and SADC legal, policy and institutional frameworks, and the AU-UN cooperation frameworks could be leveraged to contribute to achieve a reflexive and better integrated ways of working by harnessing the interlinkages in the search for effective and lasting solutions to conflicts in the subregion.

Existing international and regional agreements provide the foundation for delivering improved coherence through inter-linkages for conflict prevention and resolution. This chapter will demonstrate how a better understanding of the pillars adds value to these approaches.

The analysis in this chapter will mainstream gender and youth issues as relate to complementary and synergistic implementation of the four pillars and conflict prevention and resolutions. The results of the survey will also be incorporated in this and other chapters.

This chapter focuses on the data surrounding the interlinkages between development situations, peace and security, humanitarian action and human rights. It utilises the data gathered from the survey conducted in Southern Africa and zeroes in on the key issues pertaining to the synergistic and complementary implementation of interventions aimed at addressing the integrated approach.

### 1.5.1 Threats to peace and security

According to the data collected, the main challenges for Southern Africa with regards to peace and security are manifold, with most pressing problems ranging from unemployment to greed/corruption/mismanagement, inequality/injustice, violent crimes, and land conflict.
These findings align with the situation prescribed under 1.3 of this report. As can be seen in the subsequent graph, the issue of unemployment is a challenge faced by all countries to on a nearly similar scale. According to Southern Africa Economic Outlook 2020 “Coping with the COVID-19 pandemic” published by the African Development Bank “Southern Africa has the highest unemployment levels, averaging 12.5 percent between 2011 and 2019, followed by North Africa averaging 11.8 percent over the same period”.\(^8\) It is especially striking that youth unemployment remains high with nine countries experiencing “double-digit youth unemployment levels, with the worst-affected countries being South Africa (53.2 percent), Eswatini (47.4 percent), Namibia (44.8 percent), Botswana (37.5 percent), and Lesotho (33 percent)”\(^9\).  

1.5.1.1 Special focus: Land conflict

Figure 4: What are the threats to peace and security in your country and subregion? (as per country)

When looking more closely at the issue of land conflict, it can be seen that it is most of concern in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and South Africa. Therefore, two of these countries will be observed more closely.
While the issue of allocation of land has been present for example in Namibia for years, it grew more visible especially during the last years with political leaders and civil society rallying for a sped-up process. Led by the Affirmative Repositioning (AR) movement, which was formed in 2014, especially youth pushed for a more equal distribution of land and thereby economic welfare. With more than 50,000 applications for the allocation of land in a country of 2 million people, the movement conducted one of the biggest mass demonstrations in the history of the country. As Job Amupanda, the leader of the AR movement, now has become the mayor of Windhoek at the end of November 2016, the issue of land distribution and potential conflict remains of vital importance for the country.

For the situation in Zimbabwe, it must be recalled that the Zimbabwean government formally announced the “Fast track land reform programme” (FTLRP) in 2000, officially launching it in April 2001. The stated goal was for the state to acquire land which was then to be redistributed to poor and middle-income landless black Zimbabweans. This was to be done by acquiring “not less than 8.3 million hectares from the large-scale commercial farming sector for redistribution (an increase from the five million hectares stated in 1998)”. While initial progress was made, the issue is far from being resolved, as supported by the findings of the survey conducted in support of this report.

1.5.1.2 Special focus: Xenophobia

While most of the issues currently harming the peace and security situation are prevalent to various degrees in all countries of the sub region, xenophobia is especially problematic in South Africa with 85.71% of respondents seeing it as a threat to peace and security, as well as to a smaller percentage in Zambia and Zimbabwe. According to a 2020 report by NGO Human Rights Watch, even though the South African government launched its National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance back in March 2019, xenophobic attacks on non-nationals have remained high. Reportedly, these attacks not only have been planned and conducted by mobs of private persons but as well by armed police forces, using counterfeit goods raids as a “cover for xenophobic harassment and attacks”.10 This finding is supported by the 2019 Concluding observations on the second periodic report of South Africa of the Committee against Torture.11 In 2017, xenophobic resentments were supported by official remarks of then-Deputy Minister of Police of South Africa Bongani Mkongi, claiming that the country cannot “surrender to foreign nationals” and that the presence of foreign “businesses […] is an economic sabotage against our people”.12

Besides these areas of special concern, 53% of the respondents stated that the perceived level of conflict is increasing in their respective community our country.

---

11 UN 2019, CAT/C/ZAF/CO/2, pp. 10-11.
12 https://twitter.com/thesignalng/status/1168650989219586048
Figure 6: Is conflict increasing, decreasing or remaining the same in your community or country? (all answers)

However, when comparing the situation in the different countries of the sub region, stark differences can be seen: While the conflict situation in Zambia and Namibia seems to relax, participants from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa and Malawi experience a growing fear of conflict intensification.

Figure 7: Is conflict increasing, decreasing or remaining the same in your community or country? (as per country)

1.5.2 The situation with regards to development

When shifting the focus to the status of development in the countries of Southern Africa, 40,6% of respondents estimate the level of development in their country or community as medium, while another 36,2% rate it as low.
Figure 8: How do you rate the level of development in your community or country? (Sub region)

These views can be supported by the respective Human Development Indices for Southern African countries.

Figure 9: Human Development Index in Southern Africa; Source: AfDB Southern Africa Economic Outlook 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2019 HDI</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>2010-19 growth rate (%)</th>
<th>2018 IHDI</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>0.796</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>0.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>0.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td>0.641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé &amp; Príncipe</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>0.606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>0.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>0.751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, the issues of corruption and unemployment range among the most pressing hurdles preventing development in the Southern Africa, highlighting the crosscutting nature of these issues not only for peace and security as already shown above but also for development.
1.5.3 The human rights situation

When asked about the level of respect for human rights in the respondents’ respective communities and countries, 55.9% of the answers rated the human rights situation as medium, with the remaining half split between and high and (very) low.

Regarding the different threats to human rights in Southern Africa, the respondents fear a lack of accountability, poverty, the weak enforcement of laws and weak governance the most. With human rights under pressure in various countries in Southern Africa, the aforementioned threats can be highlighted by different ongoing human rights crises in the region. In November 2020 alone, tensions grew in several countries, with opposition politicians fleeing from Tanzania, violent oppression of demonstrations in Angola, an increasing offensive by Islamist militants in Mozambique and arrest of investigative journalists in Zimbabwe, among others.
Figure 12: What are the threats to human rights in your community or country? (Sub region)

1.5.4 Findings on the humanitarian situation

Figure 13: How do you rate the effectiveness of humanitarian programmes in your country? (Sub region)

Figure 14: What are the risks to humanitarian protection in your community or country? (Sub region)
1.5.5 Perspectives on interlinkages

The data shows that all respondents see (strong) interlinkages between the four areas of focus discussed in this report. When connecting human rights to each of the areas of the Triple Nexus individually, the rates of approval remain high, with 50.7% strongly agreeing that strong protection of human rights compliments peace and security, compared to 52.2% in connection with sustainable development and 49.3% for humanitarian support. The remaining percentage of 49.3% (peace and security), 47.8% (sustainable development) and 50.7% (humanitarian support) respectively is agreeing to the questions posed.

Figure 15: Do you agree there are interlinkages among development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars? (Sub region)

In a recent statement, the NGO Amnesty International also highlighted the interlinkages between the different pillars of the Triple Nexus and human rights, emphasizing the close ties between peace and security and human rights as well as between socio-economic development and human rights.13

---

1.6 Challenges, and opportunities for harnessing the interlinkages between the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars, taking into account the COVID-19 pandemic

1.6.1 Overview

An enhanced approach to implementing the interlinkages between the four pillars shows huge theoretical possibilities. However, the path to practical realisation is not as straightforward. A key reason for this is that single or limited mandate institutions that are mandated to work in four pillars’ respective fields have focused on their immediate brief, for many good reasons. Firstly, the normative frameworks that structure their work necessarily constrains the freedom to work across and apply the interlinkages. Secondly, the relevant institutional processes do not avail themselves to deeper integration. Finally, the skills needed to reduce silo-isation of conflict and peace work are still developing and yet not fully realised. Even in multi-mandate institutions such as the subregional RECs or other continental agencies, connected working is not the norm across different entities or departments entrusted with different but interlinked briefs. This means that various actors need to take a host of changes across these domains of operational competence in order to realise the full potential of the interlinkages. This chapter focuses on the challenges and opportunities that are apparent in the normative and institutional frameworks as well as the overall skills and human resource interfaces.

1.6.2 Understanding the normative frameworks available to key actors in Southern Africa

The core of the normative framework for the four pillar interlinkages in the Southern Africa subregion is principally based on several AU and UN key documents. These include Agenda 2030, Agenda 2063, the UN-AU Peace and Security Frameworks, the AU-UN Development Framework, the AU-UNOCHA MOU on Humanitarian Action, the UN Agenda for Humanity with its New Way of Working and the draft AU-UN Human Rights Framework. Since its adoption in 2015, Agenda 2030 has sought to better integrate the different aspects of the SDGs. Agenda 2030 articulate a comprehensive plan to achieve a number of interlinked goals spanning development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars. The Action Plan behind the Agenda is therefore a useful framework for basing the practical implementation of the enhanced interlinkages approach. However, the absence of explicit silo-breaking approaches became evident soon after the promulgation of Agenda 2030 hence the urgent attempts made to transcend the peace-humanitarian-development divide, when the United Nations adopted the Agenda for Humanity with its NWOW during the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. It aims at upholding the principles of humanitarian work while simultaneously removing unnecessary boundaries between the humanitarian and the development field. Whereas this must be acknowledged as a step forward, a comprehensive normative basis for interlinked approaches must still be articulated from an interpretive application of these frameworks. Both Agenda 203 and Agenda for Humanity and their Action Plans offer a good starting point.

Complementing the global structures is the AU’s seminal framework for development which seeks to achieve its vision of a future-fit, sustainable African continent: Agenda 2063: By far the most comprehensive consolidated sustainable development plan of the AU. Covering a wide range of areas, Agenda 2063 offers a
strong normative impetus to the interlinkages but this time with appropriate regional emphasis. Given the similar overall goals of both agendas, the AU and UN signed the AU-UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda, generally called the AU-UN Development Framework. This joint framework document is planned to guide the cooperation between the AU and the UN, aimed at promoting inclusive growth for Africa’s sustainable development and transformation. This includes joint activities and programmes to effectively implement, track and monitor Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda. It is clear that these normative imperatives have spurred on the development of the AU-UN collaborative frameworks. However, given the complexities of negotiations and most importantly the long timeframe associated with the AU-UN Development Framework, an enhanced interlinkages approach will require a dramatic shift in how collaboration has been conducted by these institutions including the normative terms of such cooperation.

Finally, the cooperation frameworks between the AU and RECs offer a steppingstone for transmitting the AU-UN modes of cooperation to the Southern Africa subregional organisations and to enable the operationalisation of the interlinkages in their multi-mandate work. Recalling chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the clear standing of subregional organisations within the AU normative frameworks, it is clear that lessons garnered from global-regional normative development have the potential for coherence at the subregional level. However, the lack of specificity will continue to pose a challenge in this regard. It is crucial that efforts are made in this regard to articulate definitive normative frameworks that encourage enhanced collaboration across the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian domains.

1.6.3 Mandate-focused institutions make for a challenging institutional framework

The limitations that are apparent at the normative level also appear at the level of institutional operations. Even with a permissive and enabling framework of rules, an enhanced interlinkages approach must be channelled through the applicable institutional framework. For a significant number of international and regional actors working in the subregion alongside member states, it is the case that the focus on single mission, or urgent priorities prevents an expansive consideration of interconnectedness between the linkages. In order to change ways of working, it is critical that a key understanding of the institutional frameworks available for enhanced collaboration is developed in order to understand where the opportunities for better coordination lie. This requires all partners both state and non-state to invest in cross-institutional learning and exchange to make the community as a whole more apt to answer current and future challenges within the areas of work of the interlinkages. To enable this process, it remains vital to establish the budgetary prerequisites on a cross-institutional level, eventually helping all actors to improve their understanding of all parts of the interlinkages as well as their ability to better connect their respective field of work with other relevant players in the sub region. In this regard, it must be highlighted that the current trends of cooperation between the organisations provides for a promising starting point as institutions are already showing more interest and are investing in more integrated, long lasting and complementary cooperation. This must be deepened in the future. However, even more commitment to this process is needed to make the enhanced interlinkages approach a reality.
Finally, while many people working within the different organisations are experts in their respective field of work, they are not yet sufficiently prepared and trained to work across the entire spectrum of the enhanced interlinkages approach. This study report however does not argue that a complete reskilling of various experts is needed, let alone favoured. This point is made to highlight the need for deeper collaboration and coordination, this time on the side of staff.
1.7  Methodologies and tools for harnessing the interlinkages and promoting complementary implementation and approaches, and associated capacity building needs

1.7.1  Overview

The analysis of the interlinkages between development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars demonstrates the urgent need for linked thinking between the four pillars. This chapter introduces the methodologies and tools for harnessing the interlinkages and promoting collaborative and complementary approaches with a view to entrenching better coordination amongst stakeholders. This chapter presents both conceptual and practical tools for undertaking such coordination. It utilises grounded data from responses during expert interviews as well as the free text forms from the survey participants. The questions for the expert structured interviews were based on the results of survey questionnaire which provided focus on institutional responses to the application of the interlinkages in Southern Africa. The following analysis presents options that potential beneficiaries of the study consider useful in bringing coherence and collaborative working in the implementation of the pillars.

1.7.2  Developing institutional resources for delivering the interlinkages

What the previous chapters demonstrate is that an interlinked approach will necessarily require some ‘new ways of working’ especially in relation to collaboration, learning and knowledge exchange, skills development and inclusion

1.7.2.1 Build on, strengthen, and adapt the existing collaborative and coordination mechanisms, partnerships, and plans between the interlinkages rather than create new ones;

The new focused approach envisaged under the new interlinkages approach has the potential to bring together subregional, regional, UN agencies and other actors together to develop quick and coherent responses that meet immediate needs and address systemic challenges concomitantly with a focus on conflict prevention as the ultimate goal. A number of joint programming frameworks, working groups, and task forces have already been established in Southern Africa, particularly in countries affected by crises to develop whole-of-system approaches and responses; and can easily be adapted to incorporate a four pillar interlinkages approach

For example, in Mozambique, the multi-agency Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster is coordinating humanitarian assistance for the complex humanitarian situation developing in the country’s northern Cabo Delgado Province with the leadership of the Government of Mozambique’s National Institute of Disaster Management. These actions are following a long-agreed Humanitarian Action Plan that has been operational since 2016. This platform has brought together humanitarian and development actors into a single coherent plan to address the impacts of multiple cyclones that have hit the northern provinces including Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado. Whilst the interlinkages approach brings into
sharp relief the focus on human rights, it is clear that institutional structures that have enabled impactful coordination must be maintained and indeed made more robust.

1.7.2.2 Upscaling opportunities for collaboration and sharing organisational capacity

Staff should not be called upon to become experts across all the four pillars of the interlinkages, especially in contexts that are already challenging to recruit for. However, an interlinked approach does require organisations, including RECs, UN agencies and others to step out of their comfort zone and work across different disciplines. The RECs, the AU and the UN need to support capacity-sharing, cross-learning and upskilling to ensure that staff and partners are able to deliver. The principles, language and interests of technical teams need to be brought together for collaborative co-production, while not subsuming the distinct standalone benefits of each technical area. This also means adapting operational practice: the need to deliver development outcomes in humanitarian contexts means that business support functions need to work even more closely with programmes, so that critical patterns in seasons and access constraints are not missed, and accurate financial reporting is delivered on time. Management and operational practices need to be reviewed to support collaboration between teams. This will require a shift in culture and mindsets, adapting business support processes for travel and cost recovery, joint workplans and changing who is included in strategy development meetings.

1.7.2.3 Leveraging the sub-regional institutional and inter-agency collaborative platform and issue-based coalitions for policy advice, cross-country exchange of experiences in the application of the interlinkages between the four pillars.

A Southern Africa subregional focused coalition on the interlinkages between development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars has the potential to drive innovation in the way the interlinkages are operationalised. There are already structures that could support the formation of such a coalition including regional coordination hubs such as OCHA ROSA. More importantly, the capacity of such coalitions serving as regional platforms for south-south exchange of knowledge and good practices is high and creates spaces for provision of timely and quality advice to member states, subregional institutions and other partners in the quest to produce response interventions that are inclusive.

1.7.2.4 Building holistic and integrated contextual analysis that is based on shared vision, collaborative approaches and continually reflexive learning

To properly understand the operational needs for the deployment of the four pillar interlinkages approach, a comprehensive and unified multi-sectoral assessment methodology is needed at an organisational level. Beyond the immediate programme location, analysis should take into account the broader institutional and resource implications of this approach with a view to establishing principled humanitarian action and long-term basis for sustainable development. Additionally, there needs to be a mechanism to share, track and enhance knowledge across different areas of practice including development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian
pillars. This means a move away from siloed specialist tools at an organisational level, in favour of joint data collection and a ‘living’ analysis of the context that includes cross-cutting gender, youth, protection and conflict-sensitivity issues. This requires information-sharing, cross-fertilization of findings and the co-habitation of interventions, geographically, by organisations (or departments within organisations) delivering across the four pillar interlinkages, to build a holistic programme strategy based on high-quality analysis. Those affected by crises should participate in such approaches to ensure locally-led contextualised knowledge is used to inform programme design. This helps ensure effectiveness and strengthen the sustainability of interventions. While joint assessments, tools and data collection are important at an organisational level for multi-mandated organizations bringing together different teams, at a response level, it may sometimes be necessary to maintain independent humanitarian assessment to ensure that the needs of the most marginalized groups are tackled. It is also important to find ways of sharing analyses with donors and other stakeholders to build a shared vision, a more integrated and complementary approach, and strong accountability and feedback mechanisms.

1.7.2.5 Continually investing in skills development and investment in adaptive management

To be efficient and effective, programmes need to be agile and responsive to changes in context. Flexibility in activities, budget lines, implementation schedules, indicator measurements and objectives will boost programme quality and ensure that multi-mandated organisations such as the RECs continue to target the most vulnerable people with appropriate interventions. This requires bringing in new skills and leveraging existing knowledge and expertise for innovation; building unified monitoring systems; and applying learning in real time. Monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning frameworks that assess programmes’ impact on drivers of fragility and vulnerability over time will need to operate beyond project timeframes. It is clear that the approaches required by the interlinkages demand more but more collaboration should in the long run spread the burden and allow upskilling.

1.7.2.6 Centring on the inclusion of women and youth in peace-making and peacebuilding planning

Amongst these groups, special attention needs to be given to those who are particularly vulnerable such as female heads of households, and disadvantaged groups such as unemployed youth, and people with disability. Sub-regional institutions must leverage on the wealth of experience and good practices under the sub-regional and AU frameworks in designing programmes that specifically target these groups as well as mainstreaming them across all interventions.
1.8 Conclusions and recommendations

This chapter outlines robust and action-oriented recommendations at various levels (including member States; RECs; AUC and other AU organs and agencies) that are based on the findings of the study.
1.9 Bibliography

1.9.1 UN documents

- UN Secretary-General (2020). Youth and peace and security: report of the Secretary-General, 1-16 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3855975?ln=en

1.9.2 AU documents


1.9.3 SADC documents

- SADC Common Agenda (article 5 of the Treaty). Available at https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-common-agenda/

1.9.4 General literature


ECA, 2016. Human and Economic Cost of Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Implications for a Transformative and Inclusive Post-Conflict Development

- Khadiagala, Gilbert M. 2018. Regional Cooperation on Democratization and Conflict Management in Africa. © 2018 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.

  Available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/26889975?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents


