Study on the interlinkages between the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars in North Africa1

Stephen Commins, Draft Report

First draft, December 15, 2020

1 The study on the interlinkages between the four pillars in North Africa is guided by the terms of reference on the same and is intended to be coordinated with similar studies undertaken for Southern Africa; East Africa; West and Central Africa
I. Executive summary: (to be completed) This is an outline of what will be developed to provide a Guidance for the reader in the 2063 Agenda and the four pillars, the main discussion points around the case studies, as well as the design of the document.

Terms of Reference The goal of this report is to provide a robust study report on the interlinkages between the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars for the North Africa subregion aimed at promoting synergistic and complementary and joined-up implementation of interventions addressing peace and security, human rights, humanitarian and development situations in the subregion, and to contribute to effective and lasting solutions to conflict. Transboundary issues relevant to the study and transversal issues such as migration, displacement, as well as gender and youth issues which will inform the analysis have been incorporated into the study report.

The report will focus on the interlinkages of the Pillars: development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars with particular reference to the contexts in North Africa and with a wider set of linkages to the other subregions of the continent and related studies. The overall aim of this study is to address this knowledge gap by better understanding issues related to the four pillars as spelt out in the terms of reference for the present study with a view to identifying effective frameworks, mechanisms and eventual tools, e.g. for operational guidance, related to the complementary and synergistic implementation of interventions related to the four pillars for sustainable and lasting solutions to conflict at national and subregional levels, involving all relevant actors. In analyzing the interlinkages between the pillars and how they could inform solutions to conflict situations, the studies should explore how the existing normative frameworks could be implemented as part of the solutions.

The analytical framework is based on the Four pillars with the core problem of conflict. The first set of four cross-cutting frameworks set out a way of assessing the transversal relations with each of the four pillars functioning in two possible manners: one as the driver of changes in the other pillars, the other as a lens for analyzing the country context through the pillars.

The second framework provides the integrated graphic of how the pillars inter-relate with each other in a dynamic situation. The central element of the dynamic framework will be conflict. In any case, the central element represents the optimal outcomes of the relationship between the four pillars in a country context, contributing to durable solutions to conflict.

Elaborating the four pillars and conflict/violent conflict, the case studies and transversal factors

Conflict and violent conflict Conflict and violence or ‘violent conflict’ are distinct but closely related issues. Conflict is part of all societies at all levels, from household to state. There are many instances when conflict over resources, norms, access to power, is negatively resolved without violence but leads to exclusion. For Example,
in education, this could involve deliberate mistreatment of indigenous children, instruction in the language of a dominant identity group, or preferential advantages to children from more powerful groups.

*The concept of conflict is distinct from violence* because all household, community, societal, state, and interstate relations involve aspects of conflict. A conflict requires some type of dispute or disagreement, which occurs daily in all societies but which is usually resolved nonviolently due to social norms, community norms, and political or other—religious, traditional ethnic, patronage—institutions. Conflict is often a constructive element of a dynamic society, but it becomes destructive when the parties to a conflict resort to violent means to advance their goals or cause. Over time, conflict resolution requires not only a reduction in the use of violence, but above all a dissolution of the underlying incompatibility so that the conflict cannot erupt into violence again.

Three Case studies, Libya, Mauritania and Sudan are utilized to support the analysis of the four pillars with conflict as the central intersection of the pillars. The cases validate the four pillars analytical framework, with conflict as the central element. Three elements are added as transversal dynamics based on the cases and on providing a further set of insights into the contextual situation of the four pillars at national and sub-national levels.

Spatiality: Different forms of planning and practice tend to be aspatial and static. However, people and societies are structured around a range of socio-spatial connections. A few of these connections and the potential factors of change are outlined below as an opening approach to identifying the multiple aspects of spatial processes: Sub-national; Borderlands; Transboundary; Migration; Urbanization

Temporality: climate change and seasonality.

Exit, voice and loyalty: may be added as a third transversal element

Implications for the implementation of the 2063 Agenda as both a normative and operational framework around the four pillars are outlined, along with specific challenges facing Youth and Women.

Some of the obstacles and challenges for supporting countries in integrating the 2063 Agenda into national plans are also identified.

The mainstreaming of the four pillars around conflict in alignment with the 2063 Agenda are set out in the section on ‘structured collaboration’. The section on structured collaboration is the core of the recommendations and initial ideas on moving forward for both regional organizations and national governments in building from the four pillars framework and its operationalization across North Africa and for each country. A further table will be developed on structured collaboration in line with each and all of the pillars as well as the conflict central framing.

Appendices contain the summaries of the case studies plus mapping of HDI and violence.
II. Introduction, including the analytical framework;

The goal of this paper is to provide a study on the interlinkages between the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars for the North Africa subregion\(^8\) aimed at promoting synergistic and complementary and joined-up implementation of interventions addressing peace and security, human rights, humanitarian and development situations in the subregion, and to contribute to effective and lasting solutions to conflict. Transboundary issues relevant to the study and cross-cutting issues such as migration, displacement, as well as gender and youth issues which inform the cases that have been incorporated, as well as transversal factors such as spatial and temporal elements.

The report focuses on the interlinkages of the Pillars\(^9\): development\(^10\), peace and security\(^11\), human rights\(^12\) and humanitarian\(^13\) pillars with particular reference to the contexts in North Africa and with a wider set of linkages to the other subregions of the continent and related studies. The overall aim of this study is to address this knowledge gap by better understanding issues related to the four pillars as spelt out in the terms of reference for the present study with a view to identifying effective frameworks, mechanisms and eventual tools, e.g. for operational guidance, related to the complementary and synergistic implementation of interventions related to the four pillars for sustainable and lasting solutions to conflict at national and subregional levels, involving all relevant actors. In analyzing the interlinkages between the pillars and how they could inform solutions to conflict situations, the studies should explore how the existing normative frameworks could be implemented as part of the solutions.

The current study is being undertaken within the goals elaborated in framework documents including: Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as well as relevant frameworks for the North Africa subregion, taking into account the four AU-UN cooperation agreements, namely: the UN-AU Peace and Security Framework, the AU-UN Development Framework, the UN-AU Human Rights Framework, and the MOU between the UN and AUC on Humanitarian Action.

The dual resolutions passed by the General Assembly and the Security Council in April 2016 (Resolutions 70/262 and 2282) which recognize the importance of coherence and complementarity between the UN’s peace and security efforts and its development, human rights, and humanitarian work. Additionally, the United Nations Secretary General and the African Union Commission Chairperson have made a commitment to work together towards the implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in recognition of the nexus interrelationships between development, peace and security, human rights and development. The

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\(^8\) The countries within the North Africa region for this study include: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan

\(^9\) This is not a new question for African countries and organizations; NEPAD post conflict reconstruction policy 2005, (p. v) paragraph 7. There is a need to bring all the current strategic planning and funding processes together into one country level strategic framework so that the political, security, humanitarian and development aspects of the post-conflict reconstruction system are synchronized and coordinated...An overall strategic framework will assist in coordinating the constituent elements of the post-conflict reconstruction around a common country strategy

\(^10\) AU-UN Development Framework

\(^11\) Preventing and Mediating Conflict and Sustaining Peace; NEPAD, Post Conflict Reconstruction Policy; UN-AU Peace and Security Framework

\(^12\) African Charter on Human Rights, 1986

\(^13\) MOU between the UN and AUC on Humanitarian Action
reference to sustainable development in the context of the interlinkages should be informed by recent frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development and the AU Agenda 2063.

In that context, the two principals signed the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security (the Peace and Security Framework) and the African Union-United Nations Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the Development Framework). The Joint Human Rights Framework is expected to be signed soon. Furthermore, there exists an MOU between the UN and the AUC on Humanitarian Action.

The following section details the interlinkages between the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars from a practical and theoretical viewpoint and outlines an overarching analytical framework with conflict (to be elaborated with distinctions between conflict and violent conflict in the following section) at the center of the interlinkages of the four pillars. It will then build on the theoretical framing drawn from the conceptual framework of the pillars and the ways in which the interlinkages can inform systems and practices.

Conceptual and Analytical Framework:

There is no universal definition of the specific framework for bringing the four Pillars together. Trying to agree on a definition may not necessarily be a fruitful exercise, but greater clarity in terms of how their interlinkages could be harnessed to meet the objectives of the study will be helpful in moving ahead. As one case study noted, “The nexus is not intended to expand the work of all actors, but more coordination: Development actors should be coming in and filling gaps.”\(^{14}\) This coordination approach would benefit from the larger framing providing by the country and subregional assessments of the interlinkages.

A fundamental element of the framework is that it makes it possible to analyze the four pillars in relation to one another (taking into account, for example, their role in conflict prevention and resolution) with a view to promoting complementary and synergistic implementation. The conceptual framework should make it possible to link the results of the analysis to the implementation of the four AU-UN cooperation frameworks within the framework of subregional frameworks, Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda.

In bringing the four pillars together, it is possible to consider how different concepts, principles and operational procedures relate to one another across the four pillars. Through identifying the common threads, potential tensions between them, and mitigation measures for the tensions, it is then likely that policy and operational guidelines on working better together in addressing conflict situations.

One key element of the analytical framework that ensures a grounded and contextual approach is to link the main elements of the framework with the relevant regional documents, such as the AU-UN cooperation frameworks, UN-AU Peace and Security Framework, AU-UN Development Framework, Draft AU-UN Human Rights Framework, and AU-OCHA MOU on Humanitarian Action within the framework of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda. The proposed framework (below) will be utilized 1) to locate the overarching documents that are then mapped to specific parts of the framework, 2) guide the questionnaires/survey questions and 3) ensure that research is organized and structured for all the countries in the region.

\(^{14}\) Michael O’Brien, The challenges for the triple nexus approach to humanitarian assistance: A case study analysis, August 2020
The framework graphics first show how each of the four pillars have a transversal or cross-cutting relationship with the other pillars and then in another type of visual, how they may all relate to each other in a dynamic manner, and how they could be harnessed to contribute to conflict prevention and resolution. The framework allows for illustrating how and why the pillars approach provides a holistic and coherent approach for policy and programmatic approaches. At the same time, at the intersection of the four pillars cannot contain a focus on all four pillars simultaneously.

The dynamic graphic provides a view of the interactions among the four pillars and how these could be harnessed to contribute to efficient and lasting solutions to conflict in the subregion. Therefore, in addition to the four pillars, it is important to situate conflict in the framework as this is a key aspect of the overall objective. The dynamic framework embodies all of the pillars, but for the North Africa study, the central pillar as an organizing point is conflict which is the focal point of the interlinkages for the purposes of the present study, while ensuring that the interactions among all the pillars are addressed in relation to the conflict situations in the subregion.

Frameworks

The first set of four cross-cutting frameworks set out a way of assessing the transversal relations with each of the four pillars set out with each of the four pillars functioning in two possible manners: one as the driver of changes in the other pillars, the other as a lens for analyzing the country context through the pillars.

The second framework provides the integrated graphic of how the pillars inter-relate with each other in a dynamic situation. The central element of the dynamic framework will be conflict. In any case, the central element represents the optimal outcomes of the relationship between the four pillars in a country context, contributing to durable solutions to conflict.

A. Cross cutting frameworks:

**Peace and Security cross-cutting**

![Peace and Security Cross-Cutting Diagram](image1)

**Human rights cross-cutting**

![Human Rights Cross-Cutting Diagram](image2)

**Development cross-cutting**

![Development Cross-Cutting Diagram](image3)
Humanitarian cross-cutting

- Peace and security
- Development
- Human rights
B. Cross-cutting framework and conflict:
This framework of the links of all four pillars with a central goal or outcome of preventing, responding to and resolving conflict, which brings together the objective of the study in outcomes supporting efficient and lasting solutions to conflict. Conflict serves as the overarching organizing point, with the recognition that there is a need in each context to adequately address all pillars and their interactions: addressing conflict serves as a main intended outcome in line with the objectives.

In practice, for North Africa, the framework adapts to the context, so that it is possible to identify or bring out how each pillar supports the interlinkages in the sub-region, in this instance, how each of them, and how by harnessing their interlinkages, they can contribute to promoting durable solutions to conflict along with the other pillars. Governance and institutions will be addressed as overarching/crosscutting policy issues as they relate to the four pillars and their interlinkages in the search for durable solutions to conflicts.

This intersectional figure in the diagram above represents the centrality of conflict prevention and conflict resolution at the intersection of the four pillars.

Another way to visualize the conceptual framework is built upon the dynamics of the framework to allow for mapping of the interactions between the pillars as for iteration between the pillars as they feed into a core goal that has conflict at the center of the alignment and coherence. The utility of the two frameworks is that they can be used to analyze conflict situations or human rights tensions with equal flexibility.

The dynamic visual of the interlinkages supports conflict prevention, response and resolution as the center of the pillars, given the overall objective of the report, which is that the lasting solutions to the four pillars requires managing conflict situations including simmering tensions and violent conflict. With the understanding that all the pillars are interrelated, the need to harness their interlinkages for holistic and
coherent approaches to preventing and resolving conflicts is essential. This approach links well with the recent African Governance Report:15

5.1 Introduction There are many descriptions and definitions of peace. Generally, peace is a situation whereby wars and civil conflict are absent, but security prevails, usually in the context of a conducive environment for sustained social and political stability. The African Union considers that governance, peace and security are prerequisites for sustainable development. 5.2 The Interrelationship of Peace, Security and Governance Democratic governance, as well as peace and security, are complementary and essential to social economic development. They are interrelated, interdependent, and mutually reinforcing imperatives for continental integration and sustainable development. Hence, the Agenda 2063 Aspiration 4, which envisages a peaceful and secure Africa as fundamental to African progress.

The Four Pillars with conflict at the center

The Interviews and case studies pointed to the importance of clarity in terms of defining Conflict and Violent Conflict. These are linked but are not the same. The value of treating the four pillars equally includes identifying why conflict and violent conflict are distinct, because they inter-relate with each pillar differently. In the first review of the four-pillar framework, participants pointed out that the manifestation of conflict was not necessarily through violence. Sometime conflict can manifest in tensions caused by several factors, including inequality, exclusion and resource stress due to climate change. Indeed, one reason that the centrality of violent conflict can be distinguished is that the failure to resolve conflict before it becomes violent is found in the cases linked with factors such as governance, leadership deficits, manifestations of corruption and failures to adequately address climate and environment changes. Thus, violent conflict can erupt due to failed governance and political leadership, the outrage over corruption that is unchecked and unpunished, or the failure of efforts to mediate tensions over access to water and land, particularly in situations of increasing seasonal stress due to climate change.

Thus, conflict and violence or ‘violent conflict’ are distinct but closely related issues. Conflict is part of all societies at all levels, from household to state. There are many instances when conflict over resources, norms, access to power, is negatively resolved without violence but leads to exclusion. For Example, in education, this could involve deliberate mistreatment of indigenous children, instruction in the language of a dominant identity group, or preferential advantages to children from more powerful groups.

The concept of conflict is distinct from violence because all household, community, societal, state, and interstate relations involve aspects of conflict. A conflict requires some type of dispute or disagreement, which occurs daily in all societies but which is usually resolved nonviolently due to social norms, community norms, and political or other—religious, traditional ethnic, patronage—institutions. Conflict is often a constructive element of a dynamic society, but it becomes destructive when the parties to a conflict resort to violent means to advance their goals or cause. Over time, conflict resolution requires not only a reduction in the use of violence, but above all a dissolution of the underlying incompatibility so that the conflict cannot erupt into violence again.

The Four Pillars relate to both Conflict and Violent Conflict, as Related but Distinct Factors, so that the connections can be outlined as follows:

The four pillars and the interface with conflict involves entrenched and frequently perpetuated differences and tensions between different groups that can be exacerbated by failures in the human rights or development pillar. Violence can be an outward and destructive manifestation both of the failure to mediate conflict or address power imbalances (such as the inability to provide security) and failures of different pillars, such as human rights/governance (unresolved points of resource management tension, power imbalances, lack of means to resolve conflicts in an equitable manner).

- Weaknesses in the pillars contribute to greater unresolved conflict because the state is either unable or unwilling to reduce negative forms of conflict, or the state contributes to greater conflict, either deliberately or through lack of capacity to address underlying issues.
- Unresolved conflict contributes to weakening key elements of the pillars when they reduce trust in the state as a source of security, fairness or services, such as education.
- Failures in Peace and Security contributes to an increase in violence through the lack of security for people affected by threats of violence, loss of access to resources and livelihoods, or through the perpetuation of violence as a form of intimidation and control, and through the spread of differently governed spaces occupied by “uncivil” society.
- Violence contributes to weakening the pillars by delegitimizing the state, increasing the willingness of individuals and different groups to seek alternative forms of retribution, and fostering grievances that require remediation.
- Unresolved conflict contributes to violence by promoting grievances from exclusion, giving legitimacy to violence against competing groups, and undermining social norms that mitigate against violence.
- Violence increases negative conflict through shared trauma and a shared sense of injustice.

III. The state of development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian action in the sub region, interfaces with other sub regions, transboundary issues and implications for regional responses;

North African countries face a range of challenges in regards to the pillars, including migration, both voluntary and involuntary between and within countries, constrained access to water resources, the legacy of colonial borders and resource agreements, and the current economic and health crises brought about by the global Covid 19 pandemic. While different countries have adjusted and adapted to various levels, the complexities of the current regional and global situation need to be taken into account.

The North Africa region presents a number of immediate challenges in terms of achieving the goals of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda. These challenges place pressure on the ability of governments to deliver services either in situations where various ‘normal’ resources, such as finances, staff availability and access to health, education, water, sanitation and food are reduced or under threat. Because of different challenges across North Africa that were outlined early in this inception report, achieving the vision of the two Agendas requires more than addressing immediate difficulties, it also involves: identifying emergent and potential future challenges, and developing mechanisms that can assist government, donors and local agencies in addressing the conflict challenges.

Amartya Sen’s definition of development contributes to the framing of development challenges in North Africa and the interlinkages for the study as it is broadly inclusive of all key elements. An analysis of the
development pillar in the region shows that there are broad challenges for human development that are evident in a range of indicators. These include such information as, GDP trends, per capita income, standard of living, quality of life, life expectancy, human capacity, access to basic social services, cultural dimensions and poverty alleviation that are all relevant, and which are summarized through the Human Development Indicators, tracking the SDGs and the Multidimensional Poverty Indicators (Appendix for case studies).

The peace and security pillar analysis is informed by the six objectives of Article 3 of the AU Peace and Security Protocol that promote pillar-interlinkages. In particular, a key point in Article 3 (promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts) highlights the interlinkages of the pillars. This connects with the findings of the case study that in the context of the North Africa subregion, governance and institutions are relevant to all of the pillars, and are essential prerequisites for equitable human development. Similarly, the negative impacts of corruption can be illustrated in the case of Sudan where state control of certain economic resources had negative effects on all pillars.

Case Studies: Libya, Mauritania, Sudan (Appendix contains first outlines)

The three country cases illustrate that the pillars function well as a framework for promoting long-term, equitable and sustainable development in Africa. The case studies also provide a rationale for supporting the analytical framework with several transversal elements that are outlined in this section of the paper. The addition of these elements promotes further angles for identifying the ways in which conflict is the central interface for the pillars. The case studies highlight why the distinction between conflict and violent conflict is important, through illustrating how Mauritania was able to reduce violent extremism through a combination of approaches over a period of time. What is determined through the case studies is that the pillars provide a sound foundation for analysis of the connections between conflict and the four pillars.

What are the specific elements of the country cases that line up? This table will summarize the cases and also link with conflict framework as well as incorporate the spatial and temporal transversal elements.

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Additional Framing of the Pillars and their Interactions in relation to conflict:

The case studies and the broader review of the four pillars highlighted the importance of several transversal factors for deepening the perspectives from the framing to the pillars, including spatial dynamics, temporal factors and the relations of exit, loyalty and voice.

Spatial:
Different national, regional and global frameworks for planning and practice in relation to the SDGs and other goals that can be linked to the four pillars, tend to be aspatial and static. However, people and societies are

16 UNECA, Africa SDG Progress and Data Availability, 2020
structured around a range of socio-spatial connections. A few of these connections and the potential factors of change are outlined below as an opening approach to identifying the multiple aspects of spatial processes.

**Dimensions of spatial connections and dynamics of change:**

- Technological: communication; transportation; increased speed of exchanges that reduce physical distance
- Economic: trade; migration; labor changes; financial flows
- Political: power shifts; conflict over territory and function; organizational capacity of political entities to manage over distances; institutional norms
- Cultural: forms; symbols; meanings; narratives
- Psycho-social: awareness of identities
- Displacement: violent conflict; sudden onset disasters; climate change

**Sub-national:**

The case studies highlighted how there a wide range of diversities in Human Development Indicators within one country, which indicates the importance of sub-national analysis of the pillars (see maps for Sudan and Mauritania in Appendix).

Countries with sub-national inequalities, local grievances, and pockets of insecurity and conflict pose particular challenges for government agencies, and current approaches may not respond adequately to the complexity. In these contexts, understanding sub-national pillars is key. Experience from different sub-national settings, such as Sudan, illustrates how conflict can shift to violence because of exclusive and unresponsive governance.

Sudan shows how failing sub-national pillars can strengthen perceptions of ‘predatory’ federal elites and drive insecurity and violence. Federal government responses are often geared to military engagement and ‘pacification’ rather than addressing underlying causes of conflict and violence.

One challenge for regional partner structured collaboration through various agreements and regional frameworks is that they may tend to focus on the federal level, often engaging at sub-national level in an uncertain and fragmented manner. A framework to provide cohesion around the pillars at the sub national level can improve responses, requires consideration of some core issues:

- What is the nature of the interface between the four pillars and conflict and how does it affect the local area?
- how are the four pillars and their link to conflict analyzed at the sub-national level
- How can governments reduce subnational manifestations of difference forms of conflict and what priorities among the four pillars are determined to be the key factors in addressing conflict dynamics
- What is the nature of the sub-national governmental system and does it offer institutionalized ways of channeling resources address the local challenges?

**Borderlands:**

Borderlands are often linked to national and transnational instability, insecurity and violence – prompting securitized responses, regulation of the border, and exceptional forms of governance. But these may exacerbate marginalization and exclusion of borderland communities. Such responses develop because mainstream policy is often state- and capital centric, based on the assumption that peace and development built from the center will automatically spread to peripheral areas.
Violence often looks different in border regions, with implications for peacebuilding approaches and priorities. Borderland violence is typically explained by generalized assumptions concerning weak institutions and underdevelopment. A detailed and precise typology of violence could strengthen evidence of why and how violence emerges and is sustained in borderlands, supporting the development of early warning systems and preventive options.

Borderlands are often areas of highly contested authority and hybrid governance structures. A key challenge for peacebuilding interventions is to identify who exercises authority and through which structures, as well as the levels of legitimacy that these have among communities. Borderland brokers can navigate these fluid environments and negotiate between communities, political leadership and conflict parties in borderlands. Greater understanding of the role of brokers to mediate between the periphery and center, within borderlands and transnationally, can strengthen interaction between national and subnational peace and development interventions.

Transboundary:

All the countries in the cases, Mauritania, Libya and Sudan have significant transboundary challenges which will be elaborated further in the next version of the paper.

**Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad-Sudan-Libya Triangle**

*The absence of state administration, both during the colonial period and since independence, defines this region. But when limited administration has existed, whether from the formal state or from various armed groups that operate there, it has been marked by continued competition over natural resources and land use between traditional chiefs, cross border traders, and rebel leaders. Inhabitants themselves have also played various roles in civil and proxy wars here. While a large economic development project failed to bring much needed assistance to the region, the recent discovery of gold has led both to conflicts and to newfound wealth.*

**Migration:** The movement of people within and between countries

*Definitions proposed by the IOM (The International Organization for Migration) in its "glossary of Migration" includes:*

**Displacement**: like a particular form of migration, in which individuals are forced to move against their will. Where people are forced to move within their country of origin, this is referred to as internal displacement.

**Migrant:** Migrants refer to individuals who have changed their place of residence either by crossing an international border (international migration) or by moving within their country of origin to another region, district or municipality (internal migration). People are normally considered 'migrants' if they remain outside their original place of residence for a period of at least three months.

**Environmental migrants:** as persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.

**Migration and the four pillars:** Research across the region shows that rural migration patterns, including by young people, are complex and determined by a variety of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Analysis of inter-governorates migration in Tunisia shows that migration flows are mostly from rural to urban areas, especially for male youth. Between 2009 and 2014 both internal and external migrants were largely young (between 20
and 40 years old) and often, on seasonal basis, international migrants had made at least one internal move before arriving at destination.

The impact of climate change or conflict on migration trends and thus on social and economic development, can only be understood when considering its interrelationship with other demographic, economic, political and social drivers of migration.

Urbanization:

*Urbanization and spatial changes are not acts of nature.* They are the result of policies which support certain types of economic priorities over others, for example allowing concentration of capital to override policies for inclusion of certain communities and citizens. Therefore, different policies, rules and incentives—internationally, nationally or regionally—could theoretically mitigate or reverse forms of inequality and exclusion. They may also be the result of violent conflict or the inability of governments and communities to adapt to different types of disasters.

In each context for the four pillars, there are economic, social and political changes that are uneven at different geographical scales – countries, regions, city-regions. Because in most countries, city-regions concentrate more and more of the economy and population, the unevenness of development of city-regions is increasingly important to add to the topics covered in policy formulation.

There is a double spatial effect of urbanization, as the productivity of activities in cities is a key driver of regional and national economies and cities increasingly determine what occurs in “non-urban areas” through the networks of production, ecological footprint, income flows, and movement of people. Governments and regional partners can seek out and/or design broad models that integrate many causes into one single framework. This can bring together various disciplines that study the spatial changes, the labor force, markets, social dimensions and risks, as well as capture the turbulence and unevenness of change.

Rural and urban areas are also linked by both long-term and circular migration. This particular linkage has also significantly influenced the formulation of human settlement policies, resulting in generally unsuccessful attempts to reduce rural-to-urban migration rates and control the growth of larger cities.

From a social-spatial point of view, urbanization can be seen as an “invisible force” that transforms patterns and styles of living, not only in urban areas themselves but also in rural areas. In this way, urbanization can be seen as a way of life, a process of transformation of ways of living, irrespective of the physical location of that transformation. People residing in a remote rural village may become urbanized without necessarily migrating to towns and cities, insofar as their access to the infrastructure and services normally associated with urban areas can be increased and insofar as their behavioural patterns can be transformed from typically “rural” to “urban” patterns.

*Temporality and Seasonality:*

**Climate change**
The relationships between climate impacts on water systems, particularly during droughts, are an area of anticipated major climate related change in coming years. Indeed, water and livelihood insecurity, population growth and mobility, employment, political and geo-strategic challenges are complex and inter-related. Specifically, when addressing water scarcity and its relation to fragility, there are no easy answers, but rather a complex and shifting set of socio-economic, governance and environmental relationships that are context-
specific and locally, nationally and regionally embedded. Indeed, water scarcity and contestation over access to resources can create a vicious cycle, in which a worsening of one exacerbates the other. What is more, the North Africa region’s future stability and resilience to human-made and environmental shocks is, to a large extent, dependent on the establishment and implementation of transboundary and regional responses to the issues of water and food insecurity, social instability and human mobility.

**Seasonality**

The ways in which seasonality relates to rural environmental resources and the productivity of agriculture and pastoralism deeply affects the potential for sustainable rural livelihoods, and may contribute to poverty and hunger, particularly in areas lacking effective governance where the state would be able to provide humanitarian assistance for citizens during periods of seasonal stress. Many poor people in the case studies are ill equipped to cope with seasonal variations when they lead to drought or flood and negative consequences for agriculture, employment, food supply and the spread of disease. The impact of seasonal fluctuations, especially when outside the normal patterns, assumes increasing importance as climate change and other forms of development disrupt established seasonal patterns and variations.

The main difference between seasonal fluctuations of economic indicators and other cyclical economic fluctuations lies in their short duration and annual repetition. The main feature of seasonal fluctuations is the “short-term” nature. Rural development studies over the past several decades on seasonality and rural poverty have identified the ways in which local households and communities have adapted to seasonal variations. However, the increasing impacts of climate change present a substantial increase in risk, so that governments and regional partners need to adjust their approaches to seasonality given the various phenomena of long-term trends. The development of methods and tools for assessing the role of seasonality in all economic activities requires greater attention and investment.

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**Note to readers:** the potential utility of Exit, Voice and Loyalty is proposed but not yet adapted to the paper as another transversal assessment tool.

**Exit, Voice, and Loyalty** (1970) is a treatise written by Albert O. Hirschman (1915–2012). The work hinges on a conceptual ultimatum that confronts individuals and communities in the face of deteriorating quality of governance, economic opportunities or unresolved conflicts: either exit, voice or loyalty.

- **Voice** describes the ways in which individuals or communities express their positive or negative views of government policies, local economic arrangements or access to natural resources.
- **Loyalty** There is an alternative to exit or voice: acquiescence, being co-opted, giving up your voice. This position may be necessary to survive in situations of unequal power, lack of alternative mechanisms for making change, or where voice carries significant risk of suppression.
- **Exit** This occurs when individuals or communities decide that they are either politically or economically unable to make changes to their situation. For individuals, migration is frequently one of their options. For communities, the cessation of paying taxes, ignoring government regulations or local natural resource arrangements may be options that are

**Exit and Voice Why** exit, even combined with voice, often done in vain? Hirschman pointed out that, “in the political realm... exit has often been branded as criminal, for it has been labeled desertion, defection, and treason.”

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IV. Key issues pertaining to the synergistic and complementary implementation of interventions aimed at addressing peace and security, human rights, humanitarian and development situations in the sub region, taking into account gender and youth issues and the UN-AU Cooperation frameworks;

Central to the North African context and the application of the four pillars is the acknowledgement that in different settings, there are root causes that result from weaknesses in one or more of the pillars. Addressing root causes requires reframing the humanitarian pillar around an African definition and approach to humanitarian ethos and programs, as the global humanitarian system has been perceived and often functioned as an ‘outsider’ approach. In order to address issues of violent conflict and the spill-over effects, the alignment of the 2063 Agenda and agenda 2030 provides a foundation, as in mapping the two agendas it is clear that there is at least an 80% convergence of goals. The cooperative frameworks provide guidance on overall goals as well as specific policies for member states. For example, there may be need for support in the area of data collection and statistical management so that the tracking of national goals can be aligned with national plans within the 2063 Agenda.

Structured regional collaboration (outlined in section VI), for example, with regards to technologies and the pandemic impacts, can support for regional and country systems with foresight because the 2063 Agenda points out clearly that the current status quo is not effective or adequate. For example, integration has been a stated priority in different sub regions, but how does it exist in practice? For example, there could be shared mechanisms that allow for the monitoring movements of goods and people between countries in a collaborative manner.

The 2063 Agenda also requires foresight which is integrated not only at a high level, but actively and within the interlinkages----humanitarian is short term but pandemic shows that Africa (and the world) dealing with many challenges in the abstract. The interlinkages can contribute to assessing current sub-regional engagements and structures (i.e., regional zones) to design new approaches that call for accountability and action on the underlying factors that prevent implementation of the Agenda. A foundation of collaboration on a regional basis could contribute to the mutual strengths of different countries, with a potential diffusion within a region, based on the strength of different countries.

Instead of repeatedly undertaking the same sectoral or single pillar projects, by connecting humanitarian action with development cooperation, human rights and peacebuilding, the alignment of the Pillars opens up a possibility of substantially strengthening humanitarian aid as well as making its outcomes more sustainable. Additionally, pillar-based approaches might increase the flexibility of government and donor budgets and of the deployment of funds to address specific challenges. This chapter will highlight the key current issues and those that require emphasis.

Youth: Some key findings from the case studies and other countries in the region are summarized below:

There is currently a lack of capacity in government ministries, formal NGOs and youth organizations to meet the challenge of engaging young people at scale and with quality programs. This means that for secondary education, ALP and TVET, there currently exists a patchwork of programs across the country, with mixed quality and capacity. Building institutional and capacity building in secondary education and training programs requires support programs to that will perform effectively, including incorporating socio-emotional and psychosocial resources.
One of the ways in which different youth programs can be strengthened and sustained is through more effectively linking sites and services, such as youth centers and through various forms of sports, arts, drama, music, radio and other media.

Incorporating increased youth participation can help guide investments and program priorities and contribute to the process of building capacity and effectiveness/responsiveness. However, there are existing realities of mistrust between many young people and their government. Diverse and committed youth organizations have emerged in a difficult and complex contexts as important participants in their own well-being.

Additionally, some areas that require greater attention going forward were identified:

- **Functional Literacy and Numeracy**: All youth focused programs should incorporate a core element of literacy and numeracy skills to ensure that all participants acquire basic, functional skills in these two areas.
- **Socio-emotional and psychosocial programs**: Training and curricula should provide teachers, tutors and trainers with general information on the development of youth brains and socio-emotional changes including specifics on culture, norms and gender as well as the specifics on impacts of violent conflict.
- **Gender**: Programs should incorporate gender disaggregation and along education/non-education, to address issues of gender exclusion on the ground. This is particularly important for dealing with education and skills building opportunities. This is more than a crosscutting theme, as it requires more in-depth attention to the granularity of how gender relations are structured.
- **Social Inclusion**: Programs can build on the examples of youth organizations that specifically sought to bring together excluded groups, such as different ethnic, pastoralists and others, or people with disabilities.
- **Partnerships**: Programs that engage young people for change require building relationships. This means that initiatives should not be ‘one off’; instead, they require long-term capacity and program quality. External support needs to contribute to program adaptation, so that the support for local partners is flexible enough to support innovation, learning or scaling up.
- **Scale and Sustainability**: Youth networks and programs face the challenge of stretching from the local up to the regional and national levels, with different entry points, potential allies, and relevant tactics at each scale. A key question for promoting sustainability of youth projects refers to why some initiatives fail to grow while others succeed. Part of sustainability results from impacts that are not the outcome of the initiative’s goals, but from the ‘by products’ that create new dynamics within communities and amongst youth.

**Women**: The impacts of these different challenges on women are varied, and the situation of women is diverse within and between countries; women face higher risks of malnutrition and are more significantly affected by reduced access to health and education services. In addition, men will often leave their homes to look for work, and therefore the responsibility of heading the household is passed to the women. Local communities that suffer the consequences of various types of challenges should be recognized by governments and international actors as the primary focus for implementing the four Pillars.

The cases identified three critical areas in rural households where women are disproportionately affected:
- Women are managing the tension between securing water for use in the home and protecting water availability for the farm, with pressure intensifying around seasonal peaks of water scarcity and farm labor.
• Women, as compared to men, typically have less access to and control over assets such as land, water, agricultural equipment and inputs, assets which might be used to buffer the effects of rainfall variability.
• Women have fewer opportunities to pursue off-farm work or migrate to urban areas as temporary or longer-term coping strategies.
v. Normative and operational challenges, and opportunities for harnessing the interlinkages between the development, peace and security, human rights and humanitarian pillars, taking into account the COVID-19 pandemic;

Harnessing the interlinkages has both institutional dimensions as well as programmatic elements requires utilizing existing frameworks and agreements as the normative basis to support programs that harness the linkages in specific countries. The complex impacts of COVID 19 promotes a repositioning of regional and national approaches to the interlinkages that identify mechanisms both to support effective responses to the pandemic that also contribute to the longer-term goals of the 2063 Agenda. One way to accomplish this is to recognize the close alignment of the 2063 Agenda with the SDG agenda so that the UN and AU can work closely on the shared agendas. External partners, whether in the UN system, the IFIs, the EU or bilateral donors need to align with the 2063 in order to avoid parallel or contradictory processes.

A single mechanism for assessing and reporting on various indicators would both strengthen alignment at all levels and avoid over stretching government systems with multiple requirements for the same, basic information. The alignment and coherence to align both the government national plans and the reporting systems. This includes human development, data systems, more than just a data issue, can also align

For interlinked approaches to be effective, there needs to be very clear analysis of the short-term/long-term trade-offs and the specific goals and objectives of program instruments, particularly if short-term interventions may run counter to addressing the medium- and long-term challenges identified within the four pillars. Program designs should directly address the problems created by the explicit or implicit process of separating the pillars into operational silos, when, in fact, there is a necessary set of interlinkages that require bringing disparate elements together. The current context of the COVID-19 pandemic increases the challenges because of the disruption of existing economic and social systems, as well as the requirements for providing assistance to affected populations.

The normative basis for ‘Pillars alignment’ can be defined as the capacity of a country’s leadership and a wide range of organizations to clearly define and:
• Understand the country context in which the pillars could be a guide for achieving positive changes in the areas of primary concern, including the four pillars and the intersection of conflicts;
• Understand the interaction between the pillars as normative and operational programs in each context; and
• Act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the context.

Thus, adoption of a four Pillars approach to programs may facilitate the creation of a secure environment where people can be supported to meet their own basic needs. A people-centered nexus approach emphasizes security as a basic need and right, and links humanitarian assistance, development, human rights and peacebuilding. For example, in situations of violent conflict, local populations – and especially women – often identify security and protection issues as being as important as material assistance.

The four pillars and regional/subregional partnerships:

Capable states are better equipped to manage organizationally complex tasks such as long-term disaster response and benefit of coordination mechanisms, state revenue, and basic infrastructure that enable them to re-engineer their response as the COVID crisis evolves and opportunities for renewed 2063 Agenda and SDG commitments are identified. These countries are able to re-deploy resources and personnel in accordance with
needs, demonstrating flexibility, and can scale up specialized services at short notice (for instance peace and security or humanitarian programs). Even resilient countries and institutions will however have a tipping point depending on the scale and duration of the challenge. Essential services could become overwhelmed by a large influx of displaced populations. The interruption in critical cross-border trade may sustainably affect the economy. At a micro level, individual resilience may be eroded by years of rampant inflation. At this point, external partnerships, resources and expertise become critical to help partner countries address the impact of the crisis at macro and micro level, by scaling up the capacity and resources channeled for service delivery, reengineering economic growth strategies, tackling the needs of new pockets of extreme vulnerability (including potentially refugees and internally displaced persons) and addressing sectoral needs (e.g., the need for a scale-up in public health capacity).

**COVID 19 and the four pillars**

The COVID 19 pandemic has caused a dramatic reduction in economic productivity, trade and generated widespread travel and related economic disruption across North Africa. Combined with government-mandated shutdowns this has had a severe economic impact in across the region, not least because of the impact on sectors such as tourism and remittances, upon which a number of the economics are heavily depend. Algeria has already suffered from the recent oil price decline and disruptions to trade with China will impact all of the countries. The major slump in European markets specifically hurts countries such as Morocco, one of Europe’s largest trade partners in the Mediterranean. Remittances and FDI, two major sources of revenues, have also declined.

This devastating combination of growing pandemic impacts and the spectacular collapse in oil prices have led to a major decline in foreign exchange revenues for governments across the region. This will further hit fiscal balances and constrain the ability of most governments to respond with financial compensation and other measures needed to mitigate COVID19’s crippling effects on domestic economic activity. Domestic borrowing cannot fill the widening fiscal gaps; and international borrowing, following years of rising sovereign debt, will come at a much higher cost and create risks down the line. Governments will face increased stress due to public sector debt, declining terms of trade, and potential interest rate spikes.

Of immediate concern is the widespread impact on economic livelihoods, especially among the very poor and the vulnerable, straining safety nets further. With few resources or unemployment insurance, and reduced food subsidies, large segments of the population that engage in subsistence or informal work are unable to protect their well-being during a sustained lockdown and interruption to their livelihoods. Currently governments may lack the capacity to respond to mounting pressures on health systems and food distribution channels. The combination of economic and social shocks may have very long-lasting legacies, including tipping many already chronically poor households into destitution.

While the shutdown is affecting the ongoing protests in countries such as Sudan and Algeria, broader government responses and rising social inequality will likely reignite greater dissent across North Africa. In Algeria, members of the Hirak movement have postponed protests for the first time since February 2019. The movement’s decision to delay protests for the greater good may enhance the trust that different communities have in its judgement.
In short, the pandemic has quite likely exacerbated economic drivers of current social grievances, while, at the same time, depleting the financial capacity of states across the region to invest in safety-net programs and other forms of social support. This will, quite possibly, lead to further economic and social inequalities, creating tinder-box conditions for future social and political unrest. A regional agenda of reforms should address the region’s structural imbalances and also support the design of a new inclusive growth model more resilient to economic shocks and pandemics. The pandemic exemplifies the interlinkages of the pillars as an immediate response has a strong humanitarian element, but the impact also highlights the economic weaknesses and vulnerabilities of certain populations, as well as the potential increase in conflict and decrease in respect for human rights. The pillars can provide a framework for envisioning a post-pandemic country context that is more than a return to normal systems and programs.
VI. Mainstreaming the interlinkages into policies and strategies at regional, sub-regional and national levels including those related to Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda; Methodologies and tools for harnessing the interlinkages and promoting complementary implementation and approaches, and associated capacity building needs;

This section outlines lessons for current good practices that effectively mobilize support for the interlinkages as they relate to the country and regional contexts in North Africa as well as recognizing some of the challenges faced by regional organizations. It proposes a way forward through what it entails ‘structured collaboration’ and which is outlined for both regional partnerships and for national governments.

What are biggest areas of challenge in implementing the 2063 Agenda? The biggest challenges are for national governments as there are major disparities in the current process for developing of national plans and their implementation in alignment with 2063, as some countries are very advanced in their plans and in their planning capacity, while some area at a nascent stage. There are both capacity and quality differences, including the level of expertise in each country, which varies significantly. An additional challenge involves the financial constraints for such core tasks as gathering, analyzing, reporting data, which has been previously noted as a core competence yet one that currently may have to produce somewhat duplicative studies and report.

One way forward would to be support the capacity of one continental organization working to harmonize data and information/statistics across the continent. This could include the overall data gathering and analyzing as well providing support for countries that currently lack the capacity to substantively collect and analyze its own situation. Even for those countries that have adopted 2063 and have committed to the alignment through both national plans and statistical commitments, there is a lack of financial resources available to support members states.

For the long-term well-being of each country and their citizens, the engagement of a wider public in the purpose and vision of the 2063 Agenda would deepen the understanding and ensure that when citizens are aware of the continental agenda, they are able to promote the agenda with their governments. In turn, governments need to know how to work effectively in bringing together the four pillars. They face issues of coordination amongst department, within different units in government, and in defining responsibilities/ mandates between departments.

Structured collaboration at the regional, sub-regional and national levels.

Effective and well-structured collaboration can help sustain support for the four pillars over a longer period of time, and reduce the overlap and duplication of effort that occurs when external agencies have based their responses to specific challenges with a single goal or a narrow approach. New forms of collaboration can help to ‘re-tool’ some of the traditional cooperation instruments that have been developed for responding to specific issues, both in terms of aligning better with the length of five- or ten-year goals, as well as responding to spatial, temporal and polity dynamics). Governmental level and inter-governmental levels are necessarily linked through all aspects of collaboration.19

No matter what affiliation, different agencies have identified sector coordination as a challenge. The coordination dynamics and manifestation are different in every context. Different modalities, incentives and procedures of the external actors can be a deterrent to collaboration. Collaboration provides a vehicle for partnership between the external partners amongst themselves, with government agencies, the private sector, civil society organizations, and communities around well design policies and programs that address the challenges identified by context through the pillars framework and in line with the 2063 Agenda. These relationships can create efficiencies by selecting effective investments on the basis of quality and cost through well-established, national plans, thereby allowing expenditure to have a wider impact and achieve more.

Structured collaboration can contribute to economies of scale, and reduce pressure on the scarce resource of management capacity, by managing through large programs rather than fragmented projects. These economies of scale can allow expenditures to be shaped by an agreed policy, thereby allowing officials to take leadership of the use of resource flows from improved domestic mobilization, the reduction of illicit transfers or new partnerships. Government agencies can work together to create mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency in the management of resources by providing simple reporting and evaluation frameworks.

Regional level: Progress within each country in developing national plans aligned with the 2063 Agenda is inherently uneven and depends on a range of factors, though African countries are overall better placed than external actors to design integrated approaches to programming. This report argues that improved approaches to conflict reduction requires greater focus on strengthening systems, in addition to the attention placed on populations and on their resilience. To achieve this shift, regional organizations need:

- To deliver improved coherence through integrated programs and frameworks that seek synergies across the pillars and privilege longer-term, development financing to the 2063 Agenda, and relies on humanitarian funding only when necessary to continue addressing emergency needs and support pockets of exclusion;
- A longer-term approach in reducing sources of conflict and the 2063 Agenda with 5-to-10-year plans, underpinned by a 20-year vision;
- To build capacity across cadres on the four pillars, conflict sensitivity and disaster risks/humanitarian response, and to adapt competency frameworks accordingly;
- To invest more effectively in building flexibility to respond to shocks as part of the pillars and within country national plans;
- To engage with regional partners, multilateral and bilateral partners to enable lesson learning and take this vision forward.

One example of a regional approach would be to support approaches to technological innovation and adaptation that built an enabling environment. This requires shifting from regulatory regimes that tend to be more focused or designed on preventing rather than supporting technologies. This requires support across Africa for a change in that mindset that provides technical support for countries and the region to review the regulatory knowledge regimes for changes that can accommodate these technologies. The continent has been stuck with some positions because they were first developed in the US or EU, but not adopted or adapted for the context of Africa. This means that some technology products are avoided without any testing, when the future should be regional support for confidence in R&D systems, and the continent’s growing intellectual, including scientific and technological capacity. This can mobilize and engage African scientists and innovators, including the importance of developing some technologies dealing with problems that are unique to Africa (i.e., Ebola and other challenges)
Linkages between the pillars

Collaboration around the 2063 Agenda can and should be embedded within the government’s own policies and programs, and planning processes such as the establishment of new approaches, as well as new interlinked pillars and management systems. A clear principle of supporting the management in design and policy should be adopted. The roles of different government agencies, as well as external partners need to be clearly defined, as well as the coordination with different Ministries.

Alignment to budgets:
A basic principle of the collaboration approach is that there exists a need for the government to coordinate resources flow through the budget process in order for institutional capacity building to occur. In a context of conflict and the importance of aligning the four pillars, this becomes even more essential for transparency and accountability to citizens, as well as addressing corruption and illicit financial flows.

Alignment to the systems of the government:
The core elements of the alignment Could be designed to use the rules, procedures, organizations and institutions of the government. Where new rules or parallel processes are adopted, this will be because reform is necessary or the appropriate organization or set of rules does not already exist. Implicit in this principle is that the programs will be tailored to context. This alignment can help ensure that the process of adopting the 2063 goals does not overwhelm the capacity of the government to respond to requests for information, meetings and other tasks amidst a period of change. The alignment can also support the government in its relations with private sector actors, effective engagement with citizens and with external partners.

Support of capacity development:
The collaborating Ministries will contribute to the training (on the job or through dedicated courses) the technical staff needed to operate the program over the longer term.

Equity and Conflict sensitivity:
The government agencies would exemplify leadership and transparency and would be conflict sensitive to the potential pressures on the departments in regards to the targeting of resources and investments between communities, whether in one city or between competing districts and groups. Where a program is targeted to a particular group, any community or individual should be able to calculate, according to the rules of the program, the amount and timing of any resources. Accordingly, programs would ensure an even-handedness would fulfill the criteria conflict sensitivity and equity.

Linking projects and programs:
Findings on the functioning of public sector systems in the cases as well as across the region show that where thousands of projects are conceived as stand-alone initiatives, management capacity is not allocated optimally, and projects are not sustainable as they are not linked to national policy frameworks; similarly, programs require projects to be implemented. Accordingly, programs provide a multi-year policy and strategic framework bringing together several projects with specific aims can be situated within the four pillars framework, integrating different sectoral actions.

Monitoring:
Sustainable and coordinated information collection is required for greater preparedness through well-established systems, strengthening crisis management and collaboration. New adaptations of mobile technologies, including social media, provide potential new platforms in crisis contexts, alongside face-to-face
surveys. Utilities and partners need to agree upon the indicators and analysis to ensure a common understanding of the needs and to inform follow up actions.

**Multi-year duration:**
One way to institutionalize collaboration and strengthen the connections for support of interlinkages and management would be if the government appoints a focal point to manage the different ministries and organizations. This can be linked with the initiation of the project itself at the time of the initial commitment to 2063 goals. Given the costs in starting up, programs should ideally be designed to run for many years, yet with the flexibility in design to adjust themselves over time. A program itself can contain a number of projects within its design.

A table will be provided to outline the relationships between the four pillars, conflict and the various elements of structured collaboration.

Spatial and temporal aspects: There is a need to move beyond rural-urban stereotypes and to acknowledge that the dichotomy misses the specific factors of complex relations and patterns of change. The connections between different areas may be strong, particularly during times of stress and economic or political change. A strong domestic agriculture market, for example, may affect urban staple food prices, and increase the supply of goods that are produced locally. Specific agricultural policies can make poverty focused use of rural unskilled labor and reduce the pressure of rural-urban migration on informal wages.

The peri-urban interface is where urban and rural activities meet. Peri-urban areas are a mosaic of agricultural and urban systems, shaped by material and labor flows in both urban and rural areas. They tend to be quite socially and economically heterogeneous and easily affected by external change. Small farmers, informal settlers, small scale entrepreneurs and urban middle class commuters may all coexist in the same territory, and programs with a spatial perspective can incorporate a range of different economic activities.

Seeking direct causality between different climate related factors is less important than a focus on identifying key trends and projections of future conditions, testing assumptions inherent in policy and practice and establishing a more effective research-policy interface on the natural resource security issues embedded in the North Africa pillars relationships, which would include focus on water security and drought management and sharing ideas for potential responses based on regional knowledge. A key element of the approach would regional capacity-building and policy exchange on these issues, while catalyzing youth engagement in developing new technical approaches to enhance water and drought monitoring/management, to prepare the leaders of the future for the challenges associated with the climate impacts. As one of those most vulnerable regions to water scarcity in the world, resulting from an arid climate and exacerbated by rapidly growing populations, instability and migration as well as the ongoing effects of climate change, the North Africa region urgently requires support. In line with the 2063 Agenda, the AU could seek to support regional integration on these key topics through an approach using both new knowledge development and peer-exchange, taking into consideration that these cross-national issues are a real opportunity for transboundary cooperation, increased regional dialogue and cross-fertilization between institutional, expert and youth actors. Women and youth organizations could be mainstreamed into every component of the project.

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20 UNEP, “Climate Change in the Arab Region”, 2015; Dorte Verner (ed), Adaptation to Climate Change in Arab Countries, World Bank, 2012
**Youth:**

There is a positive opportunity at this time, as the demand for investing in youth is coinciding with the need to democratize technology across the continent and into the marginalized and excluded areas of each country. The interest to effectively and equitably spread new and innovative technologies to every corner of Africa is growing rapidly. With an agenda for technological connections and also innovations in production functions, there is scope for Africa to benefit from such a demand which can be connected with engaging and empowering young people, who have an interest in the technology development and dissemination. This needs to be coordinated, as a significant percentage of young people, both in rural areas and in informal settlements are not connected, but there is great potential for a generational technological leap frogging if Africa can harness the ideas and energy of the next generation. African countries do not have to go into the testing of the existing generations of technology, there is a continent-wide example in how the cell phone has penetrated Africa. When governments support youth with a good level education, there are opportunities for at the same time of co-development and core development of technologies coming to the continent for first time and youth can tap these technologies. This requires that both countries and regional bodies have sound plans and processes in place for training and financing youth enterprises in technological innovation.

**Women:**

Similarly, women have tended to be excluded from the ICT sector, yet there are examples of enterprise and ICT training programs that have been established in a number of countries where women have successfully completed technology training and entered the labor force in formal employment.

As with youth, the potential for women’s enterprises has lacked adequate support, and the various ‘micro-finance’ initiatives that often emphasize the involvement of low-income women are not adequate for larger SME development. Financial literacy, women’s support networks and access to financial resources in an equitable and transparent manner are all elements of bringing more women into productive roles.

Support is particularly important as women are usually managing the tension between household labor demands along with income expectations in informal employment. In rural areas, there is also the pressure on both farming tasks and protecting water availability for the farm, with pressure intensifying around seasonal peaks of water scarcity and farm labor. Because women, as compared to men, typically have less access to and control over assets such as land, water, agricultural equipment and inputs, opportunities for building assets could be used to buffer the effects of seasonal rainfall variability.

*Particularly for rural women, programs could be designed around:*

**Home and farm:** use an integrated approach to plan ahead for seasonal water scarcity and account for multiple uses of the same water source.

**Assets and institutions:** make rural development programming more gender-sensitive and climate resilient through improved access for women to land and water rights, credit, irrigation and other technologies, along with education and training.

**Mobility and livelihoods:** support diversification of women’s livelihoods in rural areas, while maximizing the benefits of migration.
VIII. Conclusions

Based on the research outlined in this study as well as the exchange of information and perspectives with the other regional studies, this chapter brings together the conceptual framework around the four pillars with the specific recommendations for country governments, local communities, regional organizations and international partners.

The main conclusion is that there is a need a major shift in addressing the four pillars and to focus our attention on the interlinkages of the four pillars in specific contexts. Further, as outlined in the 2063 Agenda, there is a need to pathways out of conflict through strengthening all four pillars within and between countries. The international community has until recently too quickly applied a humanitarian lens to conflict and refugee crises and delivered as a result short-term solution that presume an absence of local capacity and focus on individual needs, but fails to invest to strengthen institutions, service provision and economic markets. International humanitarian assistance has become increasingly effective at saving lives, but has also created entrenched dependency on aid and at times undermined local capacity. Shifting to the four pillars and the interlinkages requires that we give greater consideration to the role and capacity of national governments, regional partners and local communities.

The AU has made substantial progress in the last few 5 years in piloting programs that innovate (e.g., that strive to go beyond saving lives to sustainably build capacity and/or support markets) in conflict situations, building on ten years of evidence on fragile and conflict states. The AU and UN have also launched several innovative refugee initiatives since 2015 with the roll-out of development programs aimed to address the impact of refugee crises. These shifts are recent and the evidence of their impact remains patchy.

The interlinkages of the four Pillars offer many avenues for inter-organizational collaboration at the community, country and regional level. Once a thorough analysis has been done and clear program options have been identified, there are many plausible entry-points for practical engagement for different actors to enhance and strengthen humanitarian, development, human rights and peacebuilding outcomes. There are, however, clear challenges to generate operational collaboration owing to the current alignment of both individual agencies (whether government ministries or international organizations). This requires using and applying new frameworks for the four Pillars to address the structures, policies and programs of all actors, including sequencing priorities, planning framework and anticipated outcomes.

Notwithstanding considerable overlaps in goals and aspirations of humanitarian action, development, human rights and peacebuilding, there has been comparatively little analysis and operational practice that brings together all four Pillars and this report and the other subregional reports provide a good beginning. A starting point is to identify realistic opportunities for joint actions, including the fostering of national ownership and contingency planning with ‘early’ assessment of capacities related to the four Pillars, and what can be contributed from guidance on capacity and integration documents that have been designed to build upon Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda.
Literature: to be added
Appendix: Case Studies

Sudan:

Human rights:

In 2018, Sudan scored 49 out of 54 African countries on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). It scored 108.7 on the Fragile States Index, ranked as one of the top 10 fragile countries in the world. It also ranked 172 out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The slightest term a person can use to describe the country’s institutes’ is extremely weak.

After long 30 years and four continuous months of peaceful anti-government protests, Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir was overthrown on 11 April 2019 to announce the end of what started as an Islamic Front lead party role 1989, known as the ‘National Salvation Revolution’. For three decades, the Islamic Front, the National Congress and various manipulated forms elections, the old leadership managed to stay in power regardless of deteriorating welfare, economic and political state. But, now that the deeply rooted regime is ‘gone’, there is a renewed opportunity build effective, responsive, rights respecting public institution in Sudan.

Peace and Security (see also ACLED map of geography of violent conflict)

Armed opposition continues in pockets of Darfur, as well as in the ‘Two Areas’ of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. In September, the government and a group of Sudanese armed movement leaders -including Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) Malik Agar faction, the Sudan Liberation Army – Minni Minnawi (SLA-MM) faction, among others –signed the “Juba Declaration”, which provides a way forward on peace negotiations. Meanwhile, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North faction led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu (SPLM-N al-Hilu) and the Sudanese government have also signed a roadmap for negotiations and officially began direct talks in Juba in October. The SLA-Abdul Wahid faction (SLA-AW) has distanced itself from these discussions and remains the only armed group actively involved in fighting inside Sudan.

Development

Sudan’s economy was largely controlled by the military and security services under the former regime, which meant that non-competitive direct tendering was common and favored political allies. One of the contentious issues under any pressure to privatize public companies was the likelihood of asset stripping during periods when the government was seeking to diversify the economy away from oil dependency by selling off assets. This was particularly notable in the real estate sector.

The public service in Sudan has been heavily politicized since the early days of the previous regime. Back in the day, a wide number of the existing public servants were sent into early retirement for the sake of ‘public good’ and were replaced by the salvation government supporters who didn’t necessarily fit the job description. This continued further throughout the fresh graduates’ recruitment process which young graduates describe as tedious and frustrating as it relied on nepotism, ethnicity, political affiliation and not so much on skills, applicants recall being asked about historical Islamic battles on interviews for engineering jobs.
The recent Human Development Index and related reports (Appendix) show that Sudan has severe problems with the basic well-being of its population, and, in addition, that the disparities even amongst the different zones are major, some of which links with the problems of peace and security and/or failed governance. Across Sudan, basic services are lacking, and natural disasters, like floods, affect people each year. But it is a deepening economic crisis, following years of stagnation and little investment in already-weak public services, that is driving worsening food insecurity, deteriorating healthcare, and other needs across Sudan.

Throughout Sudan, most people – 58 per cent of households – cannot afford a basic daily food basket. Over 2.7 million children suffer from acute malnutrition. Medical facilities across the country are not functional due to lack of essential drugs.

Humanitarian

After a year of civil unrest and political change, humanitarian needs continue to rise. Some 9.3 million people – 23 per cent of the population – will need humanitarian assistance in 2020. The transitional government is prioritizing peace and ending the economic crisis, issues closely intertwined with the drivers of humanitarian need in the country.

While incidents of fighting have reduced considerably in recent years, the situation of people displaced due to decades of conflict remains unresolved. Some 1.87 million IDPs and 1.1 million refugees and asylum seekers continue to need humanitarian assistance and protection support, both in and out of camp camps and within host communities. Pockets of armed conflict continue in Darfur, and sporadic inter-communal conflicts also continue.

Libya

Peace and Security: Eight years after the fall of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya continues to struggle to end its violent conflict and build state institutions. External actors have exacerbated Libya’s problems by funnelling money and weapons to proxies that have put personal interests above those of the Libyan people. U.N. efforts to broker a lasting peace have failed and been overshadowed by competing peace conferences sponsored by various foreign governments. Meanwhile, Libya’s borders remain porous, particularly in the southern Fezzan, facilitating an increase in trafficking and smuggling of illicit materials, including weapons. At the subnational level, many local conflicts reflect long-standing feuds between various factions, tribes, and ethnic groups. In the shadow of the ongoing conflict around Tripoli, the prospects for a political solution are dimmed by the country’s deep political and tribal divides.

Human Rights: The destruction of the long-term political system after 2011 failed to develop a functioning government as an alternative to the former regime. This has led to widespread governance failures as well as the intervention, frequently against international agreements and contrary to the guidance of African regional bodies, of regional and global powerholders. The current political transition supported by UN arrangements has failed to bring together the main parties as well as the sub-national militias, which, unfortunately exemplify the problem of oil as a ‘resource curse’ that provides financing for different groups but not for the development and well-being of the people of Libya.
Development: Despite the country’s relatively small population and previously improving Human Development Indicators (up to 2010), there are various surveys that show that the current well-being of the citizens is declining. These declining indicators can be linked to the inability of any national government to support programs in health and education, the lack of economic opportunities in an economy that was already oil-dependent, and the dislocation and displacement caused by the ongoing periods of violence in different zones of the country.

Humanitarian:

The situation in Libya remained volatile throughout the middle of 2020 with a conflict of variable intensity that continued to put the lives of civilians at risk and to generate new internal displacement. The suffering from the unprecedented bombing and shelling in urban areas in the Western Libya, deterioration of services and rapidly declining economy resulting in increased suffering of millions of children and their families in Libya cannot be underscored. Since the start of the year, at least 18 schools have been damaged as a result of the armed conflict, affecting around 15,890 children. Continuous attacks on the water system have jeopardized health and hygiene among the civilian population, particularly those most vulnerable, including children. At least 127 wells have been rendered out of services as a result of these attacks, with roughly a loss of 650,000 m3 water/day. Regular long hours’ power cuts have further affected the people of Libya in areas of active conflict and surrounding areas. The attacks on health facilities also continued as during the reporting period, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) documented two incidents targeting healthcare personnel, nine assaults on health facilities and one attack on ambulance.

Covid 19: The complex protracted humanitarian situation, with active armed conflict was further escalated at the start of the year with the onset of COVID-19 pandemic. Schools in Libya closed in mid-March in an attempt to control the spread of the virus and had not re-opened yet by the end of June, thus affecting approximately 1,300,000 children and adolescents. This has put a significant strain on children, who have missed out on more than three months of education. Distance education has been a challenge for children living with frequent power cuts, and for the most vulnerable children who have limited or no access to devices and internet. With the alarming fear of COVID-19 and lack of WASH services in IDPs sheltered schools, the need of water and sanitation services has become more important than ever. Access to routine immunization services were disrupted due to COVID-19 lockdown, leading to an increased risk of six preventable diseases including measles and polio. In May 2020, UNICEF and WHO raised an alarm over the severe vaccine shortages in Libya which put the lives and health of over a quarter of a million children under one year of age at severe risk.

Transboundary: The ongoing violent conflict in Libya has also created tensions between neighboring countries, such as Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, all of which have an interest in a peaceful settlement on their borders or near borders, but which have presented different views on the resolution of the current civil war.

Migration:

Libya remains the “gatekeeper” for the migration crisis in the region, with desperate migrants using the risky Central Mediterranean route, one of the deadliest journeys in the world, to flee to Europe. IOM estimates that there are at least 625,638 migrants from over 44 countries currently present in Libya. At least 93 per cent of the total migrants are from sub-Saharan and North Africa region while the largest migrant population identified is based in western Libya (46 per cent). 93 per cent of the migrants in Libya are adults, with 11 per cent of the adult migrants reported to be female, while one quarter of the children are unaccompanied.
UNHCR had registered 48,834 refugees and asylum seekers as per June 2020, many of these people are reported to be victims of discrimination, arbitrary arrest and detention. In addition, a total of 5,475 migrants were registered as rescued/intercepted at sea by the Libyan Coast Guards as by June 30, 2020 and disembarked in Libya.

Transboundary:
Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad-Sudan-Libya Triangle

The absence of state administration, both during the colonial period and since independence, defines this region. But when limited administration has existed, whether from the formal state or from various armed groups that operate there, it has been marked by continued competition over natural resources and land use between traditional chiefs, cross border traders, and rebel leaders. Inhabitants themselves have also played various roles in civil and proxy wars here. While a large economic development project failed to bring much needed assistance to the region, the recent discovery of gold has led both to conflicts and to newfound wealth.

Mauritania

Human Rights: After a major political change of leadership in 2019, the country has undergone an unprecedented anticorruption campaign that has revealed the unbounded level of corruption that was occurring in the previous government. This campaign is also part of an effort by the new government to gain public support for changes in the political leadership. In a September 2020 interview, one official presented the viewpoint very clearly: “The situation is more than just pushing out a former president with an unsound and unpopular ambition. It is that his vision . . . does not serve stability, does not represent democratic transition, and does not suit the country right now.” While the campaign does not necessarily signal broader efforts to increase government accountability, it nonetheless demonstrates what can be done when there is a unified political front to maintain stability and adherence to established political process.

Peace and Security: Consequently, efforts were directed toward developing both field-level human intelligence networks and technical capabilities. These ranged from the effective revitalization of the most basic existing capabilities and assets such as the Mauritanian military’s Nomad Group (GN)—camel-back units, tailored to operate in the remote areas of the desert—to the acquisition of modern surveillance radars.

For Mauritanian officials, the GN provides two benefits by fusing intelligence gathering activities with infrastructure development. “Where the state doesn’t have any infrastructure in remote and isolated areas, we’re coming to help in terms of sanitation and education,” said GN commander Colonel Abderrahamane El Khalil. In other words, the GN is improving the living conditions of populations to build loyalty to the government, which in turn pays dividends in terms of intelligence collection regarding any suspicious movements of trafficking and armed groups.
Development: A strategy of community engagement in remote areas of the desert has been a critical component of the counterterrorism approach adopted by the Mauritanian government. To improve security and public service delivery, the government established small new cities in remote rural areas vulnerable to the infiltration of extremist groups to concentrate sparse and dispersed rural populations into larger settlements. Cities such as N’Bekeit Lahwach in eastern Mauritania have led to the regrouping of families depending on their social and economic needs. The intent is not to abolish nomadism—men continue to live in semi-nomadic surroundings around their herd while their families are settled in one place, benefiting from education services and other basic amenities—but to create focal sites and defensible positions in the immediate vicinity of the Malian border. In vulnerable areas where settlements of people already exist, the policy has been to improve the security and living conditions of the population to keep them there.

Mauritania’s current HDI information shows that while the country has had fairly steady, if modest, economic growth in the past two decades, the benefits are geographically uneven, and the country map for HDI levels is similar to that of Sudan, i.e. very high levels of sub-national inequality.

Humanitarian: to be developed.

Dialoguing with Extremists
The story of Mauritania’s transformation from the weakest link in this crisis-ridden neighborhood to one of its most resilient is instructive. The country was the first in the Sahel to be hit by terrorist attacks in 2005. However, since 2011 it has avoided the expanding and diversifying threat from militant Islamist groups. That security threats in the Sahel are characterized by layers of intertwined and crosscutting interests at the local, national, and regional levels makes Mauritania’s example all the more informative. Importantly, the government has managed to restore its authority and control over border regions, which militant Islamist groups in the Sahel have often exploited to their advantage.

In parallel to these efforts at reinforcing the state’s coercive capacity and development strategy, a policy of engagement with extremist actors was pursued. Today, the idea of dialoguing with violent extremist groups is gaining credence in some Sahelian countries. In Mauritania, the regime has pursued a dual strategy of bolstering its deterrence and defense posture, while remaining open to dialogue with extremists. The second part of this strategy has fueled suspicions that the regime has concluded a mutual nonaggression pact with violent extremist groups, the same accusation that was once leveled at the former Malian president, Amadou Toumani Touré.

Transboundary (borderlands): Mauritania is adjacent to the countries in the Sahel that have experienced a rapid increase in extremist violence and displacement. In addition, the occupation by Mauritania and Morocco of the Western Sahara, remains a point of contention both with representatives of Western Sahara refugees and some neighboring countries.
Appendix: subnational conflicts (ACLED)

*Battle events in 2005 and 2014 respectively in Sudan and South Sudan. Image source: ACLED*
Appendix: Case Study country Human Development Indicators

Libya’s HDI value and rank

Libya’s HDI value for 2018 is 0.708— which put the country in the high human development category— positioning it at 110 out of 189 countries and territories.

Between 1990 and 2018, Libya’s HDI value increased from 0.676 to 0.708, an increase of 4.6 percent. Table A reviews Libya’s progress in each of the HDI indicators. Between 1990 and 2018, Libya’s life expectancy at birth increased by 4.2 years, mean years of schooling increased by 3.8 years and expected years of schooling decreased by 1.2 years. Libya’s GNI per capita decreased by about 42.6 percent between 1990 and 2018.

Table A: Libya’s HDI trends based on consistent time series data and new goalposts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (2011 PPP$)</th>
<th>HDI value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>20,344</td>
<td>0.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>19,677</td>
<td>0.704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>19,377</td>
<td>0.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>22,871</td>
<td>0.749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>28,751</td>
<td>0.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9,048</td>
<td>0.691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8,799</td>
<td>0.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10,997</td>
<td>0.704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11,685</td>
<td>0.708</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure below shows the contribution of each component index to Libya’s HDI since 1990.

Trends in Libya’s HDI component indices 1990-2018

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21 All tables and data taken from Multidimensional Poverty Indicators for each country
Assessing progress relative to other countries

Human development progress, as measured by the HDI, is useful for comparison between two or more countries. For instance, during the period between 1990 and 2018 Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait experienced different degrees of progress toward increasing their HDIs (see Figure 2).
Libya’s 2018 HDI of 0.708 is below the average of 0.750 for countries in the high human development group and above the average of 0.703 for countries in Arab States. From Arab States, countries which are close to Libya in 2018 HDI rank and to some extent in population size are Jordan and Tunisia, which have HDIs ranked 102 and 91 respectively (see Table B).

Table B: Libya’s HDI and component indicators for 2018 relative to selected countries and groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HDI value</th>
<th>HDI rank</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (2011 PPP US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>10,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>15,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High HDI</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>14,403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1. Global MPI in Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>MPI</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Vulnerable</th>
<th>Severe Poverty</th>
<th>Population Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Source: MICS year 2014, own calculations.

#### Figure 6. Censored Headcount Ratios

![Censored Headcount Ratios Chart]

Notes: Source: MICS year 2014, own calculations.

### Global MPI in Sudan by Subnational Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>MPI</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Vulnerable</th>
<th>Severe Poverty</th>
<th>Population Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Jazirah</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qadarif</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>National MPI</td>
<td>MU 70.6%</td>
<td>MU 52.6%</td>
<td>MU 15.6%</td>
<td>MU 40.9%</td>
<td>MU 4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Darfur</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Darfur</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Darfur</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>83.7%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kurdufan</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Nile</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinnar</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Darfur</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kurdufan</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Darfur</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kurdufan</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Nile</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Source: MICS year 2014, own calculations.

Figure 9. Mapping MPI Value by Subnational Region

National MPI 0.279